Have Decentralisation and Democratisation been Effective in Promoting an Inclusive Social Protection System in Indonesia? :A Comparative Case Study of the Implementation of Social Protection Programmes in Central Java by Wardhana, Dharendra
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Have Decentralisation and Democratisation been Effective in Promoting an Inclusive
Social Protection System in Indonesia?





Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 HAVE DECENTRALISATION AND DEMOCRATISATION BEEN EFFECTIVE IN PROMOTING AN 
INCLUSIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN INDONESIA? A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THE 








A thesis submitted to King’s College London for the degree of  











Decentralisation, democratisation, and social protection (SP) are widely regarded as three important 
endeavours that developing countries ought to pursue. Research has, however, neglected the 
relationship between these three. An exploration of this interplay is important given that efforts by 
decentralised governments to expand SP are often unaccompanied by sufficient resources. In the 
Indonesian context, most local governments struggle to maintain the viability of SP while attempting 
to garner electoral votes with various entitlement programmes.  This thesis addresses this gap in the 
literature. 
The thesis asks what mechanisms of decentralisation and democratisation have supported SP 
effectively. The study uses a mixed method approach and finds the quantitative results to be 
consistent with the qualitative findings. The finding suggests that being strategically responsive to the 
needs of the public, local governments tend to expand their SP programmes. The thesis is comprised 
of three parts. The first concerns the conceptualisation of theoretical and methodological frameworks, 
underpinned by theories and assumptions in the literature. In the second part, one framework has 
been utilised to explore the secondary quantitative data sets obtained from the World Bank’s INDO-
DAPOER repository and series of annual household surveys (Susenas). These two are followed by an 
in-depth qualitative exploration of case studies in two selected districts, specifically, Surakarta and 
Sragen. 
The thesis contributes to knowledge about SP programmes in democratic settings and their 
effectiveness in poverty and vulnerability reduction. The findings of the thesis highlight the factors 
that mediate the development of SP at the implementation level.  
The study concludes that current fiscal arrangements are susceptible to the fluctuations generated by 
budget cycles related to elections. The case studies in this thesis corroborate the argument that 
although the expansion of SP is an important way to reduce poverty and vulnerability, it does not 
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SJSN Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional, National Social Security System 
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SKTM Surat Keterangan Tidak Mampu, letters issued by local office for poor 
households usually to identify the holders as eligible SP beneficiaries 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
SMERU Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit (SMERU), a project managed by the 
World Bank, later became a research institute 
SP Social Protection 
SPADA Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project, a component programme of 
PNPM 
Susenas Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, National Socio-Economic Survey 
Taspen Agency that currently handles pension and old age saving programmes for civil 
servants, will merge into BPJS Ketenagakerjaan in 2029 
Tim sukses Campaign team or group of supporters who are responsible to manage and 
make sure the victory of their favorite candidate  
TKPKD Tim Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, Regional Coordinating 
Team for Poverty alleviation 
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, National Forces 
TNP2K Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, National Team for 
Poverty Reduction Acceleration 
uang lelaki Allowance money for adult male in a household, usually for non-productive 
consumptions such as cigarette or alcohol 
UPTPK Unit Pelayanan Terpadu Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, Integrated Service Unit 
for Poverty Reduction 
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PART I INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One: Introduction and Background to the Thesis 
 
‘Indonesia in 2002, by almost any measure, is in transition. Dictatorship, centralisation, and growing 
economic prosperity littered with “crony capitalism” are giving way to democracy, decentralisation, 
and economic uncertainty.’1 
‘Indonesia's political system has become more inclusive, if only somewhat more so. The fall of 
Suharto and the subsequent process of democratisation have removed key obstacles to organisation 
by poor and disadvantaged groups and their NGO allies, making it easier for them to engage in 
collective action aimed at achieving pro-poor policy change.’2 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the end of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) starting in 1997 and after the downfall of the New 
Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has gone through a decentralisation process that significantly 
changed its political and governance structures. The adoption of constitutional amendments 
throughout 'reformasi' has affected not only political and governance settings but has also had far-
reaching implications for the nature of social protection (henceforth SP). While the experiment of ‘big 
bang’ decentralisation devolved more power, resources, and authorities to local government3, the 
impact on public welfare, particularly for the most vulnerable groups, remains in doubt. Similarly, the 
deepening of electoral democracy at the regional level has shown mixed results towards the welfare 
of the citizens. A growing body of literature shows that corruption, lack of resources, and other 
problems have impeded local governments from fully realising their potentials.  
According to Faguet (2014) decentralisation is one of the most important reforms of the past 
generation, both in terms of the number of countries affected and the potentially deep implications 
for the nature and quality of governance. From the last late 1990s, estimates of the number of 
decentralisation experiments ranged from at least 80 percent of the world’s countries. 
                                                          
1 Cassing (2002, p. 95) 
2 Rosser et al (2005, p. 54) 
3 The top three tiers of government in Indonesia are central, provincial, and local. Local governments 
consist of both districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota), both of which are second-tier 
governments (at the same administration level), having their own local government and legislative 
body. The difference between a district and a city lies in demography, size, and economy. Generally, 
a district comprises a rural area, larger than a city whilst a city usually has non-agricultural economic 
activities. A noteworthy feature of decentralisation is that most functions of government were 
devolved to local governments i.e. districts and cities, bypassing the provinces (see Figure 1.1).  
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At this point, it is critical to define decentralisation, as the term used here refers to the work of Faguet 
and Sánchez (2008) and Manor (1999) as devolution by central (i.e. national) government of specific 
functions. Within this concept is, entailed the transfer of administrative, political, and economic 
attributes to regional and local (i.e. provincial, district, and municipal) governments that are 
independent of the centre within given geographic and functional domains. 
In Indonesia, the process of decentralisation from its very beginnings had to face both slow economic 
recovery and unsettled political conditions. This contributed to the delay in recuperation from 
protracted economic troubles. Hill and Shiraishi (2007) argue that the Indonesian economy had only 
taken its place on the track for recovery by the start of 2003. Currently, regulations for decentralisation 
are still a work in progress, including resource allocation mechanisms. Coordination between central 
and local governments has been improving, most notably through an annual central-local dialogue 
process on development plans (Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Musrenbangnas). 
Using socio-economic indicators (i.e. poverty rate and the inequality coefficient) as a benchmark, it 
appears that while several regions have demonstrated success, the majority have been struggling to 
mitigate poverty and inequality (for details see Miranti, Vidyattama, Hansnata, Cassells, & Duncan, 
2013; Yusuf, Sumner, & Rum, 2014). 
Law No. 5 Year 1974 Law No. 32 Year 2004 
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Decentralisation has seen the country embark on a new era where the central government delegated 
substantial authority to districts (tier-2 administrative level) (see Figure 1.1). A previous law on 
decentralisation (Law No. 22 Year 1999) provides local governments the entitlement to determine the 
size of their government, which means local governments have authority in recruiting civil servants 
based on their needs and capabilities. However, Law 32 Year 2004 clarifies that the management of 
civil servants is still retained by a national body which prevents local administration from hiring 
capable personnel. The decentralisation process has also allowed local governments to expand their 
sources of income from either domestic or international partners, by removing previous restrictions 
that prevented these business relationships; although the local government still needed to have 
approval from the central government for such activities if they involved international partners. It is 
naturally expected and assumed that by shifting some areas of policy responsibility to the local level, 
the development process will yield improved outcomes at the local level, and flowing on to positive 
national outcomes as a whole as local governments are expected to understand the needs and 
capabilities of their community better than the central ministries. 
Perceived as a corollary of decentralisation, the process of democratisation in Indonesia had followed 
the gradual process as in other developing countries. Culminated in 1998, when the authoritarian 
regime ended, the country had undertaken series of deepening reforms towards electoral democracy. 
Taking the definition from Carbone (2009, p. 124): democracy and democratisation are justified by 
reference to a multiplicity of values that encompass broad ideals such as liberty, equality, or justice. 
These values largely seem in line with the spirit of decentralisation reforms although it poses 
enormous challenges at the same time. The principles of newly-introduced democracy are meant to 
be incarnated via the introduction and subsequent working of a democratic political system. In this 
thesis, democratisation predominantly refers to the implementation of electoral democracy at the 
lowest level of administration. Direct elections for the positions of legislators and executives from its 
inception in 2005 have been the primary focus in the present study. 
Therefore, equally important in this research is to examine the potential features of electoral 
democracy which have different consequences for decentralisation in different local environments 
with varied capacities. Given that decentralisation has sought to deepen democracy, it is important to 
investigate the political consequences of devolution, for instance by detecting the presence of a 
political budget cycle which gives advantage to the incumbent while maintaining a high level of 
patronage and clientelism. In this study, the impact of local elections on public service delivery in 
Indonesia is examined, focusing particular attention on the interaction between directly elected local 
leaders since 2005 and politically fragmented constituents.  
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On top of the relatively postive outcome of decentralisation and democratisation, Indonesia has made 
remarkable progress in its democratic transition and economic recovery from the AFC of the late 1990s. 
Nevertheless, as of March 2017, around 27.77 million people (10.64 percent of the population) still 
live below the national poverty line (Statistics Indonesia, 2017). The government currently reorients 
the implementation of poverty reduction programmes into three clusters based on different 
objectives and targets, yet the overall outcome of this policy has shown mixed results (Suryahadi, 
Febriany, & Yumna, 2014a; Suryahadi, Yumna, Raya, & Marbun, 2010). At the same time, the 
government has attempted to revitalise social insurance, initially by expanding the coverage of social 
health insurance commencing from January 2014 and followed by employment insurance in mid-2015. 
However, issues such as insufficient resources and poor service quality still need to be addressed 
(Armstrong & Rahardja, 2014 p.11). While it is recognised that much has been achieved, additional 
policy adjustments will need to be made to extend SP for Indonesia’s wider population. Indeed, the 
improvement of SP at the subnational level is critical for promoting better basic services. As a 
consequence, there are mushrooming local regulations (Peraturan Daerah) and initiatives aimed at 
apportioning the local budget for various ‘populist’ programmes, ranging from free health care 
insurance to the provision of accidental grants. In reality, these are not effective to reduce levels of 
poverty and vulnerability and are often used merely as political instruments to garner votes during 
the local election as evidenced by Rosser and Wilson (2012). 
With regards to the contested definitions and concepts of SP, this study adopts the argument of 
Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) that SP has the potential to play a greater role in improving 
people’s livelihoods. Arguably, this stance is relevant for emerging countries with a significantly 
growing middle class segment but lacking sufficient resources to protect the poor and vulnerable 
groups from livelihood shocks. In addition, social policies in developing countries often encompass 
broad objectives beyond poverty alleviation. An example is given by de Haan (2014) who mentions 
the importance of SP for countries seeking to achieve several targets in the Millenium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Correspondingly, international attention has shifted to viewing social problems using a 
broader lens. The Human Development Report (2014), which considers vulnerability and resilience, is 
just one example. Within this context, SP here refers not only to the system of protective measures 
designed to act merely as a ‘safety net’, but also to measures that are able to mitigate social risk and 
vulnerability towards the ultimate goal of empowering the poor, as echoed by Ortiz’s definition of SP 
(2001). The deliberate choice of the broader definition of SP is intended to capture the complexity of 
the field while reconciling the diverse interpretations used by academics and policymakers. Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler’s concept of SP (2004) which covers four measures (protective, preventive, 
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promotional, and transformative) appears comprehensive and well rounded, although it requires a 
considerable amount of resources and readiness to manage complex systems. 
One of the most common obstacles in delivering SP is the lack of coordination between institutions 
and the fragmented nature of programmes. Since poverty and vulnerability are multi-dimensional 
phenomena (Alkire & Foster, 2011; A. Sen, 1999; Townsend, 1962), one programme alone or in 
isolation cannot address the multiple needs a family might face. Thus, one may argue that 
coordination and integration among programmes not only contribute to increased efficiency and 
reduced redundancy and duplication, but also to the greater impact of SP programmes.  
 
1.2 Motivation and Rationale for Research  
As the thesis title suggests, this research is mainly about the development of SP in the midst of 
considerable reforms in terms of decentralisation and democratisation in two locations in Indonesia. 
The research is set in the foreground of the aftermath of two prominent events: a severe economic 
crisis and extensive political reform. The reference to SP in the title indicates the central aim of 
government policies, namely that of increasing public welfare, which have been considered the 
manifestation of political and economic transformation in developing countries. 
This research attempts to advance existing theory on how decentralisation works in practice. It also 
explores how decentralisation can support the implementation of SP programmes in a country with 
heterogeneous political, social, and economic settings such as Indonesia. Much of this thesis is 
underpinned by the fact that decentralisation, electoral democracy, and SP are still in progress. Many 
aspects have been implemented but some important issues are yet to be resolved. Therefore, it is 
expected that this thesis will address the gaps that remain in the literature due to the paucity on the 
intersecting topic of decentralisation, democratisation, and SP.  
The potential for carrying out such research has been facilitated following the launch of open-access 
INDO-DAPOER database in 2014. Managed by the World Bank, this comprises detailed accounts of 
local budgets and information pertaining to development at regional levels. Although there are still 
gaps in data collection, this is undeniably an important resource for research. 
This study has signal relevance to the policy process in Indonesia for a number of reasons. First, out of 
549 decentralised districts in Indonesia, 183 are categorised as underdeveloped regions (Government 
of Indonesia, 2010). Furthermore, the locations chosen for this research reflect varied socio-economic 
statuses, fiscal capacity, and natural resource endowments. Although it has been significantly reduced 
significantly, poverty among certain populations is difficult to eradicate. In addition, there is a large 
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vulnerable population, including those who are living under the poverty line or in the near-poor 
category. Living in precarious conditions, large numbers of the population are often socially excluded. 
Although social exclusion is a malleable concept and subject to wide interpretation, it essentially 
means ‘more than material lack of income’ (J. Pierson, 2010). Even then, the majority of the socially 
excluded live in poverty with inadequate infrastructure, have very limited access to the job market, 
suffer permanent disabilities, or are denied public services because of their social/geographic 
characteristics. In this context, exclusion is also related to gender and age. It is worth looking at the 
effects of decentralised SP in addressing this problem. 
Second, government institutions have the mandate to formulate, and promote laws, and to a certain 
extent, enforce compliance with legal instruments. Within this context of governance from local to 
higher levels of administration, several questions can be addressed: is decentralisation in these areas 
effective as a means of bringing service delivery closer to the people, and are these services 
appropriately based on what the people need? Does an improved accountability chain overcome 
barriers to obtaining services? 
Third, excluded communities and vulnerable groups tend to be denied participation in policy-making. 
Notwithstanding the current emphasis on decentralisation, most policy-making still occurs at the 
national level, even though implementation is local. Decentralisation should allow for excluded 
communities to better participate in social-political affairs, giving them power to influence decisions 
that affect their lives. Decisions made with greater participation are expected to lead to better 
designed projects, better targeted benefits, more cost-effective and timely delivery of project inputs, 
and more equitably distributed benefits with less corruption and other rent-seeking activities 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2004, p. 6). 
Finally, working on the hypothesis that capacity building must precede local autonomy in order for 
decentralisation to ‘work’, this research will begin by making the case that regional institutional 
capacity is a main component for development (Fanany, Fanany, & Kenny, 2009). By looking into the 
role of central and local governments in policy making for SP programmes, provision and regulatory 
functions, there will be insights into whether inclusion for vulnerable groups is a result of shrewd 
negotiation (managing politics) or good design (capacity building). 
It is in this context that the work of this PhD has arisen. Analysing large-scale nationally representative 
survey data from Indonesia prior to exploration through in-depth interviews and observations from 
two selected locations, this PhD aims to bring recent methodological advances in statistics together 
with an inter-disciplinary perspective to gain a clearer picture on the impact of decentralisation and 
democratisation on SP in developing countries. More specifically, it seeks to demonstrate how the 
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utilisation of complex statistical models could help stakeholders maximise the depth of policy-relevant 
insights that can be derived from existing repeated cross-sectional survey data and comparative case 
studies. In so doing, it is hoped that policy-makers, academics, and society as a whole will benefit more 
from this endeavour. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
Among 115 developing countries in the world, Indonesia is considered unique for the purpose of 
research on topics of decentralisation, democratisation, and SP in several significant ways and 
therefore is worth being used as a case in point in this study. Specifically, the key objectives of the 
study are to investigate: 
a. The impact of decentralisation on areas with different characteristics, and how 
decentralisation succeeds in providing greater inclusion for the poor and vulnerable groups. 
b. The current legal framework providing responsibilities and resources to provincial and local 
governments for developing and implementing SP programmes, including gaps that may be 
present in the current legal and institutional framework.  
c. The conditions that influence the success of SP reforms and transformation in the regions 
(i.e management of resistance, reforms, local politics, and the role of leadership). 
d. The importance of coordination and integration of SP programmes for the benefit of poor 
and vulnerable families at the regional level.  
e. The local understanding of SP and the role it plays in development and addressing poverty, 
and the wide range of programmes that could be implemented at local levels.  
This research evaluates the overall implementation of SP programmes, including those that are central 
government-led and local government-initiated. Based on the evidence mentioned in the introduction 
and the objectives of this study, this research attempts to answer the main research question: To what 
extent has decentralisation and democratisation in Indonesia enabled SP programmes to improve 
the livelihood of poor and vulnerable people?  
In elaborating the main research question, the following sub-questions will be addressed to 
comprehensively capture the complex system of linkages between SP, decentralisation, and 
democratisation:  
a. What are the functional roles of local governments in Indonesia?  
b. In the context of decentralisation, what reforms and capacity building mechanisms are 
carried out in these locations?  
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c. In the context of electoral democracy or local politics, what are the key factors supporting 
the reforms? 
d. What factors influence the success of these reforms? 
e. To what extent has the implementation of decentralisation and democratisation expanded 
the coverage of SP beneficiaries? 
In answering these questions, this study will not only add to an understanding of the effects  of 
decentralisation and democratisation on SP in Indonesia, but it will also contribute to a broader 
discussion on the relationship and the nexus between the three. Moreover, the study will examine 
this relationship at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the study will focus on around 
500 districts and 33 provinces in Indonesia, while at the micro level it will examine the effects of 
regional governance on SP in two selected districts in Central Java. The following three approaches 
have been adopted to answer the research questions comprehensively: 
(1) Exploring the link between decentralisation, democratisation, and SP at both macro and micro 
levels. 
At the macro level, the relationship between decentralisation, democratisation, and SP will be 
examined by exploring the relationship between government spending and social welfare variables at 
the district level, as well as the the link between the quality of government spending (accountability) 
and outcomes. To support the analysis, secondary data for all districts collected from various official 
sources will be utilised. At the micro level, the link between decentralisation, democratisation, and SP 
will be analysed by comparing the performance of two districts, expectedly in order to capture impact 
after the implementation of policy changes. This comparison will be made in the areas of public service 
delivery, local economic development, and changes in social welfare indicators. In order to 
substantiate the comparison at the micro level, data and information from fieldwork will be combined 
with extensive use of Susenas (annual socio-economic national survey carried out by Statistics 
Indonesia). 
(2) Evaluating the current practices of local governments in their delivery of public services and their 
SP programmes. 
The second approach deals with the effects of decentralisation and democratisation in two districts 
on the services and programmes of local authorities. In more detail, this micro level study attempts to 
look at the extent to which local governments have applied the principles of good governance in 
response to the demands of their citizens and its impact on SP; how local governments have addressed 
problems of social welfare and have set SP programmes in their regions; the extent to which local 
governments have set their policies and budgets to support the implementation of local SP; and the 
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extent to which all stakeholders of decentralisation and democratisation (local parliaments, local 
NGOs, and local community) have been involved in the development process after the enactment of 
regional autonomy and direct elections. The results of the evaluation of current practices at the local 
level are expected to provide an explanation of the differences in the outcomes of policy changes. 
(3) Searching for the mechanisms of an effective local SP under the decentralised and democratised 
system and providing policy recommendation for social welfare development. 
The findings obtained from exploring the nexus of decentralisation-democratisation-SP based on the 
first two approaches will then be used to determine the mechanisms that link policy changes to 
effective SP, and thus to provide policy recommendations to local governments for a successful social 
policy. In addition this thesis aims to test and to assess the extent of compatibility of decentralisation 
and democratisation to the implementation of SP specifically and the livelihood of community in 
general. 
 
1.4 The Scope of the Study 
The time frame of this research is the fifteen-year period after the implementation of regional 
autonomy. The main consideration is that fifteen years of implementation should be long enough for 
the impact of decentralisation programmes to be apparent, particularly in the area of social welfare 
improvement. Moreover, the process of deepening democratisation which began ten years ago will 
already have resulted in local development. At the macro level, this study will observe national data 
sets at both provincial and district levels, while two districts have been chosen for the qualitative 
analysis at the micro level. Due to the large number of districts in Indonesia, the results of the study 
from these two selected districts are unlikely to represent the nation as a whole. However, the results 
of the study do show how decentralisation and electoral democracy can assist social welfare 
development in Indonesia and therefore the study can help identify lessons for other local 
governments in running their autonomous regions. 
 
1.5 Description of Poverty and Vulnerability 
For the purpose of this research, Indonesia today offers distinctiveness incomparable to many 
developing countries. With its diversity, both in geographic and institutional attributes and in 
economic performance, it permits a critical assessment of the influence of economic policies and initial 
conditions, including institutions and geographic attributes, on several variables related to social 
welfare development, including poverty and inequality. 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background to the Thesis 
10 
 
As a result of the political turmoil and economic downturn that took place in early independence, the 
Indonesian economy experienced a steadily rising inflation rate which spiralled into unprecedented 
hyper-inflation (Wie, 2010). This calamity made the economy stagnated and only created modest 
growth even during agricultural seasons with good harvest. Based on the available evidence, it is 
known that per capita income in Indonesia was below that of other Southeast Asian economies. The 
situation was mainly caused by high population growth above the rate of economic growth which 
resulted in declining GDP per capita. After recovering from detrimental economic crisis and traumatic 
political dislocations of the mid 1960s, the country embarked on a period of stable and sustained 
economic growth under the command of New Order government. During that period of the 1990s, 
Indonesia was categorised as one of the High Performing Asian Economies (Wie, 2012b). 
Indonesia has a long story of poverty reduction that goes back to the beginning of the Suharto era. 
After periods of recovery and restructuring, the country managed to achieve economic success largely 
because of its economic policy and oil bonanza (windfall profit from oil price increase). Once dubbed 
as one of the ‘Tiger Cub’ economies in Asia (along with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam), Indonesia maintained stable economic growth until the AFC struck in 1997. After a series of 
dramatic political events, Indonesia started to regain its footing. The country has largely recovered 
from the economic crisis, recently becoming one of the world’s emergent middle-income countries. 
Table 1.1 Selected Macroeconomic Variables for Indonesia 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016 
GDP growth (y-o-y) 7.55 9.88 7.24 4.92 6.22 5.02 
Inflation rate (y-o-y) 12.35 18.02 7.81 3.72 5.13 3.53 
Exports to GDP (%) 12.84 30.47 26.56 40.98 24.30 19.08 
Imports to GDP (%) 15.84 22.18 26.05 30.46 22.40 18.31 
Exchange rates (IDR/USD) 362.83 626.99 1842.81 8421.78 9090.43 13308.33 
Investment to GDP (%) n.a. 21.57 28.34 19.85 31.99 34.29 
 
Source: data.worldbank.org 
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics on the Indonesian macro economy which tells the basic story. 
The Indonesian economy has grown significantly during the past decade and is currently categorised 
as a lower-middle income country with an economy dominated by the manufacturing sector. The 
country’s per capita gross national income (GNI) increased from US$580 in 2000 to US$1,170 in 2005, 
and is estimated to further increase to US$2,963 in 2010 (The World Bank, 2013). With GDP at 
US$695.06 billion in 2010, Indonesia was ranked the fifth largest economy in Asia – after Japan, China, 
India and Korea.  
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Viewed in long term perspective, Indonesia’s record of sustained poverty reduction has been 
remarkable. Over the two decades before 1996, the proportion of people living below the 
government’s poverty line4 declined from almost two-thirds to less than one-fifth. The incidence of 
poverty was reduced dramatically in both urban and rural areas in all provinces. This was notably due 
to economic growth being the principal driver. Since 1996, the rate of poverty reduction has been 
more moderate but there have been just two periods during which the incidence of poverty did not 
fall. The first was the AFC of 1997-1998 where GDP contracted by 13 percent; and the second period 
was 2005-2006, even though GDP grew by more than five percent. 
As seen in Figure 1.2, poverty incidence fell from 28 percent in the mid-1980s to about 8 percent in 
the mid-1990s, compared to the poverty reduction of the same period from 29 to 27 percent for all 
developing countries in the Asian region (excluding China). Poverty reduction efforts have shown their 
success at the ascent of the New Order government (1976-1996) with a dramatic decrease in poverty 
rate, yet they slowed down after Indonesia was struck with an economic crisis in 1997-98. Programmes 
that directly target poverty were non-existent during the New Order era.  
*) The method for calculating the poverty rate was revised in 1998 and reapplied to the data for 1996.  
Source: GDP Growth rate: World Development Indicators; Poverty rate: Statistics Indonesia (various years) 
Figure 1.2 GDP Growth Rate and Poverty Rate in Indonesia, 1976-2016 (%) 
The pace of poverty decline has been slowing since the fall of Suharto in 1998 given the rapid and 
unequivocal shift towards more democratic and decentralised polity. Two factors have been at play. 
                                                          
4 Poverty line refers to lower threshold of monthly expenditure calculated from the prices of items 

























































































































Official poverty rate (%) Growth Rate
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background to the Thesis 
12 
 
First, for many reasons, economic growth has been much slower than in Suharto’s era, 
notwithstanding the fact that Indonesia is hardly a poor performer among countries with similar 
experiences of political transition. At the same time, however, poverty rates have become less 
responsive or less elastic to economic progress. Slower growth of employment in the more labour-
intensive segments of manufacturing and services appears to have played a major part in this outcome, 
which is in turn attributed to the less flexible environment for formal sector employment.  
Agriculture, the source of the most labour-intensive sector, shows declining trends in terms of relative 
GDP composition. This diminishing return of agriculture sector potentially lead to the dichotomy on 
economy which according to Bourguignon and Morrison (1998) could cause inequality in income 
distribution. The advancement of the agriculture sector is relatively effective in reducing inequalities 
in income and poverty, as mentioned in Ravallion and Datt (1996). Meanwhile, Mellor (1999) proposes 
that growth in the manufacturing sector is important to the country’s economic development, but 
growth in agriculture is believed to be most important to increase employment creation and poverty 
reduction. 
Despite substantial authority and fiscal power devolved to the regions after the enactment of 
decentralisation laws, problems of poverty remain in mainland Java. Figure 1.3 suggests that Indonesia 
has a regional pattern of poverty that is mainly centred on Java. This is not surprising since the 
mainland of Java has been inhabited by as large as 68 percent of the country’s population (Firman, 
2017). Java is the most populated island in the country with a high rate of urbanisation (60.8 percent 
as of 2010) and above-average annual population growth (3.10 percent as opposed to the total 
population growth rate of 1.25 per cent per year over the period of 2000-2010) (p. 51). Meanwhile in 
other islands, poverty headcount as in absolute numbers might seem very small in comparison with 
Java. Probably correlated with positive economic growth between 1993 to 2013, the apparent 
decelerating rate of poverty headcount occured in all provinces to varying degree. This chart displays 
the difference in poverty levels in six major islands over two periods: 1993 (eight years prior to 
enactment) and 2013 (twelve years after implementation). Whilst there is minor reduction in poverty 
in Java and significant decrease in Kalimantan, poverty is apparently becoming a more prominent issue 
in Sumatera, Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua. Interestingly, the message from these charts is in line with 
the findings from Miranti et al. (2013) which find that regional disparities persist including the 
imbalances in development at the district level with substantial differences in poverty rates.  
The disparity seems intractable and cannot be solved merely with decentralisation (Resosudarmo, 
Wuryanto, Hewings, & Saunders, 1999). This is partly because government decentralisation is not 
always designed specifically to target poverty alleviation, social welfare improvement, or rectifying 
problems related to inequality. Transferring anti-poverty programmes directly to local governments 
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may not necessarily be the best solution for poverty alleviation. Bird and Rodriguez (1999), using cases 
in developing countries like the Philippines, Argentina, Chile, as well as Indonesia, state that the 
relationship between poverty and decentralisation largely depends on public investment of local 
governments to reduce poverty, and in the implementation of national poverty policy, either narrowly 
or broadly defined. Given the heterogeneity of capacities and resources, they suggest that 
decentralised poverty strategies require a degree of equalisation in terms of fiscal transfers. Therefore, 
to decentralise poverty alleviation strategies, the credibility and accountability of local government is 
strictly required. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) further emphasise that decentralisation is about 
government accountability and thus central governments should obtain complete information before 
delegating authority over anti-poverty programs, as the central government cannot control the 
outcomes when autonomy has been fully implemented. 
 
Where do the Indonesian Poor Live? 1993
Sumatera
Jawa








Figure 1.2 Location of the Poor (1993 and 2013) 
Figure 1.4 shows geographically the distribution of poverty rates across Indonesia. The map reveals 
that in terms of proportion, poverty rates can be found far higher in eastern part of Indonesia which 
seemingly gives impression that the problem of poverty is more severe in islands outside Java. Yet, 
this does not change the fact that most of Indonesia’s poor are situated in the densely populated 
western part of the archipelago. For example, while the poverty rates in Java are relatively lower than 
Papua (the easternmost island), with Java being home to 57 percent of Indonesia’s total poor, while 
Papua only hosts three percent of the poor.  
However, there are provinces in the western part of Indonesia that saw increasing poverty rates such 
as in Aceh (the westernmost island), probably largely due to the prolonged conflict. These charts also 
lead to an indication that there has been uneven development which has resulted in a polarised 
pattern of population density as well as poverty. The figures also seem to convey a message that 
neither decentralisation nor democratisation seems capable of changing this persistent development 
pattern, at least in the timeframe of the last two decades. 
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Figure 1.3 Poverty Rates by Provinces (1993 and 2013) 
A few regions have seen significant improvements or decline in poverty relative to the national 
average, with the notable but not unexpected exception of Aceh, while the eastern part of Indonesia, 
especially Papua, remains considerably poorer than the rest of the country. This fact runs slightly 
counter to the aim of the special autonomy law to improve local economic development, mitigate 
social problems, and to help lagging regions catch up to the national standard. 
 




Figure 1.4 Inequality in Indonesia by Provinces (2002-2013) 
Figure 1.5 depicts the rates of inequality at the provincial level from the early phase of decentralisation 
up to 2013. It appears that the trend in inequality is slightly increasing for all provinces. Not only do 
provinces in Java have higher inequality rates, but several provinces in outer Java also experience 
above-average inequality rates. Newly-formed provinces in Sulawesi (Gorontalo and Sulawesi Barat) 
had low inequality initially but picked up pace rapidly afterwards. The highest rate of inequality can 
be found particularly in the eastern part of Indonesia. 
From Figures 1.2 to 1.5, it can be crucially assumed that although there have been significant changes 
in terms of poverty and inequality, one can still be intrigued by the actual impact of decentralisation 
and democratisation, having seen the uneven progress of development.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The novelty of this thesis lies in its application of statistical techniques to the newly emerging data set 
from Indonesia ranging from household surveys to regional administration records. In addition, the 
application of qualitative analysis is expected to provide the comparative information from the ground. 
In order to showcase the value added by applying recent methodological advances to research on 
fiscal decentralisation, influence of local democratisation, and its impact on SP, this thesis is presented 
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(Chapters 1 and 2) draws the conceptual map of this thesis, including motivational background, 
objectives, research questions, scope of the study, stylised facts, and the context which explains 
historically the development of decentralisation and democratisation in Indonesia. Part Two (Chapter 
3) provides the literature review for theories and evidence revolving around decentralisation, 
democratisation, and SP with specific reference to Indonesian development after the AFC. Part Three 
(Chapter 4) details the methodology used in this thesis, which covers several aspects such as 
developing questionnaires, methods of data collection, determining study sites, the selection of 
respondents, and method of analysis. Part Four is made up of two chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) which 
expound the results, mainly exploring the link between decentralisation, democratisation, and SP 
using secondary data from the INDO-DAPOER repository and primary data from interviews. The last 
section, Part Five (Chapter 7) concludes, outlining the answers to the research questions, and 
ultimately drawing some lessons from the study. 
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Chapter Two: The Indonesian Context 
2.1 Country profile 
Consisting of approximately 17,000 islands extending from Aceh, the westernmost province, until 
Papua on the tip of the east, Indonesia is by far the largest country in the Southeast Asia region (1,919 
km2). In terms of population, it has around 250 million residents (estimated from the result of 
Population Census in 2010) with an increasing middle-class segment (McDonald, 2014). Considering 
the vast population size, the country features enormous diversity in its economy, ecology, 
ethnography, demography, and many other characteristics. From its inception in the early 20th century, 
the policy and intellectual paradigms in Indonesia have been reflecting this diversity. It is the key 
sentiment in the national motto, ‘unity in diversity’ (‘bhinneka tunggal ika’) which aptly reflects 
Indonesians in viewing the preservation of territorial integrity and national unity.    
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Indonesia 
As in the other large nation-states, Indonesia had tried and repeatedly forged a workable set of 
arrangements governing administrative, political, and financial relations between the central 
government and its subnational authorities. Before the present form of unitary state, the 
arrangements have administratively varied from strongly centralist to de facto federalist. Hosting the 
largest Muslim population in the world, the influence of Islamic laws does not necessarily appear in 
the regulations except for specific matters in certain regions. Similarly, regions with significant non-
Muslim populations (Bali, Papua, and East Nusa Tenggara for Hindunese, Christians, and Catholics, 
respectively) do not necessarily adopt their religious laws into formal regulations.  
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With the dynamic progress of nation-state building, there are elements of continuity and change in 
Indonesia’s regional development. The most discernible continuity is the very large gap in living 
standards and economic structure between regions (Dick, Houben, Lindblad, & Wie, 2002). The 
western part of the country is generally more dynamic, developed, and richer than the east. As the 
centre of this vast growth —generating 60 percent of GDP—, the island of Java continues to prosper, 
driven mainly by the most dominant urban conurbations. Alas, progress is evident towards economic 
convergence albeit in lacklustre motion (H. Hill, Resosudarmo, & Vidyattama, 2008). 
Indonesia's social trajectory was considerably more ambiguous than neighbouring countries in 
Southeast Asia, involving long periods of authoritarian rule combined with policy directions that at 
times, and for significant numbers of the rural poor, contributed to greater inclusion. This chapter 
summarises important milestones which are related to the subjects discussed in this research. Looking 
at various fields of study, there are three areas of literature considered important for elaboration i.e. 
local politics, decentralisation, and SP. 
 
2.2 Political Developments 
The political and administrative systems have undergone major transformation since the nation’s 
independence. Having suffered extreme deprivation and poverty for a long time, the greatest concern 
of Indonesian masses after revolutionary struggle was with their day-to-day existence: the basic needs 
for, food, housing, employment, education, and health care (Booth, 2010). Beyond a general 
commitment to replacing Dutch colonial rule with Indonesian rule, they had no clear notions about 
the nature and the prospects of their independent polity. Politics did not develop as a science as much 
as an art of providing effective government and administration, taking the necessary hard and 
unpopular decisions, producing rapid social and economic change, maintaining national discipline and 
a devotion to hard work, and enhancing national unity and ethnic peace and harmony.  
The critical point in poltical development is that throughout the existence of Indonesian political 
parties, they had failed to develop into modern political institutions and effectively play the important 
functions that they are expected to perform (Ramage, 1995). In other words, they had functioned 
mostly as factions and cliques. The very first democratic election was rolled out in 1955, yet it was 
then reversed completely into a total authoritarian regime in 1959. The situation changed abruptly 
after 1965, but democratic values seemed to be suppressed for the next three decades. Later, the 
situation changed profoundly in 1998, involving a series of rapid transformations in the political 
system. Fair elections took place in 1999 when 48 political parties participated. The values of 
democracy, transparency, and open participation were seemingly ready to be established.   
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Historically, decentralisation has been a difficult political problem in Indonesia from the establishment 
of the country. It has been the focus of the conflict between those who view it as a method of 
spreading the organisation of the central government and leadership to all parts of the country, and 
those who view it as a method for accommodating regional differences, regional aspirations, and local 
demands within the confines of the unitary state (Maryanov, 1958). The conflict became confused 
with wider issues, and reached critical proportions when it erupted in rebellions and armed conflicts 
between 1958 and 1961. 
 
2.2.1 Pre-Independence Period (pre-1945) 
Indonesia before independence was almost always associated with Dutch East Indies, a large colony 
of the Netherlands. However, it was not really a single entity before the arrival of the Europeans in 
the 13th century (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 25). It could hardly have been imagined that Indonesia could 
become a country of its own. Signified by rulers and customary (adat) laws (Lukito, 2013, pp. 15–17), 
there were traditional small kingdoms scattered all over archipelago. The rulers held absolute control 
of its territory with only a close circle able to influence policies. Society was stratified based on the 
hereditary caste system which inhibited people from climbing the ranks (Sutherland, 1973, 1975). 
With the presence of Dutch and European settlers, laws were soon influenced heavily by the Dutch-
governed administration. Local administrations were officially started by the enactment of the law on 
hierarchical order regional governance in 1822 (Regelement op het Beleid der Regering van 
Nederlandsch Indie). This umbrella law did not acknowledge the concept of decentralisation, instead 
the order of command was set under the centralised system which was divided from Gewest 
(residentie), Afdeling, District, to Onderdistrict (Nurcholis, 2005, pp. 105–106).  
In 1903, for the first time the Dutch colonial government issued Decentralisatie Wet (Staatsblad No. 
326) as an early foundation of regulations on decentralisation (Woesthoff, 1915). The law made 
possible the establishment of actual regional government but still under the administration of colonial 
government. However, the scope of this regulation was limited only for the regions in Java and Madura. 
Even with the high degree of power accumulation from 1910, the Dutch created the most centralised 
state power in Southeast Asia (Friend, 2003). 
As summarised by Legge (1961), in the periods before 1903, all territories in Dutch East Indies were 
centrally administered under the full control of the Governor-General as the highest representative of 
the Dutch Empire and Monarch in the colonised land. Besides, the local administrations (swapraja) 
held by indigenous leaders were still maintained as legal institutions. These leaders governed their 
regions based on political contracts signed by representatives of the Dutch Government (Adams, 
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1996). The contract assigned local leaders to run routine administration and specific tasks in the name 
of the colonial government (pp. 14-15).  
As explained by Hudoyo et al (1998), the implementation of the 1903 law was soon followed by the 
establishment of the Regional Council in 1905 after the enactment of Decentralisatie Besluit 
(Staatsblad No. 137) and Locale Raad Ordonantie (Stb. No. 131). The council was given exclusive rights 
to generate local revenues in order to fund local administration. The members were selected from 
local prominent figures, though the head of executives (Governor, Resident, and Bupati) were 
appointed by the central government. 
In 1922, the colonial government managed to restructure local administrations whereby Java and 
Madura managed to form autonomous regions namely: Provinsi (Province), Kabupaten (Regency), and 
Kotapraja (Municipality) (Benda, 1966, p. 594). In addition, there were newly formed regions 
established under the previous decentralisation law under the control of Resident in Palembang and 
West Sumatra; and the formation of kotapraja in regions outside Java such as Palembang, Padang, 
Medan, and Makassar (Maryanov, 1958). 
Further, the reorganisation law in 1922 ('Administratief en Financiele Decentralisatie') also devolved 
authorities to the Governor and Dutch officials as the colonial government state apparatus to perform 
‘deconcentration’ duties and broader autonomy functions (Jaya & Dick, 2001). In a similar way, Bupati 
and indigenous leaders (pangreh praja) were allowed to exercise broader authority (Lev, 1985, p. 59). 
In hindsight, the colonial government seemed to gradually delegate administrative power to the locals 
(Benda, 1966). However, important authorities were still taken by Dutch officials working in colonies, 
until the invasion of Japan in 1942. 
Discussion on the decentralisation regulations during Japanese occupation is mainly based on 
Wignjosoebroto (2004). Basically, the Japanese military administration decided to maintain 
centralised rule, which was divided into three main regions: 
a. Java and Madura, controlled by 16th Commander of Japanese Army based in Jakarta 
b. Sumatra, controlled by 25th Commander of Japanese Army based in Bukittinggi 
c. Other eastern islands, controlled by Commander of Japanese Navy, based in Makassar 
The highest authority in this military occupation was held by an assembly of Japanese senior military 
officers ('Saikoo Sikikan'). Basically, the civilian version of the administration resembled much of the 
Dutch structure with only nomenclature changed into Japanese terms (Shigeru, 1996). Whilst the 
positions of Resident and Regent were preserved, the Japanese colonisation regime decided to 
remove the Province (and its Governor), and Afdeling (and its Assistant Resident). The 
deconcentration of routine tasks in Java and Madura were designated to the following order: 
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a. Syuu (Karesidenan), headed by Syuu-Cookan (Resident) 
b. Si (Kotapraja) headed by Si-Coo (Mayor) 
c. Ken (Kabupaten) headed by Ken-Coo (Regent) 
d. Gun (Distrik) headed by Gun-Coo (Wedana) 
e. Son (Kecamatan) headed by Son-Coo (Camat) 
f. Ku (Desa) headed by Ku-Coo (Head of Village) 
Within this period, the principle of decentralisation was considered later when the Japanese army 
struggled and was cornered in fighting Allied troops by the latter half of 1945. The revitalisation of 
regional councils was meant to cultivate public sympathy and mass support. Three regional councils 
were set up, namely Central Council ('Cuoo-Sangiin'), Residency Council ('Syuu-Sangikai'), and 
Municipal Council ('Tokubetsu Si Sangikai'). Nevertheless, this initiative was short-lived as Allied forces 
eventually defeated the Japanese defence system with a massive bombing operation. The event 
became an important milestone for Indonesian nationalists to proclaim their independence and move 
forward to prepare for a new administration. 
 
2.2.2 Revolutionary and Nation-building Period (1946-1965) 
When the Japanese troops finally left in 1945, the Indonesian leaders faced the immense task of 
rebuilding a country. Until 1949 Indonesia was still at war with the Netherlands, which had attempted 
to re-conquer as a colony after losing it during World War II. Despite the prolonged conflict, the newly 
formed government took on the task of attempting to form an early skeletal system of governance.  
One of the most important tasks was finding a model for managing the relationship between the 
centre and regions. At that point, a unitary model was preferred by the founding fathers (Ricklefs, 
2001, p. 258). However, the desire to give more freedom to the regions to run their own affairs was 
also surfacing. This aspiration was clearly stated in Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, allowing the 
regions to run their own administration under a unitary system. In other words, the principle of 
decentralisation has a constitutional foundation hitherto in Indonesia. 
After the new republic was proclaimed in 1945 and the transfer of sovereignty was fully completed in 
1949, the country was marred by a series of events which led to instability. The period following the 
formal transfer of power at the end of 1949 is widely considered as the beginning of the dark age of 
the Old Order (Orde Lama) representing an interregnum of fifteen wasted years. Much of the 
discussion on decentralisation and democracy during this period is summarised by Vasil (1997). 
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During the early independence period, the government introduced Law No. 1 Year 1945 and Law No. 
22 Year 1948, aiming to create a formative model for centre-region relations that would provide more 
freedom to the regions to run their own affairs (Legge, 1961, p. 26). Ironically, these regulations failed 
to be implemented effectively because of Jakarta’s lack of power and due to the political uncertainty 
resulting from the war of independence (see Kahin, 1985). 
These laws were introduced within the ongoing debate over which model of local governance would 
best suit Indonesia. Two models were discussed during this very crucial period: a unitary system and 
a federal one. The first was supported by the de facto republican leaders and military leaders (Feith, 
1962, p. 596). Their view was that because Indonesia is a diverse society in terms of people and culture, 
and is also an archipelagic nation, a unitary system with a strong government in the centre was 
important (Kahin, 1985, p. 282). 
The alternative, federalist model was supported by those who lived in the former Dutch-created 
United States of Indonesia (Reid, 2010). Their view was that the unity of Indonesia could only be 
preserved if it adopted a system of governance which would allow the regions to establish their own 
government and administrative institutions (Legge, 1961, pp. 7–8). When the war ended at the end of 
1949, strong opposition to a federal system grew because this was the system that had originally been 
imposed by the Dutch and hence it was perceived as a part of the strategy to break the unity of 
Indonesia. Undoubtedly, the perceived colonial roots of federalism have left a bad taste for any 
constructive debate about the strengths and weaknesses of a federal system in Indonesia since then 
(Feith, 1962, pp. 58–59). 
Based upon its extreme ethnic diversity and the insular nature of its territory, independent Indonesia 
faced a paramount problem of state building. The first constitution was hurriedly drafted and lacked 
any detailed provisions and consisted mostly of broad principles. It was clearly considered as 
provisional at the time (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 285). Later, the Dutch then insisted on having a constitution 
based on negotiations with nationalists so that they could view it before handing over power to the 
Indonesians.    
The short stint of federalism was the result of the revised constitution in 1950. With a group of states 
(negaras) formed in several regions, the Dutch made their objective of giving themselves the foothold 
and prolonging their own influence. The framework of the Indonesian polity was designed in 
circumstances that scarcely allowed nationalists to relate it to the social, economic, and educational 
reality of their country. Instead, the constitution had prominently reflected Western experiences and 
norms based upon the political cultures of Western societies. The short-lived idea of a federal state 
was then also supported by the first Vice President, Mohammad Hatta (Feith, 1962, p. 543). 
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During the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s, Indonesia experienced an exciting but also 
confusing period. It was in this period that decentralisation was finally rejuvenated. Jakarta introduced 
Law No. 1 Year 1957 on Local Governance (Pemerintahan Daerah), which gave more freedom to the 
regions to run their own affairs including electing their own leaders and managing their own money 
(Legge, 1961, p. 27). However, this law was enacted in the midst of political uncertainty and repeated 
failures of the parliamentary government in Jakarta, which created a sense of disunity and political 
instability in Indonesia. The intense ideological conflicts among major political parties, combined with 
regionally based rebellions orchestrated by local military commanders made it impossible to 
implement the law (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 318–320). 
The Old Order represented two periods that could be clearly defined, but were not significantly 
different: Western liberal democracy in 1950-1959 and the Sukarnoist ‘Guided Democracy’ in 1959-
1965, which can virtually be seen as parliamentary democracy turned into authoritarian (Ricklefs, 2001, 
p. 312). Both variants of democracy achieved little with regard to promoting social and economic 
change, progress, and national unity. The differences between the two related mostly to their political 
institutions, processes, styles, and rhetoric of their leaders (Bunnell, 1966).  
Most Indonesians in this period were deemed incapable of exercising their role as citizens. Undeniably, 
with their low education, they lack understanding of the concept of Western liberal democracy, 
including its institutions, and processes. However, surprisingly, the first parliamentary election in 1955 
had over 91 percent turnout (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 303–304). This fact demonstrates that in the absence 
of its socio-economic prerequisites, public interests expect a reform through established democratic 
mechanisms.   
Half-way through the period of the Sukarno administration (1950-1967), formal power was 
concentrated to a phenomenally high degree with regional heads of assemblies all being appointed 
by the president (chronological details of events can be seen in Feith, 1962; Feith & Castles, 1970). 
However, it has been suggested that form and substance did not coincide and that a de facto 
federalism actually prevailed. In 1958, several key leaders from the parliamentary period gathered in 
West Sumatera to form an alternative government. Their rebellion was not secessionist in nature 
because their main aim was to formulate a new constitution which gave the regions greater autonomy, 
making Indonesia in effect a federal state. 
As clearly told by Booth (2016a), the unjust arrangement of governance towards non-Java regions 
caused complaint mainly from resource-rich regions. Their role as the main contributors of the 
nation’s wealth made them in the position to demand for greater authority. These grievances then 
pushed the issue of regional finance to an investigation in the mid-1950s led by M. Nasroen from the 
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Department of Home Affairs, and composed of fiscal experts from various government agencies. 
However, the Nasroen proposals were vehemently criticised by Paauw (1960, p. 411) because they 
did not seem to simplify the tax structure let alone solving the problem of an extremely complex 
administrative system. Much of the critics pointed out that most taxation authorities assigned to local 
governments were never going to yield much revenue. 
In spite of these criticisms, most of the recommendations from this committee were later adopted in 
Law No. 32 Year 1956. This law did cause some changes in important concessions to the regions for 
both income taxes and foreign trade taxes to be shared between the provinces and the central 
government (Booth, 2016b, p. 49). However, as pointed out by Legge (1961, p. 193), implementation 
of this law was slow even before the reversion of the constitution in 1959.  
With this political constellation, Sukarno declared a state of emergency in 1959, ending the 
parliamentary democracy period in Indonesia (Bourchier & Legge, 1994). Returning to the original 
1945 constitution, parliament was abolished and the legal decisions of the parliament, hence annulling 
Law No. 1 Year 1957. With this, Jakarta’s willingness to support decentralisation ended. Indonesia then 
returned to a centralist political system, a system that Sukarno and the military believed could serve 
the unity of Indonesia (Legge, 1961, p. 204). During this Guided Democracy period (1959–65), Sukarno 
governed Indonesia in a dictatorial fashion, styling himself as the ‘father’ of the Indonesian nation 
(Crouch, 1979). Sukarno used every means to assert Jakarta’s dominance over the regions. 
The return to the original 1945 constitution combined with the military campaigns against rebellions 
in regions outside Java created a hostile environment where the centre had little appetite for further 
reform of centre-region financial arrangements. Mackie (1980, p. 674) argued that by the early 1960s 
‘a politics of manipulation and compromise replaced the earlier confrontational pattern of politics’ so 
that the country managed to subdue the regional rebellions to a great extent. As public finance 
deteriorated, grants to the regions diminished in real terms, making provincial and local governments 
to find their own way, dismissing regulations from central government is one of the means to express 
dissatisfaction (Booth, 2014, p. 31). Prolonged turmoil, violence, and the incapability of the central 
government to handle issues in the regions brought the Sukarno administration to the end of their 
regime. In addition, mismanagement of the economy further exacerbated the situation (Prawiro, 
1998). The vast majority of the Indonesian population faced extreme hardship brought about by 
massive unemployment, acute food shortages, and raging hyperinflation. 
The end of the Old Order became apparent with the event of a controversial failed communist coup 
and its ensuing extermination, causing a bloodbath in regions where the communist party had 
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previously taken hold (Cribb, 1990). Eventually, Suharto managed to take over the administration 
smoothly by March 1966 and was officially appointed as President on 27 March 1968. 
 
2.2.3 New Order Period (1966-1998) 
After a series of violent events in 1965-1966 and the demise of Sukarno, the New Order managed to 
pave a new way which pointed to a long period of power recentralisation. Not long after Suharto’s 
New Order era was formed, the newly-appointed president maintained a highly centralised 
framework of political power and authority in which Jakarta controlled the purse and made most 
decisions for the regions to implement (Booth, 2014, pp. 33–41). 
The New Order regime appeared to emerge out of the chaos and massacres of 1965, following an 
‘attempted coup’ by the Communist Party (see details in Anderson, McVey, & Bunnell, 1971). Several 
months of blood-letting events followed the spectre that the communists were trying to take over 
Indonesia, and out of this threat and the ensuing chaos was born a regime based on fear, and the 
created need for order and stability. Subsequently, the New Order government ruled, in what Gerry 
van Klinken characterises very aptly as a ‘state of emergency’ (2007, p. 62) for 32 years, where danger 
was believed to be ever present and where it was suspected that the masses hid potential enemies. 
The populace was also presented as a source of latent chaos and anarchy. The only hope for security, 
order and stability was a firm state and a highly centralised regime (Wie, 2012a). 
Major-General Suharto stepped in to establish the New Order government in 1966 with solid support 
from the military, the middle class, and elements within the Islamic community later in 1990s. From 
his military background, Suharto was familiar with the accumulation of power, and the idea of having 
a strong government appealed to him (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 345). This kind of government was needed in 
order accomplish Suharto’s immediate tasks in the early days of his power: providing political stability 
and rehabilitating the Indonesian economy. Suharto established a centralised political structure in 
which he had full control over three important institutions: the military (ABRI), the bureaucracy 
(especially the Ministry of Home Affairs) and the ruling party Golkar5 (Golongan Karya, lit. group of 
professionals) (K. Ward, 2010). Through these institutions, Suharto also established a system of 
political patronage linking him directly with regional political leaders. In addition, Suharto used the 
                                                          
5 Golongan Karya (liberally translated as functional groups and popularly abbreviated as Golkar) is a 
concept introduced by the New Order government as a new force comprising loyalists of Suharto 
representing every sector of society, military, labourers, and professionals to channel their 
aspirations in politics. In theory, Golkar would have to contest elections in the same way as any 
ordinary political party, but in reality it had unparalleled resources with which to coerce voter 
support. 
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state philosophy of Pancasila (ironically conceived by Sukarno) as the ideological basis for the New 
Order (p. 373). 
In that period, political re-centralisation created a stable regime but it began to create concentration 
of power which eventually ended up in a corrupt system. Chastened by the disastrous failure of 
Western liberal democracy as well as Sukarnoist guided democracy, Suharto and his loyal colleagues 
were only willing to accept a limited and managed democracy that is expected to work and produce 
rapid social and economic advancement. One of the main priorities of this democracy is to fix 
economic problems, and thus hyperinflation was tamed almost immediately. The success of economic 
policies is elaborated in detail by Wie (2012b). 
A summary of budget posture during the New Order and its comprehensive analysis can be found in 
MacAndrews (1986). The book discusses how the budget focused on strengthening sectoral purposes 
with little attention to regional needs. At the rural level, Suharto created his own channels through 
which he could deliver presidential funds (known as Bantuan Presiden—Banpres) directly to farmers 
throughout rural areas as a way of rewarding those loyal to him in Jakarta. In order to strengthen 
Jakarta’s grip over power in the regions, the New Order government introduced Law No. 5 Year 1974 
on Local Governance (Pemerintahan Daerah) and later Law No. 5 Year 1979 on Village Governance 
(Pemerintahan Desa).  
From the time he took power, Suharto believed that unless the economy was set right, living 
conditions improved, and economic opportunities were enhanced, it would be virtually impossible for 
them to create stable political order and to maintain the nation’s integrity and unity.  
The early Suharto’s administration first introduced ‘limited’ decentralisation while preserving the 
unitary system (de Wit, 1973). This entailed a model of local governance in which Jakarta had veto 
power over the appointment of provincial and district heads and also over the allocation of financial 
resources to the regions. Law No. 5 Year 1979 aimed to ensure that there was uniformity in 
governance structure at the village level across Indonesia. These two laws basically denied the rights 
of the regions to manage their own affairs (Booth, 2005). 
In line with the focus on social welfare improvement, Suharto took a stance on 'developmentalism' as 
a ‘broad brush’ strategy to reach economic growth (Cribb, 2010, p. 67). Having experienced huge 
advantages with the oil price rise in the early 1980s (‘oil bonanza’), the Suharto administration had a 
large sum of development funds. The budget was then redirected to build basic infrastructure and 
start the early phase of industrialisation (Narjoko & Hill, 2010). Yet, the disbursement and control for 
project implementation was undertaken almost entirely in a top-down mechanism.  
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For the purpose of redistribution and to appease the demand from the regions, the New Order 
government had attempted to launch long-term pilot projects that seemed to delegate some 
development and planning functions during the 1970s (Azis, 1990). By 1980, about one-fourth of the 
total development budget through eight different programmes were channelled to regions, known as 
Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres) programmes (Perdana & Maxwell, 2011, p. 275). 
In addition, Law No. 5 of 1974 established the legal framework giving semi-autonomy to regional (i.e. 
provincial and district levels) governments. 
As Indonesia became politically stable and entered the economic boom period of the 1980s and 1990s, 
rich regions such as Riau, East Kalimantan, Aceh, and then Papua, started to dispute Jakarta’s excessive 
role in their local affairs. The highly centralised (and often militarised) political system, increasingly 
controlled by a small inner circle of elites in Jakarta, had left many people in the regions feeling 
frustrated, uneasy or angry about the strongly centralised state control (Honna, 2010). Tensions 
between Jakarta and the regions raised serious concerns among elites in Jakarta. 
Along with the massive reform plan and his promise not to extend his presidency after 2003, it was 
generally believed that Suharto would make some further concessions to decentralisation before the 
crisis occurred but that centralisation would remain the dominant form and practice in government. 
Decentralisation finally gained wider political support in the lead up to the downfall of President 
Suharto in 20 May 1998. In fact, decentralisation was an important part of the reform agenda at that 
time proposed by the pro-reform camp in Indonesia (Edward Aspinall & Fealy, 2003, pp. 2–3). 
The decision to form limited democracy had taken its toll on civil rights, controlling political aspirations. 
The situation was exacerbated with the prominent role of the military, conglomerates, and corrupt 
bureaucracy. Ultimately, the fragile foundation of the economy could not sustain the 'domino effect' 
of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) that began in 1997 (Iriana & Sjöholm, 2002). The monetary crisis 
unveiled the fragile foundation of the economy, shown by the immediate adverse impact to public 
welfare. Exacerbated by the failure to secure the situation, the distribution networks crumbled and 
led to a scarcity of groceries, which then led to uncontrolled chaos. The combination of political and 
economic crises was ultimately the cause for the end of Suharto’s regime. 
 
2.2.4 Reform Period (1999-2004) 
To anyone’s surprise, the situation changed dramatically after Suharto resigned two months after his 
re-election. This commenced the period signified by efforts and struggles to transform Indonesia’s 
centralised autocracy into a decentralised, democratic state. The era of Reformasi had begun. 
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It was under Habibie’s transitional government that the highly centralised political system was 
gradually dismantled. Within eleven months in office, Habibie introduced a series of political reforms, 
including releasing almost all political prisoners, creating a new electoral system, adopting human 
rights principles, allowing press freedom and also introducing broader autonomy for regions as well 
as referendum options for East Timor (for further details see Kingsbury & Budiman, 2001; Manning & 
van Diermen, 2000). 
An interim government under President Habibie was established to manage the transition to popular 
democratic government. The new government, as if following the heavy wave of democratisation, 
produced a series of legislation in a relatively short period (Hosen, 2003). Among the many laws that 
were expedited through the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) were two that 
had the potential to change the structure and operation of government radically. These were Law 22 
Year 1999 on Regional Government and Law 25 Year 1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central 
Government and the Regions. Both laws effectively reversed almost four decades of centralism and 
authoritarianism (Silver, Azis, & Schroeder, 2001). Whilst the laws were successfully promulgated in 
1999, the implementation had to wait until 2001 largely due to the process of dissemination and the 
preparation for general election. 
The implementation of regional autonomy laws (Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah in January 2001 
brought a great deal of hope to those in Indonesia who had been crying out for reformation of the 
government and the laws. The highly centralistic government of the New Order, which kept close 
control over the use of resources, was increasingly seen as exerting a stranglehold on the lives of the 
Indonesian people. Especially outside Java, there were many who felt that they had never really 
enjoyed the fruits of 30 years of New Order, but instead bore the brunt of corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism. 
Evidently, legislatures were dominated by groups that intended to create considerable reform in all 
sectors whereas groups that still wanted to maintain the status quo began to diminish. The main 
stream pushed for reform. Enormous achievements could be seen in the removal of military seats in 
parliament and the reduction of their roles within society (Honna, 2003; Mietzner, 2006). The situation 
created unfavourable outcomes for military group. Allegedly, soon after the decision was decreed, 
some splinter groups within several military units joined local gangsters or militia to spread riots. 
Violence erupted in big cities mainly outside Java (van Klinken, 2007). 
Indonesia’s sense of vulnerability to secession was exacerbated by President Habibie’s early decision 
to allow what amounted to a referendum in the troubled province of East Timor on the issue of 
independence (Anwar, 2010). East Timorese voters, including both Indonesians who had settled in the 
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province and the large East Timorese diaspora, were invited to cast a verdict on a proposal for far-
reaching autonomy for the territory. In the event, the vote on 30 August 1999 was overwhelmingly in 
favour of independence (78.5 percent) with a turnout of 98.6 percent (Schulze, 2001).  
Following considerable reform to political regulations, new political parties consequently emerged. 
With various background and motifs, as many as 48 political parties participated in the new-format 
general election on 7 June 1999 (Liddle, 2000). PDI Perjuangan (as a political vehicle of Megawati, the 
major opposition of the previous regime) clutched 33.74 percent of winning votes. However, engaged 
in intense negotiations, the coalition of Islamist-nationalists succeeded to block Megawati from 
presidency and elected Abdurahman Wahid —conventionally known as Gus Dur— (pp. 35-38). 
During the Gus Dur administration (1999–2001), Laws No. 22 and 25 Year 1999 were introduced to 
the public, with the deadline for implementation of these laws set for January 2001. In this period, 
there was intense debate among the political players in Jakarta about the merits and disadvantages 
of decentralisation (see the opinions of experts summarised in A. L. Smith, 2001). One of the most 
important players was the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). This ministry had been the bastion of the 
unitary system during Suharto’s New Order and was controlled by powerful civilian bureaucrats and 
ex-military personnel. With the implementation of both regional laws, the role of MoHA would be 
curtailed, and thus not everyone within the ministry was happy about limited functions (Crouch, 2010, 
pp. 103–106). Further, decentralisation would require the transfer of governance from Jakarta to the 
regions, thus dismantling the privileges that had been enjoyed by the ministry in the past. 
Although Gus Dur was able to push for deeper reform in many avenues, he did not manage to reconcile 
his strife with the parliament and military. Therefore, with a little manoeuvring, the legislatures called 
for a Special Session and decided for his impeachment (see the details in Barton, 2002). His short-lived 
presidency, which lasted less than two years, was continued by Megawati until her administration 
ended in 2004.  
The rise of President Megawati in 2001 influenced the way in which Jakarta implemented 
decentralisation. Megawati had the strong nationalistic view that the unity of Indonesia (Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, NKRI) must be preserved. Therefore, she would not hesitate to reverse 
the policies of decentralisation if they were to endanger the unity of Indonesia. It is in this context that 
the idea of revising both Laws No. 22 and No. 25 Year 1999 is frequently debated among political 
players in Jakarta. 
At the implementation level, both decentralisation laws hindered efforts to harmonise the working 
relationship between the district, provincial, and national levels of government. Even worse, different 
Chapter 2: The Indonesian Context 
31 
 
regions interpreted the law differently, leading to confusion as different regions issued local 
regulations that contradicted each other and the national regulations. 
As the new president, Megawati and her team reviewed many concepts previously proposed by 
Habibie and Gus Dur, although for matters on decentralisation she seemed to push even further with 
the revision of decentralisation laws. In addition, she was also concerned with materialising the 
concept of the welfare state. In this case, she hurriedly proposed that the Law of Social Security 
enacted before the election on 5 July 2004 (Arifianto, 2006). In essence, the law urges for reform in 
social insurance, pensions, and jobs-related security, but it was drafted without proper consultation 
and seemed to be prematurely passed in legislation in order to boost support prior to the election. 
Before Megawati ended presidential office, she eventually had made substantial amendment on the 
arrangement of devolution with the enactment of Law No. 32 and No. 33 in 2004 (Booth, 2005, pp. 
209–210). The revision clarified a number of issues which have been made points of contention, 
including:  
a. Ambivalent status of province as an autonomous and administrative region. 
b. Biased towards rich-resource regions. 
c. Absence of constitutional checking mechanism to safeguard local administration. 
d. Inconsistency within decentralisation regulations. 
 
2.2.5 Consolidation Period (2004-present)  
The new period of democratisation was marked with the newly designed general election in 2004. The 
amendment of the constitution in previous years laid the groundwork for the process of election 
reform. Both legislative and presidential elections were directly held simultaneously for the first time 
(Liddle & Mujani, 2005). Senators, who are introduced at the first time in this type of election, were 
elected on a non-partisan basis. Because all the seats in the high assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat, MPR) were directly elected, this called for the removal of the military from the legislature, 
whose 38 seats were previously allocated. Nevertheless, this sophistication did not change the 
electoral pattern much and the turn out rate was found to be relatively high (84 percent). 
Whilst the administration periods of Gus Dur and Megawati were disrupted by instability within the 
high assembly, consolidation seemed to begin after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla were 
elected as President and Vice President, respectively (p. 121). Political parties set about building a 
coalition to reach their objectives and mainly to put their men into the cabinet. The election process 
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itself was considered peaceful and the result was then accepted as the success of democratic 
restoration. Arguably, the normalisation of democracy began to take place in 2004.  
In 2004, the Indonesian people experienced the first opportunity to really choose their national leader. 
The election of regional leaders followed the earlier move to directly elect the president and vice-
president at the national level in 2004. This was seen as a major breakthrough in the democratisation 
process (for more details on the unfolding process see Kartomi, 2005; Sulistiyanto, 2004). The local 
elections (pemilihan kepala daerah, pilkada), are the most recent aspect of this 'transition to 
democracy', as well as an important furthering of decentralisation - that is the power of the local 
people to make decisions locally and choose their own leaders.  
Pilkada, or the direct elections of regional heads, began in Indonesia in June 2005, and occurred in 
more than half of the regions of Indonesia in that year. With this democratic deepening, many believe 
it will reassure public participation in local democracy (Schiller, 2009). 
These direct elections can then be seen as a new avenue for the contestation of local leadership as 
well as the emergence of an active citizenship in the development of local democracy. The first 
regional head elections saw the emergence of local leaders of various backgrounds, including 
politicians, former bureaucrats, former military officers, business persons, religious leaders, 
community leaders, academics, NGO activists, and also media personalities (Pratikno, 2009). In this 
sense, the pilkada opened up more opportunities for various personages to participate in the local 
leadership contest in the regions. 
 
2.3 The Emergence of Decentralisation and Democratisation 
After the AFC, Indonesia entered a new development phase that saw the fall of the authoritarian 
Suharto government and new governance which moved highly centralised policies and powers 
towards a decentralised process. The third wave of democratisation, as coined by Samuel Huntington 
in 1991 had finally reached Indonesia and brought plenty of ramifications. Ideas and aspirations that 
were long suppressed in the previous regime had erupted to the surface. 
Just as significant in the political transformation of Indonesia was a programme of decentralisation 
which shifted responsibility for a wide range of administrative tasks from the central government to 
the level of kabupaten (district) and kota (city). Administrative devolution was initially a reaction to 
the New Order’s high degree of centralisation and it was widely hoped that intuitively it would bring 
government closer to the people. Hence public could access services better than before. The decision 
to devolve power to kabupaten (2nd tier) rather than provinces (1st tier), however, was made 
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deliberately to diminish the risk that newly empowered regions might seek to break away from 
Indonesia altogether. In the atmosphere of political freedom following the fall of the New Order, 
people in many parts of Indonesia began to canvass the hitherto impossible idea of seeking 
independence from Indonesia (E. Aspinall & Berger, 2001; Cribb, 1999). Although serious secessionist 
sentiment existed only in the already dissident regions of East Timor, Aceh, and Papua, the wider talk 
of breakup seriously alarmed the Jakarta elite (Webster, 2007). For the most part, the motivation was 
attributable to the grievances of relative deprivation and inequality caused by the uneven distribution 
of resources carried out by the autocratic regime of Suharto (see the analysis of Tadjoeddin, 2011). 
At the outset, decentralisation appears to be well suited to the particular geography of archipelagic 
Indonesia. Given such diversity and vastness, it is reasonable to assume that the experiment of 
decentralisation can deliver an efficient, effective, and responsive mode of government.  The early 
decentralisation laws: Law No. 22 Year 1999 and Law No. 25 Year 1999 (since revised as Law No. 9 
Year 2015 and Law No. 33 Year 2004), had contributed significantly to the current arrangements. Early 
commentaries on the relative success of decentralisation, signified by the smooth transfer of civil 
servants from central to local government, are summarised by Indrawati (2001) and Brodjonegoro 
(2009).  
These recent policies for decentralisation or regional autonomy need to be understood in a broader 
historical, political and legal setting. The question of whether Indonesia should be governed within a 
decentralised or centralised political structure is not a new one. Previously, the Dutch colonial 
government once introduced ‘limited’ decentralisation policies in 1903, 1905 and 1922 aiming to 
incorporate both modern and traditional elements in managing centre-region relations throughout 
Indonesia (Legge 1961, pp. 5–6). This structure was put in place, however, on the condition that the 
Dutch representatives would have full control over the government and administrative institutions 
including leaders at both the national and regional levels. When the Dutch left Indonesia in 1942, the 
Japanese occupation government not only inherited an already centralised political structure, but they 
further strengthened it because of their concern to exploit natural resources and to mobilise people 
for war against the Allies. 
 
2.3.1 Policy Context and Process 
In opting for a decentralised and democratised model of government, Indonesia seemed to be 
following a global trend. In the 1960s and 1970s, a large part of the international community had been 
a strong supporter of central planning. When that did not bring the desired developmental outcomes, 
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a new policy thrust was introduced which involved rolling back the state and relying more on the 
private sector.  
The decentralisation and democratisation process also raises serious concerns regarding the 
neoliberal agenda advocated by the coalition of domestic-based pro-reform camps and those of 
Western countries and multilateral institutions—such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme—that 
have poured funding and technical assistance into various programmes in Indonesia (Crawford, 2003). 
These multilateral institutions see decentralisation as part of a global democratisation process that 
started during the 1990s. Moreover, they have their own interests to pursue in ensuring that 
decentralisation continues and remains ‘on track’ (M. S. Winters, 2012). 
Decentralisation in Indonesia has been implemented together with other reforms and some of the 
ideas underpinning these reforms originated in the multilateral institutions mentioned above. Among 
these is the move to build a new legal framework and new institutions, to improve ‘capacity building’ 
as a prerequisite for decentralisation. so that the transfer of power, rights and responsibilities away 
from Jakarta to the regions will be enhanced by a strong legal and institutional base (Silver, 2005, pp. 
96–98). However, external assistance is not always welcome, because political actors in both Jakarta 
and the regions have their own interests to pursue and to protect, which may not coincide with the 
agenda of these international agencies. 
Many argue that a decentralised government or ‘federalisation’ is the most proper political 
arrangement for Indonesia due to its size and heterogeneity (Ferrazzi, 2000). In terms of geography 
and demography, Indonesia is considered very large. It consists of a surface area of over 4.8 million 
square kilometres of which 1.9 million square kilometres are land, broken into over 17,000 islands—
13,667 of which are inhabited—that stretch some 5,110 kilometres from east to west and some 1,880 
kilometres from north to south. In terms of population, Indonesia is large, but more importantly, it is 
very unevenly distributed. Of a total population of more than 250 million, 60 percent are living on the 
small island of Java, although which represents only seven per cent of the country’s land mass (see 
details in Statistics Indonesia, 2010). 
Socially, Indonesia is also a country with marked contrasts. Although the Javanese have been the 
dominant socio-cultural group, there are in reality 300 or more other ethnic groups scattered 
throughout the country, each strongly influenced by their own traditions that dominate their local 
areas (see Figure 2.2). Religion is another source of diversity. In spite of the fact that most of the 
citizens are predominantly Muslim (by statistical records), Indonesia actually recognises no fewer than 
five other official religions - Protestant Christianity (with multiple denominations), Catholicism, 
Chapter 2: The Indonesian Context 
35 
 
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism - all of which play a recognised and often influential role in 
Indonesian society. Given the size and heterogeneity of the country, it is very difficult for the central 
government to understand and govern effectively. Therefore, it seems logical that some functions of 
government should be devolved to the local people through the setting up of representative local 
governments. 
 
Source: Kartapranata and Statistics Indonesia (2010) 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of Ethnicities in Indonesia 
 
2.3.2 Democratic Politics and Public Participation 
If we look at Indonesian political history, this has not always been the prevailing view on 
decentralisation. There is an opposing argument that the size and heterogeneity of the country could 
lead to fragmentation and the accentuation of disparities, which might constrain policies of political 
decentralisation. Geographically, the archipelagic nature of the country creates difficulties in 
communication between areas of the country, highlighting their isolation and differences. Diverse 
languages, traditions, religions and cultures, regionalism potentially might have a greater influence on 
society than the sense of nationalism. Therefore, it is not surprising that Indonesia has witnessed a 
changing pattern of relationships between central and local governments throughout its history.  
From the independence of the country, the newly established government had experimented with 
decentralisation. Laws on local government stipulated in 1948, 1949, and 1957 promoted autonomy 
and local democracy. However, in 1959, a presidential decree moved to a centralised system of 
government that was applied throughout the remaining years of Sukarno’s government (Tinker & 
Walker, 1959). 
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The subsequent government took a similar policy option. Inheriting a chronic economic crisis from the 
previous administration, the Suharto government in its early years prioritised economics reform above 
political development, and as a consequence emphasized political stability rather than political 
freedom (Edward Aspinall & Fealy, 2010, pp. 4–5). More importantly, it rationalised the use of an 
authoritarian government to carry out these economic tasks. 
Indeed, the 1999 decentralisation policy was the result of public political pressures that the central 
government was unable to refuse or escape. The political legitimacy of the Habibie government, the 
political environment that limited the use of military coercion, and the economic crisis all undermined 
the political authority of the central government. The inability to maintain a highly centralised 
government meant the government had to adopt a decentralised system of government. Therefore, 
the sustainability of the decentralisation policy is not a fait accompli, but rather a product of political 
bargaining between local and national political powers in the years to come. 
As part of the decentralisation and democratisation process, the heads of provinces, kabupaten and 
kota have been directly elected from 2005, rather than being chosen by the provincial, district and 
city councils, with strong input from the centre, as under the New Order. It is interesting to reflect 
comparatively from the view of the Philippines’ experience in implementing a direct electoral system 
within the context of decentralisation which results point towards increasing ‘bossism’ and 
personality-oriented politics (Törnquist, 1999).  
A significant turning point was decided in parliament in the very last month of Yudhoyono’s presidency 
(September and October 2014), the abolition attempt of direct local elections overshadowed many 
other developments related to decentralisation, not least because of the very high symbolic value 
many Indonesians attach to this particular feature of democracy. Regional autonomy has long been a 
thorn in the side of the central government. Especially in Yudhoyono’s second term, efforts to weaken 
the districts and cities intensified (Tomsa, 2015, pp. 170–172).  
 
2.3.3 Designing Organisations for Autonomous Governments 
Regardless of the reasons behind the decentralisation policy, Law No. 22 Year 1999 has introduced 
quite a significant change in national political arrangements by decentralising considerable authority 
to local governments. According to this law, the authority of the national government is limited to five 
public arenas: international affairs, defence, monetary policy, religion and the judiciary (Seymour & 
Turner, 2002, p. 38). This policy is then secured by the central government regulation No. 25 in 2000, 
which lists in detail all kinds of activities and authorities that belong to the central and provincial 
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governments (Rasyid, 2004). Other activities and authorities that are not on the list fall into the hands 
of the district and municipal governments. 
The new decentralisation policy provides more autonomy at the district and municipal levels than at 
the provincial level (Alm, Aten, & Bahl, 2001). The provincial government, according to the law, is given 
authority to deal mostly with matters that cross district or municipal boundaries. It is also mentioned 
that the district and municipal governments are not subordinate to the provincial government. The 
position of the provincial government as the central government representative through 
deconcentrated power is also limited. Therefore, field administration agencies (dinas) or central 
government offices at the provincial level (kanwil or kantor wilayah, the branch of ministry at the local 
level) are now limited to the five areas that the central government still controls, while field 
administration agencies for other matters at the district and municipality level have been dissolved 
(Booth, 2003, p. 194). 
This new arrangement of central and local relations has strengthened the political position of the 
district and municipal governments. Besides having greater authority devolved to them, the formal 
position of the district and municipal governments is stronger due to the abolition of their position as 
deconcentrated agencies (Alm et al., 2001, p. 85). As the district and municipal government no longer 
see themselves as the subordinates of the provincial government, the latter often has difficulties in 
communicating and coordinating with them (Firman, 2009, p. 154).  
 
2.3.4 Fiscal Decentralisation and Regional Developments 
The enactment of decentralisation laws inadvertently created incentives for regional splitting or 
proliferation6. The number of subnational administrative units is large and increasing rapidly. Over the 
period 1998-2015 the number of provinces rose from 27 to 34, the number of districts (kabupaten) 
from 249 to 416, the number of municipalities (kota) from 65 to 98, the number of sub-districts 
(kecamatan) from 4,028 to 6,793, and the number of villages (kelurahan) from 67,925 to 79,075.  
There has also been decentralisation, to a certain extent, in terms of financial resources, as set out in 
Law No. 25 Year 1999 on central-local financial relations. While in the past there were no provisions 
in the law to allocate block grants, this law now stipulates that 25 percent of national revenue should 
be distributed as block grants to the local governments. Of the total, 10 percent is allocated to all the 
                                                          
6 The process of territorial change occurring in Indonesia today, dubbed pemekaran wilayah (regional 
blossoming) or pembentukan daerah (new region formation), refers to the splitting or dividing up of 
provinces, districts, and sub-districts into multiple new territorial administrative units (Booth, 2011; 
Kimura, 2013, p. 10; Pierskalla, 2016).  
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provinces and the remaining 90 percent is given to all the districts and municipalities (E. Ahmad & 
Mansoor, 2002). 
Another important change is the introduction of sharing between central and local governments of 
revenues generated from natural resources such as oil and gas (Fitrani, Hofman, & Kaiser, 2005, p. 61). 
While in the past only property tax was shared between the national and local governments, now a 
district producing oil receives six per cent of the total revenue generated from this source, while the 
provincial government also receives similar share. The provincial, district and municipal governments 
also receive other sharing revenues. 
The implication of this policy is clear, the regions that are rich in natural resources, such as East 
Kalimantan, Riau, West Papua and Aceh, increased their total budget significantly in 2001. The hope 
was that this policy would reduce political tensions. However, the cases of West Papua and Aceh 
provinces, in particular, were much more complex than just fiscal problems. The two regions were still 
dissatisfied and have demanded independence. In 2000, the central government decided to give 
‘special autonomy’ to Aceh and West Papua (Malley, 2002, p. 128). By this special treatment, the two 
provinces were given a higher degree of autonomy and a larger financial allocation. 
As a result of these increases, subnational expenditures now makes up about half of consolidated 
government expenditure, net of interest payments and subsidies. Not only is the flow of funds to 
subnational governments large, but the use of these fungible funds is mostly unrestricted. Over 90 
percent of subnational government revenue comes from central government transfers, with the 
General Purpose Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) contributing about 60 percent of the total (Hofman, 
Kadjatmiko, Kaiser, & Sjahrir, 2006). 
  
2.3.5 The Lessons and Prospects  
Coinciding with the abrupt transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, Indonesia had 
transformed the shape of nation-state immensely. More than a decade after the introduction of 
‘reformasi’, it is therefore timely to examine how effective the changes have been, and how they have 
affected Indonesian development.  
Indonesia’s decentralisation and democratisation process have been plagued by many protracted 
problems, from corruption to chaotic implementation. These weaknesses have been extensively 
documented. The seemingly overwhelming difficulties are not surprising as these are also common in 
a country with a per capita income below $1,000 (in 2001 base year) and a long history of 
patrimonialism. 
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There are many crucial issues in this local and central government relationship. Methodologically, it is 
necessary to differentiate the challenges of this local–central government relationship into three 
levels. The first is the conceptual level, the second is the institutional level, and the third is the 
individual level. 
At the conceptual level, there is currently a huge gap between local and central governments. Many 
multilateral and bilateral partner institutions always insist that the evolution of decentralisation 
should begin by clearly defining the functions and responsibilities divided between the central and 
local governments, particularly with regard to funding and resource issues. However, the local 
government, and the local people, are not necessarily concerned about the overall functions and 
responsibilities of administration, but have an interest in first gaining the capital, while overlooking 
the concerns of the central government. As some policy makers put it: “it’s your problem, it’s not my 
problem” (Indrawati, 2001, p. 80). So there exists a very serious gap between reality and the 
expectations of local authorities who wish for more funds and do not want to share the burdens of 
duty.  
At the institutional level, there are a lot of challenges and problems. The first is related to the technical 
capabilities of implementation, although the preparation of so-called 'local autonomy' began in the 
early 1980s when the government established the local government planning agency. Stemming from 
this, a lot of training has been done on capacity, although the quality and the speed of training have 
never met the demand. There is thus a serious technical capability issue, raising concerns about 
whether the devolved authorities can assume such a huge responsibility (D. A. Rondinelli, Nellis, & 
Cheema, 1983). Consequently, the central government of Indonesia gave priority in terms of devolved 
authorities to at least the four most important, most resource-rich provinces, namely, Aceh, Riau, East 
Kalimantan and West Papua. These regions received significant amount of funding starting from 2000. 
The question is whether they could manage the fund properly or it will create a cause for corruptions.  
The second problem concerns the existence of institutional processes of checks and balances on the 
local government and, in particular, whether the local parliament will properly monitor the local 
administration (Rohdewold, 2003). There is a tendency for both local parliaments and local 
governments to use allocated funds on consumption-orientated policies rather than for investment. 
One can easily imagine a scenario of local government salary increases and a wide array of lavish 
projects, such as gymnasiums, sport centres, or statutes of local heroes. This increase in consumption 
by local government may conflict with the central government’s anti-inflationary policies. 
The third challenge concerns the issue of governance. This relates to the extremely high levels of 
corruption in the Suharto administration (J. A. Winters, 2013) and weak institutional foundation in 
Chapter 2: The Indonesian Context 
40 
 
every areas ranging from politics to bureaucracy (Indrawati, 2002). There is currently a proposed 
scenario that by significantly increasing the salary of the higher level officers it significantly reduces 
the degree of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) in Indonesia. But the prevalence of KKN will 
not necessarily be completely undermined by this salary increase, as lucrative 'extra payments' from 
the business community will continue to be attractive. The additional legal income will not necessarily 
'weed out' KKN from the system. So some serious questions remain over how to implement more 
effective bureaucratic reforms. 
 
2.4 The Development of Social Protection 
Social protection (SP) as a policy per se was not evidently available in the colonial era. Looking back at 
the colonial period, the Dutch East Indies government designed the inception part of this programme 
limited mainly for their officers only. Most of the programmes were related to productive sectors. 
Chief among these is the Cultivation System (cultuurstelsel) in the mid-19th century which apparently 
failed to improve social welfare for the masses (Fasseur, 1994). Industrialisation policies also hardly 
affected livelihoods positively. 
The first quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of reform and experimentation aimed at the 
creation of a more modern colonial state (Luiten van Zanden, 2010). These projects were intended to 
optimise production factors (labour, land, and commodities) in order to ease the burden on the 
imperial budget. The first phase consisted of reforms initiated by Governor General Daendels in 1808-
1811 who introduced the concept of the 'enlightened' state and modern-formal Weberian 
bureaucracy into Java. Second, from 1811 to 1816, the British (with the command of Governor General 
Raffles) controlled the colony and inculcated their own ideas and practices. Third, between 1816 and 
1826 the Dutch resumed their attempts at reform.  
Analysis on social welfare in Indonesia over the early 19th century has been eclipsed almost completely 
with the vast literature on the examination of economic growth. The studies point to a number of 
distinct phases in the development of total factor productivity. Fertile lands and an enormous labour 
supply did not necessarily translate into productive factors in the economic structure. Comparison of 
Raffles’ population estimate of 1815 and the population census of 1900 suggests that the population 
grew extremely rapidly (Peper, 1970). This situation created a hefty challenge for implementing SP 
during the colonial administration. 
Apart from economic and production policies, it was the Ethical Policy (Ethische Politiek) in the early 
20th century that aimed to bring better living standards amongst member of societiy. Cribb (1993) has 
argued that there were three main strands in this policy i.e. education, irrigation, and emigration. 
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Supported by liberal groups in the Netherlands and East Indies, it was able to provide basic services 
towards indigenous population. Although the policy actually served the interests of the Dutch colonial 
ruler due to the increasing availability of quality administrators, it also created opportunities for 
indigenes to increase their life qualities. However, such policies were considered insufficient to stave 
off the threat of a ‘Malthusian catastrophe’ in Java (pp. 244-245). 
In spite of the ravages of depression in the early decades of the 20th century, the level of per capita 
GDP in Indonesia has increased substantially, yet it was still below that of neighbouring countries. 
Social indicators such as health and education also show meagre progress compared to average 
standards (Booth, 2007). One reason for poor social indicators would have been poor nutrition. The 
evidence indicates that rice availability in Java was low in comparison with many other parts of the 
Southeast Asia (Anderson, 1966). 
Entering the independence period, SP was normatively becoming one important agenda of Indonesia’s 
founding fathers. The 1945 Constitution stipulated the provision of social welfare in its preamble. 
These unfortunately did not deliver immediately for various reasons. Indonesia did not have the 
capacity to develop a social security system in its early years. In the context of instability and chaos, 
social policy was neglected in favour of other critical problems, such as political reconstruction and 
government restructuring (Anderson, 1983). 
People saw the emergence of the New Order era as a slight improvement to their self-sufficiency. 
Flurries of social policies were designed and implemented particularly after gaining considerable 
revenue out of oil and commodity trade. However, sustainable and institutionalised policies were 
hardly conceived in policymaking. Priorities on macroeconomic policies seemed to dominate the 
discourse in Suharto’s regime. Many of them were intended to control and to stabilise inflation 
through subsidies. Some programmes involved rudimentary forms of targeting. For example, rural 
infrastructure programs or block grants to poor villages aimed at particular geographic areas, while 
policies such as credit for farmers targeted specific employment sectors (Ito, 2011, p. 424). 
Meanwhile, with the influence of entrenched informal and traditional values, the Indonesian people 
never relied heavily on government run safety net programs. The country has had neither the 
economic apparatus nor the political mechanism necessary to deliver large-scale and widespread 
transfer programs. Instead, government social spending was largely focused towards 'social services' 
such as health and education, with the family and communities providing 'social insurance.' There 
were some subsidised health care and compulsory social security programmes limited only for formal 
sector employees (Waters, Saadah, & Pradhan, 2003, p. 179). 
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The economic crisis momentously triggered sets of SP-like policies. Establishing the social safety net 
programs in Indonesia in 1998 was, therefore, more like casting a new net rather than merely 
expanding an existing one. Later in the mid-2000s, Indonesia had to undertake sizable reform on 
policies regarding subsidies. The country was no longer able to use fossil-fuel subsidies to help 
alleviate poverty and to control inflation (Dartanto, 2013). However, over time, this policy has grown 
increasingly expensive. It has also been criticised for being inefficient and regressive, given that the 
rich enjoy a greater proportion of benefits than the poor (Yusuf & Resosudarmo, 2008).  
The promulgation of the Law on Social Security in 2004 was meant to be an important breakthrough 
(Widjaja, 2012). Since it was also considered a novel issue, the lengthy discussion caused by the draft 
had been revised 56 times before being enacted as Law No. 40 Year 2004 on the National Social 
Security System (Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional, SJSN). One of the major debates in the deliberation 
process was on deciding the type of institution that would manage the national social security 
programmes, that is, whether it should be in the form of a state-owned enterprise or a public and 
non-profit legal entity. The SJSN Law had the profound consequence of covering the entire population, 
in both the formal and informal sectors, and bringing them into the national social security system 
(Suryahadi, Febriany, & Yumna, 2014b). 
Following up the implementation of the SJSN Law was the enactment of Law No. 24 Year 2011 
regarding Social Security Carriers (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial, or known as BPJS). The 
discussion for this law also took a long time (see the summary in Widianto, 2013). The points of 
contention range from the benefits, memberships, contributions, punishments, and most importantly 
the status of carriers as the operating body of social security (Wisnu, 2013). Strong resistance from 
existing agencies (Askes, Jamsostek, Taspen, and Asabri) were clearly visible and their objections 
somehow contributed to protracted negotiations. Finally, with many gaps left unchecked and 
concessions, the government and legislatures agreed to promulgate the law. Subsequently, the 
government was given a mandate to issue operating regulations which include details and 
technicalities. 
 
2.4.1 Overview of Social Welfare Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis  
As one of the world’s largest emerging economies, Indonesia has experienced rapid economic growth 
and the substantial reduction of poverty over the past three decades, particularly prior to the AFC. 
Real economic growth averaged 6.7 percent per year over the three decades of the New Order Regime 
which began roughly in 1965. This growth was associated with increasing contributions of the 
industrial and services sectors, increasing urbanisation, and growth of the middle class (Wie, 2012a). 
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Before the onset of the economic crisis in mid-1997, Indonesia was one of the most rapidly growing 
economies in the world. Mainly driven by rising oil prices in the early 1980s, this rapid growth had 
generated an unprecedented reduction in poverty within a remarkably short period of time (H. Hill, 
2000, pp. 118–119). 
Indonesia’s economic growth was also associated with significant declines in poverty, especially 
among rural households. Between 1970 and 1996, absolute poverty fell by around 50 percentage 
points, accompanied by substantial gains in education and health standards. In the first half of the 
1990s, GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7 per cent, and the poverty rate fell dramatically from 
32.7 per cent in 1990 to 17.4 per cent by 1996 (Suryadarma, Artha, Suryahadi, & Sumarto, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.3 Various Poverty Rates According to Different Standards 
With significant improvement in the economy, poverty rates especially during the 1970s-80s declined 
drastically (at least according to official government data). Figure 2.3 describes the changes in poverty 
rates using various standards. It appears that national poverty rates do not differ crucially according 
to the PPP$1.9 poverty line, especially in the last two decades. However, the gap emerges substantially 
when the national poverty rate is contrasted with the lower middle income poverty standard i.e. 
PPP$3.1 poverty line. This chart conveys a message not only that the methodology in counting national 
poverty might need thorough review and update (Priebe, 2014; Sumner & Edward, 2014) but it also 
implies a higher degree of vulnerability in terms of social welfare. Yet, regardless of the stark 
discrepancy, there has been progress in poverty reduction over the last decade. 
While poverty reduction was not a policy objective in official government documents until the early 
1990s, the government’s agricultural and rural development strategies and commitment to human 
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to poverty reduction (Booth, 1997). Furthermore, the government intervened in staple foods markets 
for the purpose of reducing domestic price volatility and increasing food security.  
The impacts of crisis felt by households are channelled through several mechanisms. These can be 
traced to the different sources of household income —wages, salaries, and self-employment incomes; 
returns on physical assets; and the receipt of public transfers— and to the prices households face 
when purchasing goods and services (Ferreira & Keely, 2000). There are also effects at the level of the 
broader community, which affects individual welfare. 
When the economic crisis hit hard in 1998, concerns over its social impacts were high. As a response, 
the government within a relatively brief period formulated its social safety net policies. The 
multidimensional crisis has had a deep impact on employment, household income, and consumption. 
The impact was particularly severe because of the coincidence of massive exchange rate depreciation 
and its effect on tradeable goods prices on the one hand, and the drought and food price increases on 
the other. Summaries on how these events were unfolding and its impact are concisely written by 
Abimanyu (2001), Ikhsan (2001) and Ananta (2001). 
 
2.4.2 Social Safety Net Programmes as a Response to the Crisis 
Starting in the 1998/99 fiscal year, the government of Indonesia had launched the Social Safety Net 
(Jaringan Pengaman Sosial, JPS) programme. In that first year alone, the JPS constituted around 30 
percent of total government expenditure (Sumarto, Suryahadi, & Widyanti, 2002). As in other crisis-
affected countries, the projects were meant to be only temporary. Without a clear institutional 
antecedent, policy-makers faced the daunting task of undertaking these social interventions amid 
severe political instability and an increasingly pressing fiscal condition. JPS programmes covered 
education, health, community empowerment and employment creation, in addition to the rice 
subsidy programme known as special rice market operation (Operasi Pasar Khusus, OPK) (Tabor & 
Sawit, 2001). The scope and magnitude of this SP initiative was simply unprecedented in Indonesian 
history. 
While maintaining some JPS programmes in the years after the crisis, the government also aimed to 
restructure the grossly regressive fuel subsidies (Bahan Bakar Minyak, BBM) and to channel budgetary 
savings into targeted SP and poverty alleviation programmes (Sumarto, Suryahadi, & Bazzi, 2008, pp. 
131–132). Although the policy of subsidies reduction were very sensitive, the government on several 
occasions after 2000 managed to reduce the BBM subsidy and subsequently reallocated a portion of 
the savings to social programmes, known as 'Fuel Subsidy Compensation Fund' (Program Kompensasi 
Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar, PKPS-BBM). Alongside dramatic subsidy cutbacks in 2005, the 
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government implemented a substantial compensation package including unconditional cash transfers, 
health support, educational assistance, and infrastructure development programmes. Following the 
2005, 2008 and 2013 fuel subsidy reductions, the government delivered temporary cash transfer 
programs targeting low-income households, to relieve the burden due to higher prices (Kwon & Kim, 
2015). 
 
2.4.3 Reforms and the Expansions of SP 
In drawing lessons from the JPS and PKPS-BBM programmes, policymakers, and researchers today are 
striving to create a more efficient, equitable and coherent SP policy. The goal is not merely to provide 
risk-coping mechanisms in response to crises but also to institute sustainable programmes that 
support intergenerational pathways out of poverty. 
The JPS programmes were merely an ad hoc response to the crisis. Prepared in haste, almost all of its 
component programmes were plagued by the problems of targeting. A large number of the poor were 
not covered by the programmes and there was substantial benefit leakage to the non-poor (Overseas 
Development Institute, 2006).   
While the targeting of the JPS programmes has been called into question by numerous authors, 
without such programmes social welfare would not have recovered in such a relatively short time 
(Sumarto et al., 2008, pp. 122–123). Several JPS programmes generated clear welfare improvements 
at the household and aggregate level, and by 2002 many of the worst welfare losses had been reversed 
as the poverty rate fell to 12.2 per cent, even below pre-crisis levels. The PKPS-BBM programmes have 
since helped to maintain these post-crisis gains despite periodic bouts of economic volatility and, more 
importantly, have enabled the central government to move gradually into a more progressive public 
spending regime. 
In terms of programme design and implementation, they were supervised by the central government 
and were intended to have the following characteristics: quick disbursement, direct financing to 
beneficiaries, transparency, accountability, and encouraging participation of the society in monitoring 
the implementation of programmes (Sumarto, Suryahadi, & Widyanti, 2005, p. 158). 
In spite of the development of a modern social security system prior to the AFC, the system still left a 
large part of the population uncovered (Daly & Fane, 2002). The system limited its coverage to formal 
sector workers, whereas about two-thirds of workers were in the informal sector. Even for those who 
were covered by the system, the scheme did not deliver a sufficient level of income protection or 
quality of services for the workers and let the workers who were hit by the crisis fall into poverty. 
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With regards to health assistance, decentralisation in 2001 transferred the responsibility for managing 
health from the central government to the subnational governments, particularly to the district 
governments. This had a tremendous impact on the national health system, which was previously 
predominantly managed by the central government (Kristiansen & Santoso, 2006). The subnational 
governments, particularly the district, now have the freedom to develop and plan their own health 
programmes and activities with their own funds and the funds they receive from the Ministry of Health. 
Nevertheless, the decentralisation arrangements and its derivative regulations still create confusion 
regarding the role and responsibilities of each level of government, in particular the provincial level. 
Shared responsibility between all stakeholders, which includes the state, employers, individuals as 
workers, and families or communities, is a basic concept of social security provision. In Indonesia, as 
mentioned in the previous section, informal or traditional support systems from extended families or 
communities still have a significant role in the provision of support for people (especially those in the 
informal sectors) in times of crisis. Meanwhile, for the formal sectors, there is a strong reliance on the 
employer’s liability provisions and, to a lesser extent, on public and/or private social insurance 
programmes. 
The SJSN Law required that the regulation on implementing agencies be created by October 2009, five 
years after it was passed. However, the timeline could not be achieved by the government and the 
draft of the derivative regulation was not submitted to Parliament by that date. In the meantime, 
policies on targeting beneficiaries were already brought to high level policymaking. Led by a task force 
within the Office of the Vice President, the government developed a new asset-based measure for 
determining household eligibility. Using the proposed list, local government officials forwarded lists 
of households they judged eligible for social assistance (e.g. cash transfers and health care). However, 
local officials could certify additional households to receive benefits by issuing the household with a 
letter of indigency depending on their fiscal capacity and idiosyncratic leaderships (Sumarto et al., 
2005). 
Today, however, Indonesia’s budgetary allocations to social and human development priorities still 
remain among the lowest in South East Asia as a proportion of GDP, and its policymakers face a critical 
trade-off between further repairing the state budget and making necessary social investments.  
Later in 2011 targeting mechanisms have begun to evolve with the creation of a unified database. It 
comprises households in the the lowest 40th percentile as a roster for SP beneficiaries (Suryadarma & 
Sumarto, 2011, pp. 169–170). This comprehensive database is expected to be an important tool for 
central agencies and local governments to better deliver benefits, notwithstanding the difficulties in 
updating the list on a regular basis. In spite of data improvement, a publication from the World Bank 
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(World Bank, 2012c) has reported that 'a number of regional governments have expressed 
discontentment over its reliability and often published their versions using various questionable 
methods' (pp. 11-17). Not infrequently, local leaders decide to design and perform a universal SP 
programme without prior targeting for the sake of avoiding potential conflict owing to the disputed 
beneficiaries’ list.  
The progression of Indonesia’s SP policies has been accompanied with institutional reforms. One of 
the bigest reforms is the establishment of the National Team for Accelerating Poverty Reduction (Tim 
Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, abbreviated as TNP2K) in 2010 under the direct 
command of the Vice President (Suryadarma & Sumarto, 2011, p. 167) (Suryadarma & Sumarto 2011, 
p.167). TNP2K also holds the responsibility to manage its local counterparts, the Coordinating Team 
for Regional Poverty Alleviation (Tim Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, TKPKD). The 
main mandate of TKPKD is to establish a local strategy for coordinated poverty alleviation at the 
districts or cities level.  
The establishment of TNP2K and TKPKD was in time with the rejuvenation of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs (MoSA) which was dissolved previously during the administration of Gus Dur (1999-2001). 
Considering its mandate, one can infer that budget allocation for the MoSA after its re-establishment 
in 2001 was barely sufficient. This can be seen in low scores of the Social Protection Index (see results 
and methodology in Asian Development Bank, 2013; Baulch, Wood, & Weber, 2006). Aside from 
profound changes in institutional settings, significant reforms in financing started as the government 
decided to utilise a portion of the 'fiscal space' created from fuel subsidies reductions to finance SP 
programmes. Hence, parts of the temporary, crisis-motivated initiatives were shifted into permanent 
programmes.      
The most recent attempt at transforming SP programmes in Indonesia is marked by the 
implementation of universal programmes such as social health insurance (Allford & Soejachmoen, 
2013; Simmonds & Hort, 2013). However, the budget allocated to SP programmes at the local level 
varies widely. This variance occurs mainly in light of Law No. 32 Year 2004 which does not preserve SP 
under the 'obligatory' function of the central government and allows each province to regulate their 
own SPs without a defined standard. On a related note, local budgeting on SP is also affected by a 
higher priority placed on administrative expenses and weakened accountability mechanism in almost 
every region (Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, & Schulze, 2014).  
According to Wisnu et al (2015), key programmes and approaches to social welfare that Yudhoyono 
adopted during his ten years in office were identified as manifestation of President’s policy to play 
safe. He generally avoided clear targets, performance indicators, benchmarking, and visionary efforts 
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to anticipate future challenges. Rather than committing himself personally to particular programmes, 
he put a safe distance between himself and his policies by encouraging a plethora of complex 
bureaucratic procedures or establishing new agencies. 
 
2.4.4 The Coordinative State and Roles of Local Governments 
One of the most important characteristics of Indonesian poverty is the significant variation in the 
incidence of poverty across the archipelago (Booth, 1993). Those regions where poverty rates are the 
highest also tend to have lower levels of educational attainment, less clean water supply, poorer 
quality of sanitation, and the weakest public health outcomes, especially in the areas of maternal and 
child health and malnutrition. There are also regional disparities in access to public facilities. As a result, 
those governments that have emerged as powerful entities at the regional level since decentralisation 
now have a critical role to play (Akita, 1988). 
What determines the differences in both levels of poverty and rates of change in poverty across the 
archipelago? Poverty rates are expected to be closely related to levels of regional development, given 
the differences in resource endowments across regions and the persistence of socio-economic 
differences over time (H. Hill, 1989). But at the same time, there seems to be a tendency towards 
convergence in poverty rates over time as capital moves into and labour out of the poorer, low-wage 
regions (Miranti, 2011). 
Under regional autonomy, significant levels of funding and political authority have been transferred 
to the regions, to provincial and especially to district governments (Ostwald, Tajima, & Samphantharak, 
2016, pp. 147–148). Each year around 40 percent of central government expenditure is allocated to 
the regions. The progress of poverty reduction now depends to a greater extent than ever before on 
local government capacity to manage budgets, establish priorities and deliver sound policies. 
Supporters of regional autonomy have argued that its implementation would improve the delivery of 
essential public services. District governments would be better informed about specific challenges 
facing their areas than the central or even the provincial levels of administration and could tailor 
service delivery to meet local needs. So far, however, the impact of decentralisation has been patchy, 
while the tendency to create new regions has the potential to exacerbate existing inequalities and 
reduce access to funding between regions (B. D. Lewis, 2014b).  
In decentralised Indonesia, many of the reforms and programme activities that drive social welfare 
improvement must take place in the provinces and districts. However, there remain many important 
tasks that require effective coordination at the national level as policies in the past (Crane, 1995). 
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These include such aspects as comprehensive and nationally directed data collection process; effective 
monitoring and evaluation drawing on a pool of skilled personnel; and pooling of financial resources 
to fund large-scale programmes (Perdana & Maxwell, 2011, pp. 287–288). National-level coordination 
and decision making can reduce transaction costs and achieve economies of scale, and ultimately will 
ensure that uniform national standards are being met so that all regions receive adequate attention.  
The decentralisation laws define three types of functions: i) 'retained' (by central government), ii) 
'obligatory' (transferred to local governments), and iii) 'voluntary' (local governments may opt to leave 
with the central government or take over control) (see details in Turner, Podger, Sumardjono, & 
Tirthayasa, 2004). Social policies are in fact among the 'obligatory' functions. Yet, most overarching 
decisions regarding the design, planning, and budget allocations for social assistance programs are still 
taken by central government line ministries. This may be due to the lack of state capacity or a result 
of prioritisation. 
Several studies have documented the implementation of various SP programmes in Indonesia. Their 
findings show that the implementation of different poverty reduction programmes between regions 
have had various impacts (see for instance Jellema & Noura, 2012, p. 21). In this regards, the World 
Bank (2012a) has attempted to undertake the Social Assistance Public Expenditure Review on the 
analysis of Indonesian SP budget effectiveness. Findings in this report show a significant increase in 
public expenditure for SP, surprisingly in the poorer provinces (p. 21). In spite of a detailed review on 
social expenditure, this report only focuses on central government-funded programmes to protect 
poor households from shocks.  
Nevertheless, Alatas (2011) points out that the involvement of local government in conditional cash 
transfers, otherwise a centralised government programme, did not meet expectations due to 
insufficient supply side issues, including a lack of health and education facilities. The problem has 
become even more complex, as decentralisation has reduced interaction between central and local 
governments. Booth (2005) concurs with this finding, pointing out that given the considerable power 
and authority transferred to regional governments via decentralisation, it would not be surprising if 
regional politicians were unlikely to cooperate with central government unless they saw a direct 
personal benefit (p. 198). 
 
2.5 Summary 
The historical narrative of decentralisation, democratisation, and SP in Indonesia can be traced back 
further to the colonial era. Each period left an indelible mark on the characteristics of public policies. 
Polity and governance transformed remarkably along with regime changes.  
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With fierce struggle and bloodbaths, Indonesia obtained its independence in a very difficult process. 
This has soured the relationship with its former coloniser and made her cast off Dutch-imposed 
federalism in favour of a unitary state from the beginning of nation-state formation. Later, during the 
inception years of governance, several rebellions and attempts of secession from provinces 
contributed to Sukarno's dictatorial style of leadership. Continued by the next regime, Suharto's heavy 
centralisation during the New Order made federalism taboo in public discussion. 
In the reform period, however, the concept is re-emerging, but federalism was never discussed in an 
open, inclusive, and balanced manner. Decentralisation policy is focused on the district in order to 
distribute powers to smaller entities so that the attempt to secede (as imagined alternatively in the 
decentralised provinces) could be diffused. Designed in a rather hasty manner, this policy is 
accompanied by a confused and misleading official discourse that is consistent with the ideology of 
power retention and maintenance of patrimonial governance. As a result of greater democratisation 
of the polity, federalism is slowly entering official discourse. Although its prospects in the short term 
remain gloomy, support may grow for some federal principles within Indonesia's unitary structure.  
Looking at more recent development, the prevailing view among many policy makers and policy 
advisers is that decentralisation has been somewhat of a disappointment. This assessment derives 
from the observation that local public service delivery has merely improved little, if at all, since the 
implementation in 2001, despite an apparently significant transfer of funds to provinces and districts 
to discharge their newfound responsibilities.  
The New Order era was signified by its success in stabilising the economy and maintaining the welfare 
level of its society. Suharto's administration also benefited greatly from increasing world oil prices 
when new oil fields were being produced abundantly. Yet, as the oil boom came to an end in the early 
1980s, this made the New Order government redirect the economy from being dependent on oil 
towards the promotion of the export-oriented manufacturing sector, while large public investments 
in education, health, family planning and infrastructure continued. In this way, policy focus was 
centred largely on economic growth with minimal attention to redistribution. 
The AFC in 1997 eventually led to detrimental shocks which reverberated among layers of society. The 
social impact of the crisis has been substantial and is still evolving four years after the crisis started. 
One estimate indicates that the national poverty rate jumped from 15.7 percent in 1996 to 27.1 
percent in the next three years. During this period, the number of urban poor doubled, while the rural 
poor increased by 75 percent. To mitigate the social impact of the crisis, the government of Indonesia 
established a series of new and expanded social safety net programmes which later evolved to become 
the foundation for SP expansion. 
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Varieties of SP programmes addressed different problems of social welfare. To increase the 
effectiveness of a limited budget, beneficiaries were targeted directly. Despite heavy criticism, the 
approach continues to dominate the discourse. This approach has been complemented with aspects 
that were previously neglected like gender empowerment, being community-based, and participatory, 
among others. Current progress in both decentralisation and democratisation has influenced the 
shape of SP. Yet, it seems that most of the progress has been tarnished with protracted issues such as 
lack of coordination between central and local governments, clientelism, limited capacity on budget 
and technicalities. 
In sum, the chapter provides a background to situate the context before analysing the impact of 
decentralisation and electoral democracy to the implementation of SP at the local administration level. 
As the reforms have been taking place for the last 15 years, there are still many literature gaps to 
address. Furthermore, in the midst of growing importance of decentralisation and democratisation in 
the developing countries, the unique circumstances and unparalled trajectory of reform process in 
Indonesia can furnish as a comparative case study. 
 PART II LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter Three: Decentralisation, Democratisation, and Social Protection: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Evidences 
3.1 Introduction 
There is already a wide body of literature on the impact of decentralisation and democratisation on 
social protection (henceforth called SP) in developing countries as noted by Scott (2009, p.6) and some 
significant academic contributions to the recent debate can be found. It is interesting to observe the 
emerging consensus on the impact of decentralisation and democratisation on service delivery and 
the factors of importance in ensuring the effective local provision of services. Research from Shah and 
Thompson (2004) on the early phase of Indonesian decentralisation conveys important findings that 
a lack of incentive or responsiveness of local governments to their residents can inhibit the expected 
impact. Each part of this review emphasises that neither decentralisation nor democratisation can 
solve all the problems of developing countries, including poor service delivery, weak economic 
development, poor social cohesion and/or high levels of conflict.  
This chapter thus seeks to assess the major issues arising in the implementation of SP within the 
context of decentralisation and democratisation through a systematic review of the literature. The 
literature review is based on electronic bibliographic searches and it draws on various types of 
literature including academic journal articles, reports, and official documents. Regarding the definition 
of SP, this study adopts the argument from Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) which has the 
potential to play a greater role in improving people’s livelihood. This rationale behind the definition 
of SP is relevant to the situation in emerging countries with an increasing middle class population but 
that lack sufficient means to protect the community from shocks. In addition, social policies in 
developing countries nowadays tend to encompass broader objectives, not limited to alleviate poverty 
but often to achieve several conditions as stipulated in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Within this background, the perspective of SP taken here 
is one of the '3 Ps' terminology (i.e. protection of the poor, prevention of vulnerability from shocks, 
and promotion of livelihoods of the poor) and the transformative element as described by Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler (p.10).  
This chapter is structured as follows: it provides a brief background to both decentralisation and SP, 
before moving to outline the methodology used to search for, and review, the literature in this area. 
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The following section then presents a discussion of key issues emerging from this literature, focuses 
on Indonesian case. The final section concludes with key messages. 
 
3.2 Theories of Democratisation and Decentralisation  
Democratisation and decentralisation have emerged as mechanisms for addressing a wide range of 
issues in public sector organisations around the world (Rees & Hossain, 2010, p. 586). They have also 
evolved as a consequence of much dissatisfaction with the results of centralised economic planning 
which then led reformers to decentralisation to reduce the sizable control of central government and 
induce broader participation in democratic governance (Smoke, 1994; Wunsch, Olowu, Harbeson, 
Ostrom, & Insulza, 1990). One important assumption is that in being closer to the people, local 
authorities can more easily identify people’s needs, and thus supply the appropriate form and level of 
public services (Oates, 1972; D. Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989). Having gained increasing 
popularity, the estimated number of decentralisation experiments ranged from 80 percent of 
developing countries to all of them (Manor, 1999).  
Both democratisation and decentralisation can be regarded as highly controversial and contested 
activities that determine the locus of decision making power and disrupt established power relations. 
Likewise, Scott (2009) argues that decentralisation is not a technical activity that takes place in a 
political vacuum. In a similar vein, Rees and Hossain (p. 582) further highlight that decentralisation is 
more than a process associated with local government reform.  
The fundamental premise is that a decentralised public sector will be more effective and accountable 
to serve the rights of the people (J. K. Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 2005). In addition, the 
decentralisation experiments in various countries have been well documented and analysed, yet there 
is limited work on the impact of decentralisation on livelihoods. Furthermore, attempts to find 
research on the impact on vulnerable groups has resulted a paucity of studies within the context of 
Indonesia.  
Meanwhile, a large theoretical literature on democratisation has developed considerably. In the last 
sixty years this body of work has been joined by a vast array of empirical studies in modern political 
science. Quantitative studies have found democracy to be inextricably linked to economic 
development. Different strands of more historical research have alternatively associated the existence 
of democratic regimes with either the destruction of the agrarian world, the formation of cross-class 
coalitions, or the growing strength of the working class. Finally, under the renewed influence of neo-
instutionalism, several scholars have claimed that a stable democracy can prosper only when 
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sustained by a particular set of constitutional rules and embedded in certain social norms and 
practices. 
In the same periods when democratisation gains popularity, decentralisation has become a 
particularly important theme in many developing countries since the mid-1990s (see R. Crook & Manor, 
1998; Fukusaku & de Mello Jr, 1999; Manor, 1999; Shah, 1998; World Bank, 1999)). The most 
important underlying argument concerning decentralisation is that it enables government to be more 
accountable and responsive to the governed (Faguet, 2014). Supported by positive aspects in a newly-
embraced democracy, decentralisation also encompasses reforms in wider fields, including 
governance and the enhancement of public services which are compatible with the main essence of 
standard reform package such as the ‘Washington Consensus’ for developing countries. Bolstered by 
the popular advice of various development agencies, decentralisation is considered as one of the most 
important reforms of the past generation, both in terms of the number of countries who have pursued 
decentralisation and the potentially deep implications for the nature and quality of governance (p.2). 
This enthusiasm for decentralisation has inspired a huge wave of research seeking to identify the 
effects of decentralisation on a range of policy-relevant outcomes, as well as attempts to improve 
government programmes focusing on vulnerable groups. In brief, the nascent stage of 
decentralisation has occurred almost in parallel with a general trend towards democratisation or large 
scale reform within each country.  
Perspectives from many researchers on decentralisation are summarised concisely by Robinson 
(2007b). His paper notes that many claims are made in favour of decentralisation, ranging from the 
democratising potential of participatory and accountability processes in terms of poverty reduction as 
well as service delivery. However, the arguments for the developmental significance of 
decentralisation rest primarily on a series of assumptions and theoretical justifications. For example, 
Shah and Thompson (2004) argue that most of the decentralisation literature deals only with 
normative issues regarding the assignment of responsibilities among different levels of government 
and the design of fiscal transfers.  
Currently, a wide body of literature reveals a typical consensus that decentralised governance 
facilitates pro-poor economic and social development (e.g. Turner & Hulme, 1997). This predisposition 
suggests that the decentralisation of development programmes tends to improve targeting of 
beneficiaries and the relevance of such programmes to their contexts (Kingsley, 1996; Manor, 1999). 
However, decentralisation of governance is not a sufficient condition for broad-based economic and 
social development. For example, Priyadarshee and Hossain (2010) evaluate selected SP programmes 
in India which suggest that local governments need to incorporate better mechanisms to enhance the 
participation of beneficiaries. Their findings also raise concern on numerous governance problems 
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such as elite capture, rent-seeking, and corruption. This chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive 
and systematic review of the evidence concerning the subject and the impact on assisting SP 
programmes to benefit the poorest and vulnerable groups focusing on developing countries, 
particularly Indonesia. 
 
3.2.1 Decentralisation: Concepts and Dimensions 
One of the most critical prerequisites to translate decentralisation from theory to practice is a clear 
understanding of the concept in a definition. A quick but thorough literature review from UNDP (1999) 
shows no single agreed definition or understanding of decentralisation. In brief, the concept of 
decentralisation involves various aspects that can be distinguished into several parts i.e. political 
decentralisation; administrative decentralisation; fiscal decentralisation; and economic or market 
decentralisation (Burki et al., 1999; Litvack & Seddon, 1998).  
On a related note, Robinson (2007a) further elaborates three distinct elements encapsulated in 
decentralisation (p.7). The first is fiscal decentralisation, entailing the transfer of financial resources in 
the form of grants and tax-raising powers to sub-national units of government. Second, there is 
administrative decentralisation (often referred to as deconcentration) where the functions performed 
by central government are transferred to geographically distinct administrative units. Third is political 
decentralisation, where powers and responsibilities are devolved to elected local governments. It is 
synonymous with democratic decentralisation or devolution. The majority of literature included in this 
review focus on the third type: political decentralisation or devolution. It is this type of 
decentralisation which has been primarily emphasised in developing countries over the last two 
decades. Ahmad et al (2005) propose a broad logical framework that asserts an inextricable link 
between the importance of political decentralisation and the quality of service delivery. The 
framework explains stronger relationships of accountability between the actors in the service delivery 
chain under political decentralisation, although there remain questions on the effects of incentives at 
all levels.  
The fundamental premise commonly held by development stakeholders in low and middle income 
countries is that a decentralised public sector will be more effective and accountable to the people. 
However, the rapid implementation of decentralisation reforms in developing countries often leads 
to several problems. According to Joanis (2014), most of the problems result from the coexistence of 
multiple tiers of government in certain policy areas, which triggers new accountability issues. Many 
countries have begun delegating their responsibility for social services to lower levels, usually locally 
elected governments, yet the results have been mixed (Faguet 2014, pp. 8–9). In the case of Indonesia, 
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political expediency led the parliament to hastily pass laws in 1999 to implement ‘big-bang’ 
decentralisation, but left the expenditure law unclear on assignments which subsequently had to be 
revised. Although the legislature attempted to improve decentralisation laws in 2004, several issues 
remain, most prominently in local governance.  
One essential tenet of decentralisation is the notion that delegating expenditure responsibilities from 
central to local levels might increase overall government accountability. According to Oates (1972) 
and his seminal decentralisation theorem, increased accountability occurs when the policymaking 
process is brought closer to citizens. Within this background, the World Bank (2003a) has advocated 
decentralisation on the basis that it might help ease corruption in developing countries. However, 
empirical evidence has highlighted potentially significant accountability problems associated with the 
implementation of reforms. One example is the prevalence of local elite capture, as analysed by 
Priyadarshee and Hossain (2010) using the case of poverty reduction programmes in India, another is 
the issue of lacking incentives which inhibits the responsiveness of local governments in delivering 
services (Shah & Thompson, 2004). 
 
3.2.2 Driving Factors of Implementation 
In their initial objectives, many decentralisation experiments aim to reconstitute government, from a 
hierarchical, bureaucratic mechanism of top-down management to a system of nested self-
governments characterised by participation and cooperation, where transparency and accountability 
act as a binding constraint on public servants’ behaviour. As summarised by Firman (2010), 
decentralisation is aimed at diminishing the dependence of local government on central government; 
to encourage economic development; to improve accountability; and to institutionalise change (see 
for example Alm et al., 2001; Grindle, 2007; Smoke, 2001).  
Referring to Faguet (2014), the strongest theoretical argument in favour of decentralisation is that:  
a) it is able to improve the accountability and responsiveness of government by changing its 
structure so as to capture citizen voice and change the incentives that public officials face;  
b) reduce abuses of power by transferring certain central government functions and resources 
to lower levels;  
c) improve political stability by giving aggrieved minorities independent control over sub-
national governments with limited power over issues that affect them directly; and  
d) increase political competition by creating many smaller arenas that politicians vie to control 
(p. 2).  
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Decentralisation programmes across developed and developing countries are essentially motivated 
by a quest to improve governance. For instance, the preamble part of the Indonesian Law No. 32 Year 
2004 on Regional Administration states that the principles of autonomy are to speed up the creation 
of public welfare through the improvement of services, public participation, regional competitiveness 
based on the principles of democracy, equitable distribution, justice, and the distinguishing 
characteristics of every region (Government of Indonesia, 2004a). Likewise, looking at examples in 
other countries, devolution in Britain was aimed at ‘re-balancing power between citizen and 
government’ in order to ‘move us away from a centralised Britain to a more democratic, decentralised, 
plural state’ (Blair, 2001). Concurring with the argument of governance improvement are the findings 
of Sasaoka (2007, p. 4) which propose that democratisation is a major factor to implement 
decentralisation e.g. in India, South Africa, and Tanzania. 
The reformasi period has become the main pretext for the origins of decentralisation and 
democratisation in Indonesia. It began when the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997 
reverberated among all population segments and culminated in the moment when the central 
government, invariably associated with being strong yet corrupt, became a paralysed and 
delegitimised administration during the crisis period. In addition, regional resentment towards Jakarta, 
including demands for secession in some of Indonesia’s outer regions, had increased fears of territorial 
disintegration (for evidence please see Edward Aspinall, 2003; P. King, 2004; McGibbon, 2004; Miller, 
2009; Sulistiyanto, 2001). The ensuing period of political transformation saw the introduction of laws 
on decentralisation which reconfigured the nation.  
Decentralisation was ushered in as a way to fix the unequal relations between state–society and 
central–local government, created by the highly centralised, patronage-based system of the Suharto 
authoritarian regime from 1966 to 1998 (Ito, 2011, p. 3). Given the lengthy periods of the New Order 
regime, some of the impact of decentralisation (and other) reforms is expected not to be immediately 
observable. The process was initiated by the governance reforms advocated by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in combination with the financial and technical assistance 
provided to the country following the economic crisis (Green, 2005, p. 3).  
The process of democratisation in the early phase of the reform era was not easy. Despite the 
continued control of many elites nurtured under Suharto’s New Order, massive structural, 
institutional, and constitutional reforms were rapidly implemented in order to appease the 
widespread calls for reform. The first 'free and fair elections' since before the New Order were held in 
1999; these were to elect new members of the local and national legislatures, and to install a new 
president and new regional heads. Despite the success of these elections, they were assessed as being 
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only 'half-hearted' reforms (King, 2004) since the military was still guaranteed seats in the national 
assembly and the participation of the populace in the election of their leaders was still not direct.  
Paralleling the decentralisation process, there was another proposal to run direct elections for local 
district heads, a process known as pilkada representing a further step and necessary complement in 
the decentralisation process. This process continued until 2008 when more than 400 districts 
throughout Indonesia completed this nationwide political transformation. The justification for the 
introduction of the direct vote lay in the abuses in the previous system of choosing district heads that 
had been introduced in 1999. The direct vote was also thought to open more space to nurture the 
emergence of local democracy, which had been denied during the Suharto period.  
The scholarship on decentralisation and the emergence of local democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia 
ranges from optimistic through cautious to pessimistic. Those in the optimist camp argue that 
decentralisation and democratisation will emerge together, and have been part of the reform agendas 
pushed for and contested through the succession of post-Suharto presidencies — B.J. Habibie (1998–
99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–04), to Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (2004–2014). They are represented by international and national organizations such as 
UNDP, World Bank, Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, and a newly established local SMERU Institute 
(Nordholt, 2005). By allowing the regions (especially at the district level) to have more say in running 
their own affairs, it was hoped that local people would benefit from local government policies; in this 
sense, decentralization is a major and necessary step towards nurturing a flourishing local democracy 
because it opens up spaces for local political participation. 
However, those in the pessimist camp argue that decentralisation has been accompanied by the rise 
of preman (gangsters) who always resort to violence, as well as the spread of money politics7 and 
corruption into the regions (see evidences in Antlov, 2003; V. R. Hadiz & Robison, 2005; Malley, 2003; 
Mietzner, 2007; Sidel, 2004). Competition, squabbles, and fights to control these decentralised powers 
and resources have occurred, leading sometimes to a compromise where elites share a 'piece of the 
pie' together. On the other hand, others see that decentralisation has allowed the flourishing of local 
civil society and the (re)emergence of old local elites such as ethnic leaders in the regions (Faucher, 
2005). Decentralisation has opened up the possibility for grass-roots participation in the local political 
context and direct political participation or lobbying with the local leaders. Decentralisation has had 
diverse implications for the political changes desired by the Indonesian people; at the very least it has 
allowed the discussion and debate on the idea of 'democracy' to flourish. The latest development, the 
                                                          
7 Common practice during local election which involves patronage distribution – the distribution of 
money, gifts or other material benefits heavily, especially on the eve of the election day. 
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re-structuring of the election of leaders, is considered by many to be the culmination of this process 
of developing a 'grass-roots' democracy, and good governance. However, there is the danger of 
assuming a direct positive correlation between decentralization and democracy. In their comparative 
study of South Asian and West African countries, Crook and Manor (1998) suggest that 
decentralisation does not always improve the local governance and accountability of local leaders. 
They argue that decentralisation must be implemented together with democratisation and 
institutional reforms at the national level (p. 304). These reflections can be used as a point of 
departure for examining decentralisation in Indonesia and further to argue whether the processes and 
outcomes of the direct elections of district heads will eventually lead to the emergence of local 
democracy. 
A confluence of economic and political factors characterises Indonesia’s experience of 
decentralisation, as reported by Hofman and Kaiser (2006). They point out that economic and political 
upheaval following the crisis eventually triggered a ‘big-bang’ decentralisation process. The fiscal, 
administrative and political autonomy of local government has thus increased significantly in a 
relatively short period of time. More importantly, the government in 2004 took a major decision to 
introduce direct elections for the positions of regent, mayor, and governor whilst giving the central 
government greater powers to influence policy at the local level through direct spending and the 
creation of accountability mechanisms to monitor local government spending and district 
performance (Bennet, 2010, pp. 8–9).  Again, this decision is aimed to increase the proximity and 
effectiveness of local government in decentralised settings. However, the process of decentralisation 
in Indonesia was not accompanied by an attempt to revamp accountability at the beginning. 
Furthermore, regional proliferation which is the by-product of decentralisation has caused further 
disparity between regions. In many ways, Indonesia’s story was a portrait of ‘fixing the machine as it 
was running’. 
The government of Indonesia is currently revising Law No. 33 Year 2004 on Intergovernmental Finance 
with the aim of improving some dimensions of decentralisation and tackling implementation 
difficulties. By mending the law, the government also attempts to reduce disparities between 
provinces, mainly due to the fact that GDP per capita in some regions is falling behind that of the main 
island, Java. Therefore, revenue certainty is to be enhanced in part through changes to the general 
allocation grant (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) and specific allocation fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK) 
formulae and the disbursement mechanism for intergovernmental transfers. The revision of Law 32 
Year 2004 has not, however, sufficiently addressed the problem of inefficiency in regional spending 
(Mahi & Nazara, 2012, p. 7). The problem of inefficiency might occur in the process of resource 
allocation and production (or service delivery). Allocative inefficiency results from mismatches 
Chapter 3: Democratisation, Decentralisation, and Social Protection: A Review of Theory and Evidences 
60 
 
between needs and budget provision; productive inefficiency refers to low quality in the outcomes of 
spending, resulting, for example, from corruption. This is in line with the findings from Ranis and 
Stewart (1994) that more decentralisation offers the potential for increased allocations to social and 
economic priorities, enhancing efficiency and equity within regions; but the promotion of national 
standards and equity across regions requires central government action. 
  
3.2.3 Modalities of Distributive Politics in a Decentralised and Democratic Regime 
Like markets, politics also distributes goods (see Booms & Halldorson, 1973; Fry & Winters, 1970). 
Government programmes channel cash, jobs, credit, and a myriad of other resources to citizens; 
elected officials mete out benefits to favoured constituencies; and political parties distribute 
everything from leaflets to souvenirs in search of votes. Politics can also manage to influence taxes 
and transfers to redistribute income within society (Bird & Zolt, 2005). In general, the political 
distribution of goods is invariably more controversial than is their distribution through markets. 
Normally, people can rely on markets to move valued resources across locations and populations but 
in any democratic polity there is broad agreement that political authority rightly transfers resources 
across generations by using tax proceeds to fund social policies. 
Within the setting of decentralisation, regional governments have plenty of room to create various 
entitlement programmes. Enhanced by the values of more liberal democratisation, the political 
distribution of goods becomes increasingly important, particularly in a location with a large vulnerable 
population (Bollen & Jackman, 1985). Political authorities at different levels of government make 
choices about the distribution of goods to beneficiaries (D. Rondinelli et al., 1989). When the hold of 
these authorities on office depends on their winning elections, their choices become bound up with 
political strategies. Therefore, the modes of strategic distribution vary widely.  
Many conceptual distinctions can be drawn among distributive strategies. Stokes et al (2013) propose 
to distinguish programmes generating public goods from ones targeting individuals. Public goods 
might benefit all contributors, or they might create subsidy for public expenditures of narrower 
geographic constituencies (pork-barrel politics as suggested by Aldrich, 1995). Benefits in this sense 
might be reversible like public employment or irreversible such as roads (J. A. Robinson & Torvik, 2005). 
Political parties can make long-term and slow-moving investments in basic programmes by 
campaigning, on the margins, offering ‘tactical distributions’ (Dixit & Londregan, 1996). Incumbents 
have the advantage of controlling benefits exclusively or they might be controlled if their opponents 
are economic monopolists (Medina & Stokes, 2007). 
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Figure 3.1 below depicts the categories of distributive politics with their differing channels of 
distribution. As reiterated by Stokes et al (2013), there are two distinctions in distributive politics i.e. 
programmatic vis-à-vis non-programmatic distribution. The other important difference is between 
unconditional benefits and conditional exchanges. 
 
Source: modified from Stokes et al (2013) 
Figure 3.1 Types of Distributive Politics 
For a distributive strategy to be programmatic, according to Stokes et al (2013), two things must be 
true. First, the criteria of distribution must be public. Often, a public discussion precedes the design of 
distributive policies and their implementation. Even when ex ante public debates are absent, the 
criteria of distribution are available for public discussion. Second, the formal criteria of distribution 
must actually shape the distribution of resources.  
Post-1998 political reforms in Indonesia redistributed power from the executive to the legislature, and 
devolved substantial elements of authority from central to subnational governments. New freedoms 
spawned more political parties to contest elections with no single party able to command a clear 
majority. This caused Indonesian politics since 1999 has been characterised by coalition governments, 
divided parliaments, and policy stasis. 
As a corollary of decentralisation, Indonesia also embarked upon democratisation. The first 
democratic election was held in 1999 and around 48 parties competed for legislative seats. 
Subsequently, the new format of the presidential election was held in 2004 to choose the president 
and vice president in one ticket. Furthermore, the country has held direct local elections, known as 
1) Are rules of distribution public?







No; is receipt of benefit contingent 
on individual's political support?
Non-programmatic 
politics

















Chapter 3: Democratisation, Decentralisation, and Social Protection: A Review of Theory and Evidences 
62 
 
pilkada, since June 2005 after reforming its electoral franchise the year before (Chen & Priamarizki, 
2014; Government of Indonesia, 2010). The pilkada system allows Indonesian citizens to directly vote 
for the more than 500 mayors and district heads and 34 governors of the country. Direct Pilkada is 
considered by many as ‘one of the most important achievements of Indonesia's democratic reform’ 
(Fionna, 2015, p. 179). Prior to 2005, regional heads ‘had been elected by provincial legislatures, giving 
elites ample opportunities to negotiate the outcome behind closed doors. The introduction of direct 
elections, by contrast, gave the final say in inter-elite competition in provinces to the electorate’ 
(Mietzner, 2012, p. 213). 
In spite of this, the Pilkada system had never been flawless. Various forms of patronage and 
clientelistic politics persisted and thrived. In many places, direct elections did not shake up the 
entrenched political traditions but resume the ‘New Order’ oligarchy (for a critical take on direct 
Pilkada from a pro-democratic point of view, see Choi, 2011). In addition to that, the political right in 
Indonesia repeatedly criticised high costs and a purported ‘inefficiency’ of Pilkada, endemic corruption 
as well as ‘uncooperative regional heads’ (Chen & Priamarizki 2014, p.1). Despite these, actual or 
alleged, flaws of direct Pilkada, experts concur that, in most instances, direct elections at local levels 
have led to greater participation from the ground. Qualitatively, direct elections have forced local 
candidates to appeal directly to their constituents rather than pandering to the elites. 
 
3.2.4 Benefits and Risks of Decentralisation and Democratisation 
The empirical evidence suggests that the quest for right balance, i.e. an appropriate division of powers 
among different levels of government, is not always the primary reason for implementing 
decentralisation. Instead, various political and economic events have often triggered such an interest. 
In addition, several other countries had stipulated laws on decentralisation with specific intentions. 
For instance, research by USAID (2009) provides two distinctive cases from Colombia and South Africa. 
The first case shows how the Colombian government designed the scheme of decentralisation as a 
clear response to violence. Meanwhile, decentralisation in South Africa was formulated as a 
substantial component during transition periods from apartheid to democracy. Elected local 
governments were expected to give citizens more voice in public affairs, and so reduce the ‘reservoir 
of discontent’ that fed insurgencies.  
Lessons learnt from several countries show that decentralisation has a significant impact on resource 
mobilisation, macroeconomic stability, service delivery, and equity. Diverse arguments in favour of 
decentralisation are put forward, among others, by Breton (1998), Oates (1972), Tiebout (1956), 
Tresch (2002), and Weingast (1995) and as cited by Litvack et. al (1998, p.4), who have found that 
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public service are the most efficient when they are provided by the smallest authority in one region. 
This holds true when decentralisation is designed to support public management reform by minimising 
the span of control and reducing areas of responsibility (Aucoin, 1990, p. 122). Several studies have 
also revealed the potentially positive impact of decentralisation in several contexts, such as preventing 
rent-seeking (as found in Arikan, 2004; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Fjeldstad, 2004; World Bank, 2000b), 
service delivery (see J. K. Ahmad et al., 2005; Dillinger, 1994; McLean & King, 1999), governance 
(Faguet 2014), conflict resolution (Sasaoka, 2007), and community development (e.g. D. W. 
Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2013; Derick W. Brinkerhoff & Azfar, 2006). However, studies examining 
the positive impact of decentralisation are relatively scarce and are largely based on case studies of a 
single country or a group of countries, as argued by Ramesh (2013, p. 3). 
On the other hand, there are also several possible negative effects of decentralisation, i.e. regional 
disparities, clientelism, and an inefficient bureaucratic structure (as can be seen in Cornelius, 1996; 
Fox & Aranda, 1996; Rodden, 2002; Stein, 1999; Wibbels & Rodden, 2002). Furthermore, 
decentralisation may seriously affect macroeconomic stability, particularly when the local government 
budget has a huge deficit as noted by Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Prud’Homme (1995); Tanzi  
(1996); and Ter-Minassian  (1997). Recent decentralisation reforms in developing countries have often 
led to the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in given policy areas, triggering new 
accountability issues (Joanis, 2014, p. 36). Decentralisation has also been shown to increase income 
inequality in developing countries, as better governed and endowed regions can prosper while the 
rest fall further behind due to weaker redistribution capacity of the central government (Lessmann, 
2012, p. 1385). Other important studies from Oyono (2004) and Treisman (2000) reveal findings on 
deteriorating government performance as well as a low degree of participation and democratisation.  
Nevertheless, both the approach and the results of decentralisation have varied widely between 
countries as concurred by Smoke and Lewis (1996, p. 1289). Thus, Oates (1998) argues that ‘the case 
for decentralisation has often been made in a very general and uncritical way with little systematic 
empirical support’ (p. 97). In recent years, these observations have led reformers and researchers to 
question how sensible decentralisation strategies are for the real situations in which they are applied 
in developing countries.  
Although Indonesia has been engaged in one of the world’s largest programmes of public sector 
decentralisation for more than two decades, the evidence from Lewis (2010) suggests that Indonesian 
decentralisation has not yet led to high quality local public services (p. 649). A similar argument is 
proposed by Kaiser et al. (2006) who are unable to find evidence of convergence or divergence based 
on associations with initial service delivery conditions and observed trends.  
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The rapid and far-reaching implementation of decentralisation has given rise to significant policy 
differences across regions. While some districts have introduced more efficient and responsive service 
environments, many have burdened the economy with new trade-distorting taxes, inefficient 
procedures, and administrative corruption (von Luebke, 2009, p. 202). In a similar vein, Fitrani et al. 
(2005) find that geographic dispersion, political and ethnic diversity, natural resource wealth and 
scope for bureaucratic rent seeking all influence the likelihood of uncontrolled regional proliferation 
in Indonesia (p. 57).  
In fact, according to the report from the World Bank (2011), ‘the newly-formed autonomous districts 
and cities vastly underperformed compared with existing entities.’ Within this context, Sjahrir et al. 
(2014) argue that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending, 
instead a lack of political accountability is responsible for this excess. Consequently, the degree of 
political competition influences the level of local spending significantly. 
With regards to this problem, stricter regulations on the formation of new districts and provinces have 
been put in place. More importantly, the spatial distribution of consolidated public development 
expenditure is very unequal. This perspective concurs with Vidyattama (2013) who has suggested that 
the inequality of gross regional domestic product per capita may increase slightly (pp. 206-207). 
Responding to this situation, central spending mitigates inequality in the geographic distribution of 
sub-national development expenditure, at least to a certain extent (B. D. Lewis & Chakeri, 2004, p. 
379). Given this condition, local governments hardly have equal fiscal capacity or the capability to 
provide standardised services to the public, let alone vulnerable groups in their regions. This resonates 
with the report from the World Bank (World Bank, 2012b) which notes that ‘poorer local governments 
have greater need for SP particularly for relatively larger poor and vulnerable populations; however, 
poorer local governments often have lower capacity to raise revenues and lower capacity to deliver 
social services, including SP.’ 
 
3.3 Concepts and Theories Underlying SP 
SP is depicted as an important agenda of most international agencies and has been adopted by many 
national government development strategies in recent years (Cook & Kabeer, 2009, p. 3). A number 
of factors explain this heightened interest: the growing awareness that economic growth alone cannot 
deliver broadened development goals, using social indicators such as literacy, health, and living 
standards. Considering the recent trend and the wide popularity of SP, Barrientos and Hulme (2010, 
p. 6) argue that a wide body of literature suggests that SP is an effective response to poverty and 
vulnerability in developing countries. 
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Undeniably, the definition of SP can be vague. There is an array of varying definitions which can lead 
to confusion. Increasing concern on the misused definition has been largely centred in a drift to a 
charity perspective, not a rights-based one (Standing, 2007, pp. 512–513). In very simple concept, 
everyone is merely persuaded if not obliged to contribute altruistically to a charitable scheme rather 
than building a sustainable and robust scheme adept at realising a number of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, such as the right to adequate living standards. In addition, Brunori and Reilly (2010) 
question whether almost any public intervention could be considered more or less directly part of the 
SP system (p. 7). Using this perspective, large government interventions such as education policy, 
pension systems, health care, and many other development policies will fall under a very vague 
definition of SP. This in fact may impede the understanding of its specificity. Furthermore, Bender 
(2013) notes that different definitions of SP exist, which is not simply a problem of different streams 
of research across various academic disciplines (p. 41). She argues that the existence of multiple 
concepts across countries is largely a reflection of different histories, cultural traditions, and prevailing 
values.  
However, recent evidence suggests that the focus of the term SP has been made to risk and 
vulnerability, which has an indirect contribution to poverty (Barrientos, Hulme, & Shepherd, 2005, p. 
8). In a similar vein, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) argue against the popular perception of SP 
as social welfare programmes for poor countries. Furthermore, their notion challenges the limited 
ambition of SP policy in practice, which has moved slightly from its origins in the ‘social safety nets’ 
discourse of the 1980s, and aims to provide economic protection against livelihood shocks. They argue 
that SP can be affordable and be extended to entire populations with significant contribution to MDG 
targets of poverty reduction. Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) also argue that SP has the 
capability to empower marginalised people and be socially transformative. They discuss four 
dimensions of SP which are protective, preventive, promotional, and transformative measures (p. iii). 
Recently, a number of authorities have acknowledged the social component of vulnerability and the 
importance to incorporate consistent support to chronically poor individuals (Brunori & Reilly, 2010, 
p. 13). These considerations have found a synthesis in wider definitions endorsed by a number of 
international institutions and academics. Differences in defining SP stem both from its priorities and 
from the fundamentals upon which the concept is based. Institutions that believe in a rights-based 
definition tend to widen the domain of SP, while institutions that endorse a risk and market-failure 
view tend to propose a narrower definition. Meanwhile, Barrientos and Hulme (2009) argue that the 
differences among concepts are mainly on the approach while keeping similar goals i.e. basic needs 
fulfilment (p. 442). They believe that over the last 10 years the overarching debate has moved on from 
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contrasting social risk management and basic human needs perspectives to a more ambitious focus 
on capabilities. 
At this point, it is important to define SP and refer to the work of Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) 
that draws attention to distinctive conceptual and working definitions of SP. The former describes SP 
as public and private initiatives that provide assistance to the poor, protect the vulnerable against 
livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of marginalised groups. They define SP as 
follows: 
[S]ocial Protection is the set of all initiatives, both formal and informal, that provide: 
social assistance to extremely poor individuals and households; social services to 
groups who need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; 
social insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood 
shocks; and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination 
or abuse. (p.9) 
While the definition of SP varies and is malleable consequently upon different stakeholders, a number 
of aspects are shared and concurred. However, debates around the philosophical foundations of SP, 
pertaining to their historical and global contexts, still ensue.  
Clearly, the above-mentioned SP definition is echoed strongly by many scholars and development 
institutions. For instance, Barrientos (2011, 2013) mentioned that SP is almost always associated with 
a range of public institutions, norms and programmes aimed at protecting people (mainly workers) 
and their households from contingencies threatening basic living standards. Broadly following the 
notions from ILO (2005), these can be grouped under three main headings: social insurance, social 
assistance and labour market regulation. 
The most recent discussion on the concept of SP has been revolving around the compatibility with 
international agenda or global consensus such as 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which 
largely reflect strong commitments of most developing countries. Critical discussion still take place 
surrounding the principles and practices of SP. The diverse implementation of SP emerges from the 
variety and dynamic of ideological, political, and social settings either domestically or internationally. 
Principles, mainly referring to the thoughts of fairness and moral obligations, are still debated whether 
it can direct SP to a just society. Meanwhile, practical issues pertained to the legislation, targeting, 
financing, execution, and management these days starting to take more attention. 
3.3.1 Dominant Paradigm  
In the past, social protection (SP) programmes are oftenly perceived as the luxury and prerogative of 
developed countries. Over the past 20 years, developing counties in the southern hemisphere has 
embraced, adapted and popularised SP as an instrumental policy for achieving poverty eradication 
and development goals. The speed of this expansion, and the urgency of its ever-expanding aims, has 
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perhaps left limited room for reflection regarding the philosophical antecedents that underlie SP. 
Implicitly or explicitly, these act as a rudder for directing SP in practice. 
The wide variety of SP programmes that have emerged globally provides evidence that the rich and 
dynamic ideological, political and social settings into which new programmes and institutions are 
introduced are pivotal to setting a course for SP development trajectories,  esepecially within the 
context of developing countries. However, as SP initiatives have expanded rapidly, practical issues 
related to legislation, targeting, financing, implementation, management and technology often take 
the main stage.  
The paradigm has been influencing towards the formulation of post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), the successors of the Millennium Development Goals. In this new framework, SP is 
officially endorsed as an effective instrument for achieving both poverty eradication and inequality 
reduction. Such a strategic platform undoubtedly augurs well for the future global expansion of SP. 
The SDGs will be translated into each country’s national agenda and might represent a negotiated and 
pragmatic international consensus around a mandate for action.  
There are several features distinguishing an emerging paradigm in developing countries. Naturally, 
they have a strong focus on poverty reduction and on providing support to the poorest (Barrientos & 
Hulme, 2005; A. de Haan, 2000), whereas in developed countries the emphasis of SP is on income 
maintenance and on protecting decent living standards for all, notably workers. Using the Rawlsian 
perspective of social justice, Barrientos (2016) explains the tensions existing between a social justice-
based social minimum and ‘real’ social assistance institutions emerging in developing countries. The 
growing paradigm in developing countries encompasses the discussion of main design and 
implementation in SP, particularly ones pertaining to issues on targeting. 
Discourse on SP especially in lower middle income countries is still unfolding. Attention from 
development institutions remains high with the reports on specific issues of SP from the World Bank 
(2018) and its close relation to the achievement of SDGs as written by ILO (2017). Similarly, discussion 
among scholars has been showing critical attention towards wider aspects of SP as compiled in IDS 
Bulletin on SP for social justice (2011), IDS Bulletin on ‘graduation’8 from SP (2015), and special edition 
of Global Policy which discusses principles and practice of SP (2016). The most recent literature on SP 
points towards cross-cutting contemporary topics such as pre-empting climate risks in the long-term 
(Costella et al., 2017), how to build adaptive SP to mitigate climate-related extreme events (Béné, 
                                                          
8 Graduation in this publication means leaving a SP programme after reaching a wellbeing threshold, 
once the participant has acquired a set of resources that is expected to equip them for a higher-
income future livelihood. 
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Cornelius, & Howland, 2018), how to provide trans-national SP for (undocumented) migrants and the 
role of sub-national governments (Dobbs & Levitt, 2017; Faist, 2017; Levitt, Viterna, Mueller, & Lloyd, 
2017), how to design SP using experimentation (Hanna & Karlan, 2017). Coinciding with the process 
of democratisation in many parts of the word is the dynamics of labour protest within the context of 
declining SP (Sil & Wright, 2018) while the effect of globalisation proxied by trade volume and its 
impact on SP for the poor in developing countries is elaborated clearly by Desai and Rudra (2018). The 
evolution of SP and varied implementation in developing countries are discussed extensively using the 
most updated information by Yi (2017). 
The raison d’être of SP programmes in developing countries can be traced back to the various crisis 
events (such as the AFC in 1997-98, global financial turmoil in 2008) and policy responses. Barrientos 
and Hulme (2010) list three reasons why SP has gained increasing importance (pp. 3-5). First, only a 
few developing countries have income maintenance programmes as automatic consumption 
stabilisers. Second, it is relevant to focus on poverty and vulnerability reduction, particularly when the 
demand for public programmes to address the needs of other groups increases. In a volatile situation, 
policy responses tend to favour short-term responses which mainly address groups with stronger 
voice, such as the lower middle classes in urban areas. Third, it is found that emergency responses 
often turn out to be dysfunctional in the medium term: Cases from Latin America and Asian countries 
show the ineffectiveness of short-term emergency safety nets. In addition, SP has gained significant 
prominence due to at least three factors: a) as a response to global insecurity and vulnerability (Kiely, 
2005; Rodrik, 1997); b) the increasing costs associated with the non-existence of SP (Dercon, 2004; 
Morduch, 1999); c) the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000 that has focused the attention 
of international stakeholders on poverty and vulnerability reduction more than any other previous 
initiative (Greig, Hulme, & Turner, 2007). 
For most parts of the history, the debate on social assistance has involved choices about whether the 
basic principle behind social provisioning will be ‘universalism’, or selectivity through ‘targeting’ 
(Mkandawire, 2005). Under universalism, the entire population is definitely the beneficiary of social 
benefits as a basic right, while under targeting, eligibility to social benefits involves some kind of 
means-testing to determine the ‘truly deserving’ recipients. Policy regimes are hardly ever purely 
universal or completely based on targeting, they tend to lie somewhere between the two extremes 
on a continuum, and are often hybrid, but where they lie on this continuum can be decisive in spelling 
out individuals’ life chances and in characterising the social order. Inevitably, as mentioned by 
Devereux (2016), targeting as a mechanism for allocating scarce public resources efficiently and 
equitably has come under sustained attack, for two main reasons: 1) the apparent impossibility of 
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achieving perfect targeting accuracy; and 2) ethical reasons – social divisiveness and perceptions that 
excluding some people from benefits is socially unjust.  
With reference to SP policy in practice, the implementation in developing countries has several 
distinguishing characteristics. In the Indonesian case, the impetus of SP policy originates from the 
onset of the economic crisis in mid-1997 (Sumarto et al., 2008, pp. 121–131). This case thus has a 
different driver to the formation of post-World War II ‘welfare state’ in western countries as described 
by a number of scholars, including Gough (1979), Gutmann (1988), and Esping-Andersen (1990). The 
aftermath of crisis impacted society, primarily the poor and vulnerable, forcing policy makers to launch 
social interventions to mitigate the adverse social impact of the crisis. Government intervention during 
the 1997 crisis had been focused on the social safety net (Jaring Pengaman Sosial or JPS) programme 
with assistance from international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF. However, there was 
considerable criticism at the inception phase, perhaps most significantly for the impact on traditions 
of community self-help (gotong royong) and the associated social fabric, by fostering a ‘beggar’ or 
subsidy mentality (Pritchett, Sumarto, & Suryahadi, 2002; Sumarto, Suryahadi, & Pritchett, 2010). Such 
critique might be largely attributed to the fact that government had previously never introduced any 
intervening mechanism in the form of direct assistance. Similar comments in developed countries can 
be found on the controversy surrounding welfare states such as Murray (1990, in Dean 2012, p. 92) 
who claimed that welfare provision fosters ‘dependency culture’. 
The SP policy in Indonesia was almost non-existent during the pre-crisis period. People relied heavily 
on informal mechanisms that are identified as the ‘moral economy’, as cited in Ravallion and Dearden 
(1988). Households managed to redistribute outcomes of traditional government-run social 
programmes through private giving between families and within communities. Traditionally, 
consumption smoothing, borrowing and drawing on buffers, such as savings and assets, seem to be 
key informal coping strategies for the poor when facing idiosyncratic shocks such as illnesses (Sparrow, 
van de Poel, et al., 2013).  There was no nationally representative data to measure the social impact 
of crises until after the 1997 crisis struck the country (Wetterberg, Sumarto, & Pritchett, 1999). This 
caused difficulties in measuring the severity of the crisis and the effectiveness of safety net 
programmes.  
Further, different administration periods in the turbulent years after the crisis have strongly 
emphasised poverty reduction which aimed to provide a safety net to its citizens. Significant fiscal 
pressure grew from 2005 from a burgeoning proportion of the government budget needed for an oil 
subsidy. This situation motivated the government to launch ad-hoc cash transfer programmes as a 
means of directing subsidies to the poor and vulnerable (K. Sen & Steer, 2005, pp. 288–291). At that 
time, identifying 15.5 million poorest households as cash recipients was a challenging task. The census 
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was performed under great pressure with a very tight deadline. Early implementation of the scheme 
has, predictably, faced serious problems. There have been numerous cases of exclusion and inclusion 
errors of targeting. Further oil subsidy reductions occurred in 2008 when macroeconomic growth was 
still strong but international crises buffeted Indonesia. This led to a further reduction in oil subsidies 
again in the second quarter of 2008 which led to the government announcing its intention to re-launch 
another cash transfer programme for 19.1 million families (McLeod, 2008, p. 194). Qualitative 
assessment of cash transfer programmes has shown social discontent and social unrest due to lack of 
targeting accuracy, although the programmes do help beneficiaries to smooth consumption when 
facing shocks (Oxford Policy Management, 2012).  In 2008, rather than undertaking structural reforms 
on energy and food prices, the government decided to outline a ‘three-cluster strategy’ consisting of: 
family-based direct assistance provision; community-based empowerment assistance, and micro-
credit provision for small businesses (Ashcroft & Cavanough, 2008, pp. 357–358).  
In addition, transformation in the social policy approach was initiated by the introduction of targeted 
programmes during the 2005-2009 administration. These covered five major sectors: food security, 
employment creation, education, health, and community empowerment (Suryahadi et al., 2010). The 
targeting mechanism evolved starting from 2011 by the creation of a unified database comprising the 
lowest 40 percentile households as rosters for beneficiaries (Suryadarma & Sumarto, 2011, pp. 169–
170). The progress in targeting provides an instrumental tool for agencies and local governments to 
better deliver benefits.  
The evolution of Indonesia’s SP policies had been accompanied with institutional changes in poverty 
reduction efforts, such as the establishment of the National Team for Accelerating Poverty Reduction 
(Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, TNP2K) in 2010 under the direct command of 
the Vice President (Suryadarma & Sumarto, 2011, p. 167). More recently, the implementation of 
universal programmes such as social health insurance has been the most recent attempt to transform 
SP programmes in Indonesia (Allford & Soejachmoen, 2013; Simmonds & Hort, 2013). 
 
3.3.2 Challenges to the Dominant Paradigm 
There has been a very rapid extension of SP programmes in developing countries over the last decade. 
This has focused on social assistance, as opposed to social insurance or labour market regulation 
(Barrientos & Hulme, 2009) and has come in many forms: the introduction and extension of pure 
income transfers, such as non-contributory pensions or child based transfers; income transfers 
conditional on work, for example, public works or employment guarantee schemes; income transfers 
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combined with services, such as conditional cash transfers or integrated social assistance schemes; 
and more recently, the development of integrated poverty reduction programmes.  
In a relatively short time, several social assistance programmes have been introduced and expanded. 
Several notable examples are mentioned by Barrientos (2010) such as The Minimum Living Standards 
Scheme in China that expanded from 2.4 million beneficiaries in 1999 to over 22 million in 2002. The 
Child Support Grant in South Africa started in 2001 and rapidly reached over 7 million beneficiaries in 
2005. The Bolsa Escola in Brazil, a programme providing income transfers to poor families with school 
age children, was extended on a national basis in 2001, and the Bolsa Familia (an integration of Bolsa 
Escola and other transfers to poor households) now reaches 12 million households. The Employment 
Guarantee Scheme in India approximately reaches 24 million families. As the transfers support entire 
households, the number of those in poverty reached by these transfers is considerably larger. In South 
Africa, it is estimated that one in four households is supported with income transfers (data compiled 
from International Labour Office Social Security Department, 2009; Ministry of Rural Development, 
2013; Yuebin, 2001). 
There are, however, concerns over the financing of SP extension in developing countries. Concerns 
are more acute in the case of low-income countries (W. J. Smith & Subbarao, 2003). The concern is 
less about current affordability than about long-term financial sustainability. Affordability is less of an 
issue when the costs of not having SP are factored in. The issue is long-term sustainability, as 
developing countries are not in a position to finance the extension of SP through payroll taxes, central 
to the emergence of the welfare state in developed countries. The current gaps in effective SP have 
significant costs to society in terms of poverty and vulnerability (International Labour Organization 
(ILO), 2005). These gaps place restrictions on the development of human capital which themselves 
become a constraint on growth and development (Bourguignon, 2004). Alternative sources of 
resource mobilisation will be needed. Capacity constraints are a protracted problem in low-income 
countries, but this is a more tractable issue than finance. 
In the case of Indonesia, the World Bank (2012c) has attempted to undertake the Social Assistance 
Public Expenditure Review on the Government of Indonesia which provides a thorough analysis of SP 
budget effectiveness. Findings on this report show significant increase in public expenditure for SP 
although it is argued that further improvement could be made subject to subsidy reallocation. In spite 
of its detailed review on social expenditure, this report only focuses on central government 
investment in programmes to protect poor households from shocks. It claims that a small budget share 
of social expenditure has led to programmes with a relatively low impact. Performance of local 
government in nationwide SP programmes was discussed in a limited fashion with particular 
accentuation stress on the decreasing role of central government. The report also found that lack of 
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legal clarity in technical guidance for sub-national government inhibits social assistance initiatives at 
the local level.  
Another important finding from Alatas (2011) is that the involvement of Indonesian local governments 
in the conditional cash transfer programme, a centralised government scheme, did not meet expected 
results due to insufficient supply side issues, namely health and education facilities. The problem has 
become more complicated because decentralisation has reduced the interactions between central 
and local governments.  
Nevertheless, the role of local government as a primary stakeholder in implementing social policy has 
been considered important. It is emphasized particularly in rural communities characterised by high 
levels of poverty, inequality in land, social status, literacy and/or political power (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2006a). Also, research from Sumarto (2013) reiterates the positive impact of establishing 
regional institutions for poverty reduction. Yet, important findings from Crook and Sverrisson (2001) 
reveal the limited responsiveness of local government to the poor, determined mainly by the politics 
of local-central relations. Their study analysed the data from 12 countries and concluded that positive 
outcomes are mainly associated with a strong commitment by a national government or party to 
promote the interests of the poor at local level. Meanwhile, Priyadarshee and Hossain (2010) draw on 
empirical observations in India’s SP programmes and offer suggestions for the lowest level village 
administration to incorporate mechanisms to enhance the participation of the poor. 
With regards to the issues of targeting, there emerges albeit still little attention paid to the social 
consequences of mistargeting in the economics literature. One among these observation is Alatas et 
al (2012) which uses a 'randomized controlled trial' (RCT) to show that while statistical targeting 
methods can do a better job of identifying households with low per capita expenditure, community 
rankings result in higher community satisfaction. Proxy means testing (PMT) as a statistical method 
for targeting was initially adopted in Indonesia to complement the implementation of poverty census 
in 2005 for identifying cash transfer beneficiaries (World Bank, 2012b, pp. 15–17).  
Identifying the poor, particularly in developing countries, is a formidable task and often complicated 
by a lack of reliable data (or imperfect information about which households are poor), logistical 
challenges to undertake a census, and limited administrative capabilities. Accordingly, with the 
support and influence of various development partners, a novel concept on targeting beneficiaries 
began to emerge. Practitioners across the world have increasingly turned to some form of ‘proxy 
means testing’ (PMT) which emphasises the use of asset ownership to identify poor households. The 
purpose of PMT is simple: a score is given to each household in the relevant population based on a 
(typically small) set of readily observable household characteristics. The weights on these 
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characteristics are given by the regression coefficients for household consumption or income as a 
function of those characteristics.  
PMT has been adopted and implemented to support SP programmes all over developing countries 
with varied success rate. The earliest evaluation on PMT by Grosh and Baker (1995) describes and 
compares practical experiences for three countries i.e. Jamaica, Bolivia, and Peru. Overall, the results 
are somewhat mixed. Problems of undercoverage (exclusion error) occurred in urban Jamaica and 
Bolivia, while Peru suffered higher leakage (inclusion error). Extensive analysis on the advantages and 
disadvantages of PMT by Coady et al (2004) shows that in average PMT did indeed work effectively 
yet around 25 percent of SP programmes had shown regressive results. They further elaborate that 
the differences in targeting performance are partly explained by differences in country characteristics 
as follow: 
• Countries with better capacity for programme implementation, as measured by GDP per 
capita do better at directing benefits toward poorer members of the population. 
• Countries where governments are more likely to be held accountable for their behavior—
where ‘voice’ is stronger—appear to implement interventions with improved targeting 
performance. 
• Countries where inequality is more pronounced and presumably differences in economic 
well-being are easier to identify demonstrate better targeting outcomes. 
Technically, PMT according to Coady et al (2004) can be described as a ‘scoring’ process for each 
household that is calculated based on a small number of easily observable characteristics and a weight 
(usually obtained from factor or regression analysis of household data). Eligibility is determined by 
comparing the score against a predetermined cut-off. 
Arguably, PMT offers at least three advantages: 
• is verifiable, may reduce concerns over politicisation or randomness of benefit assignment. 
• uses readily observable household characteristics. 
• is less likely to affect work effort. 
However, PMT also has limitations on four points as follow: 
• may seem mysterious or arbitrary to some.  
• requires large body of literate and probably computer-trained staff, moderate-to-high levels 
of information technology. 
• inherent inaccuracies at household level, although good on average. 
• insensitive to quick changes in welfare, as in a crisis or in some transition countries. 
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The term ‘proxy means test’ is used to describe a situation where information on household or 
individual characteristics correlated with welfare levels is used in a formal algorithm as a proxy for 
household income, welfare or need (Grosh & Baker, 1995). At first, the idea of using proxies for income 
is appealing given the administrative difficulties associated with sophisticated means tests and the 
inaccuracy of simple means tests. However, it seems that the application of PMT is susceptible to the 
cause of resentment, hostilities, and often violent events in many places. Further, the findings from 
Cameron and Shah (2014) elaborate the types of mistargeting that are more harmful like 'leakage' (the 
share of ineligible households who received the funds) is a strong determinant of both increases in 
crime and decreases in social capital. In contrast, undercoverage (the share of eligible households who 
did not receive the payment) is not a significant determinant of crime and is not a predictor of changes 
in social capital. 
 
3.3.3 The Significance of the Concepts and Theories Underlying SP 
The introduction of safety net programmes in the late 1990s and SP in the mid 2000s as opposed to 
the ‘broad-brush’ policies (refer to various sectoral policies aiming to reduce poverty rate) in the past 
had emerged many subjects to much debate. Although it is less ideological and much more technical, 
the discourse seems do not end yet. Prominent among these debates is whether poverty alleviation 
needs its own budget allocation or not. Supporters of this view always propose an argument revolve 
around the affirmative policies directed towards the lower segments of welfare group. Meanwhile, 
the critics tend to be skeptic with the arguments of ineffectiveness and the absence of good 
governance.   
Significant transformation in the design of SP was initiated by the introduction of targeted 
programmes during the 2005-2009 administration terms. With this transformation, SP programmes 
became a part of three clusters in the newly devised poverty alleviation framework in Indonesia 
(Suryahadi et al., 2010, p. 11). Table 3.1 provides the list of the poverty alleviation programmes, 
disaggregated into three clusters, available in the country to date. 
Most of the programmes under cluster I (Social Assistance) have been maintained and expanded using 
largely similar concept. Major transformation occurred only for rice subsidy. Although rice is 
considered staple food for most of the population, it proved diificult to distribute and stored. Logistical 
issues caused many troubles especially regarding distribution scheme in rural or remote areas. This 
difficulty persisted and made government to alter the design and implementation thouroughly. These 
days, rice distribution have been replaced with cash and in-kind transfers. Cash transfers are 
undertaken electronically in cooperation with the network of the largest banks while for in-kind 
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transfers are distributed through the networks of convenience shops in rural and urban areas. 
Meanwhile, other programmes like conditional cash transfer and Jamkesmas (social health insurance) 
were expanded up to national level (Yusuf & Sumner, 2015, pp. 342–343).    
Review of cluster II. The administrative management of community empowerment programmes had 
been shifted to different agency. It has been re-packaged with distinctive brand and main concept of 
empowerment is preserved although the scope is now focused at the village level through the 
disbursement of Village Fund (Dana Desa) effectively implemented since 2015. Facilitators as the main 
component in the empowerment programme is kept with slightly different functions compared to the 
previous tasks. Cluster II had been designed as the core of the SP. Of all other clusters, this 
empowerment group had taken the largest budget ($3.6 billion from its inception to fiscal year of 
2013).  
Review of Cluster III. Meanwhile, cluster III (micro credit, loans, and incentive for small businesses) 
had not developed quite well. From its inception, the coverage of its target is relatively smaller than 
that of Cluster I and Cluster II. It managed to provide seed fund for Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) and the disbursement had reached $1.15 billion from 2007-2014 with the rate of non-
performing loan recorded as low as 3.3 percent. This scheme has been indicated to absorb around 20 
million labours.  
In sum, most of the programmes under cluster I to cluster III has been developed and to large extent 
the coverage of its beneficiaries have been expanded although the degree of expansion has been 
lower than expected. Fuel subsidy cut in November 2014 were presumed to support the expansion of 
SP programmes, especially after the visions of the President-elect, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) at that time 
which focuses largely on welfare development. In fact, Jokowi’s budget reallocations to infrastructure 
showed that the administration attempts to repeat the past developmentalism of Suharto (Warburton, 
2016). 
Table 3.1 Three Clusters of the Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Indonesia 
Elements 
  Poverty Alleviation Programme 
Cluster I: Social 
Assistance Programme 
Cluster II: Empowerment 
Programme 




Poor households  Community  Groups within community 
having small (start-up) 
business 
Goals Reduce economics cost 
burden of the poor 
Improve the poor’s income 
and affordability 
Improve savings and 
business sustainability of 




  Poverty Alleviation Programme 
Cluster I: Social 
Assistance Programme 
Cluster II: Empowerment 
Programme 
Cluster III: SMEs Support 
Programme 
small and micro enterprises 
(SMEs) 
Instruments BLT (unconditional cash 
transfer) 
PKH (conditional cash 
transfer) 
Jamkesmas (social health 
insurance) 
Raskin (rice subsidy for 
the poor) 
BSM (scholarship for the 
poor) 





conditional cash transfer) 
PNPM-Rural (community-
based village infrastructure 
development) 
PNPM-Urban (community-
based urban infrastructure 
improvement) 
RISE (Rural Infrastructure 
Socio-Economy which 
focuses to reduce regional 
gap and introduces concept 
of ‘activity sharing’ between 
central and local 
governments) 
Soft-loan scheme for the 
poor 
Source: Adapted from Suryadarma and Sumarto (2011) 
Since the inception phase of SP implementation, the debate on how to deliver the benefits dominated 
the discourse. It became clear when subsidy had proven ineffective to reach the poorest group. Energy 
subsidies as a core policy instrument for stabilising prices and protecting the general welfare of the 
population seemed irrelevant when transport costs depend not only on fuel prices, but also on road 
infrastructure and the quality and availability of public transport (Perdana, 2014). Moreover, benefits 
are only conferred if subsidised fuel actually reach consumers. Yet, in fact, many areas in Indonesia 
reported the energy prices that are far above their official subsidised levels, and have also experienced 
recurrent shortages in remote areas possibly due to additional logistical cost and smuggling activities. 
The most important point lead to the ineffectiveness is that fuel subsidies have unequal distributive 
effects. Since there is no restriction on the purchase of subsidised fuel in retail outlets, every 
household, regardless their welfare status, has a similar chance to buy subsidised fuel (Widodo, 
Sahadewo, Setiastuti, & Chaerriyah, 2012). This causes the subsidy became regressive as Perdana 
(2014, p. 6) shows that high and upper-middle classes consume more energy, and hence most of the 
subsidy allocation is enjoyed by these richer households. 
The introduction of targeting in SP programmes is considered as an important breakthrough. 
Previously, during the New Order, the government chose to undertake blanket subsidies to stabilize 
the prices of fuel and other important commodities. Some programmes involved rudimentary forms 
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of targeting. For example, rural infrastructure programs or block grants to poor villages aimed at 
particular geographic areas, while policies such as credit for farmers targeted specific employment 
sectors. Although the extent of targeting was limited, from the early 1970s until the late 1990s 
Indonesia did achieve significant poverty reduction using this 'broad-brush' approach (Perdana, 2014, 
p. 6).  
Opting for a targeted approach, government programmes in Indonesia have been the subject of 
extensive studies seeking to identify the factors that ensure or hinder success in delivering SP 
programmes. Such factors that have received a lot of attention recently include the determination of 
the poverty line, which is administered unilaterally by a central agency (Statistics Indonesia/BPS). 
Although its methodology adopts acceptable standards, the national poverty line in Indonesia (almost 
equivalent to the international absolute poverty standard of $1.5 per day) is very distant from the 
income actually needed for a decent livelihood (Yusuf & Rum, 2013). Therefore, the idea of increasing 
the standard to $2 per day for the international poverty line, which is comparable across countries in 
PPP terms, is a critical aspiration (Sumner & Edward, 2014). Another issue relates to the official 
measurement of poverty, as certain robustness checks such as comparability of poverty levels and 
poverty profiles still need attention (Priebe, 2014).   
In a decentralised and democratic regime, political scientists usually refer to the theoretical findings 
of partisan attachments and distributive politics. This is undeniably relevant to the case of burgeoning 
SP in Indonesia after 2005 when the direct election was officially launched. Yet, many political analysts 
believe there are also low-level operative factors playing in the Indonesian political system (S. Hidayat, 
2009). What has become the dominant view among theorists or analysts is similar to the practitioner’s 
rule of thumb: a party will not waste its resources on loyal supporters (or on die-hard haters), but 
instead spend on swing voters (Cox, 2009). The main reason is that parties will use largesse to change 
people’s votes; swing voters, with no prior commitment to one party or another, will be uniquely 
responsive. 
The intuition behind the 'rule of thumb theory' is straightforward. However, it is not necessarily 
supported by the hard facts. In some countries, there is a tendency that distributive politics has shifted 
over time from vote buying and other non-programmatic forms (following the definition of Stokes et 
al 2013) to programmatic politics. However, particularly in developing democratic countries, the 
transition towards programmatic politics9 is still plagued by a clientelistic approach in distributing 
                                                          
9  As opposed to patronage politics (and clientelistic politics) which involve an informal exchange 
between a politician and citizen, programmatic politics focuses largely on collective benefits i.e. 
something that benefits not just individuals but society more broadly. This includes provision of public 
goods or adoption of policies that improve living standards for the community at large. 
Chapter 3: Democratisation, Decentralisation, and Social Protection: A Review of Theory and Evidences 
78 
 
largesse or benefits (H. Kitschelt, 2000; H. Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2009). In this context, 
the broker-mediated model helps makes sense of the macro-dynamics of the demise of the party 
machine. It happens usually because leaders both rely on but suffer under their electoral agents. 
Grasping the imperfect agency relations between party leaders and their brokers helps to clarify the 
macro-logic of transitions between clientelism and programmatic politics.  
With the weakening of aliran politics in Indonesia, the pragmatic approach of social policy distribution 
is emulated in every political party (Ufen, 2008). The public often cannot distinguish between the 
differences in platforms between parties. Therefore, people often think there are similar ideologies in 
every party. The burgeoning number of new political parties (secular, nationalist, or Islamist) formed 
after the Suharto era was simply viewed by laymen not as a significant step towards democracy but 
rather as a different means to grappling with power. 
Hadiz and Robison (2013) and Winters (2011; 2013) among other political scientists point out that the 
power of oligarchy has still not diminished, but rather has survived through different regimes in 
Indonesia. With deeply entrenched influence, political actors manage to utilise informal networks in 
their electoral area. Brokers undeniably play the most important role in garnering votes, but more 
importantly, it is the benefit to the potential voters that matters significantly. 
On the eve of elections, candidates often assemble successful team members (anggota tim sukses) or 
volunteers (relawan) to distribute cash or benefits to the neighbourhoods (Edward Aspinall & 
Sukmajati, 2016, p. 5; Suaedy, 2014). Some benefits might be added if candidates manage to secure 
votes or win seats. Road improvement or infrastructure such as school building or housing are mainly 
built once candidates win the election. These days, candidates no longer rely on conventional benefits 
like cash, but they often promise to give more ‘sustainable’ programmes.  
Health care and free education are the most popular agenda candidates usually pledge in their 
campaigns (Rosser, 2012; Rosser & Sulistiyanto, 2013). Although this practice of ‘bribing’ potential 
voters with social policies is seemingly not ideal, this can arguably be said to be a major step in 
deepening democracy. Within this concept, there are attempts to move the focus away from regular 
elections to further strengthening of citizenship and democratising the state by transforming citizens 
from passive actors in dependent relationships with politicians and political parties into active ones 
who can demand public goods provision from the state. 
Most of the benefits were not designed properly and lacked inputs from wider stakeholders. For 
instance, health care is offered generously without preparing the supply side in a lagged region (B. 
Hidayat, Thabrany, Dong, & Sauerborn, 2004). This ill-conceived strategy might backfire for the 
candidates as it will cause public dissatisfaction, eventually causing the vote to shift to other 
Chapter 3: Democratisation, Decentralisation, and Social Protection: A Review of Theory and Evidences 
79 
 
candidates or leading to reduced turnout. In a similar vein, some candidates promise generous 
entitlement programmes prior to elections but then decide to cancel this after entering leadership 
mainly due to the fact that implementation would be unrealistic. 
Lacking the basic concept of SP and relying solely on the short-term approach to distribute social 
policies entail the beginnings of failure. A successful leader usually does not promise much but tends 
to rectify urgent issues in public provision. Another important factor is the willingness to cooperate 
within the existing framework of decentralisation which revolves heavily around intergovernmental 
transfer. Regional government cannot work individually to provide portable social policies and a 
substantial portion of funding is still managed by the central government (Rokx, Schieber, Harimurti, 
Tandon, & Somanathan, 2009).  
 
3.4 Scoping Study and Search Results  
This section will present the process of identifying and collating findings and important results using 
potential keywords in relevant academic journal repositories or databases. The process is undertaken 
through several steps. First, a scoping study attempts to revisit the connection between relevant 
keywords. Second, the study delved into an electronic bibliographic database and website search. 
Third, a supplementary component was prioritising papers that resulted from previous extensive 
searches. These search results are presented briefly in the following pages. 
 
3.4.1 Scoping Study and Field Mapping  
The purpose of a scoping study is to identify possible interconnection between fields relevant to the 
literature review. In this paper, the term scoping study is used to refer to a systematic classification of 
various topics which might intersect with one another. The diagram below illustrates some of the main 
potential keywords on each topic. It is apparent from the diagram that topics on decentralisation, 
democratisation, and SP are interrelated to several sub-topics which might be plausible for further 
elaboration. However, field mapping in these clustered topics must be attempted to seek specific 
topics that lie at the intersection of decentralisation, democratisation, SP, and local governance. 




Figure 3.2 Field Map of Research Study 
Equally important is to identify technical keywords for investigating important sub-topics. In this paper, 
sets of keyword strings are proposed to give initial guidance on systematic search. Keyword strings for 
each topic domain are provided in the table below. 
Table 3.2 Keyword Search Strings 
Topic Domain String No. Search Strings 
Decentralisation 1 [decentrali*ation*] OR [devolution] OR [deconcentration] 
AND [“fiscal equali*ation”] 
Democratisation 2 [democrati*ation] AND [election] AND [“local politics”] AND 
[“local election”] AND [“direct election”] 
Social Protection 3 [“social protection”] OR [“social security”] OR [“social 
assistance”] OR [“social insurance”] AND [“poverty 
reduction”] AND [“gender”] 
Local Governance 4 [accountability] AND [“good governance”] AND [“public 
sector reform”] AND [“capacity building”] AND [“service 
delivery”] AND [“intergovernmental coordination”] 
 
3.4.2 Electronic Bibliographic Database and Website Search Results  
An extensive range of economic and social databases were searched (Google Scholar, EconLit, 
International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBSS), SCOPUS, ASSIA, JOLIS, and ‘grey literature’), using 
several combinations of relevant search terms and Boolean logic operators over the period from 
January 1999 to January 2017, supplemented by a search of relevant web sites. The detailed results 
are presented in Table 3.2.  









Local elite capture 
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EconLit IBSS SCOPUS ASSIA JOLIS 
String No. 1 [Decentralisation] 5,900 7,953 1,954 17,622 19,867 2,698 
String No. 2 [Democratisation] 738 10,335 1,796 53,249 11,633 5,881 
String No. 3 [Social Protection] 18,000 26,838 2,354 23,031 27,670 5,716 
String No. 4 [Local Governance] 24 42,024 3,943 77,058 11,164 11,061 
String No. 1 [Decentralisation] AND Indonesia 862 1,781 298 533 146 91 
String No. 2 [Democratisation] AND Indonesia 261 1,568 246 556 47 50 
String No. 3 [Social Protection] AND Indonesia 13,100 1,402 227 1,032 175 40 
String No. 4 [Local Governance] AND Indonesia 2 2,782 333 544 188 28 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 AND Indonesia 2 408 42 184 19 6 
String No. 1 AND No. 3 AND Indonesia 35 297 62 54 20 1 
String No. 1 AND No. 4 AND Indonesia 5 586 35 118 47 5 
String No. 2 AND No. 3 AND Indonesia 3 175 44 23 17 1 
String No. 2 AND No. 4 AND Indonesia 2 663 71 51 22 3 
String No. 3 AND No. 4 AND Indonesia 17 324 64 16 27 6 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 AND No. 3 AND Indonesia 4 85 6 3 6 0 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 AND No. 4 AND Indonesia 1 262 14 20 13 0 
String No. 1 AND No. 3 AND No. 4 AND Indonesia 48 149 3 2 10 1 
String No. 2 AND No. 3 AND No. 4 AND Indonesia 3 94 3 2 5 0 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 AND No. 3 AND No. 4 AND Indonesia 4 69 1 1 4 0 
*) Search based on literature published 1999-2017   
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3.4.3 Literature Search Results  
While the literature search on each subject resulted in an enormous number of studies, relatively few 
studies have been carried out that explicitly focus on the linkages between two topics or more. For 
instance, a search in EconLit, one of the most comprehensive databases of indexed publications, came 
up with only 69 references (in English) to decentralisation, democratisation, and SP with the context 
of Indonesia for the period 1999 to 2017. SCOPUS, the major multidisciplinary database of 
bibliographic information gathered from thousands of scholarly journals, came up with only single hit 
on a similar string and period. A search in the JOLIS Library Catalogue of the World Bank and the IMF 
identified 91 hits under the keywords ‘decentralization in Indonesia’, which became narrowed down 
to merely a handful of publications when the search was combined with other keywords combinations.  
The result above, with relatively few scholarly publications having explicitly studied linkages between 
keywords surrounding the topics of decentralisation, democratisation, and SP, is reflected in the 
widely used volume of the Handbook of Fiscal Federalism edited by Ahmad and Brosio (2008). None 
of the articles included in the book deals explicitly with SP (one article focuses on decentralisation and 
service delivery). The comprehensive readings on Decentralization Briefing Notes edited by J. Litvack 
and Seddon (1998) contains only one article related to SP that is directly linked to local authorities: 
Decentralization and Safety Nets. 
This search on bibliographic databases yielded 120 possibly relevant ‘hits’ which were downloaded 
(abstracts where possible, titles otherwise) and reviewed. Of these only 14 were deemed relevant and 
the full paper obtained and reviewed. The websites together yielded 236 potentially important papers, 
which were obtained and reviewed. A review of the references contained within those papers yielded 
56 additional papers for review. Thus, in total, 69 papers, articles, books, and reports were reviewed 
fully (marked by * in the reference list).  
 
3.4.4 Criteria for Prioritisation of Papers  
Papers in this area may have a broad or narrow focus, according to whether, for example, they focus 
on SP specifically or poverty more generally, whether they focus on the experience or viewpoint of a 
single country, a region, or more globally, and whether they focus on local governance specifically or 
decentralisation more generally. Clearly, the relevance and importance of these papers to the specific 
issue of SP within decentralisation will differ. Papers identified were therefore categorised according 
to three dimensions: 
1. Sector: concerned with decentralisation generally or local governance specifically; 
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2. Geography: specific to developing country case or not; 
3. Social Protection Specificity: cover all types or concerned with a type of SP specifically. 
These papers were then ‘priority rated’, according to these dimensions, as: 
1. High priority: papers specifically concerned with decentralisation, democratisation, and SP 
and were developing country-specific. For instance, Priyadarshee and Hossain (2010); Fossati 
(2016a). 
2. Medium priority: papers concerned with decentralisation more generally and were concerned 
with SP, but were not developing-country specific such as a paper by Ezcurra and Rodriguez-
Pose (2009);  
3. Low priority: papers concerned with decentralisation more generally and were not SP-specific. 
For example, see Direktorat Otonomi Daerah - Bappenas, (2011); P. Smoke and Lewis (1996); 
The World Bank (2003a); Turner, Podger, Sumardjono, and Tirthayasa (2004); von Luebke 
(2009). 
Only those papers rated as medium or high priority were used as the basis for the discussion in this 
thesis (these are marked by # in the reference list). Short summaries for every reviewed paper are 
provided in Appendix A.  
 
3.5 Key Issues Arising from Literature Review 
There are considerable gaps in the knowledge base for decentralisation and SP, particularly for case 
studies in developing countries. Most of the literature is ‘data free’, based on theory, assumption, or 
conjecture. It is therefore impossible to fully assess the potential impact of decentralisation on SP, and 
thus make informed recommendations. This is critical because there is no time limitation on 
decentralisation and democratisation, meaning that one cannot turn back to an arrangement of 
centralisation in the long run. This section outlines the author’s perception of the four primary gaps 
in the literature that require further research. The intention is to prioritise where evidence is required 
by countries in order to enable a better assessment of the potential impact of decentralisation on SP. 
 
3.5.1 Mixed Impacts on the Relationship between Decentralisation, Democratisation, and Improved 
Local Service Delivery 
One basis on which to assess the impact of decentralisation is local service delivery in the country 
under question. This is important for two reasons in particular. First, basic services, such as health, 
education, water and sanitation, all of which are the responsibility of the state, are systematically 
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failing and especially failing poor people. Services are failing because they are falling short of their 
potential to improve outcomes. They are often inaccessible or prohibitively expensive. But even when 
accessible, they are often dysfunctional, extremely weak in technical quality, and unresponsive to the 
needs of a diverse clientele (World Bank, 2003b). Second, these services are consumed and provided 
locally as most of them are categorised as non-tradable goods and services. 
Robinson (2007a) identifies that in general, literature on decentralisation and service delivery can be 
grouped into two categories: a) on opportunities for increased people’s participation and increased 
accountability of local authorities, and b) on forms of service delivery involving a plurality of actors. A 
major problem with the empirical literature is that there is no systematic or comparative evidence on 
whether increased participation in decentralised local governance generates better outputs in terms 
of improvements in the provision of health, education, water and sanitation services for poor and 
marginalised people. In a similar vein, efforts to measure development outcomes, such as the rate of 
poverty reduction or improved social indicators, and to attribute these to changes in devolution and 
participation, are inconclusive and plagued by methodological contention (R. C. Crook & Sverrisson, 
2001; Dyer & Rose, 2005). 
The Asia Foundation (from 2004) launched a series of studies to evaluate the impact of 
decentralisation in Indonesia. Its findings suggest that early decentralisation successfully promoted 
the establishment of three important conditions: (i) an increased awareness and respect for people's 
participation in the political process at the local level; (ii) a stronger commitment from local 
government to service delivery and significant pressure from communities to improve the quality of 
public services; and (iii) local governments working together and sharing information to solve 
problems together.  
Nevertheless, case studies from three districts conducted by SMERU (2002) revealed the finding that 
many areas impose new levies which could potentially hamper the local businesses climate. A World 
Bank report (launched in 2008) discusses that while the poverty headcount dropped significantly after 
1999—even considering the reversal in 2005— service delivery indicators show a mixed picture. Some 
indicators have improved, such as the primary school enrolment rate, but many others have only 
improved slightly since 1999 and some not at all. Likewise, recent evaluation on newly created regions 
show that performance indicators are still far from what one might expect (see special report on 
decentralisation by World Bank, 2011). 
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3.5.2 Unclear Impact of Decentralisation on SP and Poverty Reduction 
Inter-related connections between decentralisation and SP have rarely been explored. The majority 
of studies have focused on observable effects of decentralisation on public sector outputs such as 
investment levels, public service provision, education and health indicators, macroeconomic stability, 
and other larger threads (Faguet 2014). Some notable summaries of this research can be found in 
Rondinelli et al (1983), Manor (1999), and Faguet (2012). While several studies have attempted to 
evaluate the performance of anti-poverty programmes under decentralisation, few have analysed SP 
programmes as the primary object of study. None of the studies have looked at the impact of 
decentralisation on potential beneficiaries or vulnerable groups (i.e. pregnant women, children, 
people with disabilities, elderly), with no analysis of local-financed SP programme sustainability. 
Moreover, despite the potential of decentralised policymaking which enables higher female 
participation, understandings of social risks and gender inequality in particular have not been 
effectively integrated into SP policy and programming. This fact is supported by Arif et al (2010) who 
find that despite the involvement of various institutions, no gender focal point (e.g. within the local 
departments in the decentralised structure) has been included in the delivery process from the 
national level to the village level.   
Decentralised policy making is not the only factor which determines the success of SP, for example, 
positive evidence from two Indian regions in Priyadarshee and Hossain (2010) cannot be entirely 
attributed to different implementation mechanisms. The study highlights underlying historical and 
cultural differences in both areas. The results of research by the UN Capital Development Fund (2012) 
confirms that adequate social assistance benefit levels are indeed not attained in countries with 
entirely decentralised social assistance regimes, but rather in countries with mixed systems or limited 
forms of devolution. However, the report also puts forward an important argument in favour of 
allowing a degree of local discretion to foster experimentation and innovation, as is the case with 
Bolsa Familia in Brazil, where municipalities have been able to adapt their cash transfer programme 
to local service delivery systems. 
The link between decentralisation and its impact on poverty reduction is ambiguous and largely 
influenced by country specificities. Bardhan (2002) highlights mixed empirical experience of poverty 
reduction with decentralisation in developing countries. The proximity of local government to the 
people has not universally led to better service provision in rural areas, undermined by the problems 
in coordination and lack of capacity. Additional to these problems is local elite capture which reduces 
the effectiveness and quality of services reaching the poor (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Cost effectiveness 
as a prime factor shaping service provision to the poor has also been analysed by Birner and von Braun 
(2009). 
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A review of decentralisation experiences in 19 countries by OECD found improvements in poverty 
reduction in only one third of cases (Jütting et al. 2004). The report also provides lessons learnt from 
successful countries in reducing poverty following decentralisation: it requires that the lower middle 
income status population segments have literacy rates above 80 percent and a relatively open political 
process. It also requires adequate commitment from the central government, financial and technical 
capacity of local governments, and checks and balances at the local level. An evaluation by the World 
Bank (2012c) of Indonesian SP programmes maintains that local governments have merely invested 
small budget shares for SP expenditure which caused under-coverage and sub-optimal progress. The 
report also mentions another problem which potentially impairs programme implementation: 
conflicting regulations between central and local government. For instance, currently, there are no 
harmonised local and national regulations regarding Jamkesmas (national health insurance scheme), 
Jamkesda (local health insurance scheme), and the National Social Security Law (which calls for 
universal coverage of all citizens with five insurance products including health). Neither is there a 
definitive division of roles and responsibilities between central and local governments.   
Overall, the extent to which decentralisation improve the quality of SP is unclear, but there may well 
be scope for mutual benefits when there are capable institutions, qualified personnel, and sufficient 
resources. It is relevant that capacity building is an important component of development (Fanany et 
al., 2009). Within this context, the role of local leaders may also provide opportunities for better 
services, particularly to marginalised groups. For example, this occurred to a degree in the 
improvement of social services and governance in Surakarta, Central Java during the time of Joko 
Widodo mayoralty (Majeed, 2012). 
  
3.5.3 The Regulatory Environment Determines the Impact of SP 
Newly formed authorities tend to promulgate their own regulations at the lower level. This is in line 
with the findings of Tanzi (1996) who stresses the effects of decentralisation in developing countries 
that might cause excessive regulation. In addition to the general regulatory environment, important 
are those regulations that are directly pertinent to SP, as this sector tends to be amongst (if not the) 
most over-regulated. This can lead to a situation where regulations might be conflicting or overlapping, 
resulting in ineffective coordination and weak managerial control. 
With regard to the Indonesian context, Law 32 Year 2004 gives responsibility to provinces and districts 
for the social welfare of all residents. Therefore, local authorities are expected to have more 
comprehensive knowledge regarding their citizens. However, most resources are still under the 
control of the central government. For instance, although district governments were put in charge of 
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managing (and operating) public health facilities when decentralisation started in 2001, the central 
government is still involved in the deployment and financing of public doctors who work under civil 
service contracts (Olivia & Yamauchi, 2012). 
Meanwhile, several social insurance programmes require specific conditions which can only be 
operated under national arrangement. For instance, social insurance mechanisms work only through 
the principle of the ‘law of large numbers’ by pooling funds from all participants to share risks as 
stipulated in Law 40 Year 2004 on Indonesian National Social Security System (Government of 
Indonesia, 2004b; M. L. Smith & Kane, 1994; Zeckhauser, 2008). The current regulatory environment 
will, in addition to that specifically related to SP, determine the effectiveness of programmes in 
decentralised setting. Important here is the harmony in terms of legal frameworks between a national 
regulatory system and regional laws, such as clear roles and responsibilities of regional stakeholders 
in nation-wide social insurance programmes, particularly on issues such as benefit portability and 
standardisation (Arifianto, 2006). 
 
3.5.4 The Potential of Decentralisation and Democratisation to Improve SP outcomes 
Most decentralisation problems in Indonesia, as in many other developing countries, are related to 
governance issues. Decentralisation in Indonesia has left much unfinished business largely due to its 
hasty implementation (Sumarto, 2013; Sumarto, Vothknecht, & Wijaya, 2014a; World Bank, 2003a). 
Institutions are lacking key requirements for an effective management process i.e. absence of 
performance measures and an effective framework of constraints; unclear division of responsibilities 
between the different levels of government; insufficient human and institutional capacity of local 
governments; inappropriate incentives given by the structure of decentralised public finance.  
It cannot be denied that decentralised Indonesia has made progress in addressing absolute poverty. 
There is confirmation of convergence in poverty rates at district level (Sumarto et al. 2014, p.3). It 
clearly indicates that regions with initially higher poverty levels tend to experience a greater reduction 
in poverty. However, the country currently deals with serious challenges as poverty reduction has 
been slowing and inequality within and between regions appears to be increasing (Statistics Indonesia, 
2014).  
Although SP programmes have recently only had a few real champions among local leaders and 
bureaucrats, positive cases of local leadership signify the potential of responsive administration and 
local capacity to empower society and transform livelihoods (see evidence of Surabaya in Weiss, 2013).  
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Theoretically speaking, regional governments are supposed to have a better idea and knowledge of 
the needs of their people, ensuring that strategies meet local needs and conditions. In light of this 
premise, there are four determinants of local governments’ ability to implement SP programmes. 
Firstly, the capacity for income generation at the local level. Although the major source of local 
revenue comes from central government transfers, several local governments are able to generate 
their own income. The presence of natural resources in the region is a key factor affecting the amount 
localities can generate. The second determinant is the performance in delivery of public services.  
As fiscal capacity varies between regions, technical capacity also differs significantly. Several regions 
are still lagging behind due to the limitation of infrastructure (e.g. telecommunication, road networks). 
Third are the governance aspects of decentralisation. A strong accountability chain within a 
decentralised system is key to managing actors between institutions in the same region (horizontal 
coordination) and between central and local government (vertical coordination). Fourth is the regional 
institutional capacity for reducing poverty. Almost all districts are required to establish regional 
poverty reduction coordinating agencies (Tim Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, 
TKPKD), but around 20 percent of all districts have not established a TKPKD office as of 2010. This fact 
implies that many district heads and mayors do not consider poverty reduction to be a foremost 
priority in their development plans, nearly half of the TKPKDs are located in the eastern part of the 
country. Sumarto (2013) provides an early claim that districts which established TKPKDs reduced 
poverty more significantly compared to regions without them.  
It is possible to redesign the intergovernmental transfer system to more thoroughly incorporate 
appropriate performance incentives but this would require comprehensive changes in policy 
perspective across concerned government ministries and related regulations. Lewis (2010) suggests 
that the process can only take place in the long run. The recommendations on redesigning budget 
transfer are best accompanied with a comprehensive development strategy which requires effective 
and region-specific combinations of growth and sound social policies. It is also important to delve 
more into region-based institutional aspects as well as address the endogeneity issue. Government 
decisions to shift focus on currently ineffective and regressive subsidies (fuel and electricity) will also 
strengthen fiscal capacity and room for expanding SP programmes. 
 
3.6 Evaluating the Effects of Decentralisation and Democratisation on SP: A Review of Methods, 
Concepts, Theories, and Measurements 
A number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the current wave of 
decentralisation, particularly in developing nations. Yet, there has been insufficient attention given 
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specifically to the area of SP. Furthermore, discussion in much of the literature has been lacking 
analytical frameworks, and many studies lack concepts and theories in evaluating impact. As Bardhan 
(2002) points out, there has been a problem of scarcity of quantitative evidence on the impact of 
decentralisation. There are successful cases of decentralisation in Latin America, with some evidence 
available on the “before-after” comparison of service delivery outcomes but there are hardly any 
household-level analyses in the literature on the comparative effects of centralised versus 
decentralised delivery. 
 
3.6.1 The Impact of Decentralisation and Democratisation on SP: A Review of Methods and 
Approaches used in Previous Studies 
Using notions in Development Studies (DS), this research aims to examine the validity of relevant 
grand theory (meta-narratives) whilst greater attention is given to the emergence of ‘context specific’ 
theory (micro-narratives). This approach is in agreement with recent trends which put DS research in 
a more empirically grounded understanding of problems in view of the specificity and complexity of 
situations (Molteberg & Bergstrom, 2000). Within this context, this research attempts to invalidate 
normative grand theories of decentralisation through the following economic arguments: 
a. Proximity. Decisions about public expenditure made at local government level that are closer 
and more responsive to a local constituency are more likely to reflect the demand for local 
services than decisions made by a remote central government. Decentralisation allows better 
preference matching and the generation of location-specific knowledge (Oates 1972) as well 
as the ability of people with heterogeneous preferences to sort these out in their preferred 
jurisdiction (Tiebout, 1956). In another term by Hayek (1948), fiscal decentralisation is 
generally considered to be a more efficient system of resource allocation, primarily because 
of the informational advantages that local authorities may have over central authorities. With 
these notions, this research attempts to observe whether the proximity of local public 
governance brings about significant changes in SP programmes. 
b. Competitiveness. The decision to delegate most responsibilities is to improve the ability of 
local governments and enhance innovation, hence the likelihood that governments will act to 
satisfy the wishes of citizens. Competition among subnational governments is said to allow for 
a variety of bundles of local public goods to be produced, and individuals are said to reveal 
their preferences for those goods by moving to those jurisdictions that satisfy their tastes 
(Salmon, 1987). This concept is largely embodied in the second-generation theory of fiscal 
federalism (Oates, 2005). Here the main argument in favour of decentralisation hinges on the 
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trade-off between preference matching and externalities which is elaborated in principal-
agent models of electoral accountability. In this framework, this research strives to prove 
whether decentralisation is capable of reducing the information asymmetry among sub-
national governments, and in this way, the electorate can increase their control over the local 
politicians to stimulate more electoral accountability, which finally translates into a more 
efficient government. 
Having defined both SP and decentralisation, the question arises as to where to find the interplay. 
Given the understanding of SP as a complex, multi-stakeholder concept (as resembled by 
understandings of poverty or vulnerability), it must be clear that the important factors of SP cannot 
be resolved by any single remedy like decentralisation but that it requires a combination of policies 
designed for country specific (or even local) conditions.  
 
3.6.2 Direct Measurement of the Impact of Decentralisation and Democratisation on SP 
How is decentralisation related to these broad SP-related policies? Given the definition of devolution 
which grants local government full discretion over most local affairs, decentralisation is considered to 
affect livelihood through a wide range of channels. According to the World Bank in its early publication 
(2000a), ‘decentralised poverty reduction comes into play for three complementary elements of 
strategy i.e. promoting opportunities, facilitating empowerment, and enhancing security’. First, 
promoting opportunities refers to giving poor people the chance to improve their material situation 
in life, and this includes providing access to employment, markets, financial services, infrastructure 
(roads, electricity, telecommunication), social services (education, health care), and land ownership. 
Second, facilitating empowerment implies the inclusion of all members of society in decision-making 
processes in order to achieve responsive and accountable public actions and policies. Third, enhancing 
security means reducing people’s vulnerability to different threats, like economic shocks, natural 
disasters, ill health, disability and personal violence.  
With regard to the second group, i.e. measures to facilitate empowerment, the link to decentralisation 
is relatively obvious. Decentralisation brings about increased opportunities for people to participate 
in public decision making, from which they are generally excluded in a highly centralised government 
system (Asante, 2003; R. C. Crook & Sverrisson, 2001). This in itself represents a form of poverty 
alleviation as poor people are given voice and thus power, as depicted in Figure 3.3 given citizens’ 
voices are heard (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001). At the same time, participation can increase the supervisory 
power of local (poor) people and this in turn can lead to higher accountability of public officials. Due 
to the greater proximity, citizens can easier monitor and thus influence government actions at the 
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local level (Asante, 2003; von Braun & Grote, 2002) and this can again affect the political, and possibly 
also the sociocultural, dimension of poverty. Among several possible accountability mechanisms, 
officials are assumed to be held accountable through local elections, which serve as a means to 
evaluate officials’ past performance. This is in line with the arguments from Seabright (1996) who 
notes that only if local citizens have the opportunity to observe officials’ performance and reward or 
punish them at upcoming elections, local election can be assumed to have an incentive to act in their 
electorate’s interest. In this sense, decentralisation can be thought of as a means to bring about good 
governance, the relevance of which for poverty reduction has been shown by Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
 
Source: Author’s illustration, adapted and developed from Jütting et al. (2004) 
Figure 3.3 The Links between Democratisation, Decentralisation, and SP 
 
3.6.3 Assessing the Indirect Impact of Decentralisation and Democratisation on SP through the 
Search for the Importance of Governance Quality 
In the context of decentralised and democratised SP, further elaboration is needed to justify the 
following specific topics: 
a. Democratisation. In their analysis on local health services provision, Rosser and Wilson (2012) 
suggest that democratisation at the local level has created an incentive for all local leaders to 
pursue populist and redistributive policies because they are favoured with potential voters 
and will likely translate into increased support at election time. A similar view is proposed by 
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Aspinall (2014) who traces the origins of incentives that democracy creates for elites to design 
policies that appeal to broad constituencies. Not infrequently, these measures fail to achieve 
the desired goals when lack of capability and elite capture comes to the surface.  
b. Responsiveness. The main findings from Skoufias et al (2014) shed light on the effects of 
political decentralisation on service delivery, using health and education indicators. Their 
findings suggest that directly elected district officials became more responsive to local needs 
close to elections, as reflected in the composition of district expenditures, and expenditure 
categories likely allow the incumbent district heads running as candidates in the direct 
elections to ‘buy’ political support and votes. In this context, the degree of responsiveness in 
SP provision will be measured and compared between regions. 
c. Ineffectiveness. A relatively wide body of literature provides two reasons why local 
administrative spending could be ineffective: bureaucratic self-interest and local capture. The 
theory of bureaucracy as put forward by Niskanen (1971) posits that the bureaucracy exhibits 
an inherent tendency to increase its budget as bureaucrats enjoy higher status and better pay 
with increasing size of their budgets or bureaus. Furthermore, capture of government funds 
through local elites is a recurring phenomenon in developing countries (see among others 
Galasso & Ravallion, 2005; Olken, 2007; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004). It diverts government 
funds intended for public service provision to private funds or other unintended public usages. 
While the welfare effects of decentralisation in developing countries are still a moot point and 
the evidence is highly country-specific (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b), it is clear that 
powerful local elites, where they exist, have more scope for local capture by the devolution 
of authority through decentralisation (Bardhan, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). This study 
attempts to assess whether decentralisation leads to effectiveness in delivering SP. 
 
3.6.4 Assessing the Indirect Impact of Decentralisation and Democratisation on SP through its 
Impact on Local Livelihood 
Notwithstanding the robustness of economic arguments, it is imperative to take into account a wide 
range of contextual differences and their ensuing complexities. Findings from Litvack and Seddon 
(1998) have shown that although the driving force behind decentralisation might serve the same ends 
for both good economics and good politics, successful decentralisation requires specific conditions. It 
ranges from conditions such as linkages between local financing and service provision; involvement of 
local communities for meaningful decisions; binding mechanisms for local politicians to induce 
credible incentives for people’s participation; an accountability system based on public and 
transparent information; and the complete instruments of decentralisation. Therefore, simplified 
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assumptions embedded in theories must be confronted with the existing context for a higher degree 
of rigour. 
 
3.7 Summary  
In this chapter, an attempt was made to provide a balanced review of the literature concerning SP in 
the context of decentralised and democratised governance, providing an overview of key issues that 
face developing countries. 
Problems in the processes of decentralisation and democratisation have been explored in the 
literature with the objective of finding better approaches. A sizeable number of recent studies have 
focused on the exacerbation of inequality as a consequence of regional disparities. Interestingly, rarely 
has a significant attempt been made to clarify the impact of decentralisation on SP. However, evidence 
on the likely impact of SP is virtually non-existent. Perhaps due to this, most of the literature is 
speculative about what might happen, rather than empirically-supported or verifiable, with views 
naturally quite polarised between those arguing for and against the benefits of decentralised 
government.  
Although the limited time frame and the nature of the study imply that any conclusion should be 
treated with caution, our analysis indicates that four issues arise in terms of researchable areas: First, 
the weak correlation and varied results of decentralisation implementation and local service delivery. 
This is because of a lack of systematic or comparative evidence and methodological problems which 
often lead to inconclusive results. Second, the impact of decentralisation on SP and poverty reduction 
is quite unclear. Decentralised governments have to equip themselves with proper structure and 
adequate resources. Leadership factors are also instrumental in navigating the enhancement of local 
SP programmes. Third, a country’s current regulatory environment and administrative capacity, will 
significantly determine the overall success of SP programmes. Key here is establishing the likely 
balance of ‘power’ between national regulatory system and local regulations as nationwide 
programmes need to involve all stakeholders. Although several programmes embed ‘monopolistic’ 
characteristics, this does not exempt the significant role from regional-level players. Fourth, it is worth 
pointing out potential features of decentralisation that can be drawn upon to enhance SP. Success 
stories and lessons learnt from several regions indicate the potential of responsive local leaders in 
empowering society and transforming livelihoods through SP and participatory public policy (B. D. 
Lewis, 2014b; Miller & Bunnell, 2013). 
Improved local governance can be associated with short-term action while in the long run governance 
needs to redesign intergovernmental transfers systems. Finally, given the data vacuum that exists with 
Chapter 3: Democratisation, Decentralisation, and Social Protection: A Review of Theory and Evidences 
94 
 
respect to the impact of decentralisation on SP more specifically, there is clearly a substantial research 
agenda to be pursued before one can begin to better understand the relationship between 
decentralisation, democratisation, SP, and development outcomes. 
 PART III RESEARCH METHOD 
Chapter Four: Epistemological and Research Methodological Framework 
  
4.1 Introduction 
Research methodology plays an important role in establishing the validity of a study. Without an 
appropriate methodology, convincing arguments can hardly be drawn let alone conclusions. A 
research methodology provides the glue to hold all activities within a study together in unity. It also 
helps to unite parts of the research work to address the central research questions of the study. 
This chapter is intended to highlight several aspects of the research methodology including the design, 
the strategy, method of analysis, and measurement methodology. The design of the study comprises 
discussion on the development of the list of interview questions, data sources, data collection method, 
location choice, and selection of respondents. The strategy involves issues such as periodical and 
regional comparison, the strategy of addressing research questions, the approach of data analysis, 
and the methodological aspect of measuring the level of social welfare, as well as the role of local 
economic growth.  
The previous chapter provides a fundamental background for the discussion here on the assessment 
of the impact of decentralisation and democratisation on social protection (SP), based on empirical 
work from previous studies. It also discusses some concepts and approaches used in examining the 
link between decentralisation, democratisation, and SP. By reviewing previous studies, it is expected 
that some evidence can be identified to support and develop the research, whether by exploring the 
relationship deeply or by assessing the relationship using other perspectives that have not been 
utilised previously. 
First, this chapter discusses how I come up with decentralisation and democratisation as a theoretical 
lens to address the questions of this study. Section 4.2 elaborates theory and assumptions surrounding 
research topics. I then explain the framework in Section 4.3. Further, Section 4.4 presents the cases 
and how it is being justified. Section 4.5 explains the validity and reliability of the analysis. Research 
methods are explained in Section 4.6 while limitations of this research are described in Section 4.7. All 
of these elements serve as the foundation for which the findings are later analysed.  
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4.2 On Theoretical Concerns and Assumptions 
Decentralisation and democratisation have been chosen as central policy experiments in this thesis to 
investigate the implementation of SP. As mentioned in previous chapters, decentralisation is a 
strategy that brings public service delivery closer to the citizen, improves the responsiveness to public 
demands, increases quality and efficiency, and empowers local government units as well as 
stimulating the wider participation of local people. With respect to such a promising role of 
decentralisation, many argue that it can be seen as an effective way of increasing social welfare (P. 
Pierson, 1995; Sellers & Lidström, 2007) or has a profound impact on poverty reduction (Asante & 
Ayee, 2004). In a similar vein, there has also been the well-known positive correlation between 
democracy and redistribution of economic progress, firstly uncovered by Lipset (in 1959), then 
replicated by numerous studies in the following decades, and confirmed by Przeworski and Limongi’s 
sophisticated analysis (published in 1997) using the world sample of nations in the period from 1950 
to 1990.  
Within this literature boundary, there are already large numbers of studies linking decentralisation 
and democratisation to SP using various approaches. This chapter reviews several empirical studies 
related to the linkages, encompassing a number of its methods and approaches used to examine the 
nexus of decentralisation and democratisation with SP. Based on the results of this review, and 
combined with the reviews in the previous chapter, a model will be developed for the present study.  
The main emphasis of this research is focused on understanding how and under which circumstances 
SP is being developed in a decentralised way and to deepen local democratic settings. Thus, I am 
interested in investigating decentralisation and democratisation processes in relation to SP 
implementation and its development. In particular, I focus on how SP becomes adapted to local needs 
and how this has impact on welfare. 
In the present study, the nature of the research philosophy is based on an interpretive framework. 
Additionally, this framework encompasses social constructivism which takes a particular approach to 
understanding the world in which we live and work. It strives to find the development of multiple 
meanings whilst researchers look for complexity of viewpoints 
Interpretive frameworks in Creswell’s concept (2014) can be considered a basic set of beliefs that 
guide action. The philosophical assumptions (ontology, epistemology, axiology, and methodology) are 
embedded within interpretive frameworks that researchers use. On this point, Creswell suggests 
interpretive frameworks may be suitable for social science theories (leadership, attribution, political 
influence and control, and many others) to frame the researcher’s theoretical lens in studies. On the 
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other hand, the theories may be social justice theories/advocacy/participatory, seeking to bring about 
change or address social issues in society.   
 
4.2.1 Assumptions about Decentralisation 
Almost all countries worldwide are now experimenting with decentralisation. However diverse their 
motivations are, countries are decentralising mainly because they believe this can help stimulate 
economic growth or reduce rural poverty, goals that central government interventions have 
presumably failed to achieve. Some countries see decentralisation as a way to strengthen civil society 
and deepen democracy. Some perceive it as a way to off-load expensive responsibilities onto lower 
level governments. Thus, decentralisation is seen as a solution to many different kinds of problems. 
Principally, the most important theoretical argument concerning decentralisation is that it can make 
government more accountable and responsive to the governed. Improving governance is also a central 
justification for real-world reformers and development practitioners. In addition, responsiveness is 
almost always related to the proximity of public service providers.  
In this framework, assumptions in favour of decentralisation are summarised as follows: 
a. Local government structure will be altered to increase citizen voice and change the incentives 
that public officials face. 
b. Locally elected governments will be more accountable and responsive to their citizens’ 
preferences when designing service provision and allocating resources. 
c. Citizens will have a better system for articulating their needs and wants and will be able to 
hold officials to account over breaches in service. 
d. Decentralisation will reduce abuses of power by transferring certain central government 
functions and resources to lower levels. 
e. It will improve political stability by giving aggrieved minorities control over subnational 
governments with limited power over issues that affect them directly. 
f. It is expected to increase political competition by creating many smaller arenas that politicians 
vie to control. 
g. Central government will be willing to devolve full power and responsibility for services to local 
government. 
h. Central government will ensure that local governments have adequate financial resources to 
ensure service provision. Extra finances will also be available to local government via local 
taxes. 
i. Local administrative capacity will be adequate to deliver improved services. 
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All the assumptions seemingly point towards the notion that decentralisation addresses the key 
motivations across countries to improve governance. With these ostensible advantages, the demand 
for decentralisation has naturally been strong throughout the world.  
However, as discussed by Prud'homme (1995), the benefits of decentralisation are not as obvious as 
the standard theory of fiscal federalism suggests, and there are serious drawbacks that should be 
considered. An analysis of these dangers makes it easier to understand some of the real choices. 
These choices are not so much whether to decentralise in general, but rather what functions to 
decentralise, in which sectors, and in which regions.  
Prud'homme further puts an analogous argument that decentralisation measures are like some 
potent drugs: when prescribed for the relevant illness, at the appropriate moment and in the correct 
dose, they can have the desired salutary effect; but in the wrong circumstances, they can harm rather 
than heal. Some of the negative effects from decentralisation can be summarised as follows: 
a. Decentralisation can increase disparities. Regional disparities exist in most countries and do 
not disappear with economic development. Further, a reduction in income disparities does 
not necessarily correlate with a reduction in regional income differentials. 
b. Decentralisation can jeopardize stability. Fiscal policies of subnational governments might run 
counter to those of central government (fiscal perversity). 
c. Decentralisation can undermine efficiency. The hypothesis that decentralised provision 
brings efficiency rests on assumptions that are very unlikely to be met in developing countries 
i.e. allocative efficiency, production efficiency, and minimal corruption.  
The adverse effects of decentralisation lead to the discourse beyond the centralisation-
decentralisation dichotomy. Many public expenditure theories lend themselves to decentralisation 
with particular focus on the design of a transfer system which allows subnational governments to 
finance their expenditures, while it functions as a mechanism to avoid the danger of decentralisation 
(particularly for distribution and stabilisation). Another discourse worth mentioning is regarding the 
case for the different treatment of geographical areas, sectors, and functions. 
 
4.2.2 Assumptions about Democratisation 
Political systems with democratic characteristics are not restricted exclusively to modern times in 
Western developed nations. In many areas of the world tribal chiefs were elected for centuries and in 
some places democratic political institutions long existed at the village level. In addition, the concept 
of democracy was, of course, familiar to the ancient world. Modern democracy is not simply 
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democracy of the village, the tribe, or the city-state, it is rather a democracy of the nation-state and 
its emergence is associated with the development of the nation-state. The initial push toward 
democracy in the West occurred in the first half of the seventeenth century. In this period, democratic 
ideas and democratic movements were an important, although not central, feature of many historic 
events. According to Huntington (1991), the process of democratisation emerged in different ‘waves’. 
A wave of democratisation, as argued by Huntington, is defined as a series of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that 
significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. 
In Huntington’s proposal, a wave also usually involves liberalisation or partial democratisation in 
political systems that do not become fully democratic. Hence, using the definition from Huntington, 
three waves of democratisation have occurred in the modern world. Each wave affected a relatively 
small number of countries, and during each wave some regime transitions occurred in a non-
democratic direction. In addition, not all transitions to democracy occurred during democratic waves. 
The first wave (1828-1929) emerged in today’s developed countries, a process that had its roots in the 
American and French revolutions. 
Democratisation in developing countries occurred in different sequences or periods. Mostly, it 
happened in the second (1943-1962) and third (1974) waves. Today, the promotion of 
democratisation is bundled altogether with the recommendation to uphold the rule of law and to 
strengthen good governance. This suggestion becomes a priority for many international donor 
agencies, driven by a belief in the primary importance of the various tasks of development. Almost 
inevitably, the policy recommendation for democratisation has been proposed in concurrence with 
administrative devolution within the hypothesis of bringing policymakers closer to the electorate at 
the smallest entity level.  
However, as elucidated clearly by Rodrik (2016), liberal democracy has been difficult to institute and 
sustain in developing countries. This has to do both with ideational factors i.e. the absence of a liberal 
tradition prior to electoral mobilisation and structural conditions i.e. the prevalence of mass 
mobilisation along identity rather than class cleavages.  
Acemoglu et al (2013) detail theoretical reasons why democracy is expected to increase redistribution 
and reduce inequality, and why this expectation may fail to be realised when democracy is captured 
by richer segments of the population; when it caters to the preferences of the middle class; or when 
it opens up ‘disequalising’ opportunities to segments of the population previously excluded, thus 
exacerbating inequality among a large part of the population.  
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Within a democratic regime, the emergence of various new social welfare policies indicates that the 
state has become more responsive to the interests of poor citizens and that policymaking processes 
are providing at least some avenues for input by groups representing their interests. 
Yet, the third wave of democratisation since the 1970s has been associated with radical revisions of 
social welfare systems inherited from predecessor authoritarian regimes. In some cases, such as the 
formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe, these changes have involved scaling back the state’s 
role in SP. Among the best studied examples are the countries of Northeast Asia, especially South 
Korea and Taiwan. Stephan Haggard (2005) has argued that democratisation in these countries has 
been associated with ‘a more expansive approach to social welfare’, whereby democracy has 
‘generated new pressure on governments to provide SP.’ Likewise, Wong (2004) finds that reform 
trajectories moved in tandem and in a similar direction, from limited benefits from health insurance 
schemes before democratic transition to universal and redistributive medical insurance programmes 
during the period of democratisation. Accordingly, East Asian countries are witnessing the 
replacement of what were once labelled ‘productivist’ social welfare regimes that focused merely on 
the labour force, with systems that emphasize universal coverage and redistribution. 
From the perspective of Indonesian democratisation, the similar policy shift of SP from limited to 
universal is surprising. A recurrent and dominant theme in studies on Indonesia’s democracy is elite 
capture. This view, that the institutions of Indonesian democracy nowadays are still dominated by the 
oligarchs, bureaucrats, and other elite actors, is largely unchanged from that which supported 
authoritarianism during Suharto’s pseudo-democracy era. This perspective has recently been 
challenged by scholars who suggest that it understates the plurality of interests represented in 
government bodies and policymaking during the reformasi era. For instance, Mietzner (2013a) has 
argued that activists from civil society groups have begun to penetrate legislative and other bodies, to 
exert some influence on policy. 
Hence, comparing with these countries, the expansion of SP policies in Indonesia is actually less 
surprising than the elite capture perspective would suggest. Closer to Indonesia, in the Southeast 
Asian region, similar changes have been visible. For example, in Thailand, the 1997 election signalled 
the birth of a new social contract that replaced the developmental social compact that had operated 
since the late 1950s which involved, among other things, the introduction of a popular universal health 
scheme.  
Therefore, assumptions about democratisation suggest that Indonesia is moving in the same direction. 
Based on this assumption, this study identifies two causal mechanisms, both closely paralleling the 
case of Northeast Asian countries. First, democratisation opened the policy-making process to more 
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actors, including new political parties, social movements, and organised labour, some of which have 
played an important role in lobbying and mobilising for policy change. Second, democratisation 
changed the incentive structures under which both new and old policy actors operated, especially by 
increasing pressures on political leaders to respond to voter preferences for greater welfare provision. 
The policy shifts analysed in the present study suggest greater government responsiveness to popular 
preferences than has hitherto been widely accepted in studies of Indonesian democracy. Even so, 
analyses stressing the continuing dominance of oligarchic forces remain relevant.  
 
4.2.3 Assumptions about Social Protection 
The rapid rise of SP in the development policy agenda has been remarkable, even astonishing. Part of 
the explanation is to be found in a growing recognition that SP can be essential to the achievement of 
bigger development objectives, such as the MDGs and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite 
its increasing acceptance, many still overlook SP because of the fear that it may foster 'dependency' 
culture among the poor and vulnerable. Skeptics also believe that it might also erode the familial 
support system in developing countries.  
However, scepticism does not hinder the increasing trend on SP adoption amongst developing 
countries and their development partners. Support from development institutions has been positive 
indicated with the publication of World Bank State of Social Safety Nets (2018) and the ILO World 
Social Protection Report (2017).  
Attention among epistemic community which encompasses academics dan policymakers has been 
constructive and attempting to scrutinise aspects in very detailed manner. Compilation of articles in 
IDS Bulletin on SP for Social Justice (2011) shows philosophical, moral, and ethical grounds for SP very 
comprehensively. Meanwhile, articles on special edition of IDS Bulletin on SP graduation (2015) 
attempts to convince stakeholders that it largely has the capacity to empower the beneficiaries and 
at the same time replacing the assumption that SP could create dependency. Finally, a special edition 
from Global Policy on the principles and practice of SP (2016) elaborates comprehensively the 
foundation and the variety of SP implementations globally. 
The push for SP adoption has long been advocated systematically by many institutions. For example, 
the normative framework of ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation includes 16 up-to-date 
social security standards which provides a guidance to lay foundations for national social protection 
policies. The most recent adopted standard—version of 2012—reflects the global tripartite 
commitment to guarantee at least a basic level of social security to all in the form of a nationally 
defined social protection floor, and to ensure progressively wider scope and higher levels of protection. 
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Country's commitment to building SP is also reflected many SDG targets. Most prominently, 
SDG Target number 1.3 which calls upon countries to implement nationally appropriate SP systems 
for all for reducing and preventing poverty. Furthermore, the importance of SP for sustainable 
development is reflected in several other goals, including universal health coverage (SDG 3.8), gender 
equality (SDG 5.4), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8.5) and greater equality (SDG 10.4).  
In general, concepts surrounding the design of SP programmes are based on the assumption that 
poverty (and vulnerability) is primarily a result of individual constraints, such as low levels of education 
or physical assets. SP programmes address these individual constraints, thereby providing the poor 
with the necessary means to pull themselves out of poverty and improve their living conditions. Within 
this regard, SP is assumed to be comprehensive which encompasses various different types of 
programmes suited to the needs of beneficiaries. For instance, programmes related to the elderly will 
be different to the programmes tackling child poverty.  
The classical assumption of SP is usually related to the concept of spring-board or temporary (ad hoc) 
relief for the poor. This old perspective only partially explains the development of welfare and shows 
limited understanding of the measurement of well-being. This concept is reflected to the design of SP 
which is oriented towards ‘compensatory’ cash transfer in Indonesia in 2005, 2008, and 2013 
(supposed to maintain welfare level in the midst of the inflationary effect of the revoking of fuel 
subsidy).   
Lately, the design of SP has been underpinned by technocratic approaches, particularly in embracing 
individualistic understandings of poverty which emphasise pathways out of poverty at the individual 
and household level. Furthermore, increasing fiscal pressure and political economic factors have led 
to a push for a more targeted approach. In this context, direct transfers to households become more 
relevant to replace old policies like subsidy that in many events can be regressive. Such transfers are 
often labelled in the literature as anti-poverty transfer programmes or social assistance. As espoused 
by Barrientos (2013), these programmes allow for an understanding of poverty by identifying three 
different and important perspectives: poverty because of a lack of income, poverty because of a lack 
of income and assets, and poverty as a multidimensional issue (poverty can be reflected by a 
shortcoming of income, employment, health, nutrition, educational and other opportunities).  
Following the proposition from Devereux (2016) two powerful arguments can be made for targeting, 
one normative or ethical and one pragmatic or operational. Both arguments are in line with the 
principle of redistributive justice. The ideological argument is that targeting aims to transfer resources 
from those who have more than they need to those who have less than they need to sustain a 
minimum subsistence or a decent standard of living. Consequently, targeted transfers are a 
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prerequisite for redistributive justice. Meanwhile, using the pragmatic argument, is policy-makers 
operate in a real world of budget constraints where resources are never enough to distribute to all 
the poor. Given the reality of budget constraints, scarce public resources must be used optimally and 
allocated efficiently, where they can achieve the maximum impact. 
Ostensibly, a technocratic approach in poverty measurement and targeting provides solid foundations 
for understanding concepts of poverty and poverty eradication. Commonly used poverty indices are 
utilised extensively along with the importance of panel data surveys to allow for observations to be 
made at given intervals over time. Other methods like proxy means testing have been put into central 
themes for targeting assistance. This obviously entails the sufficient readiness of personnel and 
infrastructure systems to support the implementation of regular surveys and verification mechanisms.   
Another distinctive aspect in SP that has been strongly promoted is its contemporary aim to address 
social injustice. Consequently, this course moves towards the politics of shifting SP systems to a 
universal basis. Universal means that the benefits are entitlement-based and can be claimed by all 
citizens, and where that entitlement is legitimated by an acknowledgement of rights. This approach 
resonates strongly with the ‘rights-based approach’ to development and a ‘human rights framework’ 
for SP. While there are an increasing number of SP systems that operate on a universal basis, the 
‘residual’ approach is still dominant in the international development SP discourse. ‘Residual’ schemes 
are those where SP does not extend automatically to all citizens, and where benefits are allocated on 
the basis of some authoritatively imposed targeting strategy. Echoing the notion of a universal concept 
is the ‘inclusive’ characteristic of SP which has been fostered lately, especially to tackle gaps with 
regards to age, gender, ethnicity, and other identity markings. Further, the importance of SP is 
associated with the ethics of assistance and it draws considerably from the philosophical discussions 
of the institutions of social justice and cooperation. Relevant to address in this discourse is 
consideration of the basis of individual morality (that assistance should be provided for those in need), 
and also the ‘political conception of justice’, which places the focus on social institutions, and the 
political notions of justice, where assistance is necessary to ensure commitment to economic 
cooperation and future political processes.  
More recently, SP is viewed as an ‘umbrella’ for varied programmes which encompass not only state-
funded social assistance, but also public contribution-based social insurance. Beyond the dichotomy 
of universal-targeting, social insurance invokes prolonged debate on the compulsory aspect of 
monetary contribution to sustaining programmes. Prior to the introduction of social insurance as a 
component in SP, many SP programmes developed the conceptual underpinnings, the objectives and 
instruments under the rubric of the risk management framework. This framework, as proposed by 
Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999, 2000) for mainly World Bank projects, consists of public measures 
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intended to assist individuals, households and communities in managing risks to reduce vulnerability. 
Therefore, in view of this framework, SP programmes are expected to protect or provide ‘cushioning’ 
against shocks.  In terms of fiscal affordability, the principle of collective risk-sharing is considered a 
better option when compared to reliance entirely on the government budget.   
Linked to this risk management framework is the notion of vulnerability that can be defined as the 
risk of economic units (such as individuals, households, and communities) falling below the poverty 
line (i.e. having insufficient consumption and access to basic services) or, for those already below the 
poverty line, to remain in or to fall further into poverty. In sum, traditional anti-poverty policy is 
concerned with bringing individuals up to the poverty line or at least reducing the degree of poverty 
(Lipton & Ravallion, 1995). Social risk management is believed to foster social solidarity especially in 
developing countries where familial and societal bonds are still strong. For instance, social health 
insurance that requires compulsory contribution will definitely apply risk-sharing principles (usually 
known as ‘cross-subsidy’) and pooling arrangements that are expectedly able to maintain the social 
fabric and ‘gotong royong’ (mutual help) traditions. Vulnerability and risk have influenced 
policymakers in designing SP as either ‘safety net’ or ‘safety rope’ programmes. The former prioritises 
the poor with transfers of wealth from richer to poorer households, while the latter will be more 
popular with middle-income groups if it serves an important insurance function in transferring 
resources from good times to bad (Sumarto et al., 2010). 
Another aspect recently taken into account of SP implementation is empowerment which correlates 
with the imposition of ‘conditionality’ in the programme. A prominent example is conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) that is officially adopted in Indonesia with the name: Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH). 
Started from 2007 as a pilot project in 7 provinces covering only 500,000 beneficiaries, PKH is now 
national flagship SP programme in 34 provinces covering 6 million households. The conditionality at 
the early implementation of PKH consisted of mainly health and education. Having required school 
attendance and health check-ups (as in other versions of CCT in many countries), PKH now includes 
conditions for parental meetings and wider participation of parents towards child parenting 
technicalities. Central in this empowerment aspect is the role of ‘facilitator’ who helps beneficiaries 
not only in managing their memberships or payments but also in imparting knowledge about their 
participation in other government programmes. 
To counter the misconceptions of SP that it causes dependency and is unsustainable, policymakers 
these days often include ‘graduation’ or, using the definition from Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 
(2015, p. 1), means leaving an SP programme after reaching a wellbeing threshold only when the 
participant has acquired a set of resources that are expected to equip them for a higher-income future 
livelihood.  Graduation in this context is perceived as the means as well as the purpose in SP 
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implementation. Drawn as an antidote to ‘dependency syndrome’, SP is designed to leave recipients 
better placed to achieve sustainable self-reliance when they stop receiving support.  
Inevitably, along with the ensuing progress of many government programmes, aspects and 
assumptions of SP will be altered and adjusted to the context. However dramatic its changes, SP that 
is defined as public policy actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation is 
naturally directed to promote dynamic, cohesive and stable societies through increased equity and 
security (Norton, Conway, & Foster, 2001). 
 
4.3 Conceptual and Analytical Framework 
The logical framework in this research will be divided into two branches. While the first branch 
encompasses quantitative analysis using inductive logical inferences, the second branch looks at 
qualitative measures using a 'retroductive' approach. In the former approach, data collection precedes 
theory formation, whilst in the latter approach, theory building works through the analysis of data 
collected during the research, by asking what qualities must exist in the data (Sumner & Tribe, 2008, 
p. 92). Both approaches and methods are geared towards fulfilling the requirements of 
complementarity, which requires elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and clarification of the 
results from one method with the results from the other (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989, p. 259). 
The complementarity can be illustrated by the use of a qualitative interview to measure the nature 
and level of understanding among stakeholders, as well as the influences of these understandings, 
combined with a quantitative analysis of household data sets and local government budget to 
measure the nature, level, and perceived ranking of the comprehension of the stakeholder. Combining 
both approaches is also relevant with regard to the concept of ‘triangulation’ as interpreted by 
Erzberger and Kelle (2003). These authors comment that: 
“the use of different methods to investigate a certain domain of social reality can be 
compared with the examination of a physical object from two different viewpoints or 
angles. Both viewpoints provide different pictures of this object that might not be useful 
to validate each other but that might yield a fuller and more complete picture of the 
phenomenon concerned if brought together” (p.461).  
Given the nature of this research, which encompasses multiple development subjects, this study will 
draw upon a number of theories from different areas. In respect to decentralisation, a wide-ranging 
area of enquiry into politics and local governance can be posited. Here, the in-depth analysis will focus 
on how the switch from a top-down centralistic approach to a bottom-up decentralised approach 
impacts accountability and fiscal outcomes. Equally important is further analysis on the impact of 
decentralised policy-making on the society’s welfare, including the poorest and most vulnerable 
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groups, which involves various disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and economics with their 
respective approaches and perspectives. Within this context, it is relevant to broaden the research 
context to deflect attention away from theoretical work that is often specific to particular disciplines. 
Thus, according to Brannen (2005, p. 5) utilising mixed research methods for studies related to wide-
ranging disciplines is appropriate. Furthermore, these fit with the political currency accorded to 
‘practical enquiry’ that speaks to policy and policymakers and that informs practice (Hammersley, 
2000). 
 
4.3.1 Conceptual Framework  
The frameworks discussed in this chapter will be used to guide the way to answer the research 
questions of this study. To simplify the process of framework construction, the relationship between 
decentralisation, democratisation, and SP will be first established by quantitatively evaluating changes 
on the welfare level during the period before and after the enactment of decentralisation and direct 
elections, in 2001 and 2005 respectively. Later, further analysis on the distribution of transfers is 
meant to establish a correlation between fiscal devolution policies with the outcomes related to 
welfare. The final part of quantitative analysis will present a model to estimate the relationship 
between local direct elections with the SP policies. Overall, these steps are performed to obtain a 
general view at the nexus of decentralisation-democratisation-SP. The next step in this framework 
involves qualitative inquiry which encompasses interviews and field visits in the chosen locations. 
Using structured questionnaires does not necessarily limit the scope of topics as relevant themes 
might occur during the process. Respondents are chosen from stakeholders related to SP ranging from 
local government members to beneficiaries. Thematic analysis will highlight recurring topics and 
attempts to draw conclusions.  
This research will employ ‘sequential mixed-method design’ in which two strands are undertaken in 
chronological order (Quantitative ➔ Qualitative). The conclusions based on the results of the first 
strand lead to the formulation of design components for the next strand (see Figure 4.2). Hence, the 
study design falls into the ‘explanatory’ design according to Creswell et al (2014, pp. 16–17). The 
second strand of the study is conducted to confirm or disconfirm inferences from the first strand or 
to provide further explanation for its findings (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p. 715). After having results 
from both strands, these will be reconciled to obtain a ‘meta inference’ which follows the definition 
from Tashakkori and Teddlie (2008, p. 101) as ‘an overall conclusion, explanation or understanding 
developed through an integration of the inferences obtained from the qualitative and quantitative 
strands of a mixed method study’. 
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Sequential mixed designs answer exploratory and confirmatory questions chronologically in a pre-
specified order (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008, p. 153). Comparatively, these designs are less complex to 
conduct by a single investigator than parallel mixed designs. 
 
Figure 4.1 Illustration of Sequential Mixed Design 
As mentioned at the outset, the intention of this research was firstly, to identify the extent to which 
decentralisation and democratisation in Indonesia have enabled SP programmes to improve the 
livelihood of poor and vulnerable people; secondly, to examine the complex system of linkages 
between SP, decentralisation, and democratisation. 
On this basis, eight research questions were formulated: 
1. To what extent does the current distribution of transfers affect regional welfare development?   
2. How does transfer distribution play a role in equalising welfare development?   
3. In the context of democratisation or local politics, what are the key factors involved in local 
SP distribution?  
4. Is there any pattern or cycle in the SP budget or its distribution?  
5. To what extent has the implementation of fund transfer and local elections affected the 
development of SP? 
6. In what ways does decentralisation enable or constrain local SP programmes? 
7. How do democratisation processes support local SP development? 
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8. What are the roles of stakeholders in the nexus of decentralisation-democratisation-SP at the 
local level? 
The first five questions can be addressed through quantitative methods to further build foundations 
for latter questions which can be explored and analysed through qualitative inquiry. In order to answer 
questions 1 to 5, it is necessary first to collect the available data sets and relevant variables that are 
strongly related to the topics of the present study. In this phase, data availability will lead to the 
conceptualisation of method. Afterwards, available tools chosen for analysing the data will shape the 
experiential stage in finding the fittest methodology. The results of the analysis will then explain and 
drive the formulation for further research questions that will be dissected in the qualitative part of 
the study. 
Meanwhile, to address the last three research questions, it is important to prepare questions that are 
related and cannot be explained by prior quantitative analysis. This will form the conceptualisation 
stage which supports the design of the questionnaire and selection of beneficiaries, as well as the site 
selection for fieldwork. Afterwards, during the interviews and field visit, it is imperative to record and 
transcribe interviews with respondents selected from the case of SP implementation in selected 
regions. Once the information is collected, it can be analysed through the methodology appropriate 
for handling the transcripts and capable of extracting meaningful information. Ultimately, the end 
result of qualitative analysis will be reconciled with the quantitative analysis of the previous step. 
 
4.3.2 Analytical Framework 
One of the original aims of the study was to explain the impact of decentralisation and 
democratisation on the implementation of SP at the local level, and to underpin this with a theoretical 
perspective. Theories and assumptions identified early on in the present study that are related to the 
implementation of SP were those pertaining to fiscal decentralisation (distribution of transfers) and 
the effect of local direct elections, and so these were investigated in more detail. 
There is no clear simple link between decentralisation and democratisation with SP implementation; 
rather, this relationship can work through a number of factors. The following paradigms and 
perspectives attempt to explain how decentralisation and democratisation will have an impact on SP 
at the local level. Although there has been ample literature discussing the relationship between them, 
much of it lacks a framework to explain such a relationship. Among those paradigms and perspectives, 
most focus only on indirect factors between decentralisation, good governance, and poverty 
reduction. A few emerging studies have attempted to dissect the relationship between local 
democracy and SP, but these revolve only around the downside of local politics.   
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4.3.2.1 Framework of Decentralisation - SP 
While a framework that clearly depicts the clear link between decentralisation and SP is still 
undiscoverable, an important paradigm regarding decentralisation for poverty reduction has been 
proposed by Romeo (2003). His article asserts the relationship between decentralisation and poverty 
reduction through two consecutive channels: good local governance and sustainable local 
development. Decentralisation, in Romeo’s definition is the devolution of substantial public sector 
responsibilities and resources to local authorities, expected to result in improved local governance 
favourable to the endeavour of local poverty reduction. 
However, each of these relationships seems to be very complicated because several factors and 
conditions are involved. According to Romeo, the path from decentralisation to improved local 
governance needs greater attention given to local capacity building (p. 90). The link is driven by factors 
that work at three levels i.e. individual, institutional, and systematic. Firstly, at the individual level, 
factors such as culture, norms, training, and the attitude of personnel influence local capacity 
significantly. Secondly, at the institutional level, capacity building relies on the local government body 
including rules and regulations that govern personnel activities. Finally, at the systematic level, local 
capacity is influenced and shaped by local policy, the legal system, rules, and practices that manage 
the relations between local governments and local communities. Therefore, the achievement of good 
local governance in a decentralised system depends largely on the ability of local governments to 
handle problems that may appear at the individual, institutional, and systemic levels. 
Therefore, according to Romeo (2003) the road from improved local governance to sustainable local 
development is not straightforward and typically suffers from several problems:  
a. The local economy may be susceptible to external shocks; 
b. The provision of specific public services need local-centre cooperation, which is hard to 
achieve; 
c. Local governments need to support investment in local economic infrastructure, but do so 
with difficulty. 
Within this framework, Romeo (2003) also argues that better quality of governance is a necessary 
condition for the improvement of the general welfare for local communities, particularly through 
resource allocation decisions. A general point that can be drawn from Romeo’s perspective is that 
sustainable local development can only be achieved if local governments have the capacity to manage 
their economy, deliver public services efficiently, and support infrastructure investment that 
ultimately can support local economic growth. 




Figure 4.2 The Road from Decentralisation to SP 
Finally, the link between local sustainable development and poverty alleviation also rests on other 
factors. Using Romeo’s framework, the adoption of good governance practices can result in pro-poor 
local development outcomes. This proposition is basically in accordance with the main purpose of 
decentralisation i.e. it brings government closer to the people on the assumption that local 
governments have better information about the conditions and needs of their citizens, especially 
vulnerable groups who supposedly become the target of local development. Several factors that may 
also apply include employment, economic opportunities outside the regions, and infrastructure 
investments. The cooperation between local authorities in the region and those in other regions is 
needed to foster economic development. Furthermore, local development can help reduce poverty 
more rapidly if there is a comprehensive strategy of poverty alleviation as depicted in Figure 4.2. 
Previous sections have discussed at length three important elements in this research i.e. 
decentralisation, democratisation, and SP. Bringing these elements together, the framework as 
summarised in Figure 4.2 shows how administrative, economic, social, and political mechanisms give 
rise to a set of socioeconomic positions, whereby regions are stratified according to variables such as 
economy, population size, welfare conditions, and other factors; these socioeconomic positions in 
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‘Context’ is broadly defined in this research to include all social and political mechanisms that generate, 
configure and maintain social hierarchies, including: the labour market, the educational system, 
political institutions and other cultural and societal values. Among the contextual factors that most 
powerfully affect the implementation of SP are the local ideologies and redistributive policies (or the 
absence of such policies). In the framework for the present study, ideologies are those manifested in 
political parties that generate guidelines and ‘divisions’ in the society and that define the direction of 
local policies. The most important and distinctive ideologies are: nationalism, religion, and pluralism. 
4.3.2.2 Framework of Local Politics - SP 
The approach taken to defining ‘politics’ here is a broad one, influenced by both political sociology 
and political economy perspectives. In this study, I identify four key aspects of politics in Indonesia 
that the literature indicates will be of importance in shaping SP in the country, namely political 
institutions, political actors and agencies, socio-economic forces and the global dimension. These 
aspects are useful to develop a framework, here largely following the work of Hickey (2008) in Figure 
4.3. In his framework, Hickey argues that even the simplest relationship between politics and SP is 
complicated by the fact that different forms of politics shape different dimensions of SP programmes 
(p. 249).  
Institutional features constitute the historically embedded ‘rules of the game’ within a given society 
(North, 1990). Formal political institutions include the rules for elections and policy legacies which 
have established accepted ways of doing things, whereas informal political institutions might include 
traditional values borne out from patron-client relations. Actors include those individuals and agencies 
that operationalise and contest the rules of the game in ways that shape the distribution of public 
goods and power, such as political elites, political parties or governmental departments or agencies. 
Such actors also forge the discursive element of politics, setting the terms of political discourse within 
which policy options are crafted. Key issues here include the ideological character and political 
capacity of such actors and agencies. Socioeconomic forces include public attitudes, levels of citizen 
voice, levels of urbanisation (migration), economic inequality, and levels and forms of social 
fragmentation. 
Although these societal factors are not intrinsically political they often gain a high degree of political 
salience in relation to public policy influence. Finally, the distinctive character of governance in most 
developing countries, including Indonesia, opens a large space for global actors and discourses to be 
influential. The following framework uses case-study material to discuss the influence that political 
variables within each of these dimensions have on the uptake, forms and sustainability of SP 
programmes in Indonesia. Importantly, there are strong interrelationships between each of these 
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dimensions. In the final section we argue that the notion of ‘political contracts’ offers a fuller 
explanation for how the different elements of this framework become aligned in ways that lead to 
particular outcomes for SP in Indonesia. 
As depicted in Figure 4.3, the linkages between politics and SP are multi-dimensional and multi-
directional. Even the simplest relationship between politics and SP, which concerns the influence of 
the former on the latter, is complicated by the fact that different forms of politics shape different 
dimensions of SP programmes. 
At the outset, it can be traced linearly from major factors either external (such as global and national) 
or internal (social trends). Despite the hindrance on local politics, mainly caused by entrenched 
patronage and rampant practice of ‘clientelism’, it can build political support to conceive of SP with 
various scales and forms depending on the local endowment. Ultimately, SP can create political impact 
in the form of a growing sense of citizenship and increasing public participation. 
Normally, global factors have been assumed to influence the macro level (national government level) 
in the form of policy prescriptions, advice or technical assistance. Within the nation scope, 
decentralisation does not make regional government insulated to policies at the central government 
level. Similarly, social forces have been portrayed as representing trends at the national level. These 
perceptions, however, could also hold true at the local governance level. Both global factors and social 
forces shape local politics although deeply-entrenched values in society might still persist. Local 
politics has been informed by several variables ranging from political institutions, actors, and 
contemporary political discourses. The dynamics of local politics then largely affect policymaking on 
SP. 




Figure 4.3 The Links between Local Politics and SP 
The concept of local politics occupies a conspicuous (and contested) place in discussions of local SP. 
Local politics cuts across the structural and intermediary dimensions, with features that link it to both. 
Yet focus on direct elections, depending on the administrative levels (governorship or mayoralty), 
necessitates understanding the local context, especially when the political nature involves electorates 
from vulnerable groups who are prone to old practices of vote-buying. Certain interpretations of 
‘money politics’ associated them with the strategy of not only garnering votes but also increasing the 
electorate’s welfare, which have spurred new thinking on the role of non-state actors in promoting 
welfare, wherein a key task for local SP is running the rudimentary programme and safety net for poor 
citizens. According to this literature, local government should take the main responsibility for 
developing SP that allows collaboration and participation of other stakeholders. 
4.3.2.3 Framework of Multi-Layered Local Politics - SP 
Using the context of India, Pellissery (2006) developed a framework in his thesis to unpack the linkages 
of multi-layered politics, administration capacity and SP. His framework basically shares similarities 
with the previous framework of Hickey (2008), but it particularly stresses the channel of 
democratisation with interwoven relationships amongst stakeholders and unlike Romeo’s which 
discuss many overall aims of decentralisation, it specifically explains the implementation of local SP. 
Furthermore, SP is provided by a variety of agencies. Researchers may restrict their study to one 
source of SP for the purpose of focus, and the politics involved there. A large number of studies are 
categorised of this kind, where state-mediated SP alone was studied. But, it is often the case that 
multiple sources, in the course of providing SP, interact and create 'a political economy' of unique 
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combination, attempting to create a typology of existing literature on the politics of SP. Some of the 
types of literature are not directly linked to the SP issue, but more generally with the analysis of the 
welfare state. 
While these different types of literature on the local politics of SP reveal its complexity, their layered 
structure is presented in Figure 4.4. Pellissery’s framework encapsulates different branches of 
literature category. It summarises at least two approaches i.e. the ‘welfare regime’ model and 
‘bureau-shaping’ politics. The former refers to the dominant stream of literature on the politics of SP 
which dates back to the classification of welfare states (Titmuss, 1974). He proposes the categorisation 
of welfare states into three types:  
a. Residual, where individuals and households bear most of the risk and the state steps in only 
when private support is not there. 
b. Industrial-achievement, where the benefit an individual can get is determined by the 
employment a person has, and in turn the free-market principles dominate the sector. 
c. Institutional-redistributive, the model where the state adopts a leading role by creating a 
system of defined contribution for intergenerational transfer to generate shared 
responsibility of various citizens for social security. 
The latter, which will be referred in the present study, focuses on administrative machinery. In this 
framework, the delivery of benefits is the key question. Even if local governments have the financial 
capacity and political willingness for appropriate SP, the administrative capacity can be limited. Some 
scholars argue that to distinguish implementation from policy formulation is misleading, and policies 
are formulated in the process of implementation as the constant re-interpretation of the policy 
guidelines takes place through bureaucratic interaction with the policies given by legislators. Here, 
research on SP has benefited from the discipline of public administration in a substantial manner. The 
literature on street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) has shown how the behaviour of organisational 
bureaucracy is structured not only by public policy and hierarchy, but also by their personal interests 
and by the nature of the particular client group they serve. Though public choice models of 
bureaucratic behaviour (Dunleavy, 1994) emphasise the role of politics that could be vital in explaining 
bureaucratic behaviour, analysis on SP in Western countries in general has considered implementation 
of policies and bureaucratic behaviour to be largely independent of political intervention.  
Policy analysis in Indonesia has been different in this regard. The lack of a bureaucracy (state) 
independent from the political elite has been dealt with extensively by various scholars in various 
contexts (Crone, 1988; for a general discussion see Nordholt, 2005). This is an extension of the earlier 
argument on the weak versus strong state thesis (Huntington, 1968; Migdal, 1988; Myrdal, 1968), and 
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on the implementation deficit in the policy process as has been reported from most developing 
countries (Grindle, 1980). 
The differential behaviour of bureaucrats is seen as their personal bias separate from the political 
manoeuvring they may be subjected to. Generally, the response to such situations has been to reform 
the bureaucracy. This strategy often recognises other actors in the society as an 'action environment' 
(see Grindle, 1997) in which bureaucrats make interventions. In this sense, the 'policy elites' are 
bureaucrats and political leaders. 
In Indonesia as in other developing countries, direct elections have still been marred with patronage 
and practices such as clientelism, pork-barrel, and vote buying. The connection to patronage is clear: 
when candidates are running against those whose party identity and therefore platform and official 
ideology are the same, they will face a strong incentive to differentiate themselves in other ways. 
Offering ‘concrete’ benefits to their constituents is one way to do this. Therefore, many varieties of 
benefits ranging from housing assistance to cash transfer have often been created without thorough 
consideration. The main aim of this strategy is simply to lure as many of the electorate as possible. It 
should be stressed, however, that this is not the only way political candidates can differentiate 
themselves. Another usual strategy is to create personal campaign teams. These teams are formed of 
volunteers to promote candidates’ individual recognition and generate a sense of personal connection 
with voters. In so doing, volunteers are recruited on the basis of having worked with or being familiar 
with community development programmes. It is not uncommon that facilitators working for 
government programme also help certain political candidates. 
The inception phase of the democratisation process coincided with the increasing sense to claim their 
rights as citizens even at the grassroots level. This situation made politicians devise comprehensive 
entitlement programmes to fulfil people’s demands. In this case, only incumbents and highly-
resourced candidates can afford to provide benefits up to government SP standards. On a related note, 
targeted SP programmes which are presumably effective in garnering votes and normatively increase 
local welfare standards have not always performed to achieve the desired impact.  




Figure 4.4 Framework of Multi-Layered Politics of State Mediated SP 
According to Pellissery’s framework (see Figure 4.4), politics is expected to promote the 
implementation of SP through the following linkages: 
a. Local politics can aim at expanding local SP when politicians have the interests to serve its 
constituents which therefore assume that most of the electorates belong to the vulnerable 
group. 
b. Democratisation and SP can be linked through the strategy of resource mobilisation. With 
greater control of the local electorate over local statutory structures, incumbents may be 
committed to mobilising available resources to finance SP expansion. 
c. Through the channel of empowerment, democratisation can play a significant role in raising 
public participation in the decision-making process. The role of the labour market is important 
in translating the ideological manifesto in the implementation of welfare policies and SP. 
Increasing participation can lead to the local government being more responsive to the 
demands of its society. 
Democratisation is expected to interact with SP programmes in at least three ways: First, the effective 
implementation of SP often requires valid information that is specific to the constituents. This detailed 
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local information can be obtained through an in-depth survey or census to identify potential 
beneficiaries and their locations. Second, the interaction between SP and local politics emphasizes the 
important role of direct election as stipulated by the law. In this sense, candidates who vie for every 
single vote must actively promote their plan to the electorate convincingly, which usually offers 
promises in the forms of benefits. Third, the ideology and platform of a political party might influence 
the vision of local leaders.  
 
4.4 Data Sources, Sample Selection, and Methods of Data Collection  
The study adopts two methodologies which lend to the exploration of two different sets of data, i.e. 
quantitative and qualitative. The former is usually limited by at least two factors. Firstly, most research 
questions cannot be answered by ‘number-crunching’ exercises as they are often perceived to have 
biases in many aspects. The second factor is related to the ‘over-exploitation’ of existing data sets that 
deters newly-emerged researchers from different disciplines. 
In order to complement the limitations of the quantitative method, doing qualitative analysis is 
necessary, particularly to obtain a comparative experience in assessing both types of data. Moreover, 
theories and concepts based on relationships between the factors in the present study can be tested 
or verified using not only the existing secondary data sets but also primary data generated from 
fieldwork. 
With respect to data collection during fieldwork, briefly explaining the process is tantamount to a 
review on the data characteristics. Some important aspects in the design of the study include the 
development of a list of interview questions, data collection methods, justification for location choice, 
and selection of respondents, including the number of interviews in the study. To a large extent, the 
success of the fieldwork in answering all research questions addressed in this study depends largely 
upon the appropriateness and validity of the study design. All of these aspects are explained 
separately below.  
Table 4.1 Summary for Data Source 
No. Type Extraction Method Primary Sources Sample Size 
1. Quantitative a. Download from 
websites 
b. Official data 
warehouse 
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No. Type Extraction Method Primary Sources Sample Size 
2. Qualitative a. Interviews 










4.4.1 Primary Data Collection 
The qualitative analysis in this study will be fully based on in-depth interviews. These interviews use a 
standardised list of questions, but these are supplemented during the interview process to gather 
deeper information pertaining to the subject being researched. The in-depth interview is intended to 
solicit qualitative information about the perceptions and opinions of key informants. It should be 
noted that the focus group discussion (FGD) method was arranged in this study when large number of 
respondents were available and to make it more efficient in terms of time usage.  
In the entire fieldwork, the limitation of time was a major constraint in the field work. At the time of 
the fieldwork, which coincided with the month of Ramadan (fasting month for Muslim), most local 
officials were only available in the office for fewer hours. Therefore, some of them were contacted by 
telephone in the weekend. 
As the primary data was collected based on interviews, a list of questions rather than a questionnaire 
was used in the present study. This list of questions plays a pivotal role, especially as a main guide in 
obtaining comprehensive information. Since the fieldwork was conducted in two selected districts, a 
standardised list of interview questions to measure the impact of decentralisation on SP is needed in 
order to be able to compare the results in different regions. This list is not rigid but is somewhat 
informal in a way that the subject can be changed to the situation on the ground. Yet, some core 
questions deemed important had to be asked. Each question in the list can be expanded or removed 
depending on its appropriateness. Respondents can freely express their opinion in answering each 
question. Based on the opinion or sentiment of respondents, the scope of interview can be broadened 
to capture other related issues. 
The qualitative data on in-depth interviews attempt to address several aspects:  
a. The current practices of local governments in running their autonomous regions with respect 
to participation, empowerment, public service delivery, targeting, governance, and other 
aspects determining the link between decentralisation and SP; 
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b. The extent to which local parliaments and other stakeholders are involved in the effort of 
social welfare improvement in a decentralised system; 
c. The extent to which the local government has the capacity to design and implement their SP 
programmes. 
In this regard, respondents were asked about SP programmes and their effectiveness following the 
changes of the decentralisation era, especially with respect to design, implementation, and impact of 
the programmes.  
 
4.4.2 Secondary Data Collection 
Generally, quantitative data is collected from secondary sources. Quantitative information may 
include local government statistics encompassing budgets, expenditures, human resource situations, 
and socio-economic indicators. This type of information is collected from local government institutions 
where relevant data is available. This quantitative information is used to support and to form the 
primary data analysis. 
For the analytical purpose of examining the relationship between decentralisation and SP at the local 
level, the quantitative information for all districts is taken from the INDO-DAPOER data set provided 
by the World Bank. It comprises various indicators from official sources i.e. Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Statistics Indonesia, among others. To evaluate the decentralisation impact 
on social welfare changes in selected districts, raw data from the National Socio-Economic Survey 
(Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, Susenas) was analysed. Brief notes on Susenas are given in different 
parts of the study. The advantage of having Susenas as a reference for this study can also lead to 
analysis on the effect of deepened democratisation (for instance, using proxies of local direct 
elections).  
4.4.2.1 The INDO-DAPOER dataset for analysis on government transfer: a short comment 
Those who deal with Indonesia's sub-national development issues could have difficulty in collating 
data from various sources, particularly related to inter-governmental transfers. Decentralisation is 
mainly an issue that involves at least two main ministries, Finance and Home Affairs, for fiscal 
arrangement and coordination respectively. Fortunately, the World Bank in 2014 has launched INDO-
DAPOER (Indonesia Data for Policy and Economics Research) and it is accessible for public use. It 
contains relevant economic and social indicators at the province- and district-level, which span across 
four main categories: fiscal, economic, social and demographic, as well as infrastructure. Indicators 
range from the sub-national government revenue and expenditure, sub-national GDP, to specific 
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education, health, and infrastructure indicators such as net enrolment rate for junior secondary, 
immunization rate, and household access to safe sanitation. 
The emergence of INDO-DAPOER attracts many researchers and practitioners, especially those who 
are working on decentralisation which started from 2001. This has been the focus of many research 
projects and studies, intending to monitor its progress and develop a better understanding of sub-
national issues in general. For the present study, INDO-DAPOER will be explored and analysed through 
various statistical tools. Relevant to this endeavour is to observe whether the distribution of 
intergovernmental grants has had an equalising impact on welfare-related outcomes. Also, it is 
important to find out if the gaps between provinces, districts, or islands are addressed if not solved 
within this central-local transfer mechanism. Therefore, to support these aims, cluster analysis fits to 
seek the groupings or patterns of the INDO-DAPOER data set. 
4.4.2.2 Susenas as the main source for welfare analysis: a brief note 
Susenas has been utilised as one of the most important sources of data used in both policymaking and 
studies. Undeniably, the data set has long been used to evaluate and monitor the performance of 
government programmes related to social welfare. The annual survey consists of a wide range of 
indicators such as consumption, education, health, employment, and housing. Moroever, the data set 
has also been used extensively as the primary source of the estimation for measuring poverty. The 
Susenas consists of two types: core and module. The Susenas core is conducted on an annual basis 
with a relatively similar list of questions in each period whilst the Susenas module is also conducted 
every year with different sets of questionnaires. There are three types of Susenas modules: 
a. Consumption module 
b. Education and health module 
c. Housing, social, and culture module 
Each module is repeated every three years. Different from the core, the Susenas module hosts a 
detailed list of questions and smaller sample size. Susenas core usually interviews around 200,000 
households which allow estimation at district level, while the Susenas module only includes around 
65,000 households in the survey which enables estimates at provincial level. 
In this study, particular focus will be given to the annually-published consumption module which 
encompasses questions on social assistance received by households. The usage of the Susenas dataset 
can be helpful for at least two analyses. Firstly, analysis of the percentile distribution on SP benefits 
can explain or confirm the challenge of distribution that arises particularly with regards to the 
targeting registry. The result of this can lead to errors of ‘misnumeration’ and ‘misclassification’ that 
have strong implications for targeting accuracy, which is commonly assessed using two key measures: 
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leakage (or ‘inclusion error’), when non-intended beneficiaries receive program benefits, and under-
coverage (or ‘exclusion error’), when intended beneficiaries do not receive program benefits (Cornia 
& Stewart, 1995). This analysis is relevant currently where programmes and countries today suffer 
from the adverse consequences of inaccurate targeting (Acosta, Leite, & Rigolini, 2011). 
Secondly, the analysis of the distributive impact of growth can be undertaken with the abundant 
information related to consumption expenditure or household spending available on Susenas. One 
basic tool used in this thesis is the growth incidence curve (GIC), measuring the quantile-specific rate 
of economic growth between two points in time as a function of each percentile (Ravallion and Chen, 
2003). In the literature examining income (or spending) growth, the growth process is basically 
analysed by comparing the pre-growth and post-growth distribution. There is a clear parallel here 
between the transformation of expenditure distribution through growth and the transformation due 
to social transfer. Therefore, within the boundary of assumptions on decentralisation, 
democratisation, and SP, ‘pro-poor’ growth at the local level is assumed to reduce the gap in 
distribution. 
 
4.4.3 Interview Guideline 
Using semi-structured interviews, this research employs sets of questions designed and customised 
for each respondent group. Each stresses different topics depending on their relevance. For instance, 
questions with regards to SP administration are elaborated and detailed for interviews with 
government respondents. The questionnaire set for beneficiaries is designed to capture 
implementation and to a certain degree their satisfaction level. The set of questions is not strictly 
binding and can be supplanted or improvised with other related questions (See Appendix B for the 
complete sets).  
 
4.4.4 Selection of the Study Location 
Fieldwork was conducted in two selected districts, Sragen and Surakarta. The selection of sampled 
districts was based on several criteria which were expected to meet the aims of the study (see detailed 
explanation in Chapter 5).  
Whilst decentralisation, democratisation, and SP are both centralised government policies undertaken 
on a nationwide scale comprising hundreds of districts and 34 provinces, the main focus of this 
research is the island of Java, where most populations, including where the largest poor populations 
reside. The choice of locations is based on several criteria which are expected to meet the aims of the 
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study. Hence, the selection of regions is determined based on three main control variables: the level 
of human development, local revenue, and local expenditure. These variables are estimated in depth 
using instrumental proxy sources as follows: 
1. Human development variables 
a) Gini coefficient 
b) Poverty rate 
c) Population 
2. Local revenue 
a) Proportion of General Allocation Fund to local budget 
b) Proportion of Special Allocation Grant to local budget 
3. Local expenditure 
a) Regional GDP  
b) Proportion of SP expenditure to local budget 
In order to substantiate the choice of location, cluster analysis is employed to identify four types of 
regions using a set of indicators covering definitions of development based on four conceptual frames 
(details for these steps are in Chapter 5). This method is largely derived from the research of Vázquez 
and Sumner (2012) proposing an alternative taxonomy for developing countries. Cluster analysis is a 
numerical technique that is suitable for classifying a sample of heterogeneous regions in a limited 
number of groups, each of which is internally homogeneous in terms of the similarities between the 
regions that comprise it. Ultimately, the goal of cluster analysis is to provide classifications that are 
reasonably ‘objective’ and ‘stable’ (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). 
The two locations of the study, therefore, are: 
a) Sragen: a district with limited resources and high poverty rate 
b) Surakarta: a city with positive progress in livelihood improvement 
This research is aided by the fact that I speak the Indonesian language (and Javanese), and my previous 
position in the Ministry of Planning that allowed me to reach key people in the Indonesian government, 
both central and local.  
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(in million Rp, 
constant price) 
Local Financial 




(% of population) 
Sragen 859,969 GRDP: 3,485,990 






Poverty rate: 16.7 
Unemployment rate: 
6.0 
SP beneficiaries: 12.9 
Surakarta 500,328 GRDP: 5,742,860 






Poverty rate: 12.0 
Unemployment rate: 
6.1 
SP beneficiaries: 8.7 
Source: Indo-DAPOER database, World Bank and TNP2K, Government of Indonesia. Data as of 2012. 
There are reasons for selecting a relatively small sampling strategy. The first is that existing research 
made it possible to anticipate that the effects on SP of decentralisation would be highly heterogeneous, 
as a result of how the existing diversities of social, political and economic settings interacted with local 
variations on how SP was governed (Sumarto, Vothknecht, & Wijaya, 2014b). As it is precisely an 
understanding of the interaction of the social, economic, and governance context with the outcomes 
of SP which the study aimed to assess, a large sample size is unlikely to be of value, as no meaningfully 
robust statistical analysis can be achieved from the analysis of numerous highly diverse outcomes 
(White & Phillips, 2012).  
The fact that the selected samples are located in Java might lead to biased results considering the 
huge inter-island disparity. However, as mentioned in the objectives, this study has selected cases 
which best represent regions with mature decentralisation. In that way, it is expected that the 
reflection of decentralisation effects can be observed. This is in line with the use of purposive sampling 
technique to find a specific purpose rather than sample randomly (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003, p.713). 




Figure 4.5 Map of Surakarta and Sragen 
 
4.4.5 Selection of Respondents 
The selection of respondents is an important aspect partly for determining the validity of information. 
In general, the selected respondents/key informants will come from various backgrounds so that 
comprehensive information and representative evidence can be elicited. The description of the 
sample selection is summarised in Table 4.2. The method of choosing respondents is purposive 
sampling where the study’s purpose and the researcher’s knowledge of the population guide the 
process. 
There are three approaches to contact respondents in the field. The first uses a formal approach to 
local government institutions and local parliament members. It means that standard formal letters 
will be sent prior to visits and close contacts with intermediaries (secretary or personal staff) will be 
maintained. The second is less-formal approach in establishing contacts with local NGOs, research 
institutes, universities, and programme facilitators. While formal credentials will be prepared, 
contacts through informal networks will be explored. The third approach is interviews with the heads 
of the village and/or neighbourhood. From these initial entry activities, permission and information 
were sought about how to identify SP recipients and non-recipients. Field research will be attempted 
to conduct interviews with matched pairs of households in each village, to ensure that SP non-
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recipients who may have been or have been perceived to be eligible were included in the research 
process.  
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Table 4.3 The Selection of Respondents for In-depth Interviews 





Planning agency and sectoral 
offices involved in SP programme 
are to be selected first. 
Respondents representing these 
institutions will then be selected 
for interview. 
Two heads of social 
services unit under 
district administration. 
Three representing officials 
from TKPKD (or Dinas Sosial) 
in each region. 
Managing policymaking 
on social policies at the 
local level. 
Considering the heavy 
load at particular times, 
the interview with the 
head/leader will 




NGOs and other institutions 
involve directly in monitoring the 
implementation of regional 
autonomy and/or having concerns 
with SP are to be selected with 
representatives to be interviewed. 
Two state universities 
(UNS and Undip) 
located in the region 
and around 20 NGOs in 
those districts. 
Three representing resource 
persons from nearest NGOs 
or universities. One 
potential state university 
(UNS) and four NGOs. 
The heads of 
NGO/institutions or 
those who could 
represent the 
institutions and have 
knowlege on the topic. 
NGOs might have wide-








Members of political parties who 
have responsibility for managing 
SP are to be selected and 
interviewed. Location of interview 
might be in their preferred 
locations (residence) so that they 
can freely express their views. 
Sragen and Surakarta 
each have 45 
legislative members 
from 8 political parties. 
Five representing persons 




Considering the heavy 
load at particular times, 
probably the interview 
with the head/leader will 
be delegated to their 
assistants/expert staffs. 
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Institutions Description of sample selection Population No. of samples Roles of the 
respondents 
Anticipated limitations 
Community leaders They are to be selected purposively 
by taking into account urban/rural 
characteristics and whether social 
protection programmes are 
available in their regions. 
Sragen has 208 
villages/kelurahan, 
Surakarta has 51. 
Three representing resource 
persons in each districts. 
Samples are selected based 
on the village with relatively 




serve as community 
leaders. 
In interviews with 
community leaders 
might need to be 
mindful of sensitive 
topics regarding 
corruption and targeting.  
Facilitators or 
operators of SP 
programmes. 
Persons who are recruited and 
work on permanent basis to 
support the implementation of SP 
in the field. 
Average number of 
facilitators can reach 
hundreds, depending 
on the programme 
scale. 
Three persons from 
different SP programmes in 
each district. 
Facilitators or operators 







operators might be 
distorted with their 




List of poor people available at 
local statistical office/local 
government institutions was used 
to identify the poor who are the 
beneficiaries of social protection 
programme. 
According to the latest 
poverty census, there 
are 111,067 and 
43,689 beneficiaries in 
Sragen and Surakarta 
respectively. 
10 beneficiaries (to capture 
various SP programmes) in 
each districts. 
The poor who have been 
registered and actually 
received assistance from 
SP programmes. 
Interviews with 
beneficiaries might be 
distorted with their 
complaints or demands 
on SP. 
 
*) One institute in Sragen (Matra) and one in Surakarta (PPRBM, Pusat Rehabilitasi Bersumber Daya Masyarakat or Community Based Rehabilitation–Development and 
Training Center)
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Given that the object of this study is related to governance, this entails a number of sensitive issues 
such as corruption, elite capture, and patronage. Encountering these issues, particularly among elite 
groups, might be challenging for researchers in the field. This situation will not be ideal and it will 
cause apprehension, as well as the risks of acquiring misleading information. The risks can be 
anticipated and minimised by delivering the list of questions prior to visits to gain consent earlier. The 
proper arrangement of questions using proxies and avoiding direct questions can also be used as a 
strategy during interview sessions. 
 
4.5 Strategy of the Current Study and Analysis Method 
There are three main aspects discussed in this section. These include the strategy for comparing the 
impact of decentralisation, method of analysis, and several measures used for the analysis. Details of 
these aspects are discussed separately below. 
 
4.5.1 Time Comparison and Regional Comparison 
The general strategy used in the present study to evaluate the impact of decentralisation and 
dmeocratisation on SP is largely based on two approaches: time comparison and regional comparison. 
Time comparison refers to the differentiation of the performance in selected districts between the 
periods before and after decentralisation. Regional comparison attempts to look at the performance 
of decentralisation-social welfare related measures between two selected districts under the study. It 
is also important to note that before these comparisons are made, the general relationship between 
decentralisation and social welfare were assessed at the macro level using secondary data for all 
districts whenever available. 
In terms of time comparison, the periods before decentralisation used in this study refers to the period 
1983-1999, while the period post-decentralisation refers to years 2001-2010. The selection of the 
period 1983-1999 as the basis of comparison is due to the fact that this period refers to a time when 
the Indonesian economy reached its peak with its stable growth rate. This ideal situation is expected 
to have an impact on rapid poverty reduction and social welfare improvement. In this period also, 
Indonesia actually suffered from economic crisis starting from mid-1997. Thus, the inclusion of both 
the stable and crisis period is expected to provide fair and balanced judgment on the analysis.   
For the selection of the period 2001-2010, though some effects of the economic crisis might still be 
present in many districts, a few studies (e.g. Said & Widyanti, 2002; Suryahadi, Sumarto, & Pritchett, 
2003) concerning the impact of the crisis on poverty depict that a sharp increase in poverty rate during 
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the economic crisis was, to some degree, a transient phenomenon. Using official figures, the national 
poverty rate, which reached a peak of 24 percent in 1998 and declined slightly to 23 percent in 1999, 
actually returned to a rate similar to that before the crisis, while many other social indicators like 
health and education remained relatively stable (Statistics Indonesia & UNDP, 1999). 
However, these chosen periods are not rigidly included in the analysis especially in the discussion of 
the case for two selected districts. Much of the data, which is available only during the crisis period to 
represent the pre-decentralisation era, will also be employed to compare the performance of the two 
districts. In some instances, the figures for 2000 are used mainly as a starting point for the early 
condition of decentralisation-related programmes. This is due to the fact that large amounts of data 
available in January 2001 actually reflect the condition of the previous year. 
It is also worth pointing out that although the fieldwork was conducted in 2015, comparison between 
the periods before and after decentralisation can still be made in terms of both quantitative and 
qualitative indicators. For the quantitative comparison, it can be easily assessed because data for 
these two periods is largely available. Similarly, qualitative findings rely on the the method of oral 
history from selected respondents regarding the situation comparatively between periods of pre- and 
post-decentralisation. Assuming that those who were at their 20s or older during the incepton phase 
of decentralisation, respondents are chosen based on their knowledge of the past events mainly 
reflected on their age.  
 
4.5.2 Strategy of Addressing Research Questions 
The first research question was: ‘To what extent has decentralisation and democratisation in 
Indonesia enabled SP programmes to improve the livelihood of poor and vulnerable people?’ This 
question can be addressed through the following strategies: 
a) Comparing the rates of poverty reduction (or welfare improvement) by district before and 
after decentralisation and establishing correlation with relevant social welfare indicators. 
b) Analysing changes in spending on SP programmes by district and finding correlation with 
welfare improvement at the macro level. More importantly, it might be meaningful to 
evaluate spending in selected districts. 
c) Measuring the impact of decentralisation on household poverty in selected districts and 
analysing the role of economic growth in welfare improvement during the period before and 
after the implementation of decentralisation. 
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Detailed information is explored through the list of questions addressed to the respondents (attached 
in Appendix B-1 and B-2, respectively for English and Indonesian translation). In order to dig 
information during the interviews more extensively, the usage of local language (Javanese) might be 
considered.  Locations of interviews might also affect the degree of openness and completeness of 
information so that for sensitive topics might only be addressed in informal spaces where the 
repondents can answer the questions comfortably. 
 
4.5.3 Method of Analysis: a Triangulation Approach 
The strategy of triangulation is often used in data analysis to provide various ways of looking at the 
same phenomenon and to improve credibility (Patton, 2002). In his book, Patton introduced four 
types of triangulation: 
a. Methods triangulation 
b. Triangulation of sources 
c. Analyst triangulation 
d. Theory/perspective triangulation 
Of all these four types, methods triangulation and triangulation of sources are selected for the present 
study. The advantage of these chosen triangulation methods lie in its consistency of checking the 
findings generated by different data collection methods. 
Methods triangulation may involve the reconciliation of qualitative and quantitative data. In this kind 
of triangulation, both types of data are compared and analysed. The observation will specifically point 
towards the contribution of both analyses in understanding the impact of decentralisation on SP in 
selected districts.  
With regards to the triangulation of sources in this study, it will focus on comparing the perspectives 
of people from different backgrounds and cross-checking the results with semi-structured in-depth 
interviews against programme documents and other written evidence. Practically, the most feasible 
steps to undertake triangulation is by creating group lists consist of respondents from different 
categories i.e. (1) local government officials; (2) local member of parliamentss; (3) community leaders; 
(4) facilitators; (5) NGOs/local universities; and (6) beneficiaries. Triangulation in this context refers to 
the checks and balances each and every information given by the respondents particularly ones that 
are contentious. Cross-checks can be done within the same group of respondents and across groups. 
The results of triangulation can find the pattern or the most dominant response which leads to either 
complementing information surrounding a topic or filtering possible false and inaccurate information. 
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Another important step to verify the information given at the interviews is by observing the business 
process of SP that encompasses registration, distribution, and other services. 
 
4.6 Research Methods 
This study will be informed by the extended case method (as proposed by Burawoy, 1998) which 
employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. The type of design in this research is basically 
to confirm the findings of quantitative data using the findings from qualitative analysis, which will be 
conducted sequentially.  
In the quantitative analysis, this study will use various statistical data from official agencies and non-
governmental institutions. Meanwhile, qualitative data will be collected from a combination of 
observation, interviews, focus groups and literature reviews, both in English and Indonesian (or 
possibly local ethnic languages). The qualitative research will be enhanced by interviews with elite 
groups (policymakers) and beneficiaries with the aim of providing insights into the mind-set of the 
actor/s that have played a key role in shaping society. Apart from the conceptual and analytical 
frameworks, the decision to choose a mixed-method research design in this study is also based on two 
technical reasons. First, quantitative analysis at the local level might be insufficient owing to the lack 
of detailed data sets, particularly for the newly formed regions. Thus, the limitation of the quantitative 
method can be offset by the strength of the qualitative method. Second, it anticipates the situations 
where quantitative results require an explanation as to what they mean. 
During fieldwork, I spent time in the parliament building, public offices, and offices of civil   society 
institutions, religious organisations, and houses of SP beneficiaries.  They were  the  scenes  where  my  
fieldwork was  set  out  and  with  which  my  sources  associated. Interviews usually took place in 
various locations depending on the preferences and convenience of each respondent.  The interview 
process could therefore be done in homes, offices, restaurants, or any preferable venues. The 
interviews were very worthwhile in helping me reach explanations and insights into some research 
problems that emerged during the fieldwork. The interviews with informants then became a medium 
of private narratives as they talked to me in person about particular subjects related to the research. 




Figure 4.6 Research Design and Processes 
 
4.6.1 Secondary Analysis of Data (for Macro-Quantitative analysis) 
This section will focus on the strategic picture of integration as a means to overcoming barriers to 
inclusion. The purpose of this method is to capture stylised trends regarding SP and decentralisation 
using secondary data sets from official sources (statistics from ministries and various local offices). 
The results of the quantitative analysis will serve as a basis for further qualitative analysis. The aims 
of this study will be to clarify:  
a. Variations between locations (e.g. population, local revenue, expenditure). 
b. Levels of efficiency (comparison between service provision and expenditure). 
c. Exclusion levels of the people. 
d. Availability and accessibility of services. 
Table 4.4 Description of Data Sources for Quantitative Analysis 
Variables Data Sources Years and Regions 
available 
Limitations 
Human development variables 
1. Gini coefficient 
2. Poverty rate 
3. Population 
4. Social protection 
benefits (including 
health care, education 
assistance, rice subsidy, 
cash transfers, pension) 
5. Population deprived 




poverty rate, social 
protection benefits 




whilst data on 
population is taken 
from decennial  
census. Variables 
 
Gini coefficient is 
published annually from 
2007 but it is available 
in irregular order from 
1976.  
Poverty rate for district 
level is available from 
1999 to 2009, except 
years 2000 and 2001 
while for province it is 
available from 1999 to 
2011, except years 2000 
 
Gini coefficient is 
available only at 
provincial level. 
Population figure is 
interpolated for 
years in between 
census periods. 
Information on SP 
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related data for districts 
is available from 2007 
while provincial data is 
available from 2001. 
data is found for 6 
districts, making a 
gap between 
province and total 
district in Papua.  
Fiscal indicators 
1. General allocation fund 
2. Special allocation grant 
3. Total natural resource 
revenue sharing 
4. Social protection 
expenditure 
 




compiled in the Indo-
DAPOER database 
administered by the 
World Bank. 
 
For year 1994-2009 
(realisation). Prior to 
2001, the General 
Allocation Grant was 
named Subsidy for 
Autonomous Region.  
 
SP expenditure 
before 2001 was 
not listed on budget 
classification.  
Whilst the availability of data at the local level has recently begun to emerge, there is a problem in 
‘backcasting’ the figures for newly created regions. Equally challenging is to trace these figures from 
the originating or parent regions. Given the high number of Susenas observations –around 157,000 
households in 1999 and 278,000 in 2005– the district-level data can be considered reliable. However, 
Susenas enumerators often cannot capture data in very remote areas, which detracts from this 
reliability. In the 1999 and 2002 surveys, for example, BPS acknowledged the difficulty of reaching 
conflict areas in Aceh, Maluku and Papua. The difficulty of interviewing those in the highest and lowest 
income brackets is another challenge recognised by the survey (Leigh & van der Eng 2009). 
 
4.6.2 Thematic Analysis (for Micro-Qualitative analysis) 
As mentioned previously, the data for qualitative analysis is collected using in-depth interviews. 
Interviews will be conducted with local people as well as officials, community leaders, and 
beneficiaries. An emphasis will be placed on whether SP needs are sufficiently met. This is a highly 
qualitative method, focusing on observing how accountability chains are formed, how social 
interaction shapes political processes, and how issues are presented within the community. It will also 
look at what and how capacity-building efforts are carried out and what public administration reforms 
have taken place. 
Later, the results of data gathered from multiple interviews will be analysed using thematic analysis. 
The purpose of choosing this analysis method is mainly to identify, analyse and report patterns or 
themes within the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis has its merits in terms of theoretical 
and methodological underpinning. It is considered the most flexible among various forms of 
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qualitative analysis (narrative, grounded-theory, discourse). Also, it can work alongside other methods 
simultaneously, as Ryan and Bernard (2003) state that thematic analysis is a process performed along 
with major analytical traditions, such as grounded theory rather than being an approach on its own. 
Therefore, one can rely on different approaches of being experimental, essentialist/realist, 
constructionist, or critical realist in implementing thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998). Using this 
method, it involves both inductive and deductive coding during the post-interview phase. The protocol 
for thematic analysis consists of six steps as follows: 
a. Read and re-read the data 
b. Initial codes 
c. Theme generation 
d. Reviewing themes 
e. Naming and confirming themes 
f. Dissemination 
In the context of the present study, thematic analysis is employed to capture something important 
about the data in relation to the research questions and represent a patterned response within the 
data set. Themes do not have to capture a certain amount of data or merge from a certain proportion 
of the data, they just need to capture ‘something important’. Consequently, the researcher’s 
judgement is valuable in determining themes before going into the field. 
 
4.7 Setting the Scene and Notes on Research Method 
Carried  out  for  three  months,  from  May  to  August  2015,  the fieldwork took place in two different 
locations. First it took place in the District of Sragen, while the second was in the Municipality of 
Surakarta (also commonly known as Solo or Sala, interchangeably). Each of the locations has few 
similarities and evidently more differences. The former is characterised as the outskirt or semi-rural 
type of early conurbation where the agriculture sector still predominates the local economy. In 
contrast, the latter is a rather developed urban area with a large service sector, mainly commerce and 
education sub-sectors.  
Both Sragen and Solo are located in the same province: Central Java, situated at the heart of mainland 
Java without a coastal zone. Historically, both are under the royal administration of the kingdom of 
Surakarta Hadiningrat starting from the mid-18th century until the demise of the royal family’s reign 
in the early 20th century.  
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The mainland of Java is arguably the most densely populated area in the world, a region characterised 
by paddy fields, scattered villages and volcanoes towering sometimes more than 3000 metres above 
this landscape. The climate is tropical, bringing the city and the regency to a constant average 
temperature of about 30° throughout the year, and annual precipitation sums of more than 2000 mm. 
Depending on the monsoon, the year can be divided into a rainy season from October until June, with 
December and January as the wettest months, and a short dry season in the remaining three months 
(BPS Surakarta & Bappeda Surakarta, 2010). 
The district (kabupaten) of Sragen (henceforth called Sragen), is located in the eastern part of the 
Central Java province in Indonesia. Its capital (also named Sragen) is located about 30 km to the 
northeast of Surakarta. It borders with East Java Province to the east. The longest river, Bengawan 
Solo flows through the fertile rice fields in the region. Sragen regency consists of 20 sub-districts 
(kecamatan), which are further divided into 208 administrative villages (kelurahan). 
The city of Surakarta (Solo) is the second largest municipality in Central Java (after the city of 
Semarang), located in the eastern lowlands between two volcanic mountain ranges. While official 
statistics report a population of around half a million, daytime numbers can rise up to 1.5 million, 
owing to the large inflow of commuters from surrounding districts. The economy of Solo is renowned 
for its diverse manufacturing sector, which includes one of Indonesia's oldest batik10  production 
centres. The municipality of Surakarta is divided into five sub-districts (kecamatan) and 51 
administrative villages (kelurahan). 
In order to collect the data, in this research I attempted to undertake the traditional method of 
anthropological research, i.e. participant observation, in addition to carrying out interviews. These 
methods helped me to access plenty of essential sources for primary data. The interviews gave me 
ample opportunity to talk with the respondents by deepening a particular topic of the research so that 
I could acquire a better understanding of the subject being investigated. I talked with respondents by 
asking them questions through semi-structured and open-ended interviews, as this approach made it 
possible for me to change from one topic to another and gave interviewees the chance to talk freely 
and openly. In that way, I was still able to control the flow of the talk as the interviews went on, to 
keep the subject focused. Through a series of interviews, I had a good chance to deepen particular 
issues and to address specific themes so that I could gather as much data as I needed from the 
respondents.  
Through participant observation, I engaged in a number of social activities relevant to the research 
project which helped me obtain first-hand data about the subject of research. Participant observation 
                                                          
10 Traditional cloth made using special technique of wax-resistant dyeing.  
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allowed me to get the real picture of social life and helped me to immerse myself in experiencing the 
bureaucratic process in a way that could not be done through interviews. In so doing, I attended 
various public gatherings to observe the dynamics of problems in society and joined poverty surveys 
to grasp the implementation of such methods for targeting purposes. Observing public gatherings 
(rapat warga) helped me to understand more deeply how decentralisation was perceived and 
interpreted differently in many ways by various people. I also noted that SP is a complicated business 
since it is closely associated with complex administration involving power-holders who have a great 
deal of political influence within the state. I undertook field observation not only about the day-to-
day management of local SP but  also  about  how people take part as beneficiaries, observers, or 
facilitators, and witnessed how social  initiatives were organised  by  many  social  groups such as 
NGOs, civil society associations, and religious organisations. Here, I observed live events and took 
photographs which complement my written descriptions, expressing how the public were deeply 
frustrated with the intricacies of the bureaucracy which impede access to SP.  Through participant 
observation, I had a very good chance to learn, not only from common people about general 
information surrounding decentralisation, democratisation and SP, but also to listen to their specific 
and overall complaints. 
 
4.7.1 Demographic Situation 
In terms of demography, these two regions are quite distinguishable. Sragen is populated by around 
879,000 people (as of 2015) while Surakarta as a medium-sized city is currently inhabited by 
approximately 530,000 (the most updated data from 2014). The population growth rates for Sragen 
and Solo are 0.39 and 0.08 percent respectively. Sragen has been experiencing a 10 base points decline 
in the last five years whilst the growth rate in Solo is kept stable at relatively the same rate from 2007 
to date. The most recent data shows that the proportion of population in a productive age range (15-
64 years old) in Sragen and Solo are relatively high at 67.12 and 71.41 percent respectively. A large old 
age population in Sragen is not surprising considering the situation in which large numbers of working-
age youth tend to relocate to big cities to find jobs. 
Municipality status in Surakarta means that the entire population has been living in an urban area. 
Meanwhile, the majority of the population in the District of Sragen live in rural areas. However, the 
urban population is reportedly increasing, from 27.6 percent in early 2000 to 32.3 percent in the latest 
census of 2010. 
The unemployment rates are relatively higher in Surakarta (close to 10 percent) during the period of 
2007-2013, yet the underemployment rates are always higher in Sragen (30 to 35 percent). Despite 
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the fluctuating trend, both rates have been seemingly stable for the observed periods. Figure 6.1 
largely reflects the fact that in Sragen most of the workers rely on the informal sector which can only 
provide menial, casual, or seasonal jobs with small income.  
 
Figure 4.7 Unemployment and Under-employment in Sragen and Surakarta (2007-2013) 
Source: BPS Surakarta & BPS Sragen 
 
4.7.2 Local Financial Capacity 
Figure 6.2 displays regional finance positions for both regions. Overall, there is similarity in terms of 
the enormous size of transfer on local budgets. In general, the amount of transfer had been increasing 
markedly between 2000 and 2012. The portions of inter-governmental transfer in Sragen and Solo are 
96.8 and 93.5 percent respectively. Using GDP as a denominator, an increasing trend of transfer share 
is also discernible in these regions. In addition, large parts of the spending went towards 
administrative expenses that could reach up to 56 percent in Solo and 62 percent in Sragen, as the 
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Figure 4.8 Local Revenue and Spending (2000-2012) 
Source: BPS Surakarta & BPS Sragen 
 
In sum, these charts relay the fact that both regions actually depended heavily on central government 
transfer to fund their expenses. In other words, this refers to the type of financial devolution in the 
country which emphasizes that revenues are collected or administered centrally rather than 
delegating this task to the local offices. However, these transfers were then used mostly to run the 
routine activities. This raises further questions about whether spending of local government can 
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influence real development at the local level. As regular spending dominates the expenses, it can be 
expected that considerable investments on infrastructure will be difficult to fulfil. 
 
4.7.3 Economic Structure and Economic Growth 
As a background to the in-depth analysis for each region, this section details the structure of the 
economy and its dynamics, which provides estimates on the impact of fiscal decentralisation. In that 
regard, diagrams below depict shares of the economy in 2000 (period before decentralisation) and in 
2014 (after more than a decade of decentralisation). Data are taken from the regional statistics office 
using constant price with base year on 2010.  
From Figure 6.3, the changes in economic structure are clearly apparent in both Sragen and Surakarta. 
A notable difference between Sragen and Surakarta is the composition of the local economy. In 2000, 
agriculture was the predominant sector of the local economy in Sragen (39.8 percent), followed by 
manufacturing (20.4 percent), and commerce (17.5 percent). Meanwhile in Surakarta, manufacturing 
is the main economic backbone with 29.6 percent share, followed by commerce (24.8 percent) and 
construction (11.9 percent). This suggests, as the status as a district in Sragen implies, that economic 
structure relates to the extent of rural areas in a region. The larger the size of rural areas, the more 
the contribution of the agriculture sector in an economy. Also, a large agriculture sector is pointing to 
the large population of informal workers. 
In 2014, a different situation is depicted in the lower panel of each region. Arguably, urbanisation is 
the main factor in transforming local economic structure. For instance, in Sragen, the agriculture 
sector shrunk to 16.6 percent while manufacturing and commerce sectors increased up to 32.6 
percent and 24.3 percent respectively. On the other hand, transformation in Solo is largely reflected 
by the fast rate of infrastructure development. As the chart below suggests, Solo had experienced a 
dramatic increase in the construction sector (from 11.9 percent in 2000 to 26 percent in 2014). 
Gentrification can also be found in Surakarta as indicated by the significant increase of the tertiary 
industry and the depleting share of the manufacturing sector in the economy. 










Figure 4.9 Structure of the Economy in Sragen and Surakarta (2000 and 2014) 
Source: BPS Surakarta & BPS Sragen 
 
In addition to the dynamics and differences in economic structure between Sragen and Solo, this 
section focuses attention on the distribution of local economic growth. Using growth incidence curve 
graphs, one can identify ‘the winners’ and ‘the losers’ of economic growth during specified periods. 
The winners can be said to be percentile groups who gain more benefits than the total average of 
growth while the losers are those who gain less (or no) benefits relative to other groups. By depicting 
the growth incidence curve (GIC), one can distinguish clearly whether economic growth in a location 
within certain periods is pro-poor or not. 
Figure 6.4 depicts GIC for Sragen (top panel) and Surakarta (bottom panel) comparing two spells of 
growth incidence distribution by percentile groups. These graphs show that growth distribution 
amongst percentile groups has changed markedly between 14 years.  
Growth in consumption expenditures was generally positive for all percentiles in both regions. 
However, the lowest 10 percentile group experienced the lowest growth rate, particularly in Sragen, 
while the top 10 percent group (richest) saw their significant increase in 14 years. During this period, 
the level of inequalities as measured by the Gini coefficient showed an opposing picture in two regions, 
increased from 0.28 to 0.35 in Surakarta and decreased from 0.37 to 0.33 in Sragen. 
The first spell—1999-2001—is observed in relation to the early years of decentralisation. The second 
spell (2011-2013) is chosen arbitrarily to relate with the most recent implementation of regional 
autonomy. From these graphs, it can be inferred that there are clear patterns associated with regions 
and periods. In early periods of decentralisation, Sragen had shown higher-than-average benefits that 
were incurred for lower and upper percentiles leaving the middle group gained below average benefit. 
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In the same period, Surakarta showed more pro-poor distribution. The lowest 20 percentiles benefited 
more than the average groups, although the highest 95 seemingly also enjoyed above-average growth. 
As shown in the right-hand side panel of Figure 6.4, Sragen in 2011 to 2013 saw that the benefit 
enjoyed by middle percentiles (lowest 20 to upper 80) had increased significantly compared to the 
previous period (1999-2001). Meanwhile in in Solo, the distribution of growth had seemingly become 
less pro-poor in a way that the lowest 30 percentile groups had become worse off and the upper 80 
managed to reap the benefits more than the other groups. 
Therefore, pattern of growth distribution had changed rather dramatically, especially in Sragen. These 
change in Sragen imply that more programmes were targeted more intensely although the lower 
percentile only enjoyed growth of benefits less than the average. Top percentile groups still managed 
to grow higher probably due to at least three factors. First is that the errors in targeting which often 
includes non-poor to receive various benefits of SP programmes. Second, the amount of SP benefit is 
smaller than the positive growth of the top percentiles. Third is the inception phase of decentralisation 
implementation was largely translated into preparation stage with administrative costs being the 
upmost priority (see further in Figure 5.5 in the next chapter). 
Larger amounts of devolved funds to regional authorities—as mandated by regulation pertaining to 
decentralisation—did not to seem to trickle down effectively to the lowest percentile. Almost similarly, 
the World Bank (2016) shows that over a similar period (1996 to 2010), average annual growth in 
household consumption grew three times faster for the richest households than the poorest ones. 
Using national data, the finding suggests that the poorest 60 percent of households had consumption 
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Figure 4.10 Growth Incidence Curve (1999-2013) 
Source: Susenas 
 
4.7.4 Political Landscape 
This section discusses the dynamics of the political situation in Sragen and Solo, particularly focusing 
on the events surrounding local elections in both regions. Situated within the context of emerging and 
deepening democratisation, local elections (pilkada) play a pivotal role in today’s political landscape. 
There are a number of studies on the impact of continuing modification of decentralisation laws on 
the process of democratisation in Indonesia. Many analysts and commentators have produced 
differing interpretations of the current situation. Some argue that effects on the implementation of 
pilkada are largely negative, and cause democratic values to deteriorate. On the other hand, those in 
the optimist camp argue that decentralisation and democratisation can emerge together. It is argued 
that by allowing the regions (especially at the district level) to have more voice in running their own 
democratic process, it is intuitively expected that local people would benefit from local government 
policies. The downside is, however, local election is assumed to lead to increased feelings of 
ethnocentrism and signs of a growing push for a renewed sense of local identity.  
Before the enactment of local direct elections, heads of the region in Solo and Sragen were appointed 
as an ‘assignment’ from central government rather than an ‘aspiration’ of local communities or their 
representatives. Usually in the past, almost all governors, mayors, and regents have a military 
background and strong affinity with Golkar (long-reigning institution formed during Suharto’s era). 
Nepotism was inevitably rampant whilst considerable power was reserved almost entirely by 
presidential office. Hence, top-down authoritarian mechanisms had been firmly in place from the 
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Before the New Order regime, Solo and Sragen was infamous as the stronghold of the leftist group. In 
one period, the mayor of Solo was from the Communist party (Utomo Ramelan assumed office from 
1958 to 1965). After the failed coup attempt at the end of 1965, the communist influence was 
eradicated and strong military influence had begun to entrench governance. Sudden change in the 
political constellation had affected most parts of governance and society. For the next 30 years, Solo 
and the surrounding vicinity had been completely under the control of the Suharto apparatus leaving 
only small pockets of areas for opposition groups. 
The end of the authoritarian New Order period ushered in deepened democratisation. Introduced in 
2005, local direct elections have been the milestone of public participation in local politics. In Solo, 
the public was highly enthusiastic in welcoming the implementation of the direct election system. 
With average turn-out rates between 70 to 72 percent for three elections (2005, 2010, and 2015), this 
meant considerable attention from the public towards their mayoral candidates. Meanwhile in Sragen, 
the turnout rates were even higher (93.5 to 98.5 percent). It seems that the commencement of 
democratisation arguably brought about a euphoric atmosphere and increasing role of citizenship. 
The unexpectedly high turnout rates were in stark contrast with the results of elections for legislatures 
which for years had shown declining participation (see Chapter 6 on the low confidence in political 
parties). This can partly explain the relevance of the election process for authorities whom the public 
believe will handle local issues effectively. 
Below are the tables with a summary of direct election results in Surakarta and Sragen from 2005 to 
2015. The first noticeable distinction of local elections between two regions is the higher turnout in 
Sragen with significantly more than twenty point percentage differences. Possibly, the higher rate of 
democratic participation in rural areas is explained by the awareness of the public but it is also 
unsurprisingly representing the close-knit relationship which is still strong in villages. Participation in 
communal events or gatherings is inescapably tied to the social capital that is enshrined in local values, 
hence the high number of voters. Meanwhile, Solo is characterised by more urban, active, and critical 
voters who used to abstain (golongan putih) during many elections in the New Order era as 
manifestations of civic ‘disobedience’ against the authoritarian ruling government. 
Table 4.5 Result of Mayoral Direct Election in Surakarta 2005 
Candidates Supporting Parties Votes % 
Joko Widodo–F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo PDIP 99,747  36.62% 
Achmad Purnomo-Istar Yuliadi PAN 79,213  29.08% 
Hardono-Dipokusumo Golkar, Demokrat, PKS 78,989  29.00% 
Slamet Suryanto-Hengky Nartosabdo 
(incumbent) 
Small parties coalition 14,414  5.29% 
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Candidates Supporting Parties Votes % 
Void/did not vote 104,248    
Valid votes 272,363  72.30% 
Registered voters 376,611    
 
Table 4.6 Result of Mayoral Direct Election in Surakarta 2010 
Candidates Supporting Parties Votes % 
Joko Widodo–F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo 
(incumbent) 
PDIP, PKS, PAN, Gerindra, PDS 
248,243  90.09% 
Achmad Purnomo-Istar Yuliadi Demokrat, Golkar, Hanura 27,306  9.91% 
Void   7,140    
Did not vote 111,014    
Valid votes 275,549  70.00% 
Registered voters 393,703    
 
Table 4.7 Result of Mayoral Direct Election in Surakarta 2015 
Candidates Supporting Parties Votes % 
Anung Indro Susanto–Muhammad Fajri PKS, PAN, Partai Gerindra, 
and Partai Demokrat 
111,462  39,61% 
F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo–Achmad Purnomo 
(incumbent) 
PDIP 
169,902  60,39% 
Void 103,989    
Did not vote 12,773    
Valid votes 281,364  70.70% 
Registered voters 398,126    
Source: Election Commission Surakarta 
 
Table 4.8 Result of Regency Direct Election in Sragen 2006 
Candidates Supporting Parties Votes % 
Untung S. Wiyono - Agus Fatchur 
Rahman (incumbent) 
PDIP and Golkar 
365,539  80.71% 
Inggus Subaryanto - Mahmudi Tohpati Partai Demokrat, PAN, and PPP 57,344  12.66% 
Void/did not vote 31,704    
Valid votes 452,883  93.50% 
Registered voters 484,587    
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Table 4.9 Result of Regency Direct Election in Sragen 2011 
Candidates Supporting Parties Votes % 
Wiyono-Dariyanto 
Gerindra, PPRN, and 16 small 
parties 
11,603  2.21% 
Sularno-Kushardjono independent 5,100  0.97% 
Danang Wijaya-Sumiyarno independent 10,146  1.94% 
Kusdinar Untung Yuni Sukowati-
Darmawan Minto Basuki 
PDIP, Partai Demokrat, PKS, PKB, 
and PR 
231,844  44.22% 
Agus Fatchur Rahman-Daryanto 
(incumbent) 
Golkar, PAN, and PPP 265,648  50.66% 
Void/did not vote 9,639    
Valid votes 524,341  98.20% 
Registered voters 533,980    
 
Table 4.10 Result of Regency Direct Election in Sragen 2015 
Candidates Supporting Parties Votes % 
Sugiyamto-Joko Saptono PDI P and Demokrat 58,616  14.34% 
Agus Fatchur Rahman-Djoko Suprapto 
(incumbent) 
Golkar and Hanura 
147,705  36.13% 
Kusdinar Untung Yuni Sukowati-Dedy 
Endriyatno 
Gerindra and PKS 
169,777  41.53% 
Jaka Sumanta-Surojogo PKB and PAN 32,699  8.00% 
Void/did not vote 6,054    
Valid votes 408,797  98.50% 
Registered voters 414,851    
Source: Election Commission Sragen 
The first direct election in Solo (2005) resulted in tough rivalry between candidates from PDI-P (Joko 
Widodo), PAN (Achmad Purnomo), and Golkar (Hardono). This represents the long-running struggle 
between nationalist versus religious influence in the town. For long, Surakarta had been controlled by 
a military and centralist view and in 2005 new political players were presented with an opportunity to 
break the cycle. Jokowi won the first mayoral election with only 7 percent difference against the 
toughest contender but he effectively managed to hold on to his authority in the next five years. In 
2010, the constellation of the coalition had changed drastically following the rising popularity of 
Jokowi. At least five political parties had formed a strong coalition to renominate Jokowi for the 2010-
2015 term. The result was predictable but still it was surprising to many as it recorded the highest 
landslide victory in local direct elections (90.09%). Undoubtedly, this magnificent outcome was the 
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backdrop of a further story on the nomination of Jokowi in the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012. 
Something different occurred in 2015 when Jokowi had already won the presidential election the year 
before. This time, the incumbent struggled to secure the required vote although this was not as tough 
as in the 2005 election. 
In Sragen, the story on direct elections from 2006 to 2015 presents a dynamic twist in local politics. 
The very first election in 2006 was quite predictable, in the way that the two biggest political parties 
(i.e. PDI-P and Golkar, both are nationalist parties) had joined forces and nominated the incumbent 
pair (Untung and Agus) who was previously elected as Regent (Bupati) and Vice Regent (Wakil Bupati) 
during the transition period (in 2001-2006 when indirect election was still practiced). Not surprising, 
Untung managed to win the first contest with a landslide victory. The second direct election in 2011 
shows the highest number of participating candidates. Five tickets competed, with two amongst them 
being of independent nomination. Yet, only candidates with the support of resourceful and 
established political parties managed to garner the most votes. Untung’s daughter, Yuni (backed by 
PDI-P and other large parties) had an unsuccessful venture in her first election. It was Untung’s former 
running mate, Agus Fatchurrachman, who eventually managed to win his third election, this time as 
Regent. The most recent election that was ideally set in 2016 had been conducted earlier to support 
the government’s plan to hold ‘simultaneous’ pilkada.11 The 2015 election once again involved fierce 
competition among candidates with four tickets competing. The incumbent paired with a new running 
mate while Untung’s daughter left her main supporting party (PDI-P) to form a new coalition with 
Gerindra (nationalist) and PKS (Islamist) parties. This manoeuvre was surprisingly effective in 
mobilising constituents and eventually secured the winning votes. 
 
4.8 Reflection on Limitations 
The key limitation of the qualitative method with small sample size is that it is not possible to claim 
that these results are nationally or regionally representative. However, it should be noted that there 
are equally no strong reasons to believe that findings, particularly on broad lessons about which it is 
possible to generalise across most of the 3 sites, should not apply to comparable locations in Indonesia. 
It should also be noted that elite interviews are not a panacea and have their own limitations and 
weaknesses. As George and Bennett (2005) highlight in relation to evidence more generally, 
researchers need to critically assess and weigh the value of collected data, recognising the pitfalls that 
                                                          
11 Simultaneous election (which started gradually from 2015 and is expected to be complete in 2027) 
is simply intended to eliminate the common practice of renomination in different places for 
candidates after failing in a region. 
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may limit its usefulness along with its benefits. Thus, the interviewer must constantly be aware that 
the information the interviewee is supplying, can often be of a highly subjective nature. While in many 
circumstances interviews can compensate for the distortions that exist in written sources, it is also 
sometimes the case that interviewees misrepresent their own positions in ways that raise questions 
over the reliability of their statements. In particular, politicians may attempt to modify their accounts 
and inflate or minimise their own role in an event or process depending on whether there is political 
capital to be gained or lost. 
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PART IV RESULTS 
Chapter Five: Macro-Quantitative Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Before exploring further, it is important to look at an overview of the quantitative data on the 
relationship between social welfare development, decentralisation, and democratisation across 
regions. This is to provide a general picture of the policy context and its impact within society. 
As reiterated in previous chapters, Indonesia has undertaken decentralisation and it is considered as 
a policy with the most profound impact. However, one question remains: how effective was Indonesia 
in developing districts during the decentralisation period? In the first decade of the decentralisation 
period, from 2001–2010, Indonesia’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of only 5.4 per cent. This 
was significantly slower than during 1990–1996 when Indonesia’s GDP had grown at an average rate 
of more than 7 per cent per year. 
A wide body of literature shows that corruption, lack of resources, and other problems have impeded 
local governments from fully realising their potentials. Currently, regulations on reforms are still a 
work in progress. Improvement on coordination between the central and local government has been 
taking place. In the meantime, it appears that while several regions have demonstrated success, the 
majority are still struggling to mitigate poverty and inequality (see for details Miranti et al., 2013; Yusuf 
et al., 2014). 
Although decentralisation has divided tasks and responsibilities between central and regional 
governments, high reliance upon certain programmes is still discernible. In a similar vein, 
Brodjonegoro and Asanuma (2000) offer a similar analysis. They argue that despite the new authority 
that local level government will acquire under Law No. 22 Year 1999 (later revised into Law No. 32 
Year 2004), regional autonomy still ‘misses the point’ (p. 118). Ultimately the central government 
retains too much power and control over decision making. 
As a corollary of democratisation, direct elections have played a significant role in shaping public policy. 
Reiterated by Aspinall (2014) and Rosser and Wilson (2012) in their studies at the district level in 
Indonesia, candidates during election seasons tend to utilise SP and entitlement policy as a primary 
means to garner votes during the campaign. In hindsight, Jokowi’s success stories in Solo and Jakarta, 
which ultimately brings him into the presidential seat in 2014 also involved the expansion of SP 
programmes during his tenure (Mietzner, 2014). This leads us another follow-up question on how 
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effective is SP for attracting potential votes, as well as being an instrument to improve social welfare, 
in the context of overlapping functions of different levels of government. 
 
5.2 Regional Analysis: Before and After Decentralisation 
Tables 5.1 – 5.3 provide typological analysis on important indicators i.e. regional gross domestic 
product (RGDP), economic growth, and Human Development Index (HDI) for provinces. Development 
progress at the provincial levels seems to show modest changes for pre- and post- decentralisation 
periods. Certain regions such as Jakarta, Aceh, and Papua often have high income per capita whilst 
only a few regions can attain a high welfare level. Although such a typology might not necessarily show 
the proper context,12 it exhibits to some extent the fact that decentralisation seems to have neither 
greatly improved social development nor led to significant slowing. 
Table 5.1 Regional Typology 
Average National Economic Growth  
Quadrant IV – GRDPpc < GDPpc 
Av. Reg. Ec. Growth > Av. Nat. Ec. Growth 
Quadrant I – GRDPpc > GDPpc 
Av. Reg. Ec. Growth > Av. Nat. Ec. Growth 
Quadrant III – GRDPpc < GDPpc 
Av. Reg. Ec. Growth < Av. Nat. Ec. Growth 
Quadrant II – GRDPpc > GDPpc 
Av. Reg. Ec. Growth < Av. Nat. Ec. Growth 
Human Development Index 
Quadrant IV – GRDPpc < GDPpc 
HDIi > HDI nat 
Quadrant I – GRDPpc > GDPpc 
HDIi > HDI nat 
Quadrant III – GRDPpc < GDPpc 
HDIi < HDI nat 
Quadrant II – GRDPpc > GDPpc 
HDIi < HDI nat 
 
Nonetheless, there is some initial evidence that decentralisation does not significantly increase social 
welfare. Although district governments have been allocated large funds and considerable authority to 
initiate welfare programmes, it appears from Table 5.2 to Table 5.3 that only a few regions with 
sufficient local budget and capability makes use of this potential e.g. Jakarta, Riau and Kalimantan 
Timur. These districts to some degree have similar characteristics in terms of local revenue. Whilst 
Riau and Kalimantan Timur are endowed with a large share of natural resources, Jakarta has been the 
centre of almost every business activity. 
                                                          
12 Central to the feature of decentralisation in Indonesia is that most government functions are 
devolved to ‘tier-2’ local governments i.e. districts and cities, which therefore creates arm’s-length 
relationships with the provincial authority.  




Table 5.2 Classification of Regions based on Income per Capita and Economic Growth 
1983-1999 
 Income per capita 
(2000 constant) 































Bali, DI Yogyakarta, Jambi, Jawa 
Barat, Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, 
Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan 
Selatan, Kalimantan Tengah, 
Lampung, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa 
Tenggara Timur, Sulawesi Selatan, 
Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, 
Sulawesi Utara, Sumatera Barat, 
Sumatera Utara 










) Bengkulu, Maluku, Sumatera Selatan 
 
Aceh, Kalimantan Timur, Riau 
 
2000-2010 
 Income per capita 
(2000 constant) 































Bengkulu, DI Yogyakarta, Gorontalo, 
Jambi, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, 
Jawa Timur, Kalimantan Tengah, 
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung, 
Lampung, Sulawesi Barat, Sulawesi 
Selatan, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi 
Tenggara, Sumatera Barat, Sumatera 
Selatan, Sumatera Utara 











Bali, Banten, Kalimantan Barat, 
Kalimantan Selatan, Maluku Utara, 
Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa 
Tenggara Timur, Sulawesi Utara 
Aceh, Kalimantan Timur, Kepulauan Riau, 
Papua, Riau 
 
Chapter 5: Macro-Quantitative Analysis 
152 
 
Table 5.3 Classification of Regions based on Income per Capita and HDI 
1999 
 Income per capita 
(2000 constant) 































Bengkulu, DI Yogyakarta, Gorontalo, 
Jambi, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, 
Jawa Timur, Kalimantan Tengah, 
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung, 
Lampung, Sulawesi Barat, Sulawesi 
Selatan, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi 
Tenggara, Sumatera Barat, Sumatera 
Selatan, Sumatera Utara 











Bali, Banten, Kalimantan Barat, 
Kalimantan Selatan, Maluku Utara, 
Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa 
Tenggara Timur, Sulawesi Utara 




 Income per capita 
(2000 constant) 
























Bali, Bengkulu, DI Yogyakarta, Jambi, 
Jawa Tengah, Kalimantan Tengah, 
Bangka Belitung, Sulawesi Utara 










Banten, Gorontalo, Jawa Barat, 
Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan 
Selatan, Lampung, Maluku Utara, 
Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa 
Tenggara Timur, Sulawesi Barat, 
Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Tengah, 
Sulawesi Tenggara, Sumatera Barat, 
Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Selatan, 
Sumatera Utara 
Aceh, Papua Barat, Papua 
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Tables 5.1 - 5.3 gives a glimpse of the impact of decentralisation, suggesting that it hardly improves 
public welfare and supporting the notion that virtues such as economic efficiency, accountability, and 
resource mobilisation are unlikely to be achieved. The situation occurs largely in the context of regions 
where citizen preferences are not fully translated into budget outcomes and the institutional capacity 
of existing subnational agencies is close to zero. Related to this is the fact that poor service delivery 
still persists. In this regard, Lewis (2014a) argues that poor services are attributed to the lack of 
downward accountability of local governments towards their constituents, deficiencies in local 
government planning and financial management. Using this perspective, decentralisation in Indonesia 
seems likely to result in increased costs, lessened efficiency in service delivery, and probably greater 
inequity. 
 
5.2.1 Reducing the Confounding Effects of Decentralisation and Other Factors on SP 
Although the process of fiscal decentralisation might be considered successful, it is still difficult to 
judge whether the process has been an accomplished or not. According to Brodjonegoro (2009), the 
inter-governmental transfer scheme is still far from optimal due to heavy political interferences in the 
formulation of intergovernmental transfers comprising general purpose grant (Dana Alokasi Umum, 
DAU), special allocation fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK), natural resource revenue sharing, and tax 
revenue sharing. 
In most local governments, DAU is basically their operational day-to-day budget since its role is very 
dominant in the local budget. The heavy dependence on DAU creates disincentives for local 
governments in raising the collection of the locality’s own revenue (pendapatan asli daerah, PAD). 
Brodjonegoro and Vazquez (2005) also reveal the significant negative correlation between the size of 
DAU and PAD.  
The allocation of DAU is still full of political influence as indicated by the ‘hold-harmless’ provision that 
guarantees that every local government receives a grant not less than the allocation of the previous 
fiscal year. This is clearly detrimental to the purpose of equalising fiscal capacity. While DAU becomes 
the centre of attention for most local governments, another serious issue in local finance, the locality’s 
own revenue, seems to be neglected. Current regulations obviously do not give significant local 
taxation power since Indonesian decentralisation was designed to be expenditure-led decentralisation 
financed by fund transfers (comprising mainly DAU and DAK).  
The weak local taxation power has another negative implication regarding the local climate of 
investment. Since most local governments realise that the amount of transfer is far from enough to 
fulfil their needs as a result of slow economic recovery, and at the same time they do not have 
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alternatives to existing local taxes and charges, they are trying to find other sources that unfortunately 
are illegal and disruptive. Imposing new charges, levies or fees has become the favourite tools for local 
governments to generate additional revenue and ensure a stable management of cash-flow. The 
easiest targets for those new additional revenues are unfortunately the local businesses that seem to 
be powerless in that situation. 
According to Lewis (2014a), not only does the fiscal distribution cause problems, but he argues further 
that an alternative explanation for poor service delivery outcomes would focus on the lack of 
accountability of local governments towards their constituents. Accountability in this context actually 
comprises two separate dimensions: an appeal to citizens for improvements in service quality, and a 
response by local governments to meet constituents’ demands. Appeals from citizens implicitly 
presuppose the existence of some reasonable measure of dissatisfaction with the status quo. The 
prevailing view is that local public service delivery has improved little since decentralisation began, 
despite the substantial transfer of funds to local governments to discharge their new-found 
responsibilities. 
 
5.2.2 A Brief Overview of SP Programmes: Before and After Decentralisation 
In general, SP in Indonesia has evolved from a very small initiative in its early years to privileging formal 
sector workers during the New Order period, to universal coverage in the current period. These 
changes were in line with and driven by the developments of the Indonesian economy in general, 
which has gone through various episodes marked by both booms and crises. 
Putting this in the context of decentralisation, more actors come into play with the diverse nature of 
SP in every region. However, it appears that the role of local governments has not yet been clarified. 
For example, the numbers of locally-initiated health insurance schemes without single umbrella 
regulations has multiplied regulations and none of these allow for portable access. In fact, the Law on 
National Social Security Carriers or Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS), which was stipulated 
in 2011, does not clearly mention the roles and responsibilities of ongoing local health insurance. 
These local health insurance schemes, which have variations in benefit packages and reflect partly the 
fiscal capacity and preferences of local governments, may pose a particular challenge with regard to 
harmonisation and integration of universal coverage efforts. 
Until now, local governments feel that they have not been informed appropriately on the progress of 
the universal health coverage plan, what roles they would have after universal coverage is 
implemented, and what they have to do with their ongoing local health insurance. Some local 
governments have even sued the central government to the Constitutional Court just after the SJSN 
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Law was enacted in 2004 because they believed that the law violates the Decentralisation Law, 
particularly on the roles of the local government in the health sector (Wisnu, 2013).  
 
5.2.3 Comparing Changes in Social Welfare between the Period Before and After Decentralisation 
Previously (in Sections 2.3 and 2.4), the evolution of SP happened in two different periods. This 
discussion then attempted to analyse the impact of those changes based on secondary sources using 
quantitative methods. In that way, it is expected that we have the general overview of this dynamic. 
 
5.2.4 Cluster Analysis Based on Local Government Spending 
As explained in the previous chapters, decentralisation in Indonesia features heavily the role of 
transfer from central to local government. This type of fiscal decentralisation means that the 
administration of revenue is largely retained by central government. However, the current formula of 
intergovernmental transfer from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the existing classifications of 
lagged regions from the Ministry of Village, Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (MoVDRAT) 
are arguably leaning towards the domination of finance and economic indicators such as regional GDP, 
local revenues, and spendings (Dalimunthe, 2013; Government of Indonesia, 2015). Although several 
variables reflecting demography and the size of regions are also considered, these seem to neglect 
other variables like social welfare (i.e. education, health, poverty, inequality.)  
The classification of lagged regions from MoVDRAT is used to determine the amount of additional 
funding to complement the intergovernmental transfer from MoF within the framework of 
decentralised administration. In the earlier part of this thesis, most of the poor remain in the most 
developed island, Java, while Eastern Indonesia with its lagged development has been the host of the 
poor in terms of population proportion. Not surprisingly, the transfers based on these classifications 
have not led to the progress of development indicated by worsening inter-island disparity and 
stagnant poverty reduction at the local level (B. Lewis, 2013). 
The location of poverty is changing dramatically in Indonesia. The distribution pattern appears 
consistent with the most recent global finding: that only a quarter of the world’s extreme poor, by 
income and multidimensional poverty measures, live in countries classified by the World Bank as low 
income countries (see details in Alkire, Roche, Santos, & Seth, 2011; Sumner, 2012) while most of the 
poor inhabit emerging lower-middle income countries 
The finding at the global level is seemingly echoed in Indonesia with the prevalence of poverty 
incidence and vulnerability population that is moving away from the poorest provinces or districts, at 
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least from those defined as low income regions, or lagging regions, by MoVDRAT. Regions do not 
suddenly change when they cross arbitrary thresholds, be they standards of income per capita or 
structural characteristics. However, the central government does treat regions differently if they are 
not categorised as backward or lagging. For example, in April 2015, MoVDRAT officially lodged a 
request to review criteria for deciding the lagging regions, in order to add the number of regions 
currently receiving an additional budget for development acceleration. 
From the above finding, this section aims to build new classification of regions using variables which 
encompass broader aspects of development. Arguably, categorisation of regions using income levels 
has been called into question by changing patterns of poverty locations (Daimon, 2001). Therefore, 
this paradox of ‘emerging regions’ and the incidence of poverty raises a question as to whether the 
current classifications remain useful for policymaking and analytical purposes. In response, this part 
of the thesis proposes and attempts to operationalise an alternative taxonomy for classifying regions. 
5.2.4.1 Frames and normative considerations 
In order to capture the progress a wider notion of ‘development’ in the regions, cluster analysis is used 
in this study. Therefore, in attempt to identify the types of districts using alternative perspective, I 
compile a set of indicators covering different types of definitions of development which encompasses 
four conceptual frames: development as structural transformation; development as human 
development; development as good governance; and development as sustainability. 
5.2.4.2 Indicators 
The measurement of human development and structural change has been discussed extensively in 
the academic literature. The earliest conceptual frame of ‘development’ is defined as structural 
transformation as pioneered by Lewis (1954), Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950), Myrdal (1968), and Seers 
(1963). Their works revolve around the special characteristics of developing countries which 
experienced transformation or shifts in resources to higher productivity, usually from agriculture to 
manfacturing and services. This phenomenon is largely summarised in the neoclassical growth model 
(Solow, 1956). Meanwhile, the assessment of ‘governance’ and ‘local autonomy’ in the academic 
discourse has not seemed matured yet. 
The second conceptual frame of development here in this study refers to human development which, 
according to Seers (1969), has led to the shifts in the concept of development from conventional 
measures such as GDP per capita to essential ‘basic needs’. Many attempts to determine basic needs 
were previously undertaken by other development economists (among others, see Hicks & Streeten, 
1979; International Labour Organization, 1976; Streeten, 1984) which culminated in the work of Sen 
(1999) whose profound contribution helped shaping the new approach to defining development. In 
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this study, to measure human development, I use population, poverty rates ($1.5 a day poverty 
headcount), health (morbidity rate), and education (net enrolment ratio for primary, junior, and senior 
high school). 
The third conceptual frame is ‘development’ as improved governance. Following Sen (1987), it is clear 
that access to governance structures has both intrinsic and instrumental value for citizens and for the 
poor in particular. Definitions of governance have evolved from normative recommendations (rule of 
law, rights, anti-corruption, electoral democracy) to abstract concepts such as citizenship, 
participation, and representation. Many scholars have attempted to define governance such as 
Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003) and Hyden, Court, and Mease (2003). To translate these concepts 
of governance-related development, this study attempts to measure development as better 
governance by using indicators from the Supreme Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK) that 
are commonly used in governance-related research, e.g. auditor’s report to the financial statements 
of local budget.  
Finally, the fourth frame of ‘development’ in this study refers to the local autonomy. Literature on this 
topic emerged in the 1990s and mostly discusses the impact of devolved authority on local 
development. Majority of these studies focus on decentralisation’s effects on public sector outputs, 
such as investment levels, public service provision, education and health indicators, and 
macroeconomic stability, to name a few of the larger threads. Valuable studies summarising this 
research can be found in  Rondinelli, Cheema, and Nellis (1983), Manor (1999), Treisman (2007), and 
Faguet (2012). Comparatively few studies investigate decentralisation’s effects on the quality of 
governance; some exceptions include Bardhan (2002), de Mello and Barenstein (2001), and Oxhorn, 
Tulchin, and Selee (2004).  




Sub-dimensions Proxies Sources 




RGDP per capita World Bank 
(2015) 
 1.2. Structural 
change  
GDP in non-agricultural 
sectors (% of GDP)  
World Bank 
(2015) 
 1.3. Dependency on 
natural resources  
GDP in non-oil sectors (% 
of GDP)  
World Bank 
(2015) 
II. Development as 
human development 
2.1. Population Population World Bank 
(2015) 






Sub-dimensions Proxies Sources 
 2.2. Poverty Poverty rate World Bank 
(2015) 
 2.3. Health Morbidity rate World Bank 
(2015) 












III. Development as good 
local governance 




IV. Development as local 
autonomy 
4.1. Local economic 
capacity  
Local government revenue World Bank 
(2015) 








 4.3. Economy Economic expenditure World Bank 
(2015) 
 4.4. Education Education expenditure World Bank 
(2015) 
 4.5. Health Health expenditure World Bank 
(2015) 
 4.6. Infrastructure Infrastructure expenditure World Bank 
(2015) 
 
5.2.4.3 Method and limitations 
This section explains the background for using cluster analysis, a numerical technique for classifying a 
sample of heterogeneous districts in a limited number of groups, each of which is internally 
homogeneous in terms of the similarities between the districts that comprise it. Mainly, the result of 
cluster analysis will build upon the selection of sample locations. 
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The aim of the cluster analysis in this study is basically to provide classifications that meet the following 
criteria i.e. ‘objective’ and ‘stable’ (Everitt et al., 2011). Objective means that the analysis of the same 
set of districts using similar numerical methods produces similar classification; and stable refers to the 
classification that remains similar when new districts or new characteristics describing them are 
factored in.  
Particularly relevant to this study, hierarchical cluster analysis is used to build a taxonomy of districts 
with various levels of development in order to divide them into a number of distinguishable groups so 
that: (i) each district belongs to only one group; (ii) every district belongs to a group; (iii) districts of 
the same group share ‘homogeneous’ characteristics; and (iv) districts of different groups are 
noticeably different. This procedure allows one to recognise the attributes between districts, which 
facilitate the identification of the development characteristics of each cluster. 
With 14 continuous variables, Ward’s method (1963) is chosen in this study. Using this method, the 
fusion of two clusters is based on the size of an error sum-of-squares criterion. The purpose of this 
method is to minimise the increase in the total within-cluster error sum of squares. The Ward’s 
method has been considered practical and proven to be suitable for building clusters with similar sizes 
(Everitt et al., 2011; Hands & Everitt, 1987; Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011).  
Nevertheless, cluster analysis also poses difficulties for the classification of districts. Nielsen (2013) 
points to two difficulties: first, if the values of the development indicators are evenly distributed across 
districts, the analysis is not able to distinguish groups, even though there may be important 
differences between the indicators for each district. 
 
5.2.4.4 Statistical procedure and main results 
In order to undertake the clustering process, the variables in the analysis must be examined to detect 
the presence of collinearity. The 14 variables in the analysis are treated as proxies for different 
development dimensions, therefore highly correlated variables are not uncommon. As a result, 
correlation matrix (Appendix C-1) shows four variables (i.e. health expenditure, education expenditure, 
infrastructure expenditure, and total local expenditure) that have a high correlation coefficient (over 
0.9) which indicate possible collinearity. However, we choose to keep all indicators with in order to 
observe the relationships between variables in a bigger picture. 
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The scree plot (Figure 5.1) depicts the combination of cluster at each stage and the distances at which 
these clusters merge. In the context of this study, this step is to determine the optimum number of 
district groups. Eigenvalues threshold shows that four district clusters of development are possibly 
appropriate. The scree plot clearly depicts a distinct break or ‘elbow’. This indicates a possible 
additional combination of two clusters. The number of clusters prior to the merger is the most 
probable solution. In this way, and despite the high number of districts included in the graph, the scree 
plot shows a distinct break due to the increase in distance when switching from a three to a four-
cluster solution.  
 
Figure 5.1 Scree plot 
Analysis on scree plot to determine the number of clusters is followed by examination of dendrogram 
Figure 5.2 which exhibits the distances at which districts (and clusters of districts) are joined. The 
direction for reading this dendrogram is from left to right where vertical lines represent districts joined 
together. The positions of these lines indicate the distance at which the mergers take place. This graph 
provides rough guidance in defining the number of groups. The elbow of the dendrogram indicates 















0 5 10 15 20
Number of clusters
 95% CI  Eigenvalues
Mean
Scree plot of eigenvalues after pca




Figure 5.2 Dendrogram 
The results of scree plot and dendrogram can be further examined using the ‘variance ratio criterion’ 
(VRC). By using VRC, the ideal number of clusters is the one that maximises the ratio between the 
overall between-cluster variation and the overall within-cluster variation for all clustering variables. A 
more precise and objective method for determining the optimum number of clusters was proposed 
by Calinski and Harabasz (1974), which has proven to work well in many situations (Milligan & Cooper, 
1985). The VRC recommends choosing the number of clusters that maximises the ratio between the 
overall between-cluster variation and the overall within-cluster variation with regard to all clustering 
variables (i.e. good clustering yields groups of countries with small within-cluster variation but high 
between-cluster variation). As shown in Table 5.6, the suggested number of clusters is four. Therefore, 
using the three procedures (the scree plot, the dendrogram, and the VRC), it suggests that the 
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Table 5.5 Variance Ratio Criterion 
















As an important prerequisite before comparing each cluster is the identification of variables. This is in 
order to find the influence of each variable in discriminating between districts. This step is necessary 
to investigate whether the groups of districts are statistically distinguishable. Simple analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) is employed to verify the significance of differences between clusters.  Therefore, I 
perform one-way ANOVA to calculate the cluster centroids and compare the differences. The result 
(Appendix C-2) shows that 12 out of 14 variables are statistically significant. The indicator referring to 
the relevance of variables is represented by the sixe of the F statistics. Using F statistics, population 
seems to be the variable with the greatest discriminating power with enormous gap, followed by the 
expenditures of SP, health, and education. By contrast, the variables with lowest relative importance 
in the classification are GDP per capita, morbidity rate, and non-oil GDP.  
The cluster solutions of our analysis are reasonably ‘robust’. Following the recommendation from 
Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) the robustness is verified using a two-step check. Firstly, the stability of the 
results is evaluated by using different clustering procedures, distance measures and standardisation 
methods on the same data, and test whether these yield similar development taxonomies. However, 
it is common for results to change even when the cluster solution is adequate, some degree of 
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variation is expected when changing the cluster procedure. And secondly, the order of the districts in 
the data set is changed and the analysis is re-run to check its stability. The results should not depend 
on the order of the data set, unless there are outliers that influence the results. The first check shows 
moderate variations in the results. In particular, changing the clustering procedure, from the Ward to 
the single linkage (nearest neighbour), only affects 17 out of the 40313 districts (all of them are changes 
to the nearest cluster in terms of development). 
From the previous procedures (the distances on scree plot, the dendrogram, and the VCR), the 
exercise produces four development clusters. The detail results consisting districts according to the 
four development groups are shown in the Appendix C-3. In short, the first cluster (C1) includes 223 
districts (100 of them are lagging regions and 17 are sharing borders with other countries; the second 
(C2) is composed of 121 districts (26 lagging regions and five bordering regions); the third (C3) includes 
45 districts (one lagging region, and one bordering region); the forth (C4) has 14 districts with no 
lagged or border regions.  
Therefore, C1 includes largely the poorest districts (using income per capita standard), followed by C2 
and C3; whereas C4 includes the regions with the highest incomes. However, our development 
taxonomy differs notably from the usual income classification used by MoF or MoVDRaT. Thus the 
rank analysis between the variables, regional GDP per capita, and the cluster membership shows that 
both classifications have a limited degree of coincidence. 
Notably, many districts commonly labelled ‘emerging districts’ are not in the emerging economies 
clusters because they retain characteristics of poorer districts. The result of cluster analysis shows that 
there is no simple ‘linear’ representation of development levels (from low to high development 
countries). Cluster analysis in this part of the study can be interpreted more precisely by examining 
the cluster centroids (i.e. average values of all districts in a certain cluster). This enables us to analyse 
the data on the basis of the grouping variable’s values as follows: 
Cluster 1: High poverty rate districts with significant size of traditional economies. These districts 
have the highest poverty and lowest net enrolment primary education; however, the morbidity rate 
is less acute than in C2 and C3. On average, the agricultural sector contributes to one third of the local 
GDP, although their non-oil GDP is low. Moreover, they have the second lowest productivity of the 
economies in the data set. They have the poorest governance indicators whilst local revenue and local 
spending are the highest. Many of these districts are sparsely populated which contributes to low 
productive labour. The governance indicator ranks the lowest. 
                                                          
13 The exercise utilises the data set for all districts in Indonesia (497 as of the year 2014). However, 
due to incomplete variables for several districts, the result was reduced to being only for 403 districts.   
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Cluster 2: Agriculture sector dependent districts with moderate size of population. These districts 
rank third (after C3) in terms of poverty and morbidity. However, compared to other clusters, this 
group ranks second in terms of local expenditure (after C1). The education indicators are slightly better 
than C1. The majority of local expenditure is devoted to the economic sector, as in other clusters. 
However, the allocation to infrastructural development ranks first.   
Cluster 3: Cluster with relatively dense population and high morbidity rate. This is also the group 
with the least productivity per capita. Poverty and morbidity rates are the second highest (after C1). 
Local revenue and expenditure do not contribute significantly to local development. Net enrolment 
rates for junior and secondary education rank first, which indicates the potential of human capacity, 
while local funding is mostly allocated to the economic sector, providing very small amounts for SP. 
Compared to the other groups, governance indicator in C3 ranks first. 
Cluster 4: Economically advanced emerging districts with serious challenges of population density. 
These are the districts with very high productivity and very little government contribution. Poverty 
and morbidity rates are the lowest, whilst net enrolment rates for primary education are the highest. 
However, local governance needs significant improvement. 
It is important to note, as in any development classification, that there are districts that do not 
perfectly fit their assigned development groups. The most notable cases in the above taxonomy are 
districts in Kalimantan Timur province, which is the largest and the second ‘richest’ (in terms of per 
capita GNI) district in the cluster. However, districts in Kalimantan Timur have ‘poorer’ indicators in 
terms of low autonomy reflected in the intergovernmental transfer fund which was lower than 
average. In short, C1 is the ‘most similar’ group in relation to the ‘atypical’ development values of East 
Kalimantan. Furthermore, it is worth noting that there are also important ‘development gaps’ across 
the clusters, using 14 development indicators. 
Figure 5.3 displays the map representing the development taxonomy derived from these cluster 
results. As it can clearly be seen in the map, the development clusters are distributed across the 
geographical regions, with the two least development groups (C1 and C2) mainly located outside Java 
Island and another less developed cluster (C3) persisting in Java. The map also detects the uneven 
progress pf development and the impact of heavy industrial agglomeration which has been 
concentrated in West Java (including Jakarta), parts of East Java, and several locations in Sumatra. 









Chapter 5: Macro-Quantitative Analysis 
166 
 
The result of cluster analysis (Appendix C-4) shows the degree of matching with income rank and 
development status officially released by MoVDRAT to determine funding allocation in order to 
accelerate the development process in regions which border with other countries or are lagging. It can 
be seen that almost all regions considered lagging belong to C1 or C2 (71 lagging regions in C1, 23 in 
C2 and only one in C3). 
Figure 5.4 shows that C1 to C3 (the three groups that include those districts with the worst 
development indicators) have more acute problems of poverty and health than the average districts. 
On the other hand, the productivity, governance indicators, and autonomy fund allocation differ 
significantly. The most important differences between C1 and other clusters are in terms of local fund 
fungibility (much higher, nearly 3 times the overall average). C4 has a significant advantage in terms 
of population size. 
 
Figure 5.4 Characteristics of C1, C2, C3, and C4 (average) 
Such ‘development taxonomies’ can be useful to help identify homogeneous groups of districts that 
share similar development characteristics and are practical for guiding ministries to determine the 
proper allocation of government transfers. However, building a development classification is not a 
simple task: once we overcome the over-simplistic income-based classification of the regions, we find 
that there is no simple ‘linear’ representation of development levels (from low to high developing 
districts). The result of cluster analysis in this study finds that each development cluster has its own 
characteristic development issues. There is no group of districts with the best (or worst) indicators in 
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all development dimensions. It would thus be more appropriate to build ‘complex’ development 
taxonomies on a five-year basis than ranking and grouping countries in terms of per capita incomes, 
as this will offer a more nuanced image of the diversity of challenges in the developing world. 
Given its multidimensional nature, the analysis carried out in this study seeks to provide inputs into 
thinking about massive transfers of village funds (Dana Desa, enacted as Law No. 4 Year 2014), and 
designing development programmes at the local level. In this sense, the identification of relatively 
homogeneous groups of districts in terms of development issues can encourage ‘dynamics of peer-
progress’ between districts of the same group, allowing them to collectively identify specific 
development strategies for the group, and therefore going beyond the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in 
the current formulation of government transfers (Shah, Qibthiyyah, & Astrid Dita, 2012) —an 
approach for which the previous MDG agenda has been criticised— (Vázquez, 2011). 
Using these results, it is expected that the government can focus on specific issues in each cluster, and 
hence will be able to channel resources more effectively and devise proper interventions. The clusters 
might contribute to providing inputs to enhance the existing national programmes. Below is the list of 
potential programmes in each cluster respective to the local issues that they address. 
Table 5.5 Issues and Potential Programmes for Clusters 
 Issues Potential Programmes 
Cluster 1 1. Poverty 
2. Low enrolment rate 
3. High reliance on agriculture 
4. Low productivity 
5. Local governance 
6. High local spending 
1. Poverty reduction 
2. Scholarship assistance 
3. Technical assistance on farming 
4. Vocational training 
5. Capacity building 
 
Cluster 2 1. Sparsely populated 
2. High morbidity rate 
3. Moderate enrolment rate 
4. High reliance on agriculture 
5. Moderate local spending 
1. Health care 
2. Scholarship assistance 
3. Technical assistance on farming  
Cluster 3 1. Moderately dense population 
2. Low productivity 
3. Low rate of redistribution 
1. Capacity building 
2. Cash transfers  
Cluster 4 1. Highly dense population 
2. Local governance 
1. Capacity building 
2. Transmigration 
 
5.2.5 Entitlement Distribution  
It has become clear that local governments rely on transfers to defray their routine spending. From 
the analysis using variables obtained from the INDO-DAPOER dataset, it is estimated that around 37 
percent of the state budget is devolved to the regions (542 districts and municipalities and 60,000 
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villages). This is in addition to around 10.3 percent of central government spending in the regions 
(through 34 provinces). Therefore, nearly half of the budget is now actually spent in the regions (see 
Figure 5.5). Provided that there are no dramatic changes in regulations, the proportion of revenue 
might not exceed the transfers in the immediate future. Indonesian tax revenues remain much 
centralised and transfers from the state budget dominate as a source of revenue among sub-national 
governments. Further, the variation of endowments between regions has been relatively high which 
inevitably creates widening disparity in terms of fiscal capacity. 
 
Figure 5.5 Types of Local Revenue (in %), 2001-2012 
Yet, as depicted in Figure 5.6, most of the local spending is basically just about paying enough for 
routine expenses. From the inception of decentralisation, administrative expenditure has been taking 
around 30-40 percent of total spending. This can be explained intuitively by the need for establishing 
new units at the local level which requires a high rate of investment for local governance capacity 
(infrastructure and personnel for administration, among others). The second highest expenditure is 
on education which interestingly in 2011 exceeds administrative spending. Unsurprisingly, the 
relatively high amount of education spending is related especially with the obligation to allocate at 
least 20 percent of the total budget for this sector, as stipulated in the Constitution.  
Apart from administrative and education spending, other sectors merely receive around 5 to 10 
percent at most. As expected, the health sector takes an increasing portion of local spending largely 
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social health insurance entails close coordination and cooperation with local governments in terms of 
providing health infrastructure including the supporting facilities. Meanwhile, share of SP expenditure 
has been the lowest from 2001 to 2012. Here local SP spending encompasses various programmes 
targeted to households or individuals in forms of cash or non-cash assistances14. Probably, low figures 
on local SP spending is caused by massive national SP spending in regions which consequently makes 
local governments only allocate for additional beneficiaries not in the beneficiaries list or supporting 
administrative expenses. Often, in the context of local administration, SP spending is allocated to 
support and to safeguard the implementation of national SP programme. 
In addition, several local administrators manage to introduce their own health care programmes 
which have been arguably inefficient as they overlap with the national programme. Often, the local 
version of health care creates serious financial burdens which undeniably pose sustainability risks as 
some local governments perceive the newly-gained health sector can be potentially used for profit-
generating posts (Thabrany, 2008). Offering different premiums and benefits, the local health 
insurance programme (Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah or Jamkesda) has added complexity to the 
transformation towards universal health coverage (Brodjonegoro, Nazara, & Zen, 2016, p. 143). On 
top of that, changes in administration regimes usually produce new labels and slight modifications to 
existing programmes which eventually complicate the transition process even further. In sum, various 
types of local health care were largely driven by domestic political concerns (Pisani, Olivier Kok, & 
Nugroho, 2016). 
                                                          
14 Local budget nomenclature for SP function might not fully reflect or follow the precise definition 
of SP. However, most of the spending are basically targeted to improve welfare conditions of 
households. 




Figure 5.6 Share of Local Government Expenditure, 2001-12 
Comparing periods before and after the implementation of decentralisation, one cannot disentangle 
the analyses to estimate the effects on deepening democratisation (in this context, meaning direct 
elections). In the present study, the analysis relies on two main variables, i.e. GDP per capita and share 
of SP expenditure of total regional GDP. These two variables are used as proxies to represent the fiscal 
strength of entitlement programmes to garner potential votes during periods that coincide with local 
elections. Using typology diagram (Figure 5.7), we can set quadrants which depict regions with the 
most benevolent spending of SP and regions according to their fiscal capacities. However, the unit of 
analysis in the earlier work was confined to the provinces, as the district (kabupaten/kota) data set 
was still in its inception phase, covering a relatively short timespan of about a decade. Moreover, one 
can only draw limited inferences about the effects of decentralisation, because of the analysis was 

















Figure 5.7 Provincial GDP per Capita and Share of SP Expenditure, 2001 
Quadrant 1 (top left) displays regions with low fiscal ability but high SP budget. Meanwhile, quadrant 
2 (located on the top right) is the most ideal type of region with sufficient fiscal space and a high 
degree of SP disbursement. There are three provinces in each first two quadrants. The bottom left 
quadrant (3) reflects regions with both low fiscal capacity and below-average SP budget proportions. 
As displayed in Figure 5.7, this quadrant hosts the largest number of provinces (17). The last quadrant 
(4, on the bottom right) depicts the regions with the combination of low fiscal capacity but relatively 
high SP budget. Being in quadrant 4 inevitably poses serious challenges to in the form of either 
financial pressure or SP sustainability, yet there are nine provinces that eventually manage to pull 
through. In sum, the total average SP proportion that went towards the provincial budget in 2001 was 
very low (0.04%). There are at least two main explanations for this phenomenon. First, there were 
weak incentives for governors or candidates to use SP as a tool for garnering votes as direct elections 
had not yet been introduced. Second, as fiscal devolution was in its inception phase, a high degree of 
reliance on central government funding was anticipated. 
While the previous diagram provides a glimpse of the situation surrounding the early implementation 
of decentralisation, Figure 5.8 gives a hint of socio-economic circumstances after more than a decade 
of regional autonomy has taken place. Taking the observations from 2012, the impact of direct 
elections (stipulated in 2004) is also expected to be captured. This can be indicated by a substantial 
increase in the total average SP budget (0.17%) as a proportion of each provincial annual budget. GDP 
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per capita also experienced a marked increase (10.12) possibly as effects of either economic 
progression at the local level or deepening of fiscal devolution. 
Compared with the previous chart (Figure 5.7) there occurred significant changes. Foremost among 
these is the different number of provinces in all quadrants. Quadrant 1 now has six provinces while 
surprisingly there is only one province in quadrant 2 (Papua Barat). There are 13 and 12 provinces for 
quadrants 3 and 4, respectively. In this chart, we can identify that there are an increasing number of 
provinces in quadrants 1 and 4, each with 100 and 30 percent rates of increase respectively. A few 
factors can explain the growing number of provinces in quadrant 1. As fiscal capacity is raised, this 
intuitively will enhance the ability of provinces to broaden the scope for SP. However, it might not be 
necessarily the case if the budget for SP is largely still under the administration of the central 
government. Another important factor that may explain this situation is where the benefit of 
extending SP is not easily translated into political capital. Presumably, the large segment of the middle 
and upper class who are not the prime targets for SP beneficiaries make local politicians tend to divert 
the budget to other promising sectors such as infrastructure or the economy. 
Throughout 2001 to 2012, there is hardly any clear correlation between the increases in GDP per 
capita with the rise in SP spending. In 2001, three regions with rich natural resources and strong fiscal 
capacity managed to disburse an above-average SP share, whereas in 2012, only one rich province 
was able to allocate more to SP than other regions. Interestingly, in 2001 there were 9 provinces with 
weak fiscal condition, but they managed to push through above-average level of SP spending. In 2012, 
regions of this type increased to 12 provinces. Meanwhile, the majority of provinces still struggle to 
strengthen their fiscal posture and only manage to allocate below-average SP spending, although the 
number decreased from 17 to 13 provinces. 
The results of this typology need to be seen in a context where the SP budget at the national level has 
also been increasing from 2001 to 2012 and has disbursed relatively equally across the regions through 
various programmes such as cash transfers, health care, scholarships, rice subsidy, and other small 
benefits for targeted groups (persons with disabilities, children, and the elderly). On a related note, 
the small proportion of SP expenses is largely reflected in this highly expansive centrally-governed SP 
in the regions. However, the massive and dominant role of central government in arranging SP 
apparently does not prevent local governments from innovating and launching their own SP. As 
discussed previously, the end of temporary safety-net programmes in mitigating the aftermath of the 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-98 followed by the implementation of decentralisation, leading to 
experimentation with several different models of entitlement programmes at the local level. When 
direct elections for local leaders were introduced in 2005, popular social policies arguably led to 
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success at the polls. SP programmes became an important electoral asset, moving up the political 
agenda. 
 
Figure 5.8 Provincial GDP per Capita and Share of SP Expenditure, 2012 
From both diagrams (Figure 5.7 and 5.8), we can further check whether there has been any indication 
of convergence in SP spending. A very gradual and incremental convergence in provincial SP spending 
levels was discernible as depicted in Figure 5.9, suggesting some catch-up among the poorest regions. 
Therefore, this indicates that regions which were previously allocated a small part of their budget for 
SP have a tendency to increase the proportion and will in the long run catch up with the regions that 
already have a substantial budget for SP. The convergence might take long periods as most regions 
merely have a 0.1-0.2 percentage point increase in the budget. 
The long-run regional budget convergence points towards the indication that SP is an important tool 
at the local level. This trend responds favourably to the relatively low allocation of SP at the pre-
decentralisation or pre-direct election periods. A case in point is in the late 1980s. As a response to 
the dramatic changes in the economic environment in the early 1980s, there was a significant 
reduction in the central government expenditure on health programs. This declining public 
expenditure has had a significant impact on local governments’ expenditure on sectoral development. 
Cash-strapped regions did not have much option other than relying entirely on central government 
attention. 




Figure 5.9 Convergence of SP Expenditure, 2001-12 
As reported by Kristiansen and Santoso (2006), the early implementation of decentralisation did not 
instantly bring about a dramatic increase on the local SP budget. Using the case of access to and quality 
of health care in four districts, the allocation of funds from central government sources has decreased, 
while increasingly district government expenses are now based on tax revenues from their own 
natural resources and business activities. This situation inevitably leads to a decline in real-terms in 
government funding for the health sector, as also experienced in many countries undergoing 
decentralisation and deregulation. Moreover, their research shows a total lack of financial 
transparency and accountability in the public health sector in all districts. Therefore, the increasing 
rate of SP spending conveys the positive development of SP at the local level. 
 
5.2.6 Percentile Distribution of Benefits 
Besides analysing the local SP budget and its trends, this chapter is devoted to exploring the strategies 
employed to reach intended beneficiaries and their effectiveness. Moreover, with the enactment of 
democratic regulations, the impact and influence of direct elections change the electoral franchise 
quite significantly. Prior to the direct election system, political parties often rely solely on their 
organisational machine to empower the deep-seated network involving only limited groups of the 
elite who could muster support from the community to vote for parties which then decide whether 
their members will be legislatures or heads of regions.  
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In contrast, with the direct election system in place, individuals who run for positions must work on 
the ground to convince the public and to garner political support. The job that was previously handled 
by political parties now becomes the responsibility of respective candidates and his or her teams (D. 
Hill, 2009). It is not uncommon that bitter rivalries occur within the same party when mobilising voters 
during campaigns. Previous research on the impact of elections has been done by Lewis (2017) using 
all district-level data over a ten-year period. The study finds that the direct election of local 
government executives has no influence on the generation of own-source taxes, but that districts with 
directly elected heads spend less and save more compared to their counterparts with indirectly 
elected executives. Further, the author adds that local governments with directly elected heads also 
spend more efficiently in pursuit of service outcomes than districts with indirectly elected officials. In 
that way, he argues that local governments led by popularly elected executives are relatively less 
corrupt than their counterparts with indirectly elected heads, and that this reduced corruption leads 
to a more efficient use of fiscal resources. 
This section discusses the relationship between deepening local democracy with the outreach of 
largesse or benefit of SP. Using two periods—2005 and 2008—this analysis attempts to trace the the 
relationship between local elections on the coverage of SP. The former (2005) represents the period 
when local direct election has just begun and the latter (year 2008) provides a snapshot for the 
evaluation after three years of implementation. This part does not aim neither to establish causation 
nor to test underlying assumptions. Alternatively, this part cautiously endeavours to investigate the 
correlation between local elections and SP coverage. The result of this part should not be taken 
literally and should only be considered as a preliminary findings to undertake further analysis. 
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Figure 5.11 Access to Cash Transfer, 2008 
In Figures 5.10 and 5.11 above, the increased coverage of cash transfer beneficiaries is noticeable in 
regions where direct elections were held (from 23.4% in 2005 to 30.7% in 2008) while non-
beneficiaries decreased only around 3 percent in provinces with direct elections between 2005 to 
2008. The results of these charts suggest two possible scenarios. First, it can be argued that the 
targeting mechanism was improved significantly between 2005 and 2008, hence the increasing 
coverage. Second, it could be that ‘money politics’ (common term encompassing vote-buying or turn-
out buying, usually by giving away cash on the eve of election day) was replaced by methods of 
‘distributive politics’ in which benefits might be channelled directly or indirectly in the forms of various 
entitlement programmes. Coinciding with the implementation of direct election in 2005 was the 
introduction of the large-scale targeted cash transfer programme. This programme was actually 
intended to replace the regressive and increasingly costly fuel subsidy. Hence, the underlying reason 
behind cash transfer was to change from subsidy on goods to subsidy on people (also called 
beneficiaries). 
Back then in 2005, targeted SP was a new experiment and without prior experience in the past, 
problem suddenly began to emerge. Targeting was the main reason for these problems. From the first 
phase of cash distribution, logistical challenges gave policymakers at every level a difficult time. It was 
not uncommon that statisticians and local leaders were the first to fall victim to this trouble. Violence 
and mistrust within communities had increased quite markedly. The poor targeting that resulted from 
its rapid implementation is well documented (Hastuti et al., 2006). Nearly half a billion US dollars made 
its way to ineligible households. The social unrest that resulted was widely reported in the media and 
extended from protests across the nation to acts as extreme as the burning down and stoning of village 
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of the programme that saw many eligible households missed out on payments and many ineligible 
households received them. This reduced the level of trust within the community, had a deleterious 
effect on social capital, and led to an increase in antisocial, and in some cases, criminal behaviour. 
Relating to the series of direct elections in 2008 and the second cash transfer programme, a lot of 
improvement was made mainly through proper household identification which undeniably 
contributes to the increased coverage. Obviously, many aspects surrounding the targeting and 
distribution were enhanced and people began to understand the scheme better (World Bank, 2012a). 
Those improvements made the incidence of violence were reduced significantly. The relative success 
of cash transfers in 2008 still received heavy criticism, particularly as it was implemented a year before 
the presidential election. Some still associate cash transfer as ‘money politics’ (Edward Aspinall & 
Sukmajati, 2016).  
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Figure 5.13 Access to Cash Transfer by Percentiles, 2008 
Figure 5.12 and 5.13 highlight the marked increase (from 50 percent in 2005 to 60 percent in 2008) of 
access to cash transfer for the lowest percentiles in regions with elections. In 2005, as depicted in 
Figure 5.12, the number of cash transfer beneficiaries is larger in regions with no election whereas in 
Figure 5.13 appears the opposite where regions with elections in 2008 saw greater number of 
beneficiaries than regions without elections. The increase of beneficiaries coverage from 2005 to 2008 
occur not only in the lowest percentiles groups but also in the higher ones. 
A large part of this increasing coverage can be explained by the factors above, i.e. targeting 
improvement and local politics. However, it is interesting to observe that regions with elections seem 
to see more targeted cash transfer distribution in 2008. Whilst political factors could be taken into 
account in this case, the policy of cash transfer was totally under the authority of the central 
government. There have been no local governments or local leaders who have pledged to give away 
cash assistance in their regions during these periods. In fact, a handful of local leaders stood up against 
cash transfer as it was believed to cause turmoil. Other local politicians deemed that the shift from 
fuel subsidy to cash transfer was a mistake as it could not compensate the inflationary impact of a fuel 
price hike. Hence, the consensus from the resisting local leaders pointed to the conflicts occurred 
within community and heavy protests addressed to the local governments15. 
Despite opposition from several local heads, cash transfer programmes have been successfully 
implemented in every region. Resistance was reduced and criticisms turned into constructive inputs 
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for the same projects in 2008 and 2013. Chief among these recommendations was the ‘community 
targeting’ mechanism which largely involved the participation of local leaders and required a series of 
meetings with potential beneficiaries and major stakeholders to discuss a wide range of criteria to 
determine eligibility. Though it seemed to create a leeway in designating rosters of beneficiaries, the 
central government managed to safeguard a robust methodology on targeting. Variables were strictly 
defined and local agencies were subject to comply and support the process. The role of enumerators 
(mantri statistik) was essential to ensure the validity of beneficiaries’ data. BPS undertook several 
meetings to build their capacity before doing the census. These steps to improve targeting had been 
inspiring local administrators to emulate them to some extent for other SP programmes. However, 
few local offices even managed to establish new units dedicated to this targeting procedure. 
Similarly, the increase in coverage also occurred in the ownership of health cards which entitle holders 
free health care to public health facilities. The programme shared the same data set with cash transfer 
in 2005, initially started in 2004, and drew criticism partly due to the lack of quality care. Bureaucratic 
procedures and heavy paperwork also became a reason for its ineffectiveness. Sparrow et al (2013) 
find that the programme is indeed targeted to the poor and those most vulnerable to catastrophic 
out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments. Yet, issues surrounding targeting also persist in this social 
health insurance scheme. The general pattern is that utilisation of outpatient care increases with the 
level of welfare. Hence, the pro-rich pattern is driven by differences in private care, which is 
traditionally highly skewed towards the non-poor. 
Health insurance (or formerly called Askeskin, formal abbreviation for Asuransi Kesehatan untuk 
Masyarakat Miskin) is reasonably successful in reaching individuals that would need relatively high 
OOP health spending as a share of the overall household budget to obtain the required health care. In 
2008, the formal name of this programme was changed to Jamkesmas (Jaminan Kesehatan 
Masyarakat, literally translated as Public Health Insurance). Regardless of its shortcomings concerning 
targeting, these programmes dramatically increased health care coverage, with Jamkesmas covering 
about 86 million persons out of a total population of 245 million in 2013, at a total cost of 8.29 trillion 
rupiah (about US$861 million). 
Unlike cash transfer which is solely the domain of the central government, the health scheme occurred 
alongside a proliferation of policymaking at the regional level. This is mainly the result of far-reaching 
political decentralisation and providing budgeting powers to the districts. Initially, this trend began 
with a few well-publicised programmes in districts run by reforming politicians or endowed with 
natural resource revenues. Chief among these local initiatives were programmes in Jembrana (a 
district in Bali) and South Sumatera (a province in the island of Sumatra). Generally called Jamkesda 
(Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah, translated as Regional Health Insurance), such a scheme proved effective 
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to elevate political popularity, and was being replicated in great numbers across districts and 
provinces. A survey conducted by SMERU Research Institute in 2012 found that 245 of 262 districts 
had some sort of local health financing scheme. However, the design of these schemes varied 
considerably. Most were intended to supplement the umbrella Jamkesmas programme, extending 
coverage to people who were not categorised as poor or near poor under the national scheme. 
Unsurprisingly, there was high variation in the funding models applied and the methods by which 
health centres and hospitals were paid. While all involved transfers from local budgets, only a few 
asked payments from beneficiaries or alternatively limited the benefits acquired according to income. 
 
Figure 5.14 Health care Card Ownership, 2005 
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Similar to the case of cash transfer distribution in the previous section, political factors seem to 
influence the expanding coverage of health care card ownership. Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 display 
the increasing coverage of health card ownerships with dramatic increase in regions with elections, 
from 9.6 percent in 2005 to 29,74 percent in 2008. This largely implies in the betterment of targeting 
in 2008 which shows that regions with direct elections manage to cover a larger proportion of 
beneficiaries in the lowest percentiles. In contrast, during the inception phase of the direct election 
period in 2005, regions with elections seemingly were only able to reach fewer beneficiaries. These 
graphs imply several important messages. First, the health care programmes were strongly supported 
by local administrators and received attention for more inclusive targeting. Second, within the 
situation of localpolitical franshise and ‘one person one vote’ system, the lowest percentiles had 
always been susceptible to be the main target for political campaigns, with benefits ranging from cash 
to other in-kind assistance. 
In retrospect, several local health care programmes could eventually complement the national social 
health insurance scheme. As stipulated in decentralisation laws, regional governments could have a 
more important role in providing health infrastructure, which ranges from primary facilities to the 
availability of trained medical personnel. Since 2001, the administration of health services in Indonesia 
has changed dramatically. Managerial and financial responsibilities for public health care have been 
decentralised from the central government to the district level, and health care is increasingly 
privatised. The seeds of the national social health insurance programme can be traced back to the AFC 
in 1998 which later ignited various SP programmes. Among these was the social safety net programme 
for the health sector (JPS-BK, Jaring Pengaman Sosial Bidang Kesehatan), aiming to protect poor 
citizens’ access to health care. According to the World Bank (2000a), ‘catastrophic results were 
averted’ by these temporary measures. However, Simms and Rowson (2003) found that the lenders’ 
assessments of health during the crisis were inaccurate and misleading. There seems to be general 
agreement that the JPS-BK health-card system (kartu sehat) did not work well: this was partly due to 
ignorance among patients and partly due to irregular practices and corruption among service 
providers (Junadi, 2001). 




Figure 5.16 Health care Card Ownership by Percentiles, 2005 
 
Figure 5.17 Health care Card Ownership by Percentiles, 2008 
With regards to the targeting, the increasing coverage of health care beneficiaries contributed 
significantly to the higher access of the lowest percentile groups between 2005 and 2008 (see Figures 
5.16 and 5.17). In 2005, only less than 20 percent of the lowest 10th percentile group owned health 
card while in 2008 it jumped remarkably to around 50 percent. Meanwhile, regions without election 
also see quite significant increase in health card ownership (from 25 percent in 2005 to 45 percent in 
2008).  
The increasing access of vulnerable groups was also inevitably a result of proliferating local initiatives 
on health care. Although a number of local free health care schemes are universally provided, the 
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to witness the dramatic increase of health care coverage amongst the lowest percentiles. Rosser and 
Wilson (2012) further argue that local governments, for instance in the districts of Jembrana and 
Tabanan (both in the Province of Bali) have responded quite differently to the issue of health insurance 
for the poor since the local administrations gained primary responsibility for the health policy as a 
result of Indonesia’s implementation of decentralisation in 2001. They add that this variation has 
reflected differences in the nature of district heads’ political strategies, particularly the extent to which 
they have sought to develop a popular base among the poor, and that these in turn have reflected 
differences in their personal networks, alliances and constituencies.  
The regions basically depict the situation where district governments have officially been required to 
participate in the Askeskin/Jamkesmas programmes since 2004, however under the implementation 
of decentralisation, they also had complete discretion over whether to provide additional financial 
assistance to these programmes. Moreover, underlying this issue is that these programs have been 
underfunded: they have not covered all people considered to be poor at the local level, only those 
assessed as poor by central government agencies, and have only provided for a limited range of 
services. District governments have had the authority to ‘top up’ the Askeskin/Jamkesmas 
programmes by setting up their own local health insurance schemes covering uninsured poor people. 
The case of distribution for rice subsidy (Beras untuk Masyarakat Miskin, hence abbreviated to Raskin) 
also echoes the previously-mentioned SP programmes. The lack of targeting accuracy has been the 
main issue since inception. It delivers rice to be purchased at subsidised prices in designated outlets. 
Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog, the National Logistics Agency) is responsible for purchasing rice from 
producers and delivering it as far as the over-50,000 distribution points spread throughout Indonesia. 
Households should be able to make monthly Raskin purchases from these outlets. Using local budgets, 
some regions decided to fund logistics operations to bring Raskin rice closer to households. Later on, 
Raskin has been institutionalised and become a permanent programme. In real expenditure terms, 
Raskin is one of the few social assistance programs with an ever increasing budget. 
When the unified beneficiaries’ data was released in 2005, it soon sparked a controversy on the 
matters of inclusion and exclusion targeting. From the World Bank’s report on the Raskin programme 
(2012d), the distribution of rice does not closely align with the objectives laid out in programme 
manuals and official documentation, for at least three reasons. First, a large portion of the subsidised 
rice procured for the Raskin programme was not delivered to households. In the three most recent 
years for which there is audited budget data (2007 through 2009), nationally representative household 
surveys indicate that only half (or less) of the rice procured for Raskin is purchased by households. The 
readily-available budget and administrative records cannot indicate where the bulk of this ‘missing’ 
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rice exits the delivery chain, and no single agency or authority oversees Raskin rice from procurement 
to household purchase. 
Second, although Raskin coverage is higher among poorer households, coverage extends to nearly as 
many non-poor households as poor households. Roughly 50 percent of the entire Indonesian 
population buys Raskin rice at least once a year, making Raskin’s overall coverage 20 percentage 
points higher than the next largest permanent social assistance programme. Raskin allocations to 
households are decided by local authorities, resulting in frequent Raskin purchases by poor and non-
poor households alike. In some regions, a rotating schedule has been established to share Raskin 
allotments more equally among a greater number of households. These coverage increases (beyond 
the target population) have been common since Raskin’s inauguration (as OPK) in the late 1990s. 
Finally, as total rice is spread more thinly than is specified in Raskin guidelines, only a few households 
enjoy the full amount of Raskin benefits. In fact, the amount of Raskin rice purchased by a household 
is roughly constant across the entire consumption distribution, meaning non-poor households buy as 
much quantity as poor households. By 2010, the average amount of Raskin rice bought was 
approximately 3.8 kilograms per month, while total rice purchases by poor households amount to 
nearly 35 kilograms per month, and estimated rice needs for an Indonesian household are closer to 
40 kilograms per month. 
Figure 5.18 and 5.19 indicate a correlation between direct elections and the distribution of rice subsidy. 
Yet, compared to health care programmes, Raskin coverage in election areas shows only marginal 
increase between the years 2005 to 2008. The coverage of rice subsidy beneficiaries in regions with 
election increased around 22 percent between 2005 to 2008. Meanwhile, non-beneficiaries in regions 
with election only increased nearly 5 percents (from 37.2% in 2005 to 42.7% in 2008). 
   




Figure 5.18 Access to Rice Subsidy, 2005 
 
Figure 5.19 Access to Rice Subsidy, 2008 
One can infer that political factors explain at least a small part of this growth. Unlike cash transfers or 
health cards, many evidence show that heads of communities play a larger role in targeting (Beard & 
Dasgupta, 2006, p. 238). Even the cases of mistargeting have often been handled (and mostly resolved) 
through communal deliberation. Prominent among these are methods of fair distribution of rice which 
then enable all residents to receive the allotted staple, regardless of their socio-economic status. In 
many cases, village heads have not allowed beneficiaries to purchase their full 15 kilogram allotment, 
giving the remaining rice to other villagers whom they consider just as poor. Sometimes, poor 
households themselves have voluntarily given up their rice entitlement because they could not afford 
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With prevalent ‘mistargeting’ due to the premature release of a unified data set in 2005, the universal 
redistribution by community heads became increasingly popular, and might be perceived to increase 
the rate of inclusion error within rice subsidy allocation. In practice, non-poor households are also able 
to purchase the subsidised rice with this discretion.  
However, Figures 5.20 and 5.21 depict the increasing access of lower percentiles from 2005 to 2008. 
These graphs imply significant improvement on targeting and distribution of rice subsidy. This runs 
counter to the assumption that newly-promoted community targeting will lead to the greater 
inclusion error. Another explanation lends itself to the incread coverage of the lowest percentile is the 
increased total coverage of rice subsidy from around 15.8 million households in 2005 to 19.1 million 
families in 2008. 
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Figure 5.21 Access to Rice Subsidy by Percentiles, 2008 
Another important factor that differentiates the rice subsidy from health care is that there was no 
known local initiative to replicate the programme. Instead, local governments relied only ib the 
discretionary decision of community heads regarding the equal distribution of rice. The decision to re-
distribute the rice allocation has been acknowledged to effectively avoid or mitigate conflicts within 
society. However, this temporary decision was deemed as disruptive with regards to the improvement 
of targeting mechanisms. In this situation, the national logistics office (Badan Urusan Logistik, BULOG) 
and other responsible agencies had somehow eventually relented to the community leaders’ demands.  
Therefore, with the involvement of stakeholders at the local level, who are mostly lacking in capacity 
and limited resources, the distribution of subsidised rice had become prone to patronage or 
‘clientelism’. As democratic values in Indonesia have not been inculcated deeply, these disruptions 
were believed to hinder democratic progress. In this adverse situation, local elections were impaired 
by a form of vote buying practice through the distribution of SP benefits.  
 
5.3 Political Affiliations 
Whilst democratisation in Indonesia has deepened for the last decade, it is still a long way from 
attaining perfect conditions for local democracies in Indonesia to grow. A case in point is that elections 
at the local level have been fraught with problems. An analysis of voter motivation and behaviour in 
the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections showed that voters were primarily motivated by their 
support for particular leaders and the strength of their identification with political parties (see for 
instance D. Y. King, 2000; Mujani & Liddle, 2010). Yet elections after 2009 showed different patterns 
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Therefore, this raises the question of the extent to which the existing local politics might affect SP 
effectiveness. One valid argument proposed is that political influence mostly uses largesse or 
entitlement as an instrument to gain turnout or votes during the campaign. This strategy often ignores 
important steps regarding programme design and its details. 
This section will discuss whether certain political parties or ideologies dominate the process in shaping 
SP at the local level. On top of ideological perspectives, the context of local democracy is closely 
connected with informal networks and familial relationships. Therefore, it can be said that there is a 
clear pattern of politics involving various social aspects. However, in the Indonesian context, there is 
no clear distinction or association of one party platform (or manifesto) with a certain ideology. In the 
era of the New Order, all parties need to uphold Pancasila (The Five Principles) as basic values which 
blur the identification of those parties. As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, Suharto used these principles 
as the official ideology to suppress all other ideologies and beliefs in Indonesia. In effect, all 
organisations, including political parties, must forego their ideologies in favour of Pancasila. 
Although clearly every party tends to have their typical constituents, categorising them is still difficult. 
With around 48 political parties in 1999 (in 2014 it reduced to 15 parties). A large number of parties 
often blend religious and ideological messages. In short, from the beginning of the democratic era to 
this present day, many parties are largely personal vehicles for wealth and powerful politicians. Still, 
several analysts attempt to simplify categories of ideology into secular and Islamic parties (for instance, 
see Bulkin, 2013). This simplistic view is useful in helping external viewers to put the ideological rivalry 
into context, yet it misses greatly the range of pragmatism that is present.  
Many scholars have acknowledged the spectrum of characteristics within ‘Islamic’ parties; some of 
them still maintain a conservative outlook whilst the rest seem to take more progressive and 
moderate stances. A unique pattern of political Islam in Indonesia has been the focus of various 
analyses. Baswedan (2004) highlighted the transformation of patterns in Islamic parties by 
distinguishing at least three types, i.e. Islamist, Islam-inclusive, and secular-inclusive. His analysis also 
acknowledges the influence of pragmatism among parties after 1998 in garnering Muslim aspiration, 
in contrast with pure philosophical underpinnings of similar parties in the 1950s.  
The problem of identification occurs also in categorising other ideological perspectives using classical 
notions. It is highly problematic if one attempts to use Western classification, i.e. left-wing versus 
right-wing. In most references, left-wing politics is typically defined as positions or activities that 
accept or support social equality and egalitarianism, often in opposition to social hierarchy and social 
inequality. Taking into consideration Indonesian politics, left-wing views are largely compatible with 
communism (banned since 1966), socialism (hardly exists, due to communism ban), and marhaenism 
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(simple translation renders and correlates to ‘proletarianism’, conceived by Sukarno in the 1940s in 
pursuit of authentic populist Indonesian ideology). Parties that fit into this description are PDI 
Perjuangan, Hanura, Gerindra, and the likes of Partai Buruh, PNBK, PNI Marhaen, among others. 
On the other hand, right-wing politics typically resonates with ideas, political positions, or activities 
that view some forms of social stratification or social inequality as either inevitable, natural, normal, 
or desirable. This view is mostly supported by strong networks of businessmen and their loyalists. 
Undeniably, this principle fits well with several parties including Golkar (used to be Suharto’s prime 
vehicle from early 1970s) and ironically, Partai Demokrat (founded by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the 
6th president of Indonesia). Others like Nasdem, Hanura, and PKP belong to this category. 
Within ‘Islamic’ parties, grades of conservativeness, inclusivity, and ‘Islamicising’ motives could be 
important as identifying factors. Hence, two types of Islamic parties emerge, i.e. pluralist and Islamist. 
Pluralists rely on the support of mainstream Islamic organisations (Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah, which formed PKB and PAN respectively) and use Islamic symbols but do not 
necessarily promote Islamic law (shari’a) agendas. Thus, in the view of pluralists, a formal ideological 
basis of the state is a religiously neutral ideology (Pancasila), not Islam. While not ideologically Islamic, 
religious identity is nonetheless a primary factor in their electoral support and most are embedded in 
particular sections of the Muslim community. In addition, being an inclusive party enables pluralist to 
attract potential voters and candidates, not only in Muslim-majority regions, but also in places where 
non-Muslims are the largest constituent (especially the case in the Eastern part of Indonesia).  
By contrast, Islamist parties formally proclaim an Islamic identity and seek, to varying degrees, to apply 
Islamic law more extensively in politics and society. Characteristic gradations for political parties of 
this group propose that Islam replace or at least complement national ideology. In other words, all 
Islamist parties list Islam as their ideological foundation and many have policies for greater shari’a 
implementation. The distinction between pluralist Islamic and Islamist parties is important because it 
indicates the type of politics which the various parties are likely to engage in. 




Figure 5.22 Simplification and Grouping of Party Ideologies (from the latest election, 2014) 
Figure 5.22 attempts to simplify ideological groupings as mentioned in their core values (as perceived 
by Fealy 2008). Although this aggregation might not be adequately reflective of true values and at 
times has been eclipsed by a high degree of pragmatism, it certainly helps to build a correlation 
between types of ideologies with the extent of ‘benevolence’ in every province.  
As depicted in Figures 5.23 and 5.24, it is very tricky to establish true causality between ideologies and 
‘benevolence’. Each graph is divided into four quadrants which roughly reflect its degree of SP 
disbursement and fiscal capacities (measured by GDP per capita) for all provinces respectively. In 2001, 
when the decentralisation law had been enacted but the push for democratisation had not yet been 
initiated, there were only two dominant parties in 33 provinces. PDI Perjuangan and Golkar (both claim 
the majority of seats in the legislature) apparently took hold in most provinces, whilst smaller parties 
such as PPP and PKB managed to control Aceh and Jawa Timur, respectively. 
From a different perspective, both charts also indicate the vagueness of ideologies within political 
parties, and to a large degree cannot be dissected using authoritative frameworks, for example like 
the hypothesis from Huber and Stephens (2001) that the incumbency of left-wing parties is associated 
with: (1) overall expansion of the public economy driven by the public provision of social services; (2) 
the ‘decommodifying’ effect of welfare state provisions; and (3) redistributive effects, as indicated by 
the post-tax, post-transfer income distribution, and the redistributive effect of direct taxes and 
transfers.  
Limited aspects of democratisation might be influencing the patterns of SP spending. People still voted 
for their local leaders indirectly and the machinery of political parties held overall decision making 
processes significantly. Therefore, the impetus for using largesse (SP benefits) to attract potential 
voters might not yet prevail in the early period of decentralisation. 




Figure 5.23 Provincial GDP pc and Share of SP Spending (cross-tabbed with ruling parties), 2001 
By superimposing Figure 5.7, the above chart aims to find the relationship between fiscal capacity, 
share of SP budget, and ruling ideologies (political parties). Using colour-coded plots to show different 
incumbent political parties, there are clearly only two dominant parties: PDI Perjuangan (under the 
leadership of Megawati) and much reformed Golkar (formerly controlled by Suharto), represented by 
red and yellow dots respectively. Other colours (dark green and green) represent PKB in its bulwark 
region, Jawa Timur and PPP in the strictly-religious province of Aceh.  
Although there were 48 parties participating in the 1999 election, only 28 managed to obtain 
significant votes and were eligible to send legislatures in the House (garnering minimal votes of two 
percent threshold). However, the election results only paved the way for PDI Perjuangan and Golkar 
in almost every province. Most parties were established only after Reformasi (May 1998) and might 
need some time to consolidate. PDI Perjuangan (a spin-off from PDI, existing opposition party formed 
by Suharto) had been anticipating free and fair national-level elections from 1996 (when Megawati 
became the de facto leader). While for Golkar, although the image of the party had been tarnished 
with corruption scandals and the resignation of Suharto, the party was able to recover public 
confidence.  
Figure 5.23 shows Golkar rule in regions where GDP per capita is sub-par, whilst PDI Perjuangan 
appears to control provinces with sufficient fiscal capacity (here shown in quadrants 1 and 2). Yet, 
most regions fall below quadrants 3 and 4, which indicates lack of fiscal sustainability. In these groups, 
PDI Perjuangan and Golkar control a similar number of provinces (each manage to hold power in 12 
provinces). However, close examination of quadrant 4 (where regions are most benevolent albeit with 
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low fiscal space) shows that Golkar rules most (six provinces) compared to PDI Perjuangan (only three 
provinces). 
 
Figure 5.24 Provincial GDP pc and Share of SP Spending (cross-tabbed with ruling parties), 2012 
Figure 5.24 gives a totally different image of the political situation at the provincial level. The main 
factor influencing these dynamic changes is arguably the introduction of direct election, implemented 
effectively from June 2005. The domination of PDI Perjuangan and Golkar then reduced substantially 
with the emergence of new potential parties such as PAN and PKB (from pluralist Islam group) or PPP, 
PKS, and PBB (from Islamist group). Colour-coded dots in this period show more colours, yet they do 
not convey clearly the correlation or pattern of certain parties in specific quadrants. Provinces with 
sub-par fiscal capacity are still dominant, indicating regional inequality. PDI Perjuangan seems to show 
slight dominance in quadrant 1 (the poorest and the least benevolent) and quadrant 4 (the weak fiscal 
but high SP spending). Golkar follows suit while other parties begin to take hold in a number of regions. 
It is important to note that parties often build coalitions which may vary throughout regions 
depending on the local political scenario. It is also not uncommon to have local elected leaders come 
from different ruling parties of most legislatures. 
More compelling is the fact that this image conveys a message that political ideologies might not 
significantly correlate with the degree of fiscal capacity or SP spending at the provincial level. It is 
suspected that pragmatism might be the major influence. Another meaningful hint can be traced to 
the impact of direct election which turns public attention to the figures or persona rather than political 
party or abstract ideology. Post-transition euphoria that began in 1998 had unquestionably elevated 
political parties as champions of change and hope. Yet, the situation had been completely reversed 
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less than a decade afterwards. Various opinion polls suggest that parties invariably topped both the 
list of the most corrupt political actors and the rankings of the least trusted public institutions. This 
phenomenon is substantiated by the sheer drop in Indonesia’s party identification (ID) index from 86 
per cent in 1999 to less than 20 per cent in 2012 (see Table 5.10). 
Fortunately, the sense of cynicism and disdain towards political parties does not necessarily transform 
into apathy as the public now begins to put more attention on potential candidates, particularly those 
who run for executive positions at the local level (heads of districts and municipality.) The 
transformation of Indonesia’s electoral system from a purely party-based to a candidate-driven 
process also helps to retain public participation and somehow manages to maintain a decent turnout 
during the election. This situation is expected to counter the deeply entrenched aliran-based politics16 
(Kahn, 1978). However, this trend of a strong presidentialist and personality-driven organisation 
without strong roots in one of the country’s main socio-religious communities will undoubtedly 
exacerbate the situation where public disappointment is high. 
The downfall of party reputation has been a perennial topic reflected in Western scholarship. It has 
been dominated by two powerful streams: the party institutionalisation and cartelisation schools 
(Mietzner, 2013b). The former argues that Indonesian parties are poorly institutionalised, mostly 
because they are dominated by elitists, cashed up, and self-interested leaders, who deliberately 
neglect building relationships with society. Cartelisation scholars, on the other hand, claim that 
Indonesian parties have ceased to compete, instead forming a cartel that focuses exclusively on 
exploiting the state’s resources. 
Overall, then, it is quite difficult to find strong indications that Indonesia’s party system has 
‘deinstitutionalised’ since 1998. Measured against classic institutionalisation criteria, post-Suharto 
Indonesia has either performed well or followed international trends. The effective number of political 
parties has declined, electoral volatility is down, and voter turnout has stabilised at levels considered 
healthy for a young democracy. Throughout the 2000s, more citizens have been active in political 
parties in Indonesia than in most of its East Asian neighbours, and in contrast to the majority of 
developed democracies, the country has apparently recorded no decline in this regard. Most 
importantly, support for democracy has remained high, and so has the confidence in the fairness and 
effectiveness of elections. 
                                                          
16 Aliran can be inaccurately translated as ‘political cleavage’, as firstly suggested by Geertz in 1960. 
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Table 5.6 Party ID in Indonesia, 2004-2012 
Month/Year Party ID/% 
1999 86 
March 2004 50 
June 2004 54 
November 2004 39 
January 2005 49 
July 2005 30 
January 2006 23 
December 2006 19 
July 2007 20 
October 2008 10 
July 2009 18 
October 2009 19 
March 2010 19 
May 2011 20 
October 2012 14 
Source: (Edward Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010; Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2009) 
 
5.3.1 Political Budget Cycle for SP 
Empirical evidence that supports the notion of political budget cycle or alternatively mentioned as 
‘political business cycle’ (PBC) can be frequently found in countries with early implementation of 
democracy, while there is much less evidence in mature democratic countries (Brender & Drazen, 
2003, 2005; M. Shi & Svensson, 2006). Specifically, the literature on PBC in industrial democracies has 
robustly documented that elections have a direct effect on government spending patterns, especially 
in young democracies like Indonesia (J. de Haan & Klomp, 2013; Drazen & Eslava, 2010).  
In this thesis, the analysis on PBC is focused largely on the behaviour of incumbents who aim for re-
election or to support other candidates with similar interests. This approach proposes that the 
electorate votes retrospectively, leading voters to condition their votes on incumbents’ performance 
while in office. Although this approach has traditionally been applied to studies of fiscal policy, the 
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same logic may extend to policy implementation: assuming voters will reward elected officials for 
effectively implemented policies, incumbents have an incentive to target their constituents more 
intensively and accurately as possible when running for re-election. 
As mentioned in previous parts of the study, the early implementation of electorate democracy in 
Indonesia is still marred by issues on corruption, vote buying (‘money politics’), and entrenched 
patronage relationships (Edward Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010; Blunt, Turner, & Lindroth, 2012; V. Hadiz, 
2010). In order to obtain votes and gain loyalty, candidates often persuade potential voters 
(electorates) by giving away cash and other goods (food, clothes, or souvenirs) at rallies. Candidates 
usually maintain the connection with their voters through donation during election time and after 
winning the election (Simandjuntak, 2012). Generally, the resources for these transfers are off-budget 
and illegal (Mietzner, 2011) but there are indications that some of these practices might be financed 
from local budget.  
Within the context of imperfect local democracy, patronage is usually taken into account in political 
calculation, particularly where election allows close (and frequent) contacts between candidates and 
potential voters. Traditional patron-client relations are sustained and legitimated by perceptions of 
personalised power and by political adherence exemplified in religious and cultural values. Patrimonial 
systems require a leader to supply security and protection for his or her followers. This in turn is 
recompensed by the followers' passive loyalty. In addition to protection, however, leaders in 
contemporary patrimonial systems provide material resources for their followers, which the latter 
repay with active political support. 
The following section aims to detect the existence of the PBC specifically for SP expenditure at the 
provincial level. This is done in order to find the connection between local politics, signified by election 
for local leaders and legislatures, and the amount of SP expenditure disbursed in a region. The analysis 
in this study largely follows the research from Sjahrir et al. (2013) which shows significant budget 
cycles in the first direct elections in Indonesia at the local level in the spending category that the 
district head has discretion over, especially if he or she is running for re-election.  
 
5.3.2 Data and Identification 
In order to observe the significance, importance, and direction of variables (both endogenous and 
exogenous) in this research, I create an unbalanced panel data set compiling SP expenditures for 33 
provinces during the period 2001–2012. The total SP expenditure for every province is treated as an 
endogenous variable, whilst this research proposes the use of the following model: 
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SPEXP = f (GDPCP, REV, MORB, NER, NPOV, IPOV, UNDEMP, INEQ, ELEC) 
This model is mainly based on provincial budget accounts and data for social-economic variables from 
2005 (from the commencement of direct election) to 2012 (the latest data available). Mainly, most of 
the variables are housed in the INDO-DAPOER data set organised by the World Bank. It compiles a 
wide range of variables from official resources of different agencies in Indonesia (see Table 5.11 
below). 
The primary reason in using SP expenditure is to choose the most representative proxy that allows us 
to disentangle administrative expenditure from the discretionary transfer components. Despite 
convoluted nomenclature in the local budget accounting standards, the fund under SP spending is 
almost invariably used as sources of largesse (benefits). This thesis hypothesises that incumbents raise 
their discretionary transfer funds in election years to donate to beneficiaries encompassing vulnerable 
households, individuals, religious and/or social institutions or activities such as places of worship, 
society groups or sports, in order to increase their popularity. In some cases, they channel these funds 
to finance their campaign activities. These discretionary funds, which can be spent relatively freely in 
contrast to other items, are budgeted as donation (hibah) or social assistance (dana bantuan sosial) 
under administrative expenditures, subcategory ‘others’. 
Table 5.7 Detailed Chosen Variables 
Variable Description Source 
SPEXP Social Protection expenditure World Bank’s INDO-DAPOER 
GDPCP GDP per capita World Bank’s INDO-DAPOER 
REV Total local revenue World Bank’s INDO-DAPOER 
MORB Morbidity rate Ministry of Health 





NPOV National poverty rate Statistics Indonesia 
IPOV International standard poverty rate World Bank’s INDO-DAPOER 
UNDEMP Under-employment rate  Statistics Indonesia 
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Variable Description Source 
INEQ Inequality (Gini index) Statistics Indonesia 
ELEC Local election, dummy (start from 2005) Election Commission 
 
Exogenous variables are chosen under consideration that these are reflecting current socio-economic 
status ranging from economic variables, education, health, employment, and inequality. Dummy 
variables are set on the periods of gubernatorial election in every province. These indicators are taken 
from various sources. Local budget data sets are taken from the World Bank’s INDO-DAPOER, health 
and education variables are from relevant ministries, economic variables are the domain of the 
Statistics Indonesia while periods of elections are taken from the election commission.  
Prior to model construction, it is essential to check whether variables are fit for further analysis. Firstly, 
stationarity is observed closely and SP spending (in logarithmic format) is neither suspected of 
increasing nor decreasing with all variables in the proposed model (see Figure 5.25). Therefore, having 
no stationary variables avoids the danger of spurious regression in the estimation analysis. 
 
Figure 5.25 Stationary Check 
As the local elections were held in different years, incumbents in different provinces finish their term 
at different times, meaning that some provinces will hold the event more than once. From 2005 to 
2012, all provinces have already had their direct elections (see Figure 5.26). Early implementation of 
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two in Papua) allows these regions to have elections twice. The other 18 provinces only managed to 
run elections once. One province (Yogyakarta) does not hold direct elections for the governor position 
because the Sultan (the highest position in the royal family) is automatically appointed as governor, 
referring to the Special Status Law No. 13 Year 2012. 
 
Figure 5.26 Frequencies of Direct Elections (Provinces, 2005-2012) 
Following their readiness mainly in terms of logistics, direct elections in different provinces 
commenced in different years. The earliest ones (in 2005) were held mostly in outer Java. In the 
following year, more provinces hold their maiden direct elections, including westernmost Aceh and 
far eastern Papua. Subsequently, in 2007 and 2008 all provinces but Yogyakarta17 had completed their 
maiden gubernatorial elections. With this situation, incumbents in different provinces finish their 
terms not at the same end periods. This condition is prone to create PBC.  
Related to these staggering (non-simultaneous) direct elections, government have been starting to re-
arrange the schedules for all direct elections gradually from 2015 onwards, so that Indonesia is 
expected to hold simultaneous elections for presidents, local leaders, and legislatures at both central 
and local levels in all provinces and districts by the year 2029.   
                                                          
17 Yogyakarta is the only province where there is no gubernatorial election. Underpinned by historical 
background, in 1945, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was the first royalty in formerly Dutch East Indies 
to pledge the allegiance only for Indonesia, and Sukarno return his favour by granting Sultan a 
sovereignty to maintain the structure and governance of the kingdom (keraton). This is stipulated in 
Law No. 12 Year 2012. Despite many attempts to cancel this regulation, central government today still 
acknowledges and appoints Sultan Hamengku Buwono X and his descendants as governor and Adipati 
Paku Alam (and his successor) as Vice Governor. 




Figure 5.27 First Year of Gubernatorial Election 
Panel data in this research is basically unbalanced as provinces have continued to split throughout the 
period. As provinces built up their administration, we expect capital investment to be exceptionally 
high and staff expenditure to soar since people need to be hired. Not all incumbent district heads are 
seeking re-election, partly because they are completing their constitutional limit of two terms at five 
years each, and partly for other reasons (e.g. running for presidents or other public positions, criminal 
investigations, retirement). These incumbents have little inclination to increase election year spending 
because of their weak affiliation with potential successors. As this research covers only the first two 
elections at most, it is expected that incumbents are very likely to run for re-election.  
Table 5.12 reports the results for total SP expenditures for two different models; for our preferred 
model 2 we additionally include dummies for direct elections. Our first model (without dummy 
variablees) shows a significant positive correlation of the increase in SP expenditure with the increase 
of local revenue, education, inequality, and health. While for the second model, it shows high degree 
of correlation with local revenue and yearly dummies from 2009 to 2012. This indicates the strategic 
use of the discretionary parts of provincial budget in the latest election years. 
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Table 5.8 Political Budget Cycles in SP Spending 
 
This model shows that there are significant budget cycles in the first round of direct elections in the 
category that the governor has discretion over, especially if he or she is running for re-election. This 
finding suggests a more disaggregated approach to PBC as we could not detect any significant 
correlation with other typical socio-economic indicators. This can be explained by the likely situation 
that local welfare has been improved over the periods before the direct election. An alternative 
interpretation is that incumbents do not take into account welfare variables as the focus might be on 
the disbursement towards the end of administration. The reason why PBC could not be found in the 
early elections, unlike in some other young democracies, is partly because political actors were still in 
the process of adapting to the new system. Another potential factor is that the use of SP might not 
yet be perceived as an effective instrument until later when the central government launched a variety 
of SP programmes in the regions. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2    
 b/se b/se    
   
lgdppc -0.069 -0.221*   
 (0.09) (0.09)    
lrev 1.106*** 0.952*** 
 (0.06) (0.07)    
lmorb 0.531** 0.228    
 (0.20) (0.23)    
lner 1.128*** 0.710*   
 (0.30) (0.30)    
lnpov 0.535 0.062    
 (0.32) (0.34)    
lunemp -0.011 -0.349    
 (0.23) (0.23)    
lpovgap -0.240 0.223    
 (0.24) (0.26)    
lineq 1.524*** 0.523    
 (0.26) (0.32)    
year=2002  0.000    
  (.)    
year=2005  0.176    
  (0.16)    
year=2007  0.146    
  (0.18)    
year=2008  0.379*   
  (0.18)    
year=2009  0.728*** 
  (0.18)    
year=2010  0.668*** 
  (0.19)    
year=2011  0.868*** 
  (0.20)    
year=2012  0.799*** 
  (0.20)    
Constant -14.334*** -12.158*** 
 (1.67) (1.70)    
   
R-sqr 0.706 0.750    
 
Chapter 5: Macro-Quantitative Analysis 
201 
 
5.3.3 The Impact of Local Direct Election on SP 
Whilst the previous section discussed the presence of PBC in SP spending during direct elections, this 
section focuses on the correlation between factors that are highly likely to influence SP spending at 
the local level. Considering the results on panel data regression, the factors that are chosen to observe 
are local revenue and GDP per capita. Here, total SP spending (including health and education budget) 
is used instead of targeted SP spending that is previously used in the model. Using this wide 
(composite) variable,18 the budget size is intuitively multiplied and it is expected that local leaders use 
the increased fiscal space to create wide variety of SP programme. The budget for the education sector 
in Indonesia is unquestionably tremendous and is regularly increased, especially after the amendment 
of the Constitution which clearly stipulates that a minimum of 20 percent of the state budget is 
allocated for education (Article 31 Section (4), amended on 2002). 
Similarly, the budget for the health sector has been experiencing a dramatic increase, particularly after 
the commencement of universal health coverage (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional) in January 2014 which 
attempted to expand existing coverage as a follow up of previous Jamkesmas. Currently, it is estimated 
that around 5 percent of state budget has been spent to defray health expenditure. Both education 
and health expenditure are combined together with targeted SP spending, to represent a wider 
definition of SP targeted towards citizens. 
The left-hand side panel on Figure 5.28 depicts correlations between SP spending and local revenue 
(both in logarithmic forms). The graph clearly shows that a positive correlation exists between these 
variables, both for election and non-election periods. Meanwhile, the panel on the right displays a 
positive but not so significant relationship between SP spending and GDP per capita particularly in the 
no-election period. These two panels point towards a proposition that election periods correlate with 
the pattern of SP spending which also substantiates previous findings (Figures 5.13 to 5.24). Therefore, 
it is argued that, although key policy challenges remain, local district leaders are very likely to respond 
to the electoral incentives introduced with the implementation of local direct elections. 
 
                                                          
18  Due to the absence of detailed accounts, budgets for health and education in this analysis 
encompass a large portion for the administrative component, including salary for personnel. Hence it 
might not reflect the true sense of SP which stresses on the direct transfer of benefits. 




Figure 5.28 Correlation of SP Spending with Local Revenue and GDP pc 
Echoing the previous findings, this section further develops the argument that electoral incentives 
introduced by direct elections may change the behaviour of elected local officials. Local capacity as 
represented by GDP per capita seems positively significant yet is rather insignificant compared to the 
transfer-SP spending correlation. 
The implication of this evidence is that government transfer occupies an important place in 
determining the size of the SP budget, particularly more so during election years. This finding implies 
that provinces with significant size of transfer allow leaders to roll out SP during elections, allegedly 
to retain popularity. A less significant relationship between local GDP per capita and SP budget may 
be that well-off provinces might not need SP-like programmes. 
This finding leads to further elaboration on the possible spatial or ‘neighbourhood effect’ of SP. 
Regions with a sizable SP budget might attract citizens from the surrounding vicinity to utilise the 
programmes. The main problem is that GDP per capita data does not take account of regional cross-
border transactions. Hence, to approximate the regional standard of living, a number of researchers 
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combines measures of health, education, and income or expenditure. According to a study by 
Vidyattama (2013), regional convergence does exist, though with the decreasing rate. 
As the disputes on the distribution of intergovernmental transfer are not yet resolved, they might lead 
to exacerbating inequality between regions. Variants of SP programmes might be relevant in regions 
where poverty and inequality are still rampant, however these regions are almost invariably lacking in 
terms of fiscal capacity. This situation will create a dilemma for elected leaders who aim to attract 
potential voters by offering generous SP. 
 
5.4 Summary 
This part of the thesis has explored the implementation of SP in relation to several factors including 
the nature of inter-governmental transfer, local politics, and types of SP at the provincial level. Among 
these categories of analysis, each one shows distinctive impact on SP coverage and possibly also its 
benefits. Chief among these is the impact of local politics within the context of deepened 
democratisation. Direct election has shown significant impact on the size of disbursed SP. This finding, 
while being intuitive, is also in line with Fossati (2016b, 2016a) who argues that in years when local 
elections are held, low-income households are targeted more accurately, suggesting that electoral 
incentives for local elites may increase access to social services among the poor. 
Panel regression analysis in this part also suggests that among the most important variables that are 
significant in the model is not only direct election but also intergovernmental grants. Interestingly, the 
local economy (as measured by GDP per capita) does not clearly exhibit meaningful impact. Rather, 
the amount of transfers from central to local government matters most. Socio-economic indicators do 
not appear to be significant explanatory variables. This implies that local candidates are sensitive 
mostly only to short-term targets (benefits during election periods), dismissing the actual problems 
that require a long-term solution for the sustainability of SP programmes.   
This chapter also suggests that the current formula for intergovernmental transfer needs to be 
revisited, as conveyed in the early part of this chapter. Cluster analysis provides hints of unequal 
distribution with four distinctive groups pointing to regressive impact on socio-welfare. The result 
suggests that the current transfer formula largely does not have significant distributional effects. 
Instead, it points out a heavy degree of transfer polarisation towards Java and a few parts of Sumatera. 
Variables to determine transfer need to encompass multiple dimensions of socio-welfare needs. More 




Chapter Six: Micro-Qualitative Analysis: A Case Study of Two Selected Locations 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter concerns the qualitative analysis carried out using case studies in two selected locations 
(a district and a municipality) in Central Java. Using a micro-perspective, the aim is to complement the 
previous chapter on the quantitative analysis in order to attain a complete picture of the links between 
decentralisation, democratisation and SP. In this regard, all data is collected by conducting in-depth 
interviews with stakeholders in both regions. Interviews are guided by semi-structured guidelines on 
series of occasions, in formal or informal ways. 
Depictions of sites and simple ethnographic narration are used to enrich the analysis so that it can 
place the qualitative analysis into context correctly. Therefore, this chapter explains not only the 
interview process involved in soliciting the information required, but also gives thorough illustration 
of the situation where fieldwork was undertaken. 
Given that the research design involved mixed methodology (explanatory type), qualitative 
investigation in this thesis was performed after the results of quantitative analysis (using secondary 
data) were obtained. Therefore, all aspects in this qualitative phase are to a large extent influenced 
by the results of prior quantitative analysis.   
 
6.2 SP Programme in Sragen and Surakarta during the Decentralisation Period 
This part briefly summarises programmes in Sragen and Surakarta which are categorised under social 
protection (SP). The scope of the analysis spans from the enactment of decentralisation until the 
present day. Several innovations can be found in many regions but only a handful that stand out. Most 
of these programmes were deemed unsustainable and only a few of them can be maintained after 
regime change. Noticeable is the proliferation of SP programmes approaching the election dates. 
Despite a number of locally-initiated SP programmes, most of the social transfer programmes had 
been funded and administered by central government. Chief among these is household cash transfer 
programme which from its inception in 2005 until present day has been managed by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and other supporting institutions. In this nation-wide programme, the role of local 
government is equally important. While the quota for beneficiaries is strictly defined by the central 
government (through census by Statistics Agency), local governments at times manage to append 
significant recipients with the local funding. The contribution of local stakeholders is to some extent 
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meaningful in shaping policy. Public participation is undeniably pivotal in guiding the policy to meet 
the actual needs of the public, and more importantly towards empowerment activities.  
However, some of these local versions of SP programmes had begun to make inroads into the national 
one. For example, the method for defining beneficiaries that was designed fully by the central statistics 
agency was many times disputed or even rejected by local authorities. At another time, local 
authorities attempted to outweigh the size of benefits disbursed by the national SP programme 
without careful calculation. The budget for the SP programme often encompasses activities which 
have no relationship with the welfare improvement agenda. For instance, honorariums and fees to 
support SP programmes are almost always embedded in the same budget account. 
 
6.2.1 SP Programme in Sragen 
At the beginning of the decentralised era, local governments still rely heavily on the central 
government. This also includes initiatives which always waited for the decision of the central 
government, and due to strict budget allocation. At least, there were only a handful of innovative 
policies during the first five years after the enactment of the first decentralisation law. Lacklustre 
performance and a lack of innovation in the early decentralisation period occurred mainly due to the 
adaptation process and the fact that most of the revenue was still controlled fully by central 
government. Sragen is the regency where natural resources are not abundant, such that the cash-
strapped region only managed to tinker with insignificant policies. 
During the New Order era, local agencies in Sragen had acted as implementers of policies designed by 
ministries. Not many proposals from regions could be conveyed let alone fulfilled. At that time, the 
central government focused on economic policies to foster growth and maintain purchasing power. 
Therefore, concepts of social policy were never discussed. Instead, attention towards agricultural 
productivity dominated the discourse and was considered relevant to the situation in Sragen where 
the majority of citizens worked as farmers. 
The situation abruptly changed right after the improvement of regulations on government transfer in 
2004 and the commencement of direct election in 2005. To a large extent, this amendment which 
brought larger sums of fungible funds allowed local leaders and candidates offer a breakthrough on 
many backlogged matters. Most notable among these advanced policies is the simplification of 
business licence applications, especially for local small entrepreneurs. This move promptly increased 
the ease of doing business in Sragen while at the same time also reducing the infamous red tape. 
Other policies that in the previous administration seemed ambitious and nearly impossible, due to the 
limited available budget, began to circulate in political campaigns. 
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In spite of much progress in various sectors, Sragen still lacked the provision of basic infrastructure. 
Simultaneously, limited funds held back development. Therefore, given this situation, the Sragen 
regency decided to prioritise improvement in business licensing in order to attract more private 
investment, and to increase local revenue substantially. This strategy in boosting local investment 
worked effectively to the extent that it received national recognition as an exemplary ‘champion’ 
project (proyek percontohan). Eventually, the establishment of a new unit, the Integrated Agency for 
Licensing and Capital Investment (Badan Perizinan Terpadu dan Penanaman Modal, BPT-PM) or 
widely dubbed the ‘one-stop shop’ (OSS) marked the important milestone of local innovation made 
possible by local initiative through the policy of local administration. These days, it is relatively 
common that in order to tackle problems of rent-seeking in licensing, several Indonesian cities and 
districts have implemented OSS for business licensing. 
At this early stage, one might wonder whether OSS in Sragen or elsewhere can work for the poor. Yet, 
there is good evidence from many countries that OSS provided vital support to poverty alleviation in 
a variety of forms and contexts, especially for those inhabiting remote or isolated regions. Similarly, 
the notion of simplifying procedures through OSS is to some degree able to elevate government 
efficiency and, equally important, it is politically desirable for politicians and policymakers in Sragen. 
In the meantime, various SP programmes have been piloted and expanded by many ministries and 
agencies representing central government. The local administration in Sragen has been expected to 
fully support and carry equal responsibility at the implementation level. Programmes with a 
considerable budget such as cash transfer and health care have been shaping the policies.  
Sragen citizens have generally appreciated the improvements on social policies, specifically the ones 
that have managed to tackle problems in obtaining health services. Understandably, health care in 
Sragen that generously covers catastrophic illness can be seen as a ‘cushion’ to support domestic 
finances during difficult times. 
In 2012, a year after the election won by Agus Fatchurahman as new governor with the new partner 
(Daryanto), the Sragen government continued to roll on the OSS. In fact, it developed a similar unit to 
handle issues on SP. Officially named the Integrated Service Unit on Poverty Relief (Unit Pelayanan 
Terpadu Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, UPTPK), the new unit immediately grabbed attention as it was 
given priority under the new regent. Talented workers were recruited from various existing offices, 
including education, health, social, public works, and housing, among others. In addition, the regent 
himself ensured that UPTPK would receive a substantial budget so that it could undertake its tasks 
smoothly. On many occasions, Agus openly pledged to upgrade the status of UPTPK from merely a 
unit to an office subject to approval from several Ministries in Jakarta. 
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Predictably, this office was heavily occupied with resolving numerous complaints from citizens who 
did not receive any assistance, particularly during the distribution of cash transfers in 2005 and 2008. 
The timing of the UPTPK establishment also coincided with the official date of PPLS19 release. The 
launch also indicated that the central government be prepared for another cash transfer while 
attempting to reduce fuel subsidy. Undoubtedly, the versatile data set is quintessential to support the 
implementation of SP. However, based on the two previous cash transfers, problems related with 
inaccuracies still occurred. Therefore, in order to anticipate the execution of cash transfer and to avoid 
typical problems on targeting, UPTPK was assigned to obtain full access of the precious data set. 
However, the PPLS was categorised as sensitive data for fear that it contains identification, which 
raises privacy issues or abuses. It was administered exclusively by the National Team for the 
Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K, Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan), a 
powerful unit under the Vice President who had the mandate to use the data set to decide the 
eligibility upon the beneficiaries. Having endured difficulties through bureaucracies, UPTPK finally 
managed to formally acquire the data with several conditions attached. 
Possessing the PPLS data set means that UPTPK could use the data to deliver their own targeted 
policies. It also helped to get ball-park figures for SP programmes. But the most important of all is that 
local administration could thoroughly examine its accuracies. In that way, UPTPK was able to fix the 
errors and to update the data set through its own methods. Later, the works on fixing the PPLS data 
set turned into complementing the number of receiving households. This created two versions of 
potential beneficiaries and undermined the method set by central statistics agency (BPS). However, 
this did not really worry TNP2K or central government agencies as the additional households gathered 
from the local survey were not supposed to obtain extra funding. Alternatively, with improved 
conditions of the local budget, the Sragen government decided to defray the costs incurred in 
expanding beneficiaries. 
As shown in Figure 6.5 below, the two largest SP programmes in Sragen i.e. health and education are 
explained in brochures and disseminated widely in offices, hospitals, clinics, schools, and other public 
places. The leaflets feature prominently the details of both programmes displaying the specimens of 
benefit cards (Melati, Menur, Kenanga, Sintawati), flowcharts for business process, numbers of 
beneficiaries using different data sources, and the allocated budget for respective programmes.  
                                                          
19 PPLS (abbreviation of Pendataan Program Lindung Sosial or ‘Targeting for Social Protection 
Programme’) is a data set that consists of rosters of potential beneficiaries obtained through the 
household poverty census. Starting from 2005, the method for data collection was enhanced in 
2008. This data set was used as a basis to deliver social assistance. 









Figure 6.1 Brochures on Information for Health, Education, and Economic Programmes in Sragen 
Considering the complexity and enormous size of the budget required to undertake sophisticated 
programmes such as conditional cash transfer (managed by Ministry of Social Affairs), the Sragen 
government focused on the improvement of targeting whilst exploring feasible options of SP 
programmes. Prominent among these programmes are health care provision (officially called 
Saraswati, the abbreviation for Sarase Warga Sukowati or translated as Healthy Sukowati Citizen) for 
different segments of society. The difference in benefits is indicated by different cards: Melati, Menur, 
Kenanga (translated as Jasmine, Star Jasmine, Cananga, the names of popular local plants) 
respectively catering to the poorest, poor, and non-poor.  
Local citizens who are identified as poor according to the TNP2K data set will usually receive Melati 
cards. This is the most generous scheme of all. The benefit of this card is equalised to the national 
programme of social health insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat/Jamkesmas or since 2014 
became JKN: Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional). Certainly, the Melati scheme entails an enormous budget 
since the benefit covers all diseases as stipulated in the JKN programme. For instance, cardholders are 
able to get free health care in the health centre and hospital. This includes free lifetime haemodialysis 
for kidney failure cases. Seemingly ambitious, the Sragen regency managed to control the costs and 
navigate the complexities surrounding the implementation of a local version of the JKN programme. 
The Menur card offers the second best benefits. This is provided for those who are identified poor 
from the BPS survey but for various reasons not listed in the PPLS data set. Most likely, the 
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beneficiaries were verified from the local survey run by UPTPK. The benefit is almost similar to the 
Melati scheme with minor difference in the haemodialysis service which is limited only to ten visits 
for a patient. 
The Kenanga card is given to those who are not enlisted in either the TNP2K data set or the BPS version 
of PPLS. The benefit is not as generous as Melati or Menur. A considerable majority of cardholders are 
listed from the citizen’s applications which are not deemed eligible to obtain Menur or Melati. It offers 
free health care at the local health centre (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat or Puskesmas) while it only 
provides subsidy for services in the public hospital twice in a year. The haemodialysis service is free 
only when used up to five times. From the perspective of programme administrators, Kenanga is 
basically a ‘consolation’ programme for citizens to avoid their disappointment. Hence, the essence of 
this programme is basically limited free health care for the self-declared poor. 
With regards to the statistics on cardholders, the latest data (updated on November 2016) records 
387,495 cardholders. The majority of them hold a Melati card (79.8 percent or 309,477 individuals), 
while a Menur card is owned by 51,046 persons, and the Kenanga scheme is distributed to 26,972 
persons. 
In addition to health care, Sragen regency also offers an academic scholarship programme to school-
age children when their parents receive Saraswati benefits. The programme is officially dubbed 
Sintawati (Sarana Pintar Warga Sukowati) which covers free tuition fees for studying in various 
education levels, from elementary school stage up to state universities in Java. 
 
6.2.2 SP Programme in Surakarta 
Similar to what happened in Sragen and other regions, the SP programme in Surakarta was not very 
developed during the New Order era. Most programmes during Suharto’s era emphasised agriculture 
so the development of the city was focused in the vicinity where rice fields and farmers were situated. 
Apart from the remnants of a royalty, the city received national attention because the family of Tien 
Suharto (first lady from 1967 to 1996) resided in Solo. This largely explains the construction of the 
international airport in 1977 and massive upgrading in 1989, even though there was already another 
decent airport in Yogyakarta (60 km away).   
Bearing the characteristics of an urban area, recurring problems such as sanitation, illegal settlements, 
housing, and crimes largely exhausted domestic resources. Though not as sprawled as a metropolis 
like Jakarta, Surabaya, or Semarang, the city had begun to develop its own difficulties. People come 
from surrounding rural areas, predominantly from regions with high poverty rates. The trend of 
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urbanisation continues to grow whilst unrelenting pressures on domestic resources had been 
inevitable. Consequently, urban poverty is an increasingly relevant and urgent issue in Surakarta. 
Indeed, like in most other places, formal SP provision only caters to sedentary populations, who are 
tied to a particular region. However, in the current globalised world, with new and increasingly 
frequent flows of people, goods and information, more people choose to or are pushed to live across 
regional borders, developing attachments and responsibilities in more than one area. Therefore, 
traditional and geographically fixed SP systems have become problematic. 
The first mayor in the decentralisation era was Slamet Suryanto from the PDI-P party (in office from 
2000 to 2005). Elected indirectly (when the direct election had not yet been introduced), he managed 
to assemble considerable support from local parliament members who were mostly the members of 
PDI-P. However, it seemed the mayor could not manage to devise any outstanding programmes, 
particularly ones that relate to social welfare. Even worse, his administration ended with various 
corruption scandals and the mayor himself was eventually convicted for a graft case. 
As government transfer and authority had not been increased significantly during the first five years 
of decentralisation, the local government only managed to start incrementally with limited projects 
such as initiatives on regulating ‘academic curfew’ for students —staying at home during the evening 
time to avoid juvenile delinquency— which later paved the way to the more comprehensive ‘child-
friendly’ city project.  
SP programmes had never become a focus of the mayor until his successor, Joko Widodo 
(affectionately known as ‘Jokowi’), was elected in 2005. This timing coincided with the increase of 
fund transfers to the local budget after the first revision on decentralisation laws in 2004. His first 
move was, however, neither focussed on SP nor welfare improvement but rather on business 
development and public space improvement in the city.  
Compared to Sragen, the situation in Solo is rather different. Solo’s regulatory environment had been 
less problematic. An independent assessment of the quality of local regulations in 2004 evaluated 
Solo’s local bills as ‘fairly conducive’ to investment with no serious obstructions to local trade or 
investment activities (Von Luebke, Mcculloch, & Patunru, 2009, pp. 284–285). 
Responding to complaints of the business community, which previously criticised the myriad of 
administrative desk work and article work they had to do, Jokowi streamlined existing licensing 
procedures through the establishment of an effective ‘One-Stop Shop’ (OSS). Most respondents 
confirmed that the quality of business services strongly benefited from Jokowi’s prior business 
experience as a furniture exporter. 
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After the substantial increase of the local budget and deepened democratisation, Surakarta had begun 
to launch many progressive programmes. Lately, the city is widely recognised for its policies of 
managing the widespread and uncontrolled informal sector. The local government is also acclaimed 
for its street vendor restructuring programme, various programmes to relocate flood victims, and 
locally-based programmes for the protection of the poor community in the form of education and 
health assistance. Launched in April 2010, education assistance generally covers all Elementary and 
Junior High School students, while High School students were given specific grants. Officially named 
Bantuan Pendidikan Masyarakat Kota Surakarta (BPMKS) or formally translated as Surakarta 
Community Education Assistance, it supplements operational grants from the Ministry of Education 
(Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS).  
After two years in the municipal office, Jokowi instructed Solo's Department of Health to supplement 
the national health care policy.  Siti Wahyuningsih, head of the department, in an interview with 
Majeed (2012) said:  
"In April 2007, Jokowi summoned me five days after I was appointed head of department 
to design a programme of health financing and insurance especially for the poor in 
Surakarta.  At that time, some cities near Surakarta had free health services at 
community health centers for the poor.  He asked me if it was possible to give free health 
care, and I said that we can make a similar programme with a better system."   
After doing some evaluations on health care plans in other cities, Wahyuningsih and her team 
formulated a plan for Solo.  Residents who did not belong to Jamkesmas or other kinds of public 
insurance, such as civil servant insurance, or private health insurance, and had lived in Solo for the 
past three years could use services under the programme. The local version of the health care 
programme is given the official name Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat Surakarta (PKMS, 
translated as Surakarta Public Health Maintenance), and it essentially provides free health care for 
poor families who were not previously covered by the national health insurance programme. Initially 
introduced on January 2008, it aims to cover the entire population with a benefit package similar to 
the national programme. Underpinned by the limited expansion capacity and lack of accuracy in 
Jamkesmas, Solo municipalities envisaged to include 6,989 individuals at the beginning of the 
implementation. In Surakarta, Jamkesmas covered about 100,000 people (or around 20 percent of 
residents), but according to the regulation (mainly under the umbrella laws of regional autonomy) it 
was up to the city to provide for people who were not covered by any kind of public- or private-sector 
insurance, and could not afford to buy insurance. 




Figure 6.2 Free Health care Cards in Surakarta 
Surakarta’s PKMS offers two types of health benefits represented by two cards, i.e. gold and silver. 
Gold cards (as in Figure 6.8) are distributed to those who are categorised as poor according to either 
national or local data sets. Meanwhile, silver cards are provided to Surakarta citizens in general 
regardless of their socio-economic status in which the application requires valid identification proofs. 
As both cards were targeted to two different segments, they differ in terms of benefits. While the gold 
card reimburses the entire cost of health expenses, the silver card only replaces half of the incurred 
costs. As of 2015, the PKMS beneficiaries reached 247,229 citizens or 49 percent of the total 
population. Around 91 percent of them (247,229) were registered as silver card holders while the 
recipients of gold cards were merely less than 10 percent (22.092). The design of the free health card 
basically copies from the national health care programme with slight modifications to the benefit, i.e. 
some health services are covered and some are excluded in the PKMS, as specified at the back of the 
card. 
Subsequent to the launch of health and education programmes, a wide range of additional SP 
programmes were created to complement the existing ones. For the most part, this involved larger 
participation of stakeholders while approaching new segments in the society, such as informal workers 
and disabled citizens. As is common in most bureaucracies, most of the local offices (Satuan Kerja 
Perangkat Daerah, SKPD) have a sectoral view on multi-faceted issues such as poverty alleviation and 
therefore regard these matters as the sole concern of other agencies who are responsible for the 
social sector and activities within it such as the Regional Development Planning Board (Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, BAPPEDA), the Community Empowerment Board (Badan 
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, BPM), and social services office (Dinas Sosial).  
Along with streamlining the bureaucratic procedures, Jokowi also managed to reduce narrow sectoral 
perspectives among his staff. That way, the entire procedures of business had become more effective, 
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opening up a higher extent of interaction between offices which had been compartmentalised earlier. 
The winds of reform also brought about new approaches to poverty reduction, which gradually 
became programmatic, institutionalised, and based on budgetary factors.  
With regard to the beneficiaries’ data set, the Solo municipality expanded coverage gradually using 
PPLS as baseline data. This exercise seemingly appeared to be an attempt to universalise SP. Worries 
about the unfunded SP programme did not really emerge as the programme (health care in this 
instance) mainly offers rudimentary services which generally do not seem attractive to the middle 
class, let alone wealthier segments.     
Another important SP-related policy in Surakarta was the resettlement of street vendors and squatters. 
This was carefully done through a slow process which involved hundreds of informal meetings and 
preparation of the new space. Key among the initial steps was approaching theexisting vendors who 
were invariably affiliated to various organisations (youth, religious, and entrepreneurial). Although 
those who were affected by resettlement did not necessarily receive SP (as a large number of illegal 
settlers were actually non-Surakarta residents), it seemed that the provision of SP in general could 
help to contribute as a ‘bargaining chip’ in the negotiation process. 
With regards to the issue on housing, sub-standard residential units in Solo can be categorised into 
two types: inner-city slums, typically the overcrowded Indonesian kampungs developed historically, 
and unauthorised squatter settlements which emerged in more recent times on government owned 
land. The former type can be located in very central areas, in the historical regions of the city.  
The informal workers’ resettlement programme seemed to dovetail the framework of the city’s 
infrastructure refurbishment and housing improvement, including transformation of dilapidated 
traditional markets and public parks to higher standards. Undoubtedly, these efforts appeared to 
convey a populist and pro-poor image which eventually helped to levitate the popularity of 
policymakers, especially Jokowi as the mayor.  
  
6.3 Perceptions of Decentralisation 
What are the impacts of decentralisation as comprehended by stakeholders at the local level? How 
these are differing across varied groups? Answering these questions is important in order to assess 
the nature and meaning of decentralisation, and to understand the patterns of responses (see next 
section).  
A participatory approach was taken to identifying the concept and realisation of decentralisation 
across respondents in Sragen and Surakarta. The questions were designed to enable people explain 
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their understandings and so offer insights into how people themselves view and perceive the 
realisation of decentralisation from the condition of their surroundings. In so doing, respondents were 
asked to describe the aspects of decentralisation they experienced. Responses from case study 
households were triangulated through interviews and group discussions involving a social mapping 
exercise with the local leadership. These multiple sources permit insights into the wider concept of 
decentralisation from diverse perspectives – women and men, younger and older– and therefore offer 
a rounded and relatively robust picture of conditions and contexts.   
In short, decentralisation is perceived differently among stakeholders. Summary of their 
understanding or narrative on decentralisation is presented in this section. Table 6.7 below describes 
the overview of responses based on interviews during the fieldwork. 
Chapter 6: Micro-Qualitative Analysis: A Case Study of Two Selected Locations 
216 
 
Table 6.1 General Perception of the Impact of Decentralisation 










Positive. Several initiatives 
are better designed to 
meet public needs, yet 
issues on coordination 
and budget remain 
unsolved. 
Mixed. Although much 
authority has been 
devolved to the 
regions, power is still 
retained by the central 
government and still 
leans towards the 
executive. 
Mixed. A lot of 
programmes (including 
SP) have been offered 
to the public and the 
impact on welfare is 
significant. However, 
local politics has 
become more complex 
as compared with the 
past. 
Positive. A variety of 
programmes are 
helping to stimulate 
local wisdom in 
achieving government 
policy. 
Mixed. Appreciative of 
better governance but 





susceptible to being 
politicised during local 
elections. 
Positive. More 
assistance has been 
delivered and many 
programmes have 




Improved. We can 
independently set up a 
new office or new unit so 
that we can outreach 
citizens better. We expect 
more central government 
facilities in our regions to 
be given to our office. 
Mixed. Local office 
might have been 
creative in initiating 
new programme but 
still most of the 
expenses are actually 
for salaries.  
Improved. Procedures 
have seemingly 






Do not change much. 







help citizens to 
reach services. 
SP and welfare Mixed. SP becomes main 
concern at the local level. 
Devolved budget and 
authorities reinforce local 
initiatives with regard to 
welfare promotion. 
However, most ‘big’ SP 
programmes are still 
administered by agencies 
from central government. 
Mixed. There has been 
much potential from 
the local level but most 
are hindered by lack of 
capacity, ranging from 
technical to 
conceptual.   
Improved. Poor 
households are 
identified clearly and 
well-targeted. Some 
room to improve 





role of local 
government to a large 
extent helps mitigate 
inaccuracy in 
targeting benefits. 
Negative. Some if not 
most SP programmes 
are only gimmicks in 
reality. Especially used 





need of each 
household member 
(e.g. education for 
kids, money for 
parents.) 
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6.3.1 Perceived Overview of Decentralisation 
The question of how respondents perceive the impact of decentralisation is influenced to a large 
extent by their understandings of regional autonomy which developed more than a decade ago. 
Therefore, familiarity with the concepts varies among respondents. Apparently, it seems, some 
respondents already have a strong background and orientation towards abstract notions while some 
struggle to grasp concepts unless they are informed by basic definitions related to decentralisation.   
With different levels of background and foundational knowledge of decentralisation, responses vary 
considerably across respondents. Local officials seem to grasp the concepts thoroughly and reply with 
more technical jargon and abbreviations. Although there is no guarantee that their opinions are 
unbiased, their statements are almost always on the record and made available for checking against 
facts. Local MPs and academics also present vast knowledge, are able to recall the process of 
decentralisation in the early period, and manage to review the transformations occurring at the local 
level. Interpretations of decentralisation and its impact among community leaders and programme 
facilitators were sufficiently exemplary although they are mostly lacking the details. Meanwhile, 
beneficiaries appear to be those respondents with very low comprehension on conceptual notions of 
decentralisation and tend to ameliorate their judgments for various reasons, mainly for fear of losing 
benefits after making negative comments. 
Positive perceptions are held mainly by local officials, facilitators, and beneficiaries while mixed 
responses (negative and positive) were given by local MPs, community leaders, and people with an 
NGO background. Especially among NGOs, several critical points were made on the drawbacks of 
decentralisation. 
Overall the basic idea of the impact of decentralisation can be quoted from an observer based at the 
local university: 
“…the process of democratisation and decentralisation has happened very quickly; yet 
there is a sense that it is incomplete in some ways. Jurisdictions often remain ill-defined 
or overlap, and local legislation and regulations are frequently at odds with national 
policies. And because it has happened so quickly, the checks and balances needed for 
good governance have had very little time to evolve organically.  
Indeed, the capacity of the sub-national governments – from the 34 provinces to the 
83,000 villages – to deliver high-quality public services is often lacking, and so are the 
frameworks that monitor the proper and efficient use of public resources…” 
In sum, most respondents agree that decentralisation is still in progress, and it requires constant 
improvement and support from all levels of society. This huge undertaking cannot be left alone to the 
local government but it is extremely important to have greater participation from citizens. Borrowing 
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the concept of gotong royong (mutual help), its ubiquity reminds every citizen to share similar 
responsibilities in the development process (Bowen, 1986). 
  
6.3.2 Public Service Delivery 
Respondents were also asked to describe their experiences or views on public service delivery in 
general. The responses were again triangulated across multiple sources. Unlike their perceptions on 
the abstract concept of decentralisation, which were more likely to be responded to more technically 
by several groups, public service delivery tends to be recognised more generally across respondents. 
However, an important finding, which affirms much of the literature on decentralisation in Indonesia 
and elsewhere, is that the betterment of public service delivery depends substantially on the existing 
capacity and political willingness at the local office. This is particularly true of the local arrangements 
in managing the data sets for SP beneficiaries, but also to some extent of whether and how local 
governments launch and develop new schemes.  
This section analyses not only respondents of this research, but people and mass media that generally 
recognise and sometimes criticise the advancement of public service delivery. Most importantly, they 
believe this can happen mainly due to the power to exercise the decision flexibly without rigid 
procedures or compulsory consultations with the central government as in the past. Decentralisation, 
according to most respondents, brings decision-making closer and therefore yields higher attention 
to local needs.  
Analysis of the findings about how people perceive the difference in public service delivery after 
decentralisation shows three broad aspects: 
a. Increasing speed and quality of service delivery, particularly ones related to business 
registration and citizenship documentation; several policies were supposed to streamline the 
process and cut down substantial time required to obtain a licence. This improvement was 
normally accompanied with the betterment of supporting facilities, like a waiting room, air-
conditioner, and computerised system.  
b. Improved amenities. The most famous one is the improvement in public parks. This project 
was seemingly neglected by the previous administration as it was not seen tohave meaningful 
effects on local development or other meaningful progress. Yet, these days, many local leaders 
have been giving significant attention for the re-development of public spaces like parks. Apart 
from their simplicity and low budget required, such upgrading is associated with cleanliness 
and state provision for participatory spaces where the public can meet or speak. 
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c. Local economic development, including the informal sector. The renovation of traditional 
shopping centres and relocation of street vendors were appraised highly.  
  
6.3.3 SP and Welfare  
From previous discussions, it has been found that much of the development of SP and welfare has 
been attributed to the implementation of decentralisation. Various programmes have been made 
available after substantial proportions of the budget were devolved to local administration. A bottom-
up approach to designing public policy is also under the spotlight particularly in identifying priorities 
on activities and beneficiaries. Generally, all respondents except people from NGOs and academics 
have a positive impression of local SP. Although the room for improvement is still considerable to local 
officials and local MPs, reception of the newly introduced SP programmes was warm. The critical 
appraisal from academics, pointing to the dangers of misusing SP as a political tool, is valid. The benefit 
is seen as very marginal and not really effective in increasing people’s welfare, let alone eradicating 
poverty. 
  
6.4 Changes in Social Welfare in Sragen and Surakarta: Before and After Decentralisation 
This section describes the outcomes that are evident in Sragen and Surakarta prior to the 
decentralisation era and social progress made after the enactment of regulations pertaining to 
devolution. In this section, most of the information relies not only on quantitative indicators, mainly 
official figures, but it also encompasses information garnered from the interviews and observations 
during field visits. The incorporation of both aspects is aimed purposefully to obtain a complete picture 
of the actual situation. 
  
6.4.1 Trend in Poverty 
The development of social welfare in the two regions shows considerable differences. For instance, 
poverty rates in Sragen and Surakarta are 14.86 and 10.95 percent respectively (as of 2014 calculated 
using BPS method). The higher rate of poverty in Sragen is attributable possibly to the decline of the 
agriculture sector, creating unemployed farmers and smaller plots of rice fields. Industrial 
transformation seemingly did not occur perfectly because of many factors inhibiting new business. 
Meanwhile in Surakarta, poverty is more prevalent due to the increasing rate of migration as indicated 
by the formation of squatter settlements nearby riverbanks. 
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Poverty rate dynamics from the early decentralisation period (2000) to the latest available data (2012) 
shows significant decline in both regions (Figure 7.9 below). Sragen eventually managed to slash the 
poverty rate from 30.23 to 16.72 percent (around 13.5 percentage points reduction) while Solo could 
bring down the rate from 18.68 to 12.01 percent (-6.67 percentage change) in 12 years. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Poverty Rates in Sragen and Surakarta (2000-2012) 
Source: BPS Surakarta and BPS Sragen 
 
From the outset, the economic turbulence that rocked the country at the end of the 1990s has left a 
different impact on Sragen and Surakarta. The recovery process was relatively speedy in Sragen, while 
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it took longer for Surakarta to rise from downturn largely due to the extensive damage after the series 
of riots and lootings. Post-crisis programmes at the local level to a certain extent had managed to 
control poverty and unemployment rates, mainly through SP and social welfare-related policies.  
However, the actual poverty rate is perceived by many to be higher than the official statistics. This is 
allegedly a result of the low threshold in the poverty line calculation which insufficiently represents 
actual situations. This might be caused by the fact that the process of targeting and poverty line 
construction is not comprehended clearly by the public. Instead, lack of involvement from local 
governments and citizens might be the factors that engender suspicion towards data manipulation 
and inaccuracies. On top of that, with the growing budget size, the municipal administration started 
to cover additional beneficiaries which eventually portray a larger number of vulnerable groups 
previously untouched by official surveys. This expansion policy can be interpreted as an encroachment 
on the established formal methodology set by the central government. 
Predictably, by taking into account multi-dimensional aspects on the latest poverty census (PPLS 2011), 
vulnerability emerges significantly higher than what was implied from figures extracted from annual 
household surveys. Based on PPLS 2011, around 44,872 households in Surakarta were registered as 
‘vulnerable’ which qualify them as possible beneficiaries for SP programmes. Assuming each 
household has four members, resulting in 179,488 vulnerable citizens or approximately 33.8 percent 
of the total population. The treble increase from the BPS official poverty rate indicates a high degree 
of vulnerability as well as a sign of unreliability of the consumption measurement used to define 
poverty. 
Unlike other cities of the world, poverty in Surakarta is not concentrated in single areas of the city and 
every RT-unit of Surakarta has a certain degree of poverty. Areas showing the highest degree of 
poverty are located in the south-eastern part of the city, along the riverbanks of Bengawan Solo, but 
also along other channels, railroad lines and on government-owned land. Dwellers of illegal plots and 
slum areas typically do not own any identification documents, and some of them migrate temporarily 
to other places. Almost invariably, however, these undocumented citizens tend to be missed out 
during the census or survey, hence this group will not appear in statistics. 
Similarly, poverty in Sragen is generally viewed as more rampant than the official figures. This is 
especially due to the geographical challenges which often times hinder enumerators from conducting 
proper survey in several remote locations. Problems have occurred usually when large scale SP 
programmes were distributed using data sets from BPS. Hitherto, Sragen officials always attempted 
to increase the number of recipients, in order to close the significant gap between BPS data and ‘the 
real condition’. Yet, constrained with a limited budget to top-up the national flagship SP programme, 
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they usually add the new beneficiaries in the upcoming fiscal year with a scale of benefits that is 
inevitably less than the existing beneficiaries. 
Local democratisation has also brought about the emergence of non-governmental organisations. 
Though seemingly these new agencies aim towards various agendas, issues on poverty-related policies 
have always been in the backdrop. As one official in UPTPK Sragen mentioned: 
“Indeed, poverty has been the main focus as well as priority in local development agenda. 
This echoes pak Bupati’s (head of regency, Regent’s) manifesto during his rally. His 
campaign was apparently successful in gaining substantial votes of electorates who live 
in under-developed sub-districts. Not only (poverty reduction) will this fulfil his promises 
during the rally but it also fits with the needs of local citizens, I think” 
A similar statement from an official in Surakarta (Social Welfare Office) also implies the importance 
of a poverty reduction strategy: 
“Poverty reduction and local empowerment are actually the brainchild of Pak Wali 
(shortened form of Walikota: mayor) during his first administration, although it does not 
seem unique to Surakarta only. The approach we undertook was unparalleled at that 
time, as far as I know…” 
Therefore, the decentralisation and democratisation era appear to bring more open discourses on 
poverty and increasing awareness on accountability for poverty definition. The role of the mass media 
in bringing to light discussion on poverty related subjects had become pivotal, especially in reaching 
out to laymen readers with provocative headlines and colourful language in many articles. 
Furthermore, more proposals and ideas had been emanating from non-government actors such as 
civil society organisations and academics. 
Relating to the trend on poverty figures, most officials believe that there has been significant progress 
on poverty reduction. Despite many challenges, local governments in both regions are seen capable 
of managing the SP programmes so that they bring about the desired impact on people’s livelihoods.  
 “We do not need to show the figures (on poverty), you can see clearly the progress we 
have made in mass media. People have become more satisfied and they have 
appreciated our work. I do not say that poverty is completely alleviated but the number 
(of poor) is decreasing, I am convinced…” 
“Awards and recognition that we received is one way to measure that our attempts in 
reducing poverty are not futile. Ambitious it may seem, but if we keep doing this 
programme right, I believe we will hear less about extreme poverty, famine, or other sad 
news…” 
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6.4.2 Trend in Inequality 
With regard to inequality, Solo as an urbanised region reveals more of an unequal situation, with the 
Gini ratio staying at 0.35, whilst Sragen has a relatively lower inequality rate (0.33) from the latest BPS’ 
release (2014). Again, however, these official figures lend insufficient explanation for the reality as 
perceived by stakeholders in both regions. With the advantage of hindsight, it is possible to see that a 
discrepancy emerges due to the BPS’s methods of measuring inequality that rely largely on household 
consumption instead of income, let alone wealth or assets. 
One might argue that local economic growth could act as a springboard for citizens to improve their 
livelihoods, hence closing the gap between the poorest and the richest. Unfortunately, as time passes, 
the evidence mounts that economic advancement has also left protracted problems like inequality. 
This echoes the global phenomenon of the widening welfare gap.  
Like the prolonged discussion on disparity of nominal vs actual poverty, there have been perennial 
disputes concerning the measurement of inequality. For the most part, the polemic usually revolves 
around the methodology used by the BPS. Using the regular Susenas survey, the statistics agency 
releases the Gini index based on consumption or expenditure. Meanwhile, brief observation of the 
ownership of assets might provide a different impression. While official figures indicate slowly 
declining inequality, people hardly believe this to be a fact. It is simply a result of lacking trust in the 
official data. 
Besides this, the discrepancy is also a result of widespread informality in terms of jobs. Those who 
work in the informal sector usually have a lower income than their colleagues who hold formal jobs. 
Naturally, informal sector employees have an uncertain duration of employment which cannot 
guarantee stable earnings and is prone to termination. 
At the outset, some argue that widely used gauges of economic inequality, like the Gini coefficient, 
are not really well suited for measuring social and economic progress. That metric and similar ones do 
not focus on what is actually unfair about the status quo: the absolute deprivation and lack of 
opportunity imposed on a large segment of society. In this regard, upward mobility becomes more 
important, although lamentably the lacuna on the literature concerning this topic in the Indonesian 
context is not yet filled. 
Using a wider spectrum, inequality can be traced from the socio-economic conditions of privileged 
versus non-privileged groups in terms of access to education and facilities that are important to 
sustain basic necessities. Within the wider context of inequality, it is instructive to distinguish two 
types of inequality i.e. based on outcome or opportunity. Borrowing a concept from John Roemer 
(2000), inequality of outcome, which at times is represented by income disparity among members of 
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a society, is not necessarily a result of the difference in effort undertaken or connatural talent among 
individuals but it also reflects the gap in circumstances beyond the control of particular individuals.  
The unequal opportunity is seemingly taking place in regions where quality of public facilities are 
generally sub-standard while privately-arranged institutions limit the access of citizens from low 
income groups. This notion fits into the situation in Surakarta where most of the developed education 
and health facilities cater only to non-poor segments while sub-par public facilities provided for the 
poor only help a little, barely functioning as a springboard to elevate socio-economic status in the long 
run. 
Therefore, while SP intervenes to address income inequality, it requires further policies to unravel the 
problems of economic immobility. Yet, the problem of inequality seems to have been overlooked at 
least on paper. Various government documents in Surakarta and Sragen generally do not touch upon 
the inequality issue. According to an official, SP programmes have been mainly oriented towards 
poverty reduction. Targets and indicators were translated so as to achieve targets on the poverty rate 
or the improvement of social welfare. As a government official in Sragen put it: 
“We in this office were instructed by pak Bupati specifically to safeguard the agenda on 
poverty reduction. This is very important as poverty was one of the main concerns during 
his campaign years ago. As regard to inequality, we acknowledge the problem has begun 
to emerge lately, but we did not mention it in our local planning document because our 
priority is still on poverty alleviation and the promotion of human development…” 
Unlike policies of equalising outcome, policies of equalising opportunity by providing support to 
individuals with less favourable circumstances to level the playing field is relatively more acceptable 
across different positions on the political spectrum, from left to right. As the left in politics is virtually 
prohibited by law, the idea is normally transmitted to the concept of people-oriented ideologies such 
as social democracy (as embedded in PDI Perjuangan’s manifesto) or subtly traversed in other parties 
which typically hoist the banners of nationalism and development. 
 
6.5 Reflections and Key Findings  
Data analysis during this stage followed an iterative process and notes were transcribed to identify 
any inductive patterns in the data. Data collected from the interviews and secondary sources reveals 
not only the detailed operationalisation of SP programmes at both sites, but also the relationships 
between stakeholders. 
Using the conceptual framework of decentralisation, and drawing methodologically from the field of 
policy implementation research and from brief sociological ethnographies, thematic analysis was 
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conducted on the data from official documents (encompassing budget report and work plan), 
researcher field notes, and qualitative interviews with stakeholders, including officials, facilitators, and 
beneficiaries who were the targeted recipients of the SP programme. Next, a follow-up framework 
analysis was conducted on a subset of data to examine prominent patterns that emerged during the 
field visits. The results of the qualitative part of the study are broadly illustrative, but by no means 
strictly representative, of the SP programmes implemented nationally. The results appear to echo and 
complement the findings of the quantitative part of this study.  
Normally, themes are expected to recur frequently as responses towards critical research questions, 
although on several occasions, unforeseen topics featured heavily. This indicates two possibilities. 
First, it might indicate that the prepared set of research questions did not comprehensively capture 
the situation in the field, hence the existing research framework will benefit considerably from 
additional topics. Second, it implies either a lack of knowledge on certain subjects or reluctance to 
inform sensitive matters. Either way, inputs from respondents (or interlocutors) will build valuable 
data sets to analyse. 
Assisted by NVivo software, patterns of themes are established. The identification of patterns is 
analysed and this leads to formulation on four main recurring themes. These four leading themes are 
elaborated in this section.  
Chief amongst these emerging themes is the rivalry between the local and central government. This 
happened especially after the local direct election was imposed and the regional budget was 
significantly increased. Inevitably, they were vying for administering various SP programmes as the 
division of authority between agencies has not been clearly delineated. Therefore, overlapping 
programmes and conflicting regulations become the central topic in almost every interviews, 
especially with respondents from local government offices. 
Whereas competition between the central and local government remains, vertical coordination in 
various forms still takes place. In this context of rivalry, however, the degree of prerogatives for the 
provincial level seems limited, and hence is insignificant. Following decentralisation, most of the SP 
programmes were organised by the central government (ministerial level). The role of ‘middle men’ 
as played by the province is no longer relevant in this case. In practice, however, one of the 
distinguishing features of provincial authority is how it can affect policymaking through political 
influence, particularly when the governor and the mayor (or the regent) belongs to the same party 
(coalition). Conversely, when these office holders come from rivalling parties, they will fight fiercely in 
local policymaking. In the following section, other important key findings will be elaborated further.   
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6.5.1 Local Initiatives are intended to Complement National Programmes but Seem Suboptimal 
One of the most important features in the decentralisation of public administration, particularly after 
the introduction of direct election, is the emergence of competing approaches in shaping local public 
policy. This rivalrous attitude among policymakers can be narrowed down into the technocratic vis-à-
vis populist. The former was popular not only after the decentralisation laws were implemented but 
also played an important role in the decision-making process during Suharto’s New Order period 
(1970s-1990s), with the ‘Berkeley Mafia’ as the main proponent whilst the latter prevailed in Sukarno’s 
Old Order era (1950s to 1960s). Nowadays, at the national level, policymakers strive hard to balance 
these divergent styles.  
In Sragen and Surakarta, both local governments increasingly adopted a technocratic approach 
without completely neglecting a populist outlook. This ambiguity could possibly be found in other 
regions where the orientation of the SP programme was towards effective, evidence-based policies 
while local leaders still gained enormous support of the electorate. The situation seemed problematic 
from the outset, yet it was manageable at times with trial-and-error experimentation. Targeting in the 
initial stage required a household survey methodology to estimate the level of vulnerability. However, 
this initiative created turmoil at the beginning of implementation and dissatisfaction emerged, as 
mentioned by an official in Surakarta: 
“We understood the intention and purpose of targeting for delivering the benefits but 
unfortunately there was hardly a discussion to formulate the methodology, let alone an 
instrument before the survey started. Nevertheless, we had to deal with the 
imperfection of the data set and follow instructions from the ministry. Yet, we finally 
managed to anticipate the problem caused mainly by the resentment of non-
beneficiaries...” 
Within the context of fiscally-constrained SP distribution, the most important aspect is targeting. 
However, competing narratives on the effectiveness of targeting can also be discerned and traces of 
evidence can be spotted in the circles of policymakers. With the benefit of hindsight, most social 
policies in the past had less concern for targeting. Increasing world oil prices in the mid-2000s marked 
the exigency to depart from previous inefficient programmes as the resources were diverted to fuel 
subsidy.  
Subsequently, at the national level, PMT is adopted as the official method for the poverty census and 
this lead to a further discussion on the design of new SP programmes suitable for the community. 
Convincing as it seems, the concept of PMT resonates through many local government strategies to 
identify beneficiaries in their regions.    
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Transformation from simple non-targeted assistance to intricate targeted intervention was then 
emulated at the local level, using the cases in Sragen and Surakarta, and the local government felt the 
same urgency to prioritise funding for a more efficient SP programme. In addition, these local 
governments attempted to devise a new methodology for determining beneficiaries using ‘localised' 
indicators different to those of the national version. They also experimented to involve the community 
in targeting to check validity as well as to explore possible additional beneficiaries. Targeting 
beneficiaries seemingly dominates the discourse at the local level, yet at times the notion of universal 
beneficiaries comes to the fore, particularly during the periods of political campaign. Naturally, 
candidates will offer as many benefits as possible to the electorate. One of the most common 
strategies related to SP programmes is extending the number of beneficiaries. This seems to be highly 
inefficient and unsustainable given the limited fiscal capacity. Yet, mostly the winning candidates 
could adjust the benefit or number of beneficiaries once facing budgetary problems. As commented 
by an official in Sragen: 
“The campaign message of the incumbent was ‘welfare of all’ which implies universal SP 
programmes, therefore, our office launched the Kenanga scheme that provides health 
benefits to everyone who applies regardless of their socio-economic status. However, 
to prevent moral hazard and to control the budget, we decided to limit the benefit so it 
is not as generous as other schemes. For instance, it only subsidizes a small fraction of 
hospitalisation expenses assuming that the cardholders can afford to pay the 
difference…” 
Expanding or universalising beneficiaries, however, has negative implications for the national SP 
programmes. As the local government released a different version of the beneficiaries’ roster, the 
multiplicity of data can perhaps cause confusion in implementation, and again creates a lack of 
confidence in the credibility of the data. 
Reflecting on the cases of Sragen and Surakarta, local governments attempt to address the imbalance 
in distribution of social aid. For the first time after several decades, local administration had a chance 
to manage their budgets and to govern the mechanism of channelling benefits. However, it seems, 
their endeavour in SP could not match the ongoing effort by central government in many aspects. 
Ideally, the work of both local and central governments should complement each other. Many praise 
local programmes, including SP, as being appropriate for the local needs, but each programme also 
suffers a major drawback, i.e. the issue of portability. No matter how generous the scheme was to 
beneficiaries, it would not serve optimally in other places. 
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Another protracted discourse is on the strict usage of the proxy means test (PMT, henceforth) or more 
lenient ‘community-based targeting’20 which generally points to the debate regarding decentralisation 
in targeting. The main contention usually revolve around the debate of weighing the benefits of 
utilising local information versus the costs of various forms of malfeasance, such as elite capture 
(Alatas et al., 2013). In the PMTs, the main presumption is that household assets are harder to conceal 
from government surveyors than income; in community-based targeting, the presumption is that 
wealth is harder to hide from one’s neighbours than from the government (Alatas et al., 2012, p. 1207). 
Meanwhile, other issues such as costs and accuracy still do not lead to the firm conclusion towards 
the best targeting method. 
Figure 6.8 below shows that almost all conversation topics almost always lead to the issue of targeting. 
Dominated by the issues of targeting, the discussions with respondents range widely from 
technicalities to more abstract subjects like the concept and philosophy of targeted benefits. 
 
Figure 6.4 Recurring Themes in Qualitative Analysis 
The choice between the two approaches is generally posited as a trade-off between the better 
information that communities might have, versus the risk of elite capture in the community decision-
making process (Alatas et al., 2012). However, in the perspective of local governments in the case of 
Sragen and Surakarta, community-based targeting almost invariably prevails over the issue of public 
resentment. Furthermore, the size of benefit is no longer a priority because equally distributed 
                                                          
20 In community-based targeting, the government allows the community or some part of it (e.g. local 
leaders) to select the beneficiaries. This method is widely used in developing countries such as 
Bangladesh Food-for-Education programme (Galasso & Ravallion, 2005) and the Albanian Economic 
Support safety net programme (Alderman, 2002). 
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benefits are found to be effective in ensuring a cohesive tight-knit community and suppressing 
resentment. The following statement from a local community leader supports this notion: 
“I personally prefer the decision of Pak Bupati to distribute the benefit more equally (in 
the case of subsidised rice) and give the access for the existing non-beneficiaries to apply 
(for health and education schemes). This will create more transparency and I believe 
people will understand if their application is eventually rejected after review. Compared 
to the case of BLT (unconditional cash transfer) in 2005-2006 that was marred with 
violence, today I can say it can be avoided because everyone is now involved in the 
process and gains relatively equal benefits than before…” 
Apart from the capacity issue, newly established local governments in transitional times encounter 
multiple internal hurdles. One among these obstacles is the problem of coordination. Resentment 
towards UPTPK as a new agency was based on positive discrimination in respect of the budget and 
flexibility on recruiting talent. SP integration entails institutional upgrading but creates repercussions 
and crowding-out of the budget which eventually triggers friction within the local administration. In 
the end, it will risk affecting the programmes that by design involve wider collaboration between 
offices. As quoted from an officer in the Social Welfare Office in Sragen: 
“We do not begrudge the newly established agency (UPTPK), we also completely 
understand that they have special mandate from pak Bupati but we would like to 
express our concern that if UPTPK had been given much attention without careful 
consideration on existing regulations, one day we will see this ending up with serious 
problems. Now it seems easy for them to obtain limitless funds and recruit talent from 
many offices, but I worry that they have bypassed and infringed many regulations” 
The decentralisation of authority can be simply translated as ‘windfall’ in the local government budget 
through intergovernmental transfer. Increased authority allows local agencies to develop new 
activities or set up new units. Local governments, however, must make difficult choices in allocating 
scarce funds for development. Investment in social infrastructure can be difficult to justify when the 
‘returns’ may not be realised for a decade or more. Especially when governments are facing pressures 
from local constituencies, infrastructure projects such as a bridge, market building, or roads may offer 
more tangible returns for the taxpayers or campaign-funders. Experiments in expanding SP 
programmes will definitely put other programmes aside and potentially drain limited resources. The 
anxiety is not uncommon among officials in various units, as mentioned by an official working in the 
Local Budget Office in Sragen: 
“People always think that through decentralisation nowadays local offices hold 
abundant development funds. That perception is untrue, as we can see from the budget 
report that most of the expenses went to the salary and routine disbursement. I realise 
the establishment of UPTPK is necessary to attain the development objective as 
stipulated in RPJMD, but I began to worry after knowing this new unit requires huge 
initial investment and high cost for the upkeep.” 
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The problem of coordination did not really become a serious issue in Surakarta. Frictions among 
policymakers on issues such as local budget and authorities are less prominent for the most part 
because local offices share authority relatively more equally. Unlike Sragen, where UPTPK acts like a 
superior body overriding existing regulations, there is a potential clash amongst offices in Surakarta, 
hindering the prospect of coordination. Minor problems occurred when a local office had to use 
inexact beneficiaries’ data from the central government (PPLS) as a condition to execute important 
programmes like rice subsidy while locally-collected data was considered more accurate. Most of the 
time, the problem was solved through deliberative mechanisms to use both sets of data for the sake 
of budget and programme continuity. 
Last but not least, the key problem of newly-established local agencies is capacity. This problem 
constantly appears in the context of decentralisation in developing countries. Lacks of funding and 
weak personnel capacity are interrelated factors that inhibit the initiative. The word-cloud in Figure 
6.9 depicts the hundred terms most commonly used in discussions of decentralisation. 
  
 
Figure 6.5 High Frequency Terms in Discussion of Decentralisation 
Undertaking survey for targeting has not been an easy task, particularly in regions where capacity and 
resources are limited. Targeting process in Sragen relies heavily on the poverty survey. Officials are 
equipped with basic knowledge on survey technique. A single-page questionnaire form (see Figure 
6.10) is designed very simply with around twenty short questions. At a glance, this form appears to be 
an abridged version of BPS’ form for similar purposes. Upon completion of the survey, the forms will 
be assessed, sometimes on the spot, to count the scores and determine the eligibility of households 
to obtain benefits. With the infrastructure marred by lack of maintenance and slow development, 
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logistical challenges inevitably become the most significant impediment. Therefore, this activity is 
often arduous, challenging, and sometimes frustrating because most locations are remote.  
As the survey is normally conducted during daytime (working hours) and without prior notification to 
anticipate for moral hazard,21 it is consequently quite frequent that the household head is not at home, 
which causes the officers to repeat the visit without certainty of meeting the person. Officials 
undertaking the survey need not elaborate on the closed questions as they are already straightforward 
to answer. Yet, more importantly, they should be able to recognise and filter sincere responses. With 
regards to the questions related to assets ownership, surveyors have the right to inspect, if necessary, 
the actual conditions in a household to verify the responses. Respondents might be providing false 
responses on socio-economic status (such as employment, education, expenditure, and income) 
deliberately, while the validity of responses in terms of durable assets might be difficult to fake. 
Moreover, the surveyor can also verify the information against statements from neighbours or 
community leaders. 
                                                          
21 In the past, when the surveyors from BPS visit the households to determine the eligibility of cash 
transfer recipients, it is common that households tend to conceal their assets. Therefore, the idea of 
unnoticed visits is expected to surprise the households and prevent them from hiding their assets. 




Figure 6.6 Poverty Survey Questionnaire in Sragen 
The process can be more laborious when the household is suspected not to be eligible as beneficiary. 
Usually, in the case that the household is suspected as being ineligible, the official requires 
confirmation from community leaders and the neighbours before the decision is finally taken. Unlike 
targeting processes undertaken by the central government, this local version of the poverty survey 
enables failed applicants to appeal or protest regarding the final outcome. Normally, those disgruntled 
households will eventually understand the outcome, especially after hearing the explanation from the 
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scoring process and methods. This procedure is important to ensure transparency in the survey. In 
addition, the implication of this mechanism will assure to a certain extent the confidence level of 
society towards the targeting exercise. Therefore, unlike in previous surveys attempted by BPS, 
conflicts and resentment are more likely to be suppressed with this grievance mechanism. 
 
Figure 6.7 Survey Visits at Potentially Eligible Households 
 
Figure 6.8 Survey Visits at Potentially Ineligible Households 
The form designed to enumerate socio-economic conditions for potential beneficiaries is considered 
reliable and versatile to the extent that it allows surveyors to undertake the process in a relatively 
efficient way. The survey and its methods are later replicated by other institutions, such as faith-based 
organisations (FBOs). Muhammadiyah – the second largest Islamic foundation in Indonesia – has been 
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active in adapting and developing SP programmes targeting specific regions where the organisation 
has the most vulnerable members. However, constrained by resources and aiming for increased 
effectiveness, they inevitably need to perform targeting to select beneficiaries. Traditionally, 
Muhammadiyah focused the operation mainly in urban areas where finding beneficiaries is more 
difficult. Having formed its charity institution to manage alms and donations (Lembaga Zakat Infak 
Sedekah Muhammadiyah, shortened by LAZISMU), the organisation aims to adopt more innovation 
for distributing benefits to the needy.  
In collaboration with UPTPK, LAZISMU has been embracing the notion of formulating ‘scores’ to 
determine the eligibility of beneficiaries. Therefore, it then emulated the survey in a special form. The 
form is generally similar to that of UPTPK, with specific focus on education which encompasses tuition 
costs, academic achievements, and related needs (uniform clothing, books, stationery, transportation 
expenses). 
Once the rosters are collected through the poverty survey, LAZISMU then arranges benefit distribution 
according to the specific needs. Yet, in several cases when the number of eligible beneficiaries exceeds 
the available resources, LAZISMU will contact UPTPK for providing assistance. As the form was already 
made under the consultation, UPTPK in most cases will generally accept the rosters as additional 
beneficiaries for the current fiscal year. Only when the budget was already nearly exhausted did UPTPK 
keep them for the upcoming fiscal years. In order to avoid double applications and overlapping, UPTPK 
will firstly input the proposed lists to the maintained database and keep the records for the further 
use. Only in a few cases where possible and where suspicion arose, UPTPK will undertake spot checks 
randomly to verify these new additions. 
 




Figure 6.9 Poverty Survey Used by a Faith-Based Organisation 
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In sum, the initiative for improving the targeting process is motivated by the need to supplement those 
poor people who have been largely left out. Pivotal in this approach is the attempt to simplify the 
design of the questionnaire form, and to introduce a scoring system for selecting beneficiaries. To a 
large extent, this mechanism and the active poverty survey could enhance the current system for 
managing beneficiaries at the local level. Yet, the main drawbacks can be spotted, particularly in parts 
where many applicants are not eligible but insist on applying for benefits. This typical case can 
potentially reduce the effectiveness of the poverty census and add complications for scrutinising 
beneficiaries. Most of the initiatives are apparently concentrated on increasing the coverage of 
beneficiaries. Under stringent financial circumstances, this might exhaust the available resources and 
neglect other local development priorities. 
  
6.5.2 Participation and Empowerment are Enhanced but Challenges Remain 
There has been ample evidence pointing to the increase in participation that is the result of expanded 
SP programmes, especially on schemes with catchphrases like ‘community development’ or 
‘participatory process’. The intended result of SP can encompass a broad range of objectives. With 
regards to participation, SP is often expected to ignite or stimulate effective involvement of 
stakeholders in all phases, from design, to implementation, to the monitoring of programme. 
Overall, there have been various attempts to meet the immediate economic needs of local citizens by 
harnessing their local knowledge. The degree of participation varies across SP programmes. For 
instance, conditional cash transfer might require active participation of the beneficiaries more than in 
any other programme. Meanwhile, community and economic empowerment programmes usually 
necessitate intense involvement from facilitators.  
After three decades of authoritarian rule which discouraged citizen participation, implementation of 
the new model of SP had opened new perspectives in defining participation, more importantly, at the 
local level where the locus of development is believed to take place. Previously in the New Order era, 
rarely did the central government put participation as an important element in any development 
programme. Nowadays, with the enactment of the Village Law in 2014 that expectedly will bring much 
devolution to the lowest layer of administration, funds from the central and provincial government 
will be disbursed directly to villages. To acquire these funds, villages were required to compose 
proposals in open, deliberative meetings for approval. These meetings were organised and supported 
by facilitators (most likely from the outgoing PNPM programme), who also oversaw the execution of 
the projects.  
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In the monitoring and evaluation process, for safeguarding the implementation of SP programmes, 
the participation of stakeholders is crucial to build trust and public support behind schemes, and 
ensure that there is a sense of ownership. In the case of Sragen and Surakarta, beneficiaries, non-
beneficiaries and community leaders and authorities all agree that participation, most importantly in 
beneficiary selection processes, was necessary to overcome the problems that had happened in the 
past. 
Nevertheless, distortions and capture by local elites is widely recognised as surrounding the 
implementation of participation at the local level. Also, when the initiation of participation is not 
accompanied with the increase in human capacity, the outcome is usually sub-optimal. Many 
instances show the failure of beneficiaries in understanding the concept, let alone their role in a 
programme. Therefore, it raises another issue, i.e. dependence on ‘middle men’ (such as facilitators) 
which resembles the existing mechanism of patronage. The problem is not uncommon in Indonesia 
thanks to a long legacy of authoritarianism, political patronage and weak institutions. In this situation, 
access to services on SP programmes is governed more by personal connections than legal status. 
A cursory look at SP programmes at the local level points to discernible evidence that participation 
amongst members of society is increasing, albeit rather gradually. This can be seen clearly during the 
regular meetings attended by beneficiaries and local officials. As a recipient of Kartu Menur said: 
“Of course, I will always try my best to attend the meeting for getting more information 
to participate and obviously to obtain the benefit that I need. I also enjoy meeting with 
neighbours and friends from other kampung (neighbourhoods). Sometimes, materials 
given during the meeting are very useful. For example, now I know better about child 
care and education, something that I never learned and always relied on what people 
suggested” 
As is common in other developing countries, stakeholder engagement in SP encompasses not only 
local government, but also inviting the greater involvement of non-state actors. Local NGOs are 
expected to play an important role in shaping policies as well as safeguarding implementation. The 
Department of Health Affairs in Solo solicited the help of the citizenry, especially the city’s active NGO 
community, to register residents.  At the end of 2007, the department started publicising the health 
care programme in print and electronic media and through community meetings.   
Based on previous studies, a higher extent of public participation was attributed as the key to success 
in exerting positive changes concerning political, democratic, and governance aspects, among others. 
These reforms were widely adopted and copied by developing countries and pushed hard by 
international donors. They were designed to promote basic values like public participation and 
accountability as the foundation for broader social change. Meanwhile in Indonesia, a long list of 
political reforms was instituted, from direct elections for national and local government to the 
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introduction of new institutions at the community level like the village assembly which executes and 
oversees development projects.  
During three months of fieldwork in 2015, I had the opportunity to observe how the reforms have 
worked in practice. What I found is a much more complex picture of social and political transformation. 
Today, the citizens I have seen are certainly more critical and politically savvy compared to 15 years 
ago. In a typical 5-year democratic cycle, they may vote several times for candidates at the national 
level all the way down to their neighbourhood leaders. 
Communities have also been equipped with a sophisticated system of checks and balances in which 
the village assembly plays the role of legislature in controlling the executive authority of the village 
head. It mimics the national state in miniature, with its own consultations, budgets and laws. The 
intention has been to foster ‘good governance’ at and from the grassroots level. 
Nevertheless, careful and deeper looks into the everyday lives of citizens in Surakarta and more 
prominently in Sragen reveal clear signs that the old patronage structures are already subverting the 
new local institutions. For example, all the leaders in the village are elected, but the influence of 
money is still rampant. The whole political structure is practically controlled by one dynasty or oligarch 
who contributes their money to ‘buy’ votes for the candidates they endorse. As one villager told:  
“Today, being a leader is not difficult, even for someone with no talent or experiences 
of leadership, as long as they have a lot of money to bribe the people.”  
Most of the citizens I interviewed are fully aware of this fact and express their disagreement, but 
nevertheless they go along with it: “I know it isn’t right, but almost all candidates are doing that, so 
who should we choose? Besides, we don’t see it as buying our votes but as charity.” 
In order to access entitlement programmes and assistance for services like health and education, 
citizens rely heavily on middle-men like community activists or volunteers to help them navigate the 
deterring and complex administrative procedures of hospitals, schools, and government offices. Like 
one of beneficiaries explained: 
“It’s very complicated to deal with the documentation before using the health care card 
at the local hospital, so we need someone to take care of it, while we take care of the 
sick….It’s just easier to ask and pay someone. Owning a health insurance card isn’t a 
guarantee of obtaining medical help, since dealing with the staff is often an agonising 
experience.” 
The situation is typical where the mediator was invited to intervene, for they were able and trusted 
to take care of all these hassles. The mediators themselves argue that they just want to help people. 
They argue that the money is just sufficient to cover transportation and communication costs. 
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According to beneficiaries and mediators, the amount of money is never fixed but depends a lot on 
circumstances like distances covered and difficulties.  
In this scope, the challenge of transformation of participation is not only a matter of institutional 
reform, but instead a deeply cultural and personal process that lives in the history of each region, in 
people’s past perceptions and daily experiences. These are elements that are often missed by 
policymakers who tend to assume that people will readily be willing to attend new offices, 
participatory meetings, and take part to hold elected leaders accountable for their decisions. Instead, 
wariness, fear, and disappointment forestall citizens from engaging with government in order to claim 
their rights: 
“One time, I tried to go to the village head to ask about assistance to renovate my 
dilapidated house. I heard the programme mentioned by my neighbour who 
understands better. The village head said he would help me and promised to visit my 
home. But many years on, I still got nothing. So that’s it for me, I will never ask for 
anything again. It’s embarrassing to ask the same thing again and again once you get 
ignored.” (A non-beneficiary living in Sragen).  
The ordeal can potentially trigger deeply-entrenched clientelism in the form of ‘money politics’. 
Usually, a broker who has broad connections with parliaments and the bureaucracy at the local level 
and sometimes even with Jakarta will offer promises to citizens who failed to access SP benefits for 
various reasons. If the offer is accepted, not only will the clients receive the benefits but they will be 
given a further promise for benefiting from other programmes. This will require compliance from 
citizens in the form of votes during local election. Although this seems to be a very loose contract 
between two parties, the strategy has been proven effective, at least according to the testimony from 
beneficiaries who were in favour of this scheme: 
“As much as complexity prevents many illiterates like me to access the government 
programme, I could not refuse the offer from Pak… [name undisclosed, a beneficiary in 
Sragen] whom I usually meet in the mosque. Initially, we merely talked about random 
topics, but then we ended up discussing social issues and problems on welfare. It 
obviously became of much interest to me. And when he said that he could help me to 
access several government programmes, I started to pay more attention. The next day, 
he said that we’d better discuss it at my house for the sake of privacy and convenience. 
When we finally met at home, he said more openly that he could help but with certain 
conditions though no formal documentation was involved at that time. A few weeks 
afterwards, he came with a letter, a receipt, and sums of money. The amount of money 
was less than stated in the receipt as he needed to cut some for his expenses (journey 
to Jakarta) and ‘administration’. We concluded this meeting with his request that I vote 
for a person from a renowned Islamist party, and more assistance can be delivered upon 
his success in the next election.” (Another beneficiary in Sragen).  
The story above exposes the case where components of SP have brought unintended consequences, 
i.e. creating dependency on ‘middle-men’ and inculcating practices of ‘transactional’ politics which is 
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potentially detrimental to local democracy. This case also uncovers the persistent problem of a 
complex bureaucracy that impedes people from accessing benefits and hindering public participation. 
Consequently, local SP programmes will be ineffective and costly in reaching beneficiaries. Detailed 
discussion on local politics and its relationship with SP is discussed in another section of this chapter 
(6.6.5). 
Therefore, participation is the main aspect of SP and seems to constitute a great role in defining its 
success. With the advantage of hindsight, it appears that stakeholders encompassing beneficiaries, 
facilitators, and others could adapt staggeringly with newly introduced schemes on various SP 
programmes which impose active engagement on its implementation. However, it seems that an 
approach to enlighten beneficiaries needs to be carefully constructed to mitigate the risks of ‘money 
politics’ and to enable people to better participate in other civic programmes and ultimately to claim 
citizens’ rights.   
 
6.5.3 Positive Impacts of SP on Community Relations with Cautions on Risk of Mistargeting 
In addition to being protective (providing relief), preventive (averting deprivation) and/or promotive 
(enhancing incomes and capabilities) SP interventions can be ‘transformative’. Transformative 
objectives aim to address concerns of social equity and exclusion which often underpin people’s 
experiences of chronic poverty and vulnerability. However, recent research points out that SP 
programmes are evaluated against their first order effects on poverty or human capital, with their 
impact on social relations within and between households typically more limited. Feeling a sense of 
shame in being poor and receiving social support, such as cash transfers, is a common theme.  
SP programmes in general can have positive as well as negative impact on social capital. Evidence from 
parts of the world shows that such assistance can result in increased collaboration and trust at 
community level (e.g. through greater participation in community meetings—as part of the condition 
to receive benefits—or increased involvement in community saving initiatives) or more positive 
relationships due to a reduction in hunger, stress, begging or even reduced crime. However, this does 
not necessarily translate into an articulation of voice in local politics. Several SP programmes can have 
negative repercussions if the targeting is perceived to be unfair, as was seen with Indonesia’s early 
cash transfer implementation. 
Some key findings about social institutions of relevance to collective risk management arrangements 
include that first, community institutions range from informal reciprocal systems for assisting people 
in distress, typically underpinned by kinship, to more formalised gotong royong institutions with set 
times, activities and assigned responsibilities. A large range and number of local institutions, informal 
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civil society groups and collective customs are of relevance to community social life and risk 
management. 
Second, in most rural communities, with the presence of ubiquitous SP programmes, citizens noted 
that collective social life remained strong. Many people offered several examples of activities that were 
conducted collectively or in the wider community interest, of which several were relevant to coping 
with crisis. Perhaps intuitively, urban and semi-urban communities were more fragmented and 
predominantly had fewer functioning institutions. This was also generally true of more socially diverse 
and divided communities, although there were notable exceptions in which people from different 
religious backgrounds described collaborative working and mutual aid systems across faiths (see 
quotations below). 
According to a neighbourhood leader in Sragen, there was no such helping habit between people in his 
community. He said this happened because the place he lived in was already in the city. Many people 
prefer to live individually. However, he still felt the spirit of helping each other with some of the other 
residents whom he had already known for a long time. Until then, his family had never received any 
donation or funding, they had only received zakat (a fixed amount of charity given to the poor 
according to Islamic rule) during Eid ul-Fitr (annual religious festival ending the fasting month of 
Ramadan).  
“People who live here are not generous in giving these days. How can it be? Well, they 
always think about what they will get when they give away something to others or 
becoming more transactional, so to speak.”  
As he went on to say: 
“Now some people are protesting, because there is a suspicion on cash or rice 
distribution. Consequently, the gotong royong culture (mutual help or joint bearing of 
burdens) which used to be good now does not exist anymore. Everyone wants to be the 
leader. Yet, people won’t listen anymore. Moreover, the provocateur is the village 
apparatus themselves. The local government staff can be the provocateur, causing 
conflict in the community.”  
Within more diverse communities, clan, kin, ethnic or faith identities were likely to draw people 
together, so that there were pockets of strong social cohesion within larger and more diverse and 
fragmented village territories. Customary and collective risk management institutions were by no 
means always positive: in a significant number of communities, poorer people noted that the costs of 
compulsory participation or voluntary contribution to marriage or mourning events were often so 
onerous as to exclude or burden them excessively. This was sufficiently widespread to constitute a 
non-trivial finding. This evidence is also a reminder that it is important to avoid romanticising 
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customary institutions which in the context of a modern market economy may have outgrown their 
purpose.  
The overall pattern of findings regarding the impact of SP on social relations is summarised in this 
section. In the overwhelming majority of locations, there was some social disruption and negative 
effects from the introduction of SP components such as cash transfer and rice subsidy where most of 
the imprecise targeting cases occurred, but these were neither very serious, nor did they endure. In a 
small number of cases, various SP programmes were received generally positively, or at least 
encountered no more of a negative response than other government programmes. And in a very small 
number of cases, I identified lasting negative impact. As will be discussed below, the enduring negative 
impact was related to officials and local leaders rather than to relations between ordinary members 
of the community.  
There can be no doubt that several SP schemes widely caused jealousy, disagreement, resentment, 
and some disruption to ordinary social relations. However, this conflict was chiefly ‘of the mouth’ 
rather than more confrontational or violent aggressive responses: most reports of the impact of SP on 
community relations were of complaints, whispering and gossip, and some joking about those who 
received it by those who did not but felt eligible: 
"We don’t have any conflicts concerning the social programme here … even if there is 
one, maybe just some rumours about it. Actually, protests did happen, but it didn’t 
escalate into making a huge fight, only fierce arguments (altercation) against each 
other…" (A facilitator in Sragen).  
There were some indications that women were apparently prominent in protests and complaints, 
possibly because they face the challenge of managing families most directly. In several sites, 
community leaders mentioned whispering campaigns and gossip among the women. But women were 
also at the forefront of some protests, and many appear to have felt their exclusion from the SP 
programme keenly. One woman in Surakarta who were not registered as beneficiaries said that: 
"If I see someone received the benefit, it really hurts my feelings, so to see [that] I have 
the desire to come and get angry at the location where the benefit was distributed (cash 
or rice). But my husband would not let me do such an action and he said: “aren’t you 
ashamed to fight with those people who received assistance just because of money or 
rice.” Listening to his words made me stay in silence."  
There were a small number of more serious incidents, in Sragen, where a village leader official was 
openly rebuked and verbally abused by people who had not received the payment, to the point that 
he gave up and offered to resign. In neighbouring areas, it was reported that the RT head’s house had 
been attacked.  
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There was limited evidence of sustained negative impact on the quality of social relations within 
communities; the ill-feeling between recipients and non-recipients was generally either mitigated by 
voluntarily sharing the benefit, having it shared by distributing officials, or defused gradually by the 
passage of time and the stronger perception of the need to live well together. In addition, for most 
people, the amount of benefit was not large enough to deserve sustained conflict or ill-feeling with 
neighbours or fellow community members. Like the excerpt from an interview with a beneficiary in 
Surakarta: 
"The feeling of envy and jealousy always occurs between the recipients and non-
recipients, but it will not affect the established kinship system and the tradition of 
helping each other between the citizens in this village, I feel that way. And so I happened 
to be one of the cash transfer recipients in 2008, and there was one of my next door 
neighbours who felt that way… from what I’ve seen, I don’t see there is a change in our 
social relationship and also people’s participation among the citizens before and after 
cash transfer. And maybe because the thing I said earlier, the amount of money is 
relatively small and given only thrice a year, so [there was] no influence on the people 
here. But yes, there was a conflict raised when it was distributed, yet it was more 
because there is no transparency of the data from BPS and there was no clarity about 
the source of the funds, that caused a misunderstanding to arise.”  
An important impact on community relations was that in several places, dissatisfied non-recipients 
were said to be unwilling to participate in voluntary work for the community. As one religious cum 
community leader in Sragen explained,  
“people who didn’t get the cash transfer, subsidised rice, or health care often said that 
they don’t want to be involved in community activities anymore.”  
It seems that non-recipients felt excluded and showed their displeasure by temporarily withdrawing 
their support for communal activities. It is not clear how long this situation lasted, but most people 
who mentioned this issue noted that it did not last long. Nevertheless, this withdrawal from 
community life was memorable to have been recalled several years later and clearly had considerable 
significance in relation to social cohesion.   
Local officials and community leaders appear to perceive SP, particularly cash transfer and rice subsidy, 
as having had more negative impact than other communities largely because these persons were the 
subject of protests and complaints. In a significant minority of communities, SP is associated with 
lasting distrust of local officials and community leaders, and even more so of central government 
practices of targeting. However, it could not be determined whether the negative impact on 
community trust of local officials was exclusively or mainly the result of SP programmes; given the 
frequency of complaints about and allegations of corruption or mismanagement in other central and 
local government programmes of much greater duration and size, it seems unlikely that this distrust 
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owes exclusively to SP. The lack of faith in central government targeting procedures, however, clearly 
originates with the beneficiary selection process of SP programmes. 
In a nutshell, the introduction of new SP programmes in both districts has been able to foster 
relationships among community members. The traditional social fabric remains resilient in the midst 
of disputes caused by deficiencies in targeting or malfeasant administration. In many cases, local 
leaders played an important role in recovering and maintaining public trust during difficult times. 
Simple innovations like displaying the list of beneficiaries in public spaces for checking and equal 
distributions of benefits to cover non-beneficiaries are commendable, and were proven effective in 
defusing disgruntled citizens. Nevertheless, the problems surrounding targeting had been perceived 
as the most important factors in conserving community relations. 
 
6.5.4 SP and Local Election: Is Entitlement Worth the Vote?  
In what follows, I continue to illustrate how the distribution of SP benefit and politics are intertwined 
and what sorts of pathways of power are taken by politicians, including the incumbent administration 
at the time of political contest. A cornucopia of studies on the relationship between local democracy 
(i.e. direct elections) and the expansion of SP points to distributive politics, touching upon a wide range 
of aspects from clientelism, pork-barrelling, patronage, to vote-buying. Similarly, as the quantitative 
analysis part of this research supports the presence of the PBC at the provincial level, there has been 
significant expansion of the SP (or SP-related) budget at the municipal or district level, including Sragen 
and Surakarta. Programmes are usually disbursed near the time of election and often involve networks 
of informal brokers. 
The impact of the SP budget during election is not confounded, evidently based on the fact that the 
incumbent in Sragen was defeated in the last local election (December 2015) leaving a big question 
mark as to whether his achievement in building an integrated SP system helped him during the 
election or not. With recognition from various agencies and international awards given at the end of 
the incumbent’s administration, the popular vote was previously expected to be for the incumbent, 
but along the way it seemed that more citizens felt the current administration only cared about social 
development while leaving the economy and infrastructure untouched. A member of the legislature 
in Sragen had actually expressed his concern long before the election: 
“To be honest, I actually already said to pak Bupati about this (his decision to prioritise 
social development). Although I really appreciate the hard work which now comes into 
fruition, I do not think that it is sufficient to guarantee him the seat for another term. 
People will ask for more, like road improvement which has been long overdue and now 
in a bad condition. The current policy seems to only target vulnerable groups which are 
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obviously very significant in numbers, but as we witness the growing proportion of the 
middle class segment, the election might be determined by their aspiration.” 
Meanwhile in Surakarta, the success of Jokowi’s leadership in his two periods of mayoralty (2005-2010 
and 2010-2012) has left impressions unprecedented for the electorate mainly with his SP programmes 
and focus on vulnerable groups as beneficiaries. This approach and his casual style managed to attract 
public attention and gain media coverage. The legacy was successfully capitalised by his successor, FX 
Hadi Rudyatmo, to win the election in 2015. Not only did SP catapult Jokowi’s political path to the 
national level, but his strategy in managing SP in Solo and Jakarta (in 2012-2014) had influenced other 
candidates in many regions. This can be summarised by an excerpt from an interview with a 
parliament member in Solo: 
“Finally, we can witness the positive result of democratisation and to a large extent also 
decentralisation. Solo, and I believe many other districts, have potential and capable 
candidates participating in every election. The strategy on prioritising SP and focusing 
on vulnerable groups certainly comes into fruition. However, we should be cautious that 
the work of politics is not necessarily predictable, especially as we know that 
democratisation is not in the mature stage yet. It can be still easily fraught with money 
politics and all the dirty images of politics.”   
During election periods, electoral dynamics were largely shaped not only by entitlement policies of 
the incumbent leader but also by the strategies from other candidates. I find that in many ways 
electoral dynamics in Sragen and Surakarta share a high degree of resemblance. Most candidates 
targeted voters from vulnerable groups and used patronage networks to attract their support. I found 
relatively less one-on-one retail vote buying, as occurs elsewhere in the country, instead there was a 
lot of delivery of club goods such as small-scale projects for communities, usually with the 
neighbourhood heads acting as brokers. As in any other regions, candidates mostly built personal 
campaign machines instead of relying on party structures to undertake their campaigning. Many 
candidates also used religious, ethnic, and other informal networks to reach potential voters. In 
addition, there were many candidates who combined these approaches with more programmatic 
appeals, media strategies, and appeals specifically to middle-class voters. Above all, electioneering in 
Sragen and Surakarta was primarily characterised by what could be called clientelist social welfare: 
many voters wanted access to health, education, and other services while many candidates strove to 
deliver such services in ways that would generate personal political debts. 
In reaching out to poor voters, there were normally four preliminary steps. Firstly, candidates typically 
mapped out areas to target where they predicted higher potential votes. Occasionally, it seems, they 
did mapping on the basis of previous election results. Candidates also aimed for areas where they had 
personal or network connections. A member of the legislature whom I interviewed employed a 
professional consultancy firm to map areas where he had received the highest number of votes in 
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2006, identifying kelurahan (precincts or urbanised village) which he later made the focus of rallies. 
Moreover, he mentioned that some of his colleagues also resorted to professional political firms to 
identify locations where their popularity would be high: 
“I personally prefer to rely on familial network and kinship connections to sort things 
out, but these days we face harsher competition and fiercer rivalry in politics, even 
within our party internally, and I did not have much choice but use their (professional 
firm) service to get the upper hand. In 2006, when I did not use this kind of service, 
informal networks and family connections were largely my success factor but as time 
went by who can be sure that one is still loyal or not…” 
Secondly, candidates established ad hoc ‘success teams’ whose job was to reach out to voters in these 
target areas. Most teams adopted the basic structure of territorial organisation commonly found 
throughout Indonesia. One of the largest teams I found was that of one candidate who claimed to 
have a thousand relawan (volunteers) in his team spread across 20 precincts. Depending on the 
candidate’s campaign budget, some of the people occupying top positions in these structures were 
paid honoraria, albeit modest, around Rp250,000 to Rp1.5 million though at different rates (thus the 
Rp250,000 payment was for menial jobs such as photocopying or distributing flyers; the higher 
payment was a monthly regular salary). In addition, candidates also worked through any social 
networks they could establish or had access to in order to mobilise support. One MP from Golkar was 
known for his association with large farmer organisations. Other members generally used ethnic or 
religious networks, providing a hint to identity politics. Most advanced teams could even identify the 
amount of largesse for electorates in a region. This will to some extent shape the SP-like programmes 
from the perspective of MP candidates. 
Thirdly, candidates then mobilised their teams to boost recognition of their name by distributing 
equipment: t-shirts, posters, banners, stickers, and other merchandise through areas identified as 
targets. As a result, even the narrow alleyways that wind through kampungs in Solo and Sragen were 
festooned with banners and posters. Almost all the grid poles and public lights were covered with 
pictures and slogans, mostly awkwardly worded. Some candidates, aware of the saturation advertising 
on the roadsides, tried to cut through the noise by using more inventive methods. One candidate paid 
street cleaners and street vendors a certain amount of money to wear his t-shirts emblazoned with 
his picture and slogans. Another technique, which became popular, was deploying ‘cyber troops’ 
specifically to operate in social media. Staff in this division usually works on big issues emerging from 
conversations, posts, or news emerging on social media outlets such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and 
news websites. They were so active in observing the development in social media that almost every 
topic could be covered and responded to intensely. With this information, they were adept in 
promoting the candidates either subtly or overtly. 
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Fourthly, these success teams organised various forms of blusukan (impromptu visits), a term for 
meet-the-people campaign made popular by Jokowi. Most MPs were sure that direct personal contact 
with voters is critical for success. Jokowi himself used the term blusukan for meetings in public spaces 
such as marketplaces; while interviewed candidates used it to describe face-to-face meetings of all 
sorts. The typical method was small meetings facilitated by neighbourhood leaders, but a wide variety 
of focal points were practicable: visiting religious gatherings organised by Islamic study groups, 
welfare community meetings, or arisan (rotating saving) meetings. Involving the women of a particular 
locale was very common. The main goal was to ensure that as many voters as possible felt they had 
some personal connection with the candidate and could have easy access should they need anything 
in future. Some candidates took extraordinary efforts to make themselves highly accessible. One 
legislator distributed materials that listed all his contact details ranging from telephone numbers to 
BlackBerry Messenger pin code.  
Apart from those basic steps, perhaps the most striking thing about election campaigning in the 
regions was that so many candidates emphasised delivery of what in many settings would be 
considered part of normal government service: provision of healthcare or ambulances, road repairs, 
help with accessing government agencies, among others. The basic thinking motivating this type of 
strategy was simple. In Surakarta and most commonly in Sragen, as probably throughout the country, 
most candidates believed that voters were not interested in vague programmes or general promises 
about what the government could deliver to the country like the statement below: 
"What the people need, what they hope for, is only concrete things." (A community 
leader in Sragen) 
In providing such concrete benefits, most candidates would normally avoid giving direct cash 
payments to voters. To make sure, most of them handed out small gifts and keepsakes when they had 
the opportunity to meet constituents. Most patronage came in the form of club goods (donations 
conferring some collective benefit to a community) or constituency services. Therefore, they argued 
that they always avoided 'money politics' even as they relied on patronage as their main strategy. One 
legislator even differentiated between 'political costs' and 'money politics' with the latter consisting 
of cash payments to supporters which he renounced. However, donations in the form of assistance 
that would benefit most or entire communities fell into the 'political costs' category, as a legislator 
further argues: 
"Fixing damaged roads, public lavatories, or bathing facilities, street lighting, or carpets 
in a mosque—that's all fine. Those are part of my political expenditure or costs. But 
giving away money to them? I will not do that. Money feeds pragmatic politics." 
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Some of the resourceful candidates had sophisticated machinery to provide constituents with such 
benefits. One of the most common strategies is by donating ambulance cars to provide health care 
and funeral services to the potential electorates, especially in remote areas. The cars are decorated 
with photos of the candidates and coulour of their political parties.  
Clientelist social welfare as a political strategy is entirely relevant to the context where persistent 
patronage networks still dominate. Moreover, making matters worse is increasing economic 
inequality within society that causes the issue of redistribution to become more befitting for local 
politics. As is the case elsewhere, income inequality is visibly on the rise in Sragen and Surakarta. 
Accordingly, the reality of increasing inequalities has been accompanied by growing popular concern. 
The rising disparity between citizens and entangled informal network of patronage motivate 
candidates to offer various entitlement programmes or oftentimes merely simple handouts such as 
rice, cooking oil, and a small amount of money to households. 
Undeniably, the discussion of implementing ‘clientelist social welfare’ is heavily dominated by 
allegations or presumptions of the incumbent exploiting the local budget every five years (election 
periods). Although the notion of clientelist social welfare is vehemently rejected by local officials, they 
attempted to provide explanations regarding the presence of the five-yearly political budget cycle in 
local budgets: 
"I can be sure that the suspicion of deliberately deploying a huge amount of resources 
during the election period is unfounded. There is no such thing as directives from pak 
Bupati or whoever that SP expenses are boosted in a certain period. What I can explain 
in relation to the pattern of budget cycle is that most of the programmes take a while 
before realisation. For example, a multi-year infrastructure project needs planning, 
feasibility study, and procurement process that already takes usually nearly one fiscal 
year to complete. Analogously, although not perfectly similar, is that SP programmes 
that have been gradually expanded annually will take large portions of funding at the 
end of the administrative term which coincides with elections. [statement from a local 
official in Sragen]" 
With newly elected leaders, often the agenda for the next five years is different from that of previous 
leaders. For instance, if the new elected leaders prefer infrastructure development to social assistance 
with an incremental increase for the next five years, this will create a new budget cycle from relatively 
low spending to higher by the end of term, especially when the number of beneficiaries and scale of 
the programme are constantly expanded over several years.  
With regards to beneficiaries, the majority made a positive comment on the use of SP or entitlement 
during the political campaign, yet almost none of them believe the strategy is always effective in 
garnering votes, let alone winning the election. This is partly due to the rivalry between candidates 
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using indistinguishable strategies which in the end will make it difficult to predict the winners. Another 
factor can be attributed to the rationality of voters. As explained by a cash transfer beneficiary in Solo: 
"These days, citizens are clever indeed. They cannot simply be deceived to elect only 
because of small cash, simple foods, or other stuff. Instead, they will be happy to receive 
the generous donations but then they will still consider their choices based on many 
factors on the election day. Although of course, some voters especially poor people tend 
to vote for candidates who are known as generous in distributing goods, rather than 
candidates who merely spoke of promises in the rallies." 
The amount of benefits and flurry of SP programmes had inevitably caused unintended consequences. 
There were indications that resentment erupted among non-beneficiaries, and became widespread 
as many issues were still left unsolved. In Sragen, most prominent among these issues was road 
damage. The public had been longing for the local government to mend potholes, as they were 
presumed to have substantial fund allocation for infrastructure, especially given that regional 
autonomy comes with the assumption that most projects can be executed faster.  
However, most of these wishes did not materialise. Deteriorating conditions of main roads had taken 
a toll. Traffic accidents and congestion led to widespread public outcry. Though only very few 
expressed their discontent openly, most citizens shared the same negative feelings on this issue, as 
discussed by a respondent who formerly worked as a facilitator in SP programme and is currently 
entrusted to be neighbourhood leader in Sragen: 
“Not many people have the ability and opportunity to write in newspapers or to see the 
officials, let alone arranging public protest for demanding road improvement. But I 
believe everyone on the coffee shops always talks about the issue over and again. My 
prediction is that this discontent among the public will ultimately be a damaging blow 
for Bupati’s reputation in the upcoming election.”  
This situation can be perceived as a ‘trade-off’ between SP programmes and infrastructure 
development which is now currently in favour of SP beneficiaries and to a large extent denies the 
rights of ‘upper and middle-class’ taxpayers. As the problems remain unresolved, this probably 
engenders dissatisfaction among voters from the non-poor segment until the election comes. As 
indicated, there is fierce competition for resources and influence, as well as juxtaposition of two 
different electorate groups, i.e. between the new, aspiring, critical yet somehow insecure middle 
classes, and the existing vulnerable groups. Sometimes, the contestation between them is also layered 
with different educational backgrounds and many other socio-economic variables, although of course, 
this is a simplified generalisation. In other words, both the emerging middle class and vulnerable group 
want to benefit from current democratisation. This signifies the gaps not only between their 
livelihoods but also their expectations. The situation might become worse considering the increasing 
trend of inequality. 
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To sum up, much of the discussion within the scope of SP and local democracy has hitherto been 
largely confined to the defective aspects of politics. Nevertheless, the nexus of SP and elections has 
the potential to commence innovative practices as shown in the cases of Sragen and Surakarta. 
Unequal characteristics within local electorates bring about strategies which at times are bounded 
with strictly limited resources. This leads politicians to find a workable equilibrium in serving their 
constituents. 
   
6.6 Explaining the Different Performance in SP between Sragen and Surakarta  
It is critical to raise the question of why the performance between Sragen and Surakarta was 
remarkably different, with respect to the qualitative performance of decentralisation in terms of SP 
implementation and the improvement of general socio-economic conditions. In comparing the 
performance of each local SP between these districts, it is relevant to look at several factors that could 
possibly affect the disparate outcomes. These factors may include resources (both natural and human 
resources), economic structure of the region, geographic location, political landscape, and local 
government policies. This section attempts to briefly examine the extent to which each of these 
factors has contributed to the different performance in SP implementation between the two regions. 
Athough there are many similarities between the two locations, a number of patterns can explain 
important differences in terms of SP performance. Given the large number of different characteristics 
in the two regions, the identified similarities need to be treated with caution. As explained earlier in 
this chapter, administration in Sragen as a district tends to be associated with rural governance, with 
baseline socio-economic conditions perceived to be lower than municipalities (cities) and basic 
infrastructure often portrayed as less developed. 
Natural resources and human capital can significantly affect the performance of a district in the area 
of poverty reduction and welfare development. A district well-endowed with natural resources can 
greatly increase its local revenue and financial resources which can support local SP programmes. 
Similarly, the capacity of human resources in a district is also an important factor in SP programmes, 
since this factor influences the capability of the district to manage the region, especially in running 
government programmes effectively. Comparing Surakarta and Sragen in terms of natural resources, 
there is no significant difference between them. Both regions are not endowed with oil, gas, or other 
mineral resources so that they in general share similar fiscal capacity. Yet, Surakarta appears to have 
abundant talents as indicated by higher literacy rates for the latest decade. Another measure such as 
Human Development Index also indicates the superiority of human capital in Surakarta. This gap of 
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human resource capacity might be explained to the different pattern of redistribution. As indicated in 
part 4.7, lower percentile groups in Solo seem to enjoy increasing growth larger than Sragen.  
The type of political party dominating the local parliament may also influence the performance of SP, 
especially with respect to targeted assistance. During the first five years of decentralisation, the heads 
of the district and municipality were elected by members of local parliaments. In this situation, the 
political party that dominated parliament would have a sizeable chance of establishing their candidate 
as the head of district. Similarly, the background of candidates, whether civil or military, businessman 
or labourer, could also possibly influence the decentralisation performance of the district. However, 
within this assumption, the performance of Surakarta and Sragen could not be used to explain the 
different performance of the two regions, because the same political party (i.e. Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia-Perjuangan/PDI-P) has dominated the seats for local MPs in both locations. Although these 
days, coalitions or alliances could potentially be effective in nominating candidates for direct election, 
the influence of the largest political party still exerts significant influence. A case in point is Sragen’s 
election in 2015 when the winning pair was not supported by PDI-P, but the candidate had personal 
support from former functionaries of PDI-P (especially given the fact that Kusdinar Untung Yuni is the 
daughter of Untung S. Wiyono, a loyal cadre of PDI-P and the regent of Sragen from 2001-2011).   
The geographic location and economic structure of regions are also factors considered important in 
explaining SP performance. Logistical challenges can be attributed to geographical impediments. 
Likewise, the performance of a region where the secondary sector (manufacturing) dominates the 
economy is likely to be different from those dependent mostly on the extractive agricultural sector. 
The proximity to the growth centre is also assumed to affect the local economy. In this context, 
comparing Sragen and Surakarta seems to be insignificant as both regions are located rather far from 
the nearest growth centre (in Semarang). However, the quality of infrastructure which is apparently 
higher in Surakarta may explain the differences. 
Also, the level of economic growth may have a significant influence on the size of the SP budget and 
its performance, as explored in the literature review and quantitative analysis earlier. The discussion 
of the economic background of the two locations clearly revealed that the rate of economic growth in 
Surakarta was higher than that of Sragen, but the findings in this chapter show that a higher rate of 
economic growth in Surakarta is not the key factor in SP expansion and its effectiveness, while a lower 
rate of growth in Sragen was able to exert impact on SP to reach the previously uncovered vulnerable 
groups. Therefore, the different performance of SP implementation in both regions can hardly be 
associated solely with the differences in rates of economic growth. 
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Furthermore, population growth, which is at times significant in explaining the difference in social 
welfare programmes, commonly found at the macro level of analysis, seems not to be significant in 
explaining the different performance in SP. For the last decade, the average of population growth for 
both regions is nearly identical. However, close observation will convey different levels of net 
migration for Sragen and Surakarta. The former appears to have low in-migration but rather high out-
migration rates for the last five years. In contrast, Surakarta experienced a significant increase in the 
in-migration rate recently (Obermayr, 2017). 
According to the issues elaborated in this chapter, there are several differences that could be 
discussed further. We divide the analysis into two main categories: (1) the origin, process, and 
mechanism of SP implementation by the local administration; and (2) the outcome and responses 
from stakeholders. 
With regards to the origination of initiatives, case studies in the two locations present different 
trajectories. The idea of bringing an integrated office for SP in Sragen was borne from business sector 
development (licensing) while Surakarta had developed the concept out of the interests in city 
planning. This leads to dissimilar trajectories of the two regions. With regards to the organisation and 
personnel, Sragen is considered superior as it managed to build a new unit from scratch with concepts 
seemingly derived from the streamlining of business applications. Emulating the success of the 
business sector, another pivotal role is talent recruitment which largely determines the quality of 
personnel handling routine jobs. The combination proved effective in gaining solid ground before 
commencing initiatives mainly on beneficiaries’ data management.   
Later, the development of a dedicated unit (UPTPK) was proven important in supporting Sragen to 
incorporate and adopt several new methods in welfare measurement from the central government. 
This unit, although initially perceived to receive favourable treatment personally from the head of 
district, has been able to collaborate closely with other stakeholders, not only within Sragen local 
offices but also with other local agencies in other regencies or provinces. 
Meanwhile, Solo only utilised the existing agencies to undertake such an endeavour with a 
considerable role of the mayor (Jokowi) as the ‘prime mover’. Local initiative started from the small 
projects for improvements on public facilities encompassing public parks to community housing 
(kampung) development. The implementation of these will inevitably require resettlement of illegal 
dwellers in river banks and unoccupied lands. Usually in the past, policy makers tried their best to 
avoid these engagements as they tended to ignite conflicts and eventually eroded the popularity of 
local leaders. However, under Jokowi’s administration, resettlement was accompanied with ‘cultural’ 
non-violent approaches, and lengthy deliberative processes. Without significant increase in resources 
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and relying on the existing facility and personnel, the administration in Solo eventually managed to 
launch a newly-devised health assistance programme with simplified procedures.   
Although the approach differs from that of central government which pushed for targeted transfers, 
universalising benefits seemed very effective for garnering support in Surakarta. This was indicated by 
the various spotlights from mainstream media and the outcomes of the last three direct elections. 
Unlike Sragen which focused on adopting methods to improve targeting households, local agencies in 
Surakarta had depended on relatively modest innovations on targeting, and centred the design of 
policies on expanding beneficiaries. Another key factor that causes Surakarta to differ from Sragen is 
the ability of local government to build close relationships with NGOs and the local media. The 
involvement of NGOs was crucial particularly to disseminate policies to the grassroots level. Not only 
did this convey the message to citizens, NGOs also played an important role in feeding in inputs to 
improve policy design. Meanwhile, wide exposure to mass media helped to circulate information 
regarding SP which eventually elevated the profile of Jokowi outstandingly.  
In terms of the perceived outcomes, the implementation of SP in Sragen had seen favourable 
responses mainly from the perspective of outsiders like international agencies; yet it failed miserably 
to raise the incumbent’s popularity, such that he lost the election in 2015. On the other hand, SP in 
Solo was underpinned by another acclaimed achievement in tackling informal settlement, and was 
widely covered and could be capitalised effectively as a political springboard for Jokowi in winning the 
Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012, and subsequently the presidential election in 2014. 
Meanwhile in Sragen, Agus Fatchurrohman’ controversial defeat at the hands of Kusdinar Untung Yuni 
was surprising but not entirely unexpected. Though a likable and popular incumbent, he was thought 
to be losing months before election. A seemingly insignificant issue of road damage grew unexpectedly 
into widespread dissatisfaction that was scantily expressed in public. While UPTPK as the brainchild of 
Agus had put him in the national spotlight and high-profile network, it was apparently not the winning 
strategy. In the 2015 election, Agus lost to Kusdinar Untung Yuni with a five percentage point 
difference. 
Why did this outcome differ? Probably the answer lies with the situation where politicians were facing 
more critical, and to a large extent, demanding citizens. A targeted SP programme might be an 
appropriate policy but the focus of it can alienate other segments of constituents who are equally 
critical and difficult to appease. The latest election results in Solo seemed to prove that the case of 
near-universal SP and other policies directed to different segments of society are effective to win the 
political contest. 
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6.7 Summary  
This chapter has attempted to describe the implementation of SP in the locations selected as case 
studies and to examine comparatively the most likely factors explaining the different performance in 
terms of SP implementation and outcomes between the two regions. The main finding of this chapter 
is that the overall performance in Sragen in executing SP programmes was relatively more impressive 
using high benchmarks and international standards. While the acceptance of the public in Surakarta 
is no less positive, the international award from the UN in 2015 is evidence that the achievement of 
the local government in Sragen is significantly better. The difference in outcomes also emerges within 
the context of local politics.   
Both case studies convey meaningful messages regarding local SP in the midst of decentralised and 
democratised regions. This chapter also describes five recurrent patterns that reveal important 
findings. First, local initiatives were primarily intended to support the implementation of SP in national 
programmes, yet are still constrained with limitations on resources and capacity. In this situation, local 
SP had only attained achievements that seem sub-optimal using the perspective of the established 
national methodology. Secondly, increasing attention towards local SP is largely indicative of 
participation that shapes and defines implementation. Each stakeholder engaging with the local SP 
programme was generally constructive and propelled greater involvement in other local government’s 
programmes, although the recognised risk of money politics still persists. Thirdly, the growing role of 
stakeholders means the social fabric becomes more resilient through fostered relationships. In most 
cases, the role of leaders is essential in maintaining public trust, particularly during tough times. 
Fourthly, the gender aspect in the context of local SP cannot be circumnavigated as it encompasses a 
wide range of SP components. Much of the focus revolves around women's roles in the household, 
also touching upon women's mobilisation within the SP context. Overall, the complexities and novelty 
of SP almost invariably lead to the uneven comprehension of gender dynamics. Finally, the inextricable 
link between SP and local elections adds much complexity to the existing deficiencies of local politics. 
Despite the drawbacks, however, the process of democratisation seems to offer prospects of 
innovation and expansion for local SP. 
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PART V CONCLUSION 
Chapter Seven: Summary, Research Implications, and Conclusions 
 
More than a decade has passed since the Indonesian government implemented its decentralisation 
and democratisation policies at the local level. This research has attempted to examine the impact of 
these policies on governance and implementation, following the central delegation of most authorities 
in the area of social protection (SP) to an increasing number of local governments at provincial and 
district level. 
This research is initiated by a simple question of how decentralisation and democratisation actually 
affect the implementation of SP at the local level. It turns out that this study is not as simple and 
obvious as I had anticipated beforehand. In this research, I also found a number of unexpected, 
unpredicted, yet interesting findings along the way. This chapter attempts to show how the research 
findings answer the aims and objectives of this research. I discuss and summarise the cases with 
respect to their implications for both theory and practice. I also describe several consequences for the 
extant literature on decentralisation, democratisation, and SP for policy makers and stakeholders 
regarding the contribution of this research. Section 7.1 summarises the research findings mainly from 
the previous two chapters. Section 7.2 extends the discussion with regard to the important 
significance of decentralisation and democratisation to local SP. In addition, this chapter will propose 
the original contributions of the thesis to the development of knowledge as well as to practitioners in 
Section 7.3. Finally, the possible limitations of the research and opportunities for future research are 
pointed out in Section 7.4. 
This research has addressed the impact of decentralisation and democratisation on SP in Indonesia at 
both macro and micro levels, and has attempted to explain the main research question: To what 
extent has decentralisation and democratisation in Indonesia enabled SP programmes to improve the 
livelihoods of poor and vulnerable people?  
The main research question was derived and deepened into more technical five research questions as 
follows: 
1. What are the functional roles of central and local governments in Indonesia?   
2. In the context of decentralisation, what reforms and capacity building mechanisms are carried 
out in these locations?   
3. In the context of democratisation or local politics, what are the key factors supporting the 
reforms? 
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4. What factors influence the success of these reforms?  
5. To what extent has the implementation of decentralisation and democratisation expanded 
the coverage of SP beneficiaries? 
Chapters 5 and 6 addressed the extent to which the enactment of decentralisation and 
democratisation in Indonesia has impacted SP development, with the analyses conducted at both 
macro and micro levels. Building on the findings of the previous parts of the study, I return to the 
question framed in the beginning of this thesis: how is SP actually implemented in decentralised 
settings? In this framework, I analysed the empirical evidence which was driven by the theoretical 
interests underpinning this research. 
  
7.1 Summary of the Research and Key Findings 
This thesis foregrounds the impact of decentralisation and democratisation in the management of 
local SP by establishing interplays between factors such as significant increase of the local budget, 
devolved jurisdiction, and proximity advantages that allow much innovation, notable improvements 
in local governance, and political calculation to garner the required votes in the direct elections. 
Decentralisation can assign ownership incentives among sub-national government entities within a 
concept of governance devolution and fiscal federalism (Oates 1972 and Tiebout 1956), and thus 
promotes effectiveness, accelerates responses, and assists the organisation of a complex system. 
Types of decentralisation might differ between countries or even within a nation, as in asymmetric 
forms of decentralised governance in Aceh, Yogyakarta, Papua, and Jakarta. From the results of the 
systematic literature review, several key issues have been raised which later helped to shape and 
sharpen research objectives. Few important themes among these issues are the mixed impact of 
outcome on decentralisation, unclear impact of decentralisation on SP, the regulatory environment, 
and potentials to develop local SP programmes. 
One of the most important concerns in decentralisation and democratisation is that there is no current 
‘best’ or ‘ideal’ form with which we could contrast and set the results side by side. Since every nation 
(or sub-national government) has a distinctive strategy, thus the design and implementation will not 
become similar or identical as the context matters significantly. Decentralisation emerged from 
different histories in different places. In Indonesia and other developing countries, the process often 
took many years to complete. The end result of the transformation exercise is sometimes completely 
different from what is described in the usual textbooks or normative cases, as might be reflected in 
developed countries. Mixed or hybrid approaches in embracing new values of decentralisation and 
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democratisation usually depend on the bargaining process that takes place at every level among 
stakeholders. Therefore, it is difficult to describe a single 'correct' method for transformation.  
Differing concepts of decentralisation and democratisation underlie development policy debates 
which inevitably characterises the differences in implementation. Even within a nation, a disparity in 
comprehension occurs between central and local governments, although in practice, convergence can 
be expected in the long run. Like in other developing nations, such negative practices as corruption 
and patronage are still rampant. These have been deeply entrenched in society and often unopposed 
and unchallenged, and can inevitably affect the performance of agents who are expected to exert 
influence towards meaningful change. Mapping the different examples of local practices also reveals 
a gap in the existing literature which overlooks the particulars and tends to assume if not generalise 
the impact of local policies to the nation as a whole.  
 
7.1.2 Findings of the Macro Level Analysis 
The analysis of national data at the district and provincial level led to several important findings. First 
at the preliminary stage, based on the static regional comparison of changes of economic level, HDI, 
poverty, inequality, and income per capita, the study reveals that a change has taken place during the 
periods before and after the enactment of decentralisation. Further, the cluster analysis on districts, 
which results in four distinctive clusters, shows over-concentration of economic activity and 
development outcomes in Java.  
Where intergovernmental transfer funds are distributed with a formula that equalises the 
development targets instead of the needs, the outcome might be completely different (Brodjonegoro 
et al 2005). However, on the contrary, a simplified formula that focuses merely on the conventional 
variables like population, area size, and share of revenue presumably lead to unequal and 
concentrated development at the district level. Using cluster analysis, four distinctive groups have 
emerged and have shown considerable differences between one other, with the most advanced 
development group constituting districts mostly located in Java. This finding echoes theoretical 
considerations by Prud’homme (1995) implying that decentralisation might increase regional 
inequality, largely due to weakened redistributional capacity of the central government, while the 
efficiency-enhancing effects of decentralisation that might promote regional growth and convergence 
as proposed by Qian and Weingast (1997) seem to not emerge in this context.  
Furthermore, the result of cluster analysis shows a heavy concentration of developed districts in Java 
bears strong resemblance to the general impression on the current development which mainly depicts 
unequal development and heavy imbalance in economic progress (Garcia & Soelistianingsih, 1998). 
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This clustering result also reiterates the need to disperse or develop new centres of growth to outer 
Java islands, especially in the eastern part of Indonesia. The result leads to the conclusion that the 
current formula on intergovernmental transfers entails significant transformation so that the local 
finances among the regions can be distributed more equally or fairly. Progressive schemes for the 
distribution of transfers in this matter are very relevant owing to the current decentralisation regime 
with no devolution yet of substantial revenue collections. 
Second, analysis on the relationship between certain local political parties with SP budget spending 
remains inconclusive as the differences in ideologies amongst parties are blurred if not similar. With 
the absence of political affiliation in this framework, further analysis on the detection of the budget 
cycle provides meaningful results. Analysis of the political budget cycle (PBC) indicates strong and 
significant correlation between direct election periods with the increase in SP budget at the provincial 
level. This finding largely reiterates previous results from Sjahrir et al (2013) which shows significant 
PBCs for Indonesian districts only for direct, but not for indirect, elections. This new finding supports 
the logic behind PBC on SP spending that voters need to be persuaded to vote for the incumbent only 
in direct elections. Moreover, the percentile distribution of various SP benefits has shown substantial 
differences between periods where direct election was held and periods without election. However, 
the SP budget growth is not apparently underpinned by the actual needs, but it is likely to be driven 
by revenue boost (transfers). This is similar to what Skoufias et al (2014) propose, that the reforms on 
introducing direct elections in Indonesia did nothing to raise the district governments’ performance 
in terms of human development outcomes.  
Overall, the findings of this thesis build an argument that decentralisation and democratisation have 
significantly changed the arrangement and implementation of SP at the local level. It is however too 
premature to conclude that the relationships brought either positive or negative impact. The 
distribution of fiscal transfer is pivotal in redistributing resources yet the results of cluster analysis 
showed that curent formula leads to large disparity between regions. Meanwhile, aspects of 
democratisation and local politics and its effects to SP are difficult to unpack. This thesis can only 
suggest that political budget cycle leads to the change of SP distribution and improve targeting slightly 
although its change could possibly be influenced pragmatically with the occurrence of local direct 
elections.   
 
7.1.3 Findings of the Micro Level Analysis  
Taking a closer look at the qualitative micro analysis of two regions in Central Java (Sragen and 
Surakarta), this corroborates previous quantitative findings to a large extent. Employing thematic 
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analysis, recurrent keywords during structured interviews leads to the identification of topics 
surrounding issues of governance, capacity, empowerment, patronage, clientelism, and gender gaps 
among others. Many similarities but more differences can be drawn from these case studies which 
ultimately bring in anecdotes about career progression in local politics, and revolve almost always 
around efforts to expand SP beneficiaries.   
As typical in qualitative research, respondents from different groups have various levels of 
comprehension on the basic knowledge and subtle concepts concerning decentralisation, 
democratisation, and SP. Moreover, they also differ in their perceptions of policy impact, with policy 
makers tending to inflate their statements especially with regards to their roles and achievements; 
academics and NGO workers usually being more critical of policies; while beneficiaries are inclined to 
be complacent with government programmes.  
In general, micro level analysis concerning the impact of decentralisation and democratisation on local 
SP finds positive impact on social welfare in Sragen and Surakarta. While there had been a slowing 
down, poverty rates in both regions are declining. Better performance of Sragen in poverty reduction 
could also be seen in another welfare indicator such as HDI, which appears to catch up with its 
neighbour, Surakarta in the last decade. Significant progress in poverty reduction and human 
development had been quite significant in the periods after decentralisation commenced in 2001. 
Fiscal decentralisation and enlarged authority were believed to be closely associated with SP 
programmes at the local level. Meanwhile, the deepening of democratisation in 2005 has substantially 
enhanced the implementation of local SP, as people had been more active and critical in choosing 
their local leaders. The importance of every single vote made incumbents and politicians calculate 
meticulously for the expansion of SP with regard to its beneficiaries and variations. 
In spite of the positive impact, thematic analysis concludes at least five challenges that might restrain 
local SP. First, lack of capacity at the local level makes the initiatives on SP development become less 
than optimal. Second, high dependence on facilitators and other external ‘helpers’ makes 
beneficiaries vulnerable to exploitation, politically or financially. Third, problems on targeting accuracy 
caused prolonged disputes which potentially damage the social fabric. Fourth, comprehension of 
gender-based SP programmes among stakeholders has been unequal and still lacking. Fifth, deeply 
entrenched paternalistic views towards politics have left beneficiaries completely exposed to the 
practices of ‘money politics’, and this may be correlated with the malfeasance of the public budget 
during election periods.  
Case studies in Surakarta and Sragen also presented different narratives with different dynamics in 
terms of local governance and local politics. A similar storyline can be established with regards to the 
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development and expansion of local SP. From the beginning of the administration period, local leaders 
in both regions had been very keen in building new approaches to extending benefits. The nature of 
decentralisation proves to be useful in explaining the dynamics of local SP. It describes the boundary 
of the local authority, interdependencies among local offices, as well as power relations among 
different stakeholders. In Sragen, the adoption of a robust methodology in registering beneficiaries is 
crucial and commendable. Simplified stages in the working process also help local agencies to perform 
efficiently. Unsurprisingly, this achievement has been highlighted and received favourable comments 
from various agencies. Other local governments have shown interest in following Sragen's policies. 
Meanwhile in Surakarta, the decision to approach informal workers and expand social services is an 
effective combination to gain public trust. SP is pivotal not only as an instrument to maintain welfare 
but is also useful to support other policies which are often considered unpopular. In the case of 
Surakarta, resettlement was implemented successfully without any violent incidents, which was a rare 
positive case.  
With regards to the outcome of SP development, differences occur. One can expect SP as the main 
tool to obtain support and garner votes during election time. However, the case in Sragen has shown 
that the expansion of local SP could not guarantee success in election, although the programme has 
had an impact and been perceived positively amongst beneficiaries. The failure of the incumbent 
conveyed a subtle message to other politicians that constituencies do not merely comprise vulnerable 
groups alone. Although initially the group might be a majority in terms of proportion, they should take 
into account the increasing number of the newly emerging 'middle-class' in their localities. On the 
other hand, the success of SP expansion in Surakarta had brought the local leader to national attention, 
even ultimately winning the presidential election. Eventually, the prominent case of Jokowi's career 
can simply be labelled as a 'political springboard' for politicians who aim for career progression. 
The significant progress achieved by local governments of Sragen and Surakarta in developing SP 
during the era of autonomy can be explained in several ways. First, it can be viewed through the lens 
of public spending and service delivery. For instance, while the expenditure for administrative 
purposes is still dominant, per capita spending for social services, which is believed to be closely 
associated with SP, increased significantly in both regions. Higher local capacity and an established 
local economy in urban Surakarta contributed to this significant achievement when compared with 
rural Sragen. A comparison of the performance in terms of social welfare development between the 
two regions shows that the establishment of a special unit dedicated to manage the administration of 
beneficiaries has also had a positive impact on the delivery of basic services such as education, health, 
housing, and food. The formation of UPTPK in Sragen as a versatile unit is also evidence of local 
initiative to tackle the daily convolutedness of the bureaucracy and setting an ideal standard for social 
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welfare management. Meanwhile in Solo, the enhancement of the existing unit is tantamount to the 
effective bureaucratic improvement, although the achievement is not recognised widely as in Sragen.   
Second, the different impact of decentralisation and democratisation on SP between the two regions 
can be further explained by examining the performance of local economic development (LED) in these 
districts, especially since fiscal decentralisation commenced. Two key findings related to the 
performance of Sragen and Surakarta in developing their local economies can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. A comparison of style in LED between Surakarta and Sragen shows that the structure of the 
local economy has modernised in Surakarta, where services dominate the local GDP as 
explained in Chapter 6, while the economy in Sragen is still focused on a more traditional 
sector, i.e. agriculture, though the incipient manufacturing sector has begun to increase. As a 
result, the implementation of regional autonomy has created a larger number of income 
opportunities and potential revenue increase for the local government in Surakarta. 
Meanwhile in Sragen, the focus of the expanding manfucaturing sector will absorb significant 
numbers of new labour market entrants. 
2. Surakarta has been much more successful in increasing its own local revenue than Sragen. The 
municipality has also been renowned for its human resources. This has both improved the 
ability of Surakarta to fund and manage its own development programmes. Further, the 
endowment has helped to improve the ability of the local administration to create a pro-
business environment to attract more investment and support economic development from 
which the poor might have benefited. 
Therefore, with this underlying context, policies in Surakarta after decentralisation began could be 
associated with a ‘pro-growth strategy’ while the Sragen local government’s attachment to the 
agriculture sector and concerns for the expansion of manufacturing could be said to be a ‘pro-job 
strategy’. Meanwhile, their focus to build a local SP arrangement can be tagged as a ‘pro-poor strategy’. 
An attempt at simple comparison to determine which strategy is more effective leads to mixed and 
intricate results. While the poverty rate in Surakarta has been significantly lower than that of Sragen 
for a decade, it has been declining only very slowly in the last five years.   
Finally, the context of local democratisation and gaps within the economic class also provide an 
explanation of why two incumbents with a similar approach and vision of SP development could see 
different outcomes in the last election. Analysis on class might be relevant in dissecting this 
phenomenon, as the current SP focusses intensively on vulnerable groups. In this regard, a balance 
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between the interests of vulnerable groups and those of the middle class becomes pivotal to the 
perspectives of rational local politicians.  
 
7.2 Significance of Decentralisation and Democratisation to Local SP  
Decentralisation and democratisation are perhaps not yet indispensable to the most emerging 
economies. Both policy experiments will not automatically transform people’s lives unless many 
requisites are fulfilled. The success story is often what attracts wide attention, however, success is 
often the result of a series of previous failures. Before the start of the 21st century, a centralised 
political system has long been the dominant feature of government in most developing countries. 
Recently, due to the driving forces discussed extensively in the literature review part of this thesis, 
many developing nations have shifted to a decentralised system. Likewise, waves of democratisation 
also happen to reach countries where authoritarian polities are previously unimaginable in allowing 
for dramatic changes. With this backdrop, many studies have been conducted to evaluate the impact 
of decentralisation and democratisation on issues such as local participation, public service delivery, 
poverty reduction, and economic growth, among others. Clearly, much effort has been devoted to 
compare the performance or the outcome of entities during the period of centralisation after the 
regime changes. The finding of this thesis is that the performance of local governments has been 
progressive, albeit at different levels. Different impacts in gaining electorate support among regions 
raise questions about the role of the political situation in SP development.   
This research also finds that decentralisation and democratisation allow the creative, innovative and 
responsive local governments that are aligned with public goals and citizens’ expectations to perform. 
These days, the transition towards decentralised and democratised polities appears to be adapted 
from the templates and organisational architecture of developed countries with different contexts, 
cultures, and endowments. However, a lack of attention on foundational requirements like local 
capacity and mechanisms to reduce malfeasance is common in developing countries, usually resulting 
in misapplication with outcomes lower than expected. Therefore, instead of the positive impact that 
might enforce governments to be more honest and efficient by bringing officials ‘closer to the people’ 
and forcing them to compete for mobile capital, decentralisation might create negative effects such 
as coordination problems and obstacles to reform, while exacerbating incentives to shirk responsibility 
on public provisions. 
Meanwhile, SP programmes, especially in developing economies, operate in such arrangements with 
heavy reliance on central government resources. Low financial capacity and lack of quality human 
resources inhibit the development of much needed SP, particularly in regions where vulnerable groups 
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are persistent. Unlike any other sectoral development programmes, SP which is cross-sectoral by 
nature entails close collaboration among supporting agencies. Coordination between central and local 
governments is critical, based on the fact that more than a hundred newly formed districts and 
municipalities were established right after day-one of the decentralisation regime. Most of these, 
along with possibly many other lagging regions, are likely to have limited human and financial 
resources. With such limitations it may be advisable for the central government to play a stronger 
initial role to guide these districts, especially in establishing complex SP programmes. Simultaneously, 
local governments could also design, develop, and implement their own version of SP programmes, 
possibly in consultation with the central government or development agencies. Meanwhile, the 
central government, in the transition periods to full local autonomy, could raise the administrative 
capacity of every district so that they can effectively manage their own responsibilities. 
Positive stories from the cases of Sragen and Surakarta have pointed to the characteristics that can 
potentially be replicated or emulated in other regions. Three attributes of organisational structure are 
immediately of interest. First, the unit overseeing the implementation of SP has direct support from 
the local leader. Therefore, the classic problem of coordination can be minimised so that convoluted 
and lengthy bureaucratic process is significantly curtailed. Second, the adoption of success factor from 
other well-proven policies (i.e. business permit application) is crucial and provides critical support. In 
this case, many positive aspects were modified within the implementation of local SP programme. 
Third, ‘openness’ or accountability plays an insurmountable role in ensuring and safeguarding all the 
steps of SP implementation. That is perhaps because public trust can be maintained which later 
attracts attention if not support from wider stakeholders. Thus, the success of SP at the local level is 
the result of various aspects of governance.. In this case, many of the aspects that were previously 
organised using pen and paper can now be handled in much more expedited fashion. Third, ‘openness’ 
or accountability plays an insurmountable role in ensuring and safeguarding all the steps of SP 
implementation. That is perhaps because public trust can be maintained which later attracts attention 
if not support from wider stakeholders. Thus, the success of SP at the local level is the result of various 
aspects of governance. 
The findings from quantitative analysis have led to the conclusion that the current type of 
decentralisation which focuses mainly on fiscal devolution, while at the same time limiting revenue-
generating authorities to the regions, is generally still sub-optimal. The distribution of transfers from 
central to local governments has been vital to sustain local governance. However, the expected effect 
of equalising resources to the regions has not yet occurred. Presumably, the current formula largely 
neglects the importance of specific needs in regions particularly outside Java. Quite unsurprisingly, 
the existing mechanism for fund transfer is perceived to be inadequate for developing regions, not to 
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mention the remote districts. It means that the local budget is simply not enough to stimulate efforts 
to build the required infrastructure and improvement of public service delivery, let alone to promote 
social welfare. Therefore, if the current situation persists, gaps between the area within Java and 
outside Java will increase.  
The inability of local governments to raise significant revenue also causes problems of over-reliance 
on the central budget, just to cover routine administrative spending, and only set aside a little for 
development expenditure. The introduction of direct benefit transfers to households and the 
commencement of direct elections in relatively the same period (2005) opened up the avenue for this 
research. Formative analysis in this study regarding both events leads to the conclusion that periods 
during direct elections significantly correlate with the increased disbursement of benefits specifically 
to the lowest percentile of the population. Another important finding in this research is that the 
political budget cycle exists following the implementation of direct elections, indicating the impact of 
democratisation on SP expansion.    
This research has shown that both decentralisation and democratisation can affect the outcomes of 
SP at the local level, as demonstrated in the two locations. In the case of Sragen, decentralisation has 
led to an improvement in governance quality as shown by the good performance of the local 
administration. What we can learn from Sragen is that decentralisation will help improve local SP 
significantly if the problems specific to local implementation are firstly addressed. Such reforms can 
lead to a more accountable and transparent government. Various awards and recognition are forms 
of acknowledgement of this achievement. Yet, its success has not been sufficient to convince the 
electorate in the last election. Naturally, an expanded and effective SP will potentially garner votes in 
the context of democratic election, but here the case in Sragen presents a different conclusion. While 
in Surakarta, the impact of decentralisation and democratisation has been beneficial, not only to the 
conception of enlarged SP benefits, but in also helping significantly to promote the popularity of the 
local leader.   
This thesis emphasises the impact of decentralisation and democratisation in managing the 
complexity of SP by increasing local potential and highlighting the needs of vulnerable groups. Whilst 
maintaining interdependencies with the central government and retaining effectiveness by adopting 
factors rooted from local contexts, the development of SP at the local level can be furthered to achieve 
other goals. The management of local SP can assign ownership incentives among different 
stakeholders within a coordinated network, and thus promote communication and involvement of 
non-state actors. 
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7.3 Contributions and Implications  
This thesis contributes to the emerging literature on decentralisation, democratisation, and its impact 
on SP at the lowest government level. The main theoretical contribution of this study is to the 
literature on fiscal decentralisation, political budget cycle, and local governance within the context of 
SP management.  
There are at least two main contributions of this study. First, it has contributed to knowledge 
development by providing a thorough analysis of the steps and links in the relationship between 
decentralisation, democratisation, and SP. This research has also demonstrated that there is a missing 
link particularly in the decentralisation-SP nexus as hypothesised by many scholars, in that not only 
good governance but also fiscal and administrative capacity as a pre-condition for making 
decentralisation work. Another missing link can be found in this study within the nexus of 
democratisation and SP in which the most significant aspect is the targeting strategy. Second, this 
study has contributed at the policy level, both for Indonesia and possibly other developing countries, 
as it has shown cases of how to make decentralisation benefit the most vulnerable group. 
Theories on decentralisation and democratisation can be used to describe and explain the structure 
and relationship of local SP governance. They also uncover the dialectical process between local and 
central government. On the one hand, the local administration aims to devise locally-specific SP and 
deliver benefits accurately in order to achieve balance between fiscal constraints and demands of 
constituencies. On the other hand, it can be confirmed that the central government tends to intervene 
with regards to targeting methodology. Within the scope of this thesis, the results indicate that these 
theories deserve a revisit. There are at least two important steps for enhancing theories surrounding 
decentralisation, democratisation, and SP. First, an additional element of the attempt to revisit the 
decentralisation literature is that the devolution of authority seems to perform well only in fiscally-
permitting districts that enjoy abundant resources, hence implying the importance of fiscal 
redistribution towards the equalising of local capacity. Second elements pertained to the local politics 
and democratisation need to be considered in the construction of a new theory. Prominent among 
these factors is the emergence of growing ‘middle class’ in evary regions with its diverse characteristics. 
Depending on its context, generally middle class in developing regions seem to be increasingly active 
in local politics. Increased welfare condition of middle class does not really correlate with decreasing 
precarity yet their new-found welfare means their demands shift from access to quality of public 
services. Therefore, with this thesis I can argue that theories on the impact of decentralisation, 
democratisation, and SP need to be complemented with caveats on the diverse settings of local 
capacity, resources, and demographic changes. The nexus between the three seemingly leads to the 
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overall positive development outcome yet it needs clarification to the attribution of factors specific to 
each regions.  
Equally important to the enhancement of the existing theories is a re-formulation of fiscal 
intergovernmental transfer. The current literature on fiscal decentralisation neither discusses nor 
includes relevant variables with regards to SP or welfare development: (1) the current formulation 
only engages with the share of resources while neglecting the priorities for lacking regions where 
vulnerable groups reside; and (2) the literature focuses on variable such as population and the size of 
the economy, resulting in an unequal distribution of fiscal transfers, which therefore leads to the 
enormous gap between districts in Java and outside Java. The existing body of knowledge on 
democratisation which revolves around SP implementation does not specifically discuss the behaviour 
of incumbents. 
With reference to methodological contributions, our cases not only show the advantage of the case 
study method in complementing the big picture from the results of quantitative analysis, but also the 
potential of the case study method for theory construction—as long as it follows validity and reliability 
criteria. I also found that good research should be driven by problems in the real world, rather than 
being methodology-driven. Thus, a combination of different kinds of methods and data will be best 
for carrying out the task. 
   
7.4 Research Limitations and Future Directions 
This research on decentralisation and democratisation within local SP development suffers from 
several theoretical and empirical limitations that might lay out avenues for future studies. First of all, 
due to the issue of data availability, I deliberately focus the analysis on the period after the 
commencement of decentralisation (in 2001) and democratisation (in 2005). Analysing the impact of 
decentralisation and democratisation covering both pre- and post- implementation will perhaps 
provide some interesting and complementary findings. Secondly, we did not consider the possible 
impact of other policy changes occurring within the periods of analysis (2001-2012). The discussion on 
how it may be beneficial or problematic to consider other social development programmes such as 
community-driven development or nation-wide social health insurance (Fossati, 2016a; Gonschorek, 
Hornbacher-Schönleber, & Well, 2014; Panda, 2015) will make for interesting new research. While 
quantitative analysis in this thesis used secondary data sets compiled by the World Bank, qualitative 
analysis relied on two in-depth local SP case studies in two regions within the same province, and so 
can only provide evidence of the impact of decentralisation and democratisation in these locations. 
The key limitation of the approach is that it is not possible to claim national or global 
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representativeness for these results. However, it should be noted that there are equally no strong 
reasons to believe that the findings, particularly those broad lessons about which it has been possible 
to generalise across other districts in other studies, should not apply to comparable locations in 
Indonesia. 
The choice of location for case studies is not only based on the clustering result (elaborated in Chapter 
5) but to also capture dynamics that perhaps were relevant to the contemporary situation. The case 
of Jokowi in Surakarta and international recognition for Sragen's administration had received 
remarkable attention and were highly covered in the media. Nevertheless, I would expect our findings 
to apply to other similar themes in emerging economies, but future comparative studies with larger 
samples or with more extreme cases could confirm the extent to which our findings are generalisable. 
Since all of our cases are district-based samples and provincial-level analysis, subsequent studies on 
village-based or other regional models will add to the discussion in the literature. 
It is modestly expected that this study shows the potential for new research to further advance these 
debates around the impact of decentralisation and democratisation to other local policies situated in 
the context of developing countries. From the result of this study, I also believe that issues on the 
effectiveness of SP need further theoretical and empirical study on design, definition, as well as 
advancement with regard to methodology and measurement. In particular, the present investigation 
focuses on decentralisation and democratisation with minimal consideration of other variables. 
Studies on the effectiveness of local SP are still incipient, which indicates that greater attention might 
be given to the topic. Another key concern is how to filter the impact of other policies on SP, and thus, 
evaluate clearly its implementation. This question makes the study of SP more challenging. 
Some other opportunities for subsequent studies have been discovered. Further research needs to 
address political perspectives that particularly focus on the ideological aspects of SP provision. I have 
discussed the concepts, frameworks, as well as principles developed for the expansion of SP at the 
district level. This approach can now be extended with research from other disciplines where 
decentralisation, democratisation, and SP are becoming influential, for example: political science, 
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Ahmad, Devarajan, 





 Provides a framework evaluating benefit 
and cost that explains both why 
decentralisation can generate 
substantial improvements in service 
delivery and why it often falls short of its 
promise. The framework describes three 
key players in accountability relationship 
i.e. policymakers, poor people, and 
providers. 
Service delivery depends on the relationships of 
accountability of different actors in the delivery 
chain. Decentralisation introduces a new 
relationship of accountability—between national 
and local policymakers—while also altering 
existing relationships, such as that between 
citizens and elected politicians. In particular, the 
various instruments of decentralisation—fiscal, 
administrative, regulatory, market, and financial—
can affect the incentives facing service providers, 





sample of 89 
villages in West 
Bengal, India 
1978-1998 Using intra-village and inter-gram 
panchayat (local government), the 
authors employ regression method to 
estimate the interpretation of the 
(partial) correlation between targeting 
and poverty via its impact on the political 
power of the poor, relies on the 
assumption that conditional on the 
control variables included in the 
regression, poverty is exogenous with 
respect to targeting. 
There is not much evidence that targeting 
patterns of private goods such as credit or 
agricultural minikits in West Bengal were 
vulnerable to ‘elite capture’ within local 
communities. The principal problem lay 
elsewhere: in the selection of local infrastructure 
projects under employment generation programs, 
and the process of allocating resources across GPs 
by higher levels of government. In this respect 
there was a perverse tendency to generate less 
employment out of allotted funds, and allocate 
less rather than more resources (in the form of 
minikits, employment and other fiscal grants) to 
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Methodology Summary of Empirical Findings 
frequency of low caste households within those 
villages rose. 
Brinkerhoff & Azfar 
(2006) 
None  A review of the literature on community 
empowerment in the context of 
decentralization reveals, the multiple 
meanings of empowerment and the 
relative lack of systematic studies across 
a range of cases, limiting our ability to 
make precise conclusive statements 
regarding the relationship between 
community empowerment, 
decentralization, and outcomes relating 
to deepening democracy and service 
delivery effectiveness. 
This review reveals the key role of central 
government in supporting decentralization and 
local community empowerment. However, the 
existence of a legal and institutional framework, in 
and of itself, is insufficient. The implication is that 
a strong civil society is needed to fully exploit their 
potentials. Communities need the capacity and 
resources to engage in collective action, including 
belief in their own agency, for empowerment 
mechanisms to achieve their intended effects. 
Crook & Sverrisson 
(2001) 
Comparative 






the case of West 
Bengal, India 
 Measuring responsiveness and 
participation of local governments in the 
context of decentralisation. Measuring 
social and economic outcomes for any of 
the governmental policies. 
The review shows that only the evidence relating 
to West Bengal indicates positive decentralisation 
outcomes on both dimensions of responsiveness 
and social-economic development. The most 
successful case were the ones where central 
government not only had an ideological 
commitment to pro-poor policies, but was 
prepared to engage actively with local politics. 
Fair and competitive elections were a key factor in 
developing public accountability. 
Ezcurra & Rodriguez-
Pose (2009) 
Panel data for 20 
OECD countries. 
1990-2005 To examine the effect of the degree of 
decentralization of SP expenditure on 
economic growth using reduced-form 
growth model (8 variables). The model 
includes the level of SP expenditure in 
the sample countries. 
Positive impact of the sub-national share of total 
government expenditure in SP on economic 
performance. It is observed that the coefficient of 
the degree of decentralisation of SP expenditure is 
in all cases positive and statistically significant. 
This implies that the sub-national share of total 
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Methodology Summary of Empirical Findings 
contribute to promoting economic growth in the 
sample countries, highlighting the relevance of 
devolution processes in this context. 
Fossati (2016) Qualitative and 
quantitative data 










Comparing how trends in health 
insurance coverage evolved in districts 
located in provinces with and without 
agreements, yet data limitation can only 
allow analysis to rest on cross-sectional 
analysis. 
Fossati builds a model to represent the 
relationship between the two with a 
hierarchical linear model (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002) in which health insurance 
coverage is a function of multi-level 
cooperation and random intercepts for 
provinces. 
Decentralisation reforms empower local 
government, but they do so by creating political 
systems in which local authorities are still closely 
tied to higher levels of government through 
various channels. This paper has shown that 
relations between politicians at different levels of 
government are consequential for local-level 
social policy outcomes in low- and middle-income 
countries, even when local institutions are weak. 
Through an analysis of the politics of health 
insurance for the poor in Indonesian districts and 
cities, the author argues that multi-level 
cooperation has a direct impact on local policy 
outcomes. 
Jütting et al (2004) Comprehensive 
review of 19 LIC-
MIC cases which 
are classified by 4 
performance 
types. 
1995-2003 This study addresses the following three 
questions: 
1) Through which channels are 
decentralisation and poverty linked?  
2) What evidence of the impact of 
decentralisation on poverty can be found 
in the literature? 
3) Under which conditions and policies is 
a pro-poor outcome of decentralisation 
most likely? 
It is found that an unambiguous link between 
decentralisation and poverty reduction cannot be 
established. In some of the poorest countries 
characterised by weak institutions and political 
conflicts, decentralisation could actually make 
matters worse. Interestingly, the poverty impact 
of decentralisation would appear to depend less 
on the physical country setting, for example a 
country’s size or quality of infrastructure, than on 
the capacity and willingness of policy makers to 
ensure a pro-poor devolution process. 
The success of pro-poor decentralisation was also 
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Methodology Summary of Empirical Findings 
The impact on poverty was analysed 
with respect to country background, in 
order to identify the impact of the 
country setting, the nature of social 
institutions, and local authorities’ 
capacity on the process and outcome of 
decentralisation. 
of the authorities (at the national, but also the 
local level) to carry out reforms. It depends on a 
variety of factors: 
1. Financial Resources at the Local Level 
Evidence 
2. Local Human Capacity 
3. Political Commitment at the National 
Level 
4. Donor Involvement and Support 
The transparency of reform and degree of 
participation of population can also be attributed 
as success factors in determining decentralisation 
with following criteria: 
1. Information Flow 
2. Participation 
3. Role of Civil Society 
Other factors which influence the impact of 
decentralisation to poverty reduction are elite 
capture and policy coherence. 
Hofman & Kaiser 
(2006) 
Indonesia 2002 In-depth review Despite its rapid implementation, decentralisation 
in Indonesia did not appear to lead to a 
breakdown in service delivery. Evidence from the 
field, however, suggests significant concerns 
about the quality of governance at the local level.  
Perceptions of service delivery were quite 
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service delivery and the still evolving nature of 
standards and expectations. 
The overall relationships between the quality of 
local service delivery and indicators of poor 
governance is complex. 
Lewis (2010) Indonesia 1999-2009 In-depth analysis and comprehensive 
reviews on existing situation. 
The evidence suggests that Indonesian 
decentralisation has not yet, however, led to good 
quality local public services. Implementation of 
immediate remedies typically proposed by 
government officials and others are all likely to be 
deficient in one regard or another. 
 
A long-term, incremental approach that focuses 
on experimenting with out- put-based central-
local incentive grants, enhancing local 
government capability in expenditure and 
revenue management, and, most importantly, 
building capacity in civil society groups to educate 
citizens and motivate demand seems the most 
feasible strategy for moving forward under the 
current circumstances. 




 Literature review and analysis of 
experience with decentralisation in 
developing countries to explore how a 
wide range of variables can affect 
decentralisation efforts and how policies 
and incentives can be designed to 
improve outcomes. 
The paper highlights the fact that decentralisation 
is neither good nor bad for efficiency, equity, or 
macroeconomic stability; but rather that its 
effects depend on institution-specific design. 
The broader agenda suggests an enhanced focus 
on accountability, governance, and capacity in the 
context of designing policies for decentralisation. 
This approach has strong implications for the 
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Methodology Summary of Empirical Findings 
for a reinvigorated research effort focused on 
developing countries. 
Much research needs to be done—primarily in 
case studies—on a variety of important issues, 
particularly with respect to the outcome of 
alternative institutional changes. 
Priyadarshee & 
Hossain (2010) 
2 Indian states i.e. 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UP) and Andhra 
Pradesh (AP) 
 Comparative analysis on the 
performance of two different 
decentralized delivery mechanisms while 
delivering SP programmes to poor 
households. 
Empirical observations on the delivery of 
selected SP programmes in sample 
villages. The observation is focussed on 
several aspects i.e. beneficiary 
identification, corruption and rent 
seeking, ration cards, cash disbursal 
mechanisms, convergence with other 
schemes, and feedback mechanisms. 
It is argued that village panchayats (local 
governance councils) need to incorporate 
mechanisms to enhance participation of the poor, 
and women, in its institutions. This may enhance 
accountability and transparency in the functioning 
of panchayats and may make them more relevant 
to the deprived population. 
Ramesh (2013) Asian countries  Literature review and analysis on 
empirical evidence related to 
decentralisation. 
Empirical studies on decentralisation are no more 
encouraging than those assessing the logic and 
theory underlying the concept. There are many 
empirical studies in the case study mode, 
qualitatively or quantitatively examining the 
effects of decentralisation. 
The findings of comparative studies are 
contradictory, depending on the countries 
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are largely negative about the effects of 
decentralisation. 
There are nascent trends suggesting that local 
governments are being consolidated in many 
countries and tighter taxing and spending 
guidelines are being set to limit local 
governments’ autonomy. The weight of the 
evidence on decentralisation certainly warrants a 
pause in further attempts to deepen and expand 
the extent of decentralisation in Asia and warrants 
re-thinking of its goals as well as operational 
details. 
Robinson (2007b) Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America 
 Review of several findings pertinent to 
decentralisation on service delivery. 
The consequences of democratic decentralisation 
in terms of service delivery outcomes are largely 
negative. 
 
Poor and marginalised people have not generally 
experienced improved access and service quality 
under democratic decentralisation. 
 
Improved outcomes are contingent on a 
supportive set of conditions and mediating 
factors, some of which lie outside the control of 
elected local governments. 
Scott (2009) Empirical case 
studies from Asia, 
Africa and Latin 
America 
2003-2009 Analytical review explores the links 
between decentralisation and service 
delivery, economic development and 
social cohesion. 
There is a vast chasm between the benefits that 
proponents of decentralisation have claimed that 
reforms can have on service delivery, economic 
development and social cohesion and the reality, 
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It has generally been found that decentralisation 
has not delivered service delivery improvements, 
primarily for political reasons. Limited 
administrative capacity and financial constraints 
become factors that hinder the potential of 
decentralisation to improve services. 







 Review of major controversies and key 
approaches pertaining to 
decentralisation programmes i.e. big 
push vs. small steps; bottom up vs. top 
down; and uniform vs. asymmetric 
decentralization 
The decentralisation programme in Indonesia 
should be commended for its achievements over a 
short period of time, however incentives are 
lacking for local governments to be accountable 
and responsive to their residents. 
Critical missing links identified in this paper 
include: (a) tax decentralisation; (b) performance 
oriented transfers to set national minimum 
standards; (c) equalisation to a standard; (d) 
administrative decentralisation and (e) results-
oriented management and evaluation. 
Sumarto et al 
(2014a) 
Indonesia 2005-2010 Panel data analysis  Regional output, poverty reduction and income 
distribution are strongly interrelated. 
Poverty appears to have decreased more in 
districts with: 
1. a local office established for the 
coordination of poverty reduction 
initiatives (TKPKD) 
2. a higher share of fiscal revenues, as long 
as fiscal revenue represents more than 
50% of local gross domestic product  
3. a larger share of local leaders with 
secondary education 
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Appendix B-2 - Information Sheet and Consent Form – ENGLISH 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
REC Reference Number: REP/14/15-62 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
Has Decentralisation and Democratisation been Effective in Promoting an Inclusive 
Social Protection System in Indonesia? A Comparative Case Study of the 
Implementation of Social Protection Programmes in Central Java 
I would like to invite you to participate in this research project which forms part of my PhD 
Research. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage 
you in anyway. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether decentralisation in different areas of Central Java, 
Indonesia builds an inclusive social protection (SP) system by tackling exclusion and vulnerabilities. In 
order to get first-hand experiences and expert opinions on this topic, I am inviting stakeholders i.e. 
local government officials, local parliament members, NGO workers, community leaders, facilitators 
and social protection beneficiaries to take part. 
Participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part. You should read this information sheet and if 
you have any questions you should ask the research team. You should not agree to take part in this 
research until you have had all your questions answered satisfactorily. 
If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a 
consent form. At a time convenient for you, I will then call or email you to discuss the interview 
procedure with you. On request you will be given the interview topic guide. With your consent, I will 
arrange to interview you in a private area (for confidentiality reasons) on voluntary organisation 
premises where you work (or at a suitable venue in a local public site if you prefer). 
The interview will take approximately one hour and be based on the interview topic guide, but it is 
designed to be flexible so as to meet your needs. The interview may be recorded, subject to your 
permission. Recordings of interviews will be deleted after transcription. Even if you have decided to 
take part, you are still free to cease your participation at any time and to have research 
data/information relating to you withdrawn without giving any reason up to the point of publication 
in August 31, 2016.  
There are no foreseeable risks in participating in the study. The main disadvantage to taking part in 
the study is that you will be donating around an hour of your time to take part. It is possible that you 
may find answering some of the questions challenging. This is unlikely but if it were to occur you 
could terminate the interview at any time.  
You are welcome to choose anonymity. If you want to remain anonymous, I promise that what is 
said in the interview is regarded as strictly confidential and will be held securely until the research is 
finished. Your name will not be attached to any information you provide to me. All files or 




destroyed. I am the only person who has access to any of the information you provide. All 
information and documents held electronically used within this project will be encrypted.  
The UK Data Protection Act 1998 will apply to all information gathered within the interviews and 
held on password-locked computer files and locked cabinets within King’s College London. No data 
will be accessed by anyone other than me; and anonymity of the material will be protected by using 
false names. No data will be able to be linked back to any individual taking part in the interview. You 
may withdraw your data from the project anytime up to the point of publication in August 31, 2016. 
All recordings of data on audio-equipment will be deleted after transcription. If you ask me to 
withdraw your data at any time before August 31, 2016 I will remove all traces of it from the 
records. 
This study is being funded by a PhD studentship given through by the Ministry of National 
Development Planning of Indonesia. The study has been approved by the King’s College London 
Research Ethics Committee.  
The research findings will be published as a final PhD research thesis, to be disseminated publicly 
through Kings College London. It may also be published in the form of a publicly available peer 
reviewed journal article. You are therefore advised that if you foresee any recriminations likely to 
occur to yourself through the information that you provide to me, you should choose anonymity. 
If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact me using the 
following contact details:  
Dharendra Wardhana 
King's International Development Institute 
King's College London 
London, WC2R 2LS 
dharendra.wardhana@kcl.ac.uk 
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct of the 
study you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice and 
information:  
Dr. Andrew Sumner 
King's International Development Institute, King's College London 
Room 1SEBb, South East Building, Strand Campus, Strand, London WC2R 2LS 
andrew.sumner@kcl.ac.uk 
Tel: 0044 (0) 20 7848 7158 
 






CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
Title of Study: Has Decentralisation and Democratisation been Effective 
in Promoting an Inclusive Social Protection System in Indonesia? A 
Comparative Case Study of the Implementation of Social Protection 
Programmes in Central Java 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: REP/14/15-62 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research 
must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions 
arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the 
researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent 
Form to keep and refer to at any time. 
I confirm that I understand that by ticking each box I am consenting to this element of 
the study. I understand that it will be assumed that unticked boxes mean that I DO 
NOT consent to that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any 
one element I may be deemed ineligible for the study. 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
Version 1.1 - 26/11/14 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information and asked questions which have been 
answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason. Furthermore, I 
understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to the point of 
publication in August 31, 2016 
 
3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes 
explained to me.  I understand that such information will be handled in 
accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
4. I understand that my information may be subject to review by 
responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit 
purposes. 
 
5. Anonymity is optional for this research. Please select from the following 
3 options: 
 
a. I agree to be fully identified  
 
b. I agree to be partially identified 
 
Please tick  




c. I wish to remain anonymous 
 
 
6. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a 
report. 
 
7. I consent to my interview being audio/video recorded. 
 





__________________               __________________              _________________ 
Name of Participant                 Date        Signature 
 
 
__________________               __________________              _________________ 

















Draft introductory email and formal letters for recruiting interviewees 
Subject: King’s College PhD Student – Interview request – Decentralisation and Social 
Protection Programme 
Dear XXXXXX, 
I am a PhD student from Kings College London, working within the International 
Development Institute under Dr Andrew Sumner. The title of my research project is ‘Has 
Decentralisation and Democratisation been Effective in Promoting an Inclusive Social 
Protection System in Indonesia? A Comparative Case Study of the Implementation of Social 
Protection Programmes in Central Java’ and I would very much like to interview you as part 
of my work.  
I am interested in discovering what links exist between the implementation of 
decentralisation and the design and reform of social protection programmes. Please see 
attached an ‘Information Sheet’, which explains my research in more detail and the kind of 
people who I am asking to assist me with interviews.  
I will be travelling to Indonesia in XXXX (precise date TBC), and would very much like to 
interview you as part of my research. Please see the attached ‘Consent Form’ which you will 
be required to read and sign if you agree to be interviewed.  
If you are interested in assisting me with my work, are available for an interview, or if you 
know anyone else who may be, please let me know via email so we can arrange a time and 
place for the interview. Also feel free to provide a contact telephone number for yourself if 
you wish to discuss further over the phone.  
Please note that you are under no obligation at all to reply to this email or consent to being 
interviewed, and that if we proceed you will be able to withdraw consent at any time. Also 
note that this study has been approved by King’s College London Social Sciences, 
Humanities and Law Research Ethics Subcommittee, under reference number XXXX. 
I hope that is all clear and OK. Please feel free to ask me any question you may have about 





King's International Development Institute 
King's College London 






Topic guide for the interviews 
A. Respondent: local government officials 
Area: regional autonomy and governance 
1. In your opinion, what does regional autonomy mean? 
a. What are its implications for budget size? 
b. What are its implications for local governance? 
2. How does the local government set up regional development planning? 
a. To what extent do local leaders influence the local planning process? 
b. To what extent do local parliaments influence the local planning process? 
c. Are local people involved in the planning process? 
d. How does local government respond to public aspirations? 
3. With respect to the delivery of public services, which services are new and which services 
have been continued from the pre-decentralisation era? 
a. Are there any minimum standards used when providing public services? 
b. How is the public involved in monitoring or delivering public services? 
4. How is the local government budget being allocated? 
a. What are the sources of revenue? 
b. Are there any priorities in the budget allocation process? 
c. How are the priorities being decided?  
d. To what extent does the budget reflect community priorities? 
5. Do you have any capacity building training or workshops for local government? If so: 
a. Are they regular? 
b. How are they conducted? (Length, materials, resources, personnel) 
 
Area: social protection programme 
1. A number of social protection (SP) programmes were considered as national flagship 
programmes. How are they set up in respect to regional development planning? 
a. Are there any special implementation agencies for the national SP programme? 
b. Can you explain the operational mechanisms of the national SP programme at the 
local level since the implementation of regional autonomy? 
c. Is there any co-ordination between local government and the higher levels of 
government? 
2. Has the local government initiated programmes and policies directed towards poor and 
vulnerable groups?  
a. What are they? 
b. Do they come from the local leaders or local parliament? 
3. If the local government has initiated SP locally, who is involved in setting and implementing 
the programmes? 
4. Does the local government have full authority over implementation or do they have to 
follow central government guidelines? 
5. With respect to the local SP budget, how much is allocated for this year? 
a. What is the trend? (Increasing, decreasing, stagnant) 




c. Who is involved in the budgeting process? 
6. Does the local government have detailed information on who the poor and vulnerable are?  
a. If yes, how does the local government obtain the information? 
7. In regards to targeting beneficiaries, can you explain the data collection process? 
a. Is it done under the authority of local government or is it done through using the 
unified database from central government? 
b. How long does the process take? 
c. Do you know about its method?   
d. Did the local government have the baseline data before the collection process? 
e. Which stakeholders are involved in the data collection process? 
f. What are their roles and responsibilities?  
g. What criteria are used to select beneficiaries? 
h. Who decided on the beneficiary lists? 
i. What percentage of the budget is used for the targeting and selection process (as a 
percentage of the total budget for SP)?  
8. In regards to the dissemination of the SP programme, can you explain the process? 
a. Which dissemination method is used for the SP programme? 
b. Who is involved in the dissemination process? 
c. Who is the target audience for the dissemination? 
d. What are the contents of the dissemination?  
e. What percentage of the budget is used for the dissemination process?  
9. Can you mention what has been achieved in the local SP programme?  
a. To what extent is the degree of success/failure compared to the national SP 
programme? 
10. What are the main problems facing the implementation of SP? 
11. Have there been any changes in the delivery of SP programmes since the implementation of 
regional autonomy?  
a. What are the significant changes? 
 
B. Respondent: local parliament members 
Area: regional autonomy and governance 
1. In your opinion, what does regional autonomy mean? 
a. What are its implications for budget size? 
b. What are its implications for local governance? 
2. Do you know how the local government sets up regional development planning? 
a. To what extent do local leaders influence the local planning process? 
b. To what extent do local parliaments influence the local planning process? 
c. Are local people involved in the planning process? 
d. To what extent does the local government respond to public aspirations? 
3. Based on your experience and evaluation, how does the local government performance in 
delivering public services? 
4. Do you think that local government applies minimum standard when providing public 
services? 
5. Is the local government budget allocation based on priorities?  




b. In your opinion, to what extent does the budget reflect community priorities? 
Area: social protection programme 
1. Has the local parliament been involved in the SP programme in this region? 
2. If yes, can you explain its involvement (e.g. setting the budget, monitoring, evaluation, etc.)? 
3. Has the local parliament contributed towards initiating programmes and policies directed 
towards poor and vulnerable groups? If so: 
a. What are they? 
b. Does the initiation come from certain local parliament members or factions? 
4. Do you think that there is sufficient budget allocation for SP? 
5. To what extent has the local parliament had a controlling role in the implementation of SP? 
6. What are the main problems facing local parliaments in this region regarding monitoring and 
evaluating SP? 
 
C. Respondent: NGOs and community leaders 
Area: regional autonomy and governance 
1. In your opinion, what does regional autonomy mean? 
a. What are its implications for budget size? 
b. What are its implication for local governance? 
c. What are its implications for public participation? 
2. Have you ever participated in or been involved with a local government agenda? (For 
example, in setting up programmes or in the delivery of public services) 
3. In your opinion, to what extent does local government respond to public aspirations? 
4. What are the most important public services that local government should be delivering? 
5. Based on your experience and evaluation, how local government performing in delivering 
public services? 
6. Do you think that citizens are involved in monitoring or delivering public services? 
7. Is the local government budget allocation based on community priorities? 
a. Do you agree with the current priorities set up by the local government? 
8. To what extent does public service delivery meet the community’s main needs? 
9. What is your opinion of the administrative and technical skills of the region’s civil service? 
a. Do you think that public sector personnel are competent enough to undertake their 
duties? 
10. In your opinion, how accountable is local government in this region?  
Area: social protection programme 
1. To what extent do poverty and inequality exist in this area? 
2. Do you know that the SP programme is a national programme which must be conducted in 
this district and that it should be one of the main priorities in the regional development? 
3. What type of SP programme is conducted in your area? 
4. To what extent are the local people involved in setting up the programme? (In terms of 
determining the most appropriate programme for meeting local conditions, preferences, 
and needs)? 





a. How can potential beneficiaries apply for SP? 
b. How can beneficiaries participate in the programme?  
6. Can you tell me the extent to which the programme has been successful?  
7. Are there any problems or difficulties in programme implementation? 
a. What are the problems? 
b. What caused these problems? 
c. How can these problems be resolved? 
 
D. Respondent: facilitators 
Area: governance 
1. Who is responsible for the recruitment process? 
a. What are their roles? 
2. Can you briefly explain the recruitment process (Steps, tests, results, timeline)? 
3. Is there any form of binding work contract? 
a. Does the contract mention any of your rights? 
b. Does it explicitly mention your roles? 
4. Did you undertake any training before working as a facilitator? 
a. Who provided the training? 
b. How does it support your job?  
5. How is the co-ordination mechanism established in your work? 
a. To whom do you deliver regular reports? 
6. Are you related to any personnel working in the local office? 
7. Do you think that the facilitators are involved in monitoring or delivering public services? 
8. In your opinion, how accountable is the local government in this region? 
Area: social protection programme 
1. To what extent do poverty and inequality exist in this area? 
2. Do you know that the SP programme is a national programme that must be conducted in 
this district and that it should be one of the main priorities in development of the region? 
3. What type of SP programme is conducted in your area? 
4. To what extent are the facilitators involved in the programme?  
a. What is your main duty? 
b. Are you related to any SP beneficiaries? 
c. Is your working area close to your home? (Approximately <5km) 
d. Were you involved in selecting the beneficiaries? 
5. Are there any clear guidelines or dissemination for the SP programme from the local 
government?  
a. How do the facilitators work in the SP programme?  
b. Is the current ratio of facilitators to beneficiaries ideal? 
c. If not, what is the ideal number in your estimation? 
6. Can you tell me the extent to which the SP programme has been successful?  
7. Are there any problems or difficulties in programme implementation? 
a. What are the problems? 
b. What caused these problems? 




d. Have you received any complaints from the beneficiaries? 
 
 
E. Respondent: beneficiaries  
Area: governance 
1. Have you ever participated in or been involved with a local government agenda? (For 
example, in setting up programmes or in public services delivery.) 
2. In your opinion, to what extent does the local government respond to the public’s 
aspirations? 
3. What are the most important public services that the local government should be 
delivering? 
4. Based on your experience and evaluation, how does the local government perform in 
delivering public services? 
5. In your opinion, how accountable is the local government in this region?  
Area: social protection programme 
1. How did you first find out about the SP programme that you are currently receiving? 
2. Since when have you (or your family) received assistance in the form of SP? 
3. What is the assistance? (Subsidised rice, scholarship, cash transfer) 
a. How much do you receive for this assistance? 
b. How do you receive the assistance (e.g. from the post office, transferred to your 
bank account, at the local markets, delivered by a facilitator)? 
c. When do you usually receive it? (How regularly?) 
d. Do you think that you currently receive the actual amount? 
e. If not, what do you think the difference is used for?  
4. In your opinion, do you think that the benefit is sufficient to meet your needs? 
a. If not, how much do you think that the benefit should be increased? 
5. To what extent do poverty and inequality exist in this area? 
a. Do you know of neighbours or friends who should receive assistance, but they do 
not? 
b. Do you know of neighbours or friends who should not receive assistance, but they 
do? 
c. Do you think that you are eligible for other SP programme? What are they? 
6. To what extent are beneficiaries involved in the programme? (This is in terms of determining 
the most appropriate programme for meetings the local conditions, preferences, and 
needs.) 
7. Is there clear guideline about the programme for beneficiaries?  
a. How can people apply for SP? 
b. How can the beneficiaries participate in the programme?  
8. In regards to your relationship with the facilitators, did you know them before the 
programme? 
a. How often do you meet with the facilitators? 
9. Have there been any problems or difficulties in implementing the programme? 
a. What are the problems? 




c. How can these problems be resolved? 
d. How do you voice your complaints? Have they been redressed properly? 

























Appendix B-5 - Coding scheme and description 





DAU (general purpose grant) 


















Local service delivery 
Minimum service standard 
National mandate 
Local initiative 
Monitoring and evaluation 
Corruption 
Democratisation 
Direct election Political campaign 
Success team 
Money politics 



































































Appendix B-6 - List of interviews 
Date Place Title Group 
11/05/2015 Office of  UPTPK Head of UPTPK (Bapak Suyadi) Local government - 
Sragen 
11/05/2015 Office of  UPTPK Head of Education Section 
UPTPK (Bapak Indardjo) 
Local government - 
Sragen 
12/05/2015 Office of Kesbangpol 
(National Unity and 
Politics) 
Official of Kesbangpol (Bapak 
Sugeng Priyono) 
Local government - 
Sragen 
12/05/2015 Office of Bappeda 
(Regional Development 
Planning agency) 
Official of Bappeda (Bapak 
Wahyudi) 
Local government - 
Sragen 
13/05/2015 House of Bapak Sunarto Recipients of health care and 
scholarship 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
13/05/2015 House of Bapak Agus Recipients of health care Beneficiary - Sragen 
13/05/2015 House of Ibu Atun Recipients of health care and 
subsidised rice 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
13/05/2015 House of Bapak Sugimin Head of RW (Bapak Sugimin) Community leader - 
Sragen 
13/05/2015 Office of Dinas Sosial Head of Local Social Office 
(Bapak Wangsit Sukono) 
Local government - 
Sragen 
17/05/2015 Office of Dinas Sosial Secretary of Local Social Office 
(Ibu Dwi) 
Local government - 
Sragen 
18/05/2015 Office  of Regional 
Secretary 
Head of Section for Women 
Empowerment, Gender, and 
Child Protection (Ibu Dian) 
Local government - 
Sragen 
19/05/2015 Office of MATRA  Director of MATRA (Bapak 
Suparto) 
NGO - Sragen 
19/05/2015 Office of MATRA  Secretary of MATRA (Bapak 
Sugino) 
NGO - Sragen 
19/05/2015 House of Bapak Dalino Recipients of health care and 
housing improvement 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
19/05/2015 House of ibu Rumiyatun Recipients of health care, rice 
subsidy, and housing 
improvement 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
19/05/2015 House of Bapak Sujimin Recipients of health care Beneficiary - Sragen 
19/05/2015 House of ibu Poniyem  Recipients of housing 
improvement 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
20/05/2015 Office of BAZ 
Kabupaten Sragen  
Secretary of BAZ Kabupaten 
Sragen (Bapak Drs. H. Mahmudi, 
M.Si) 
NGO - Sragen 
20/05/2015 Office of BAZ 
Kabupaten Sragen 
Official of BAZ Kabupaten 
Sragen (Ibu Yuli) 
NGO - Sragen 
21/05/2015 House of Bapak Karyo Recipients of health care and 
cash transfer 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
21/05/2015 House of Ibu Sukinem Recipients of health care and 
cash transfer 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
25/05/2015 Office of DPRD - Sragen Head of Commission IV Social 
Welfare (H. Suharjo, SH)  





Date Place Title Group 
26/05/2015 Office of DPRD - Sragen Member of Commission IV 
Social Welfare (Bapak Bambang 
Lukito Samudro)  
Local parliament - 
Sragen 
27/05/2015 Office of Sub-District 
Sragen Tengah 
Coordinator (Bapak Darmanto) Facilitator - Sragen 
27/05/2015 Office of Sub-District 
Sragen Tengah 
Official (Bapak Andri) Facilitator - Sragen 
28/05/2015 House of Bapak Ahmad Recipients of health care, 
disability benefit, housing 
improvement, and subsidised 
rice 
Beneficiary - Sragen 
01/06/2015 Office of PPRBM Director of PPRBM (Bapak 
Sunarman Sukamto) 
NGO – Surakarta 
02/06/2015 Office of DPRD - 
Surakarta 
Head of Commission IV Social 
Welfare (Bapak Paulus Haryoto) 
Local parliament - 
Surakarta 
03/06/2015 Office of Dinas Sosial & 
Nakertrans (Office of 
Social and Labour) - 
Surakarta 
Head of Local Social Office 
(Bapak Sumartono Kardjo) 
Local government - 
Surakarta 
03/06/2015 Office of Kesbangpol 
(National Unity and 
Politics) 
Head of Kesbangpol (Bapak 
Suharso) 
Local government - 
Surakarta 
03/06/2015 Office of Bappeda 
(Regional Development 
Planning agency) 
Official of Bappeda (Bapak Yuli) Local government - 
Surakarta 
04/06/2015 House of Bapak Agung Recipients of cash transfer, 
health care and scholarship 
Beneficiary - Surakarta 
05/06/2015 House of Bapak Kurnia Recipients of cash transfer, 
health care and disability 
benefit 
Beneficiary – Surakarta 
05/06/2015 Office of Sub-District 
Laweyan  
Coordinator of facilitators 
(Bapak Suminto) 
Facilitator – Surakarta 
08/06/2015 Office  of Regional 
Secretary 
Head of Section for Community 
Development, Women 
Empowerment, Child Protection 
and Family Planning (Bapak 
Anung Indro Susanto) 
Local government - 
Surakarta 
08/06/2015 House of Bapak Rudi Head of RW (Bapak Rudi) Community leader - 
Surakarta 
09/06/2015 House of Ibu Darmi Recipients of cash transfer, 
health care and scholarship 
Beneficiary – Surakarta 
10/06/2015 House of Bapak 
Yahman 
Recipients of cash transfer, 
health care and scholarship 
Beneficiary – Surakarta 
11/06/2015 Office of Sub-District 
Purwosari 
Facilitator (Bapak Arif) Facilitator – Surakarta 
11/06/2015 House of Ibu Sri Recipients of cash transfer, 
health care and scholarship 























































                                     
1.00                                  
Sig. (2-
tailed)                                   





                  
1.00                                
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.000                                 
N 495 495                               
Non-oil GDP 
Pearson -0.4973 -0.2036 
                              
1.00                              
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.000 0.000                               
N 495 495 495                             
Population 
Pearson 0.0636 0.2887 0.0269 
                  
1.00                            
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.1574 0.000 0.5506                             




Pearson -0.1553 -0.2602 0.0733 -0.2497               1.00                          
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0006 0.000 0.1059 0.000                           
N 488 488 488 488 488                         
Poverty rate 
Pearson -0.1979 -0.3883 0.011 -0.2051 0.508 
              



















































tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.8068 0.000 0.000                         
N 495 495 495 495 488 495                       
Morbidity 
rate 
Pearson -0.0832 -0.0941 0.0523 -0.0112 0.0594 0.0861               1.00                      
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0642 0.0364 0.2453 0.8032 0.1904 0.0554                       





Pearson 0.0637 0.1021 -0.0554 0.1224 -0.3742 -0.4276 0.003 
              
1.00                    
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.1573 0.0231 0.2182 0.0064 0.000 0.000 0.9471                     
N 495 495 495 495 488 495 495 495                   
Net 
enrolment 
ratio - junior 
Pearson 0.1545 0.2497 -0.0504 0.2284 -0.4329 -0.4227 -0.0566 0.656 
              
1.00                  
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0006 0.0000 0.2634 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2088 0.0000                   
N 495 495 495 495 488 495 495 495 495                 
Net 
enrolment 
ratio - senior 
Pearson 0.1787 0.3206 -0.1075 -0.0505 -0.2596 -0.3329 -0.0099 0.3669 0.6554             1.00                
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0001 0.000 0.0169 0.2628 0.000 0.000 0.8259 0.0000 0.0000                 
N 493 493 493 493 486 493 493 493 493 493               
Audit result 
Pearson -0.0711 -0.2890 0.0105 -0.2174 0.4368 0.4642 0.0478 -0.2637 -0.363 -0.2723               1.00              
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.1163 0.0000 0.8164 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2910 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000               
N 489 489 489 489 488 489 489 489 489 489 489             
Total local 
expenditure Pearson -0.1673 -0.2769 0.0779 -0.2649 0.987 0.5198 0.0709 -0.3863 -0.4513 -0.2531 0.4429 
              



















































tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0857 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1179 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000             




Pearson -0.111 -0.2065 0.0514 -0.2599 0.3706 0.4227 0.0108 -0.4390 -0.4128 -0.3270 0.3016 0.3853 
                       
1.00          
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0251 0.0000 0.3013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000           
N 407 407 407 407 406 407 407 407 407 405 407 406 407         
Economic 
expenditure 
Pearson -0.1012 -0.2137 0.0314 -0.2656 0.6762 0.5123 -0.0167 -0.4670 -0.4898 -0.3316 0.4550 0.6836 0.6980 
                       
1.00        
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0412 0.0000 0.5278 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7368 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000         
N 407 407 407 407 406 407 407 407 407 405 407 406 407 407       
Education 
expenditure 
Pearson -0.2504 -0.3051 0.1405 -0.2878 0.6949 0.3815 0.1400 -0.2341 -0.3297 -0.1021 0.3022 0.707 0.4782 0.5948 
                       
1.00      
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0402 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
N 406 406 406 406 405 406 406 406 406 404 406 405 406 406 406     
Health 
expenditure 
Pearson -0.1615 -0.2148 0.0916 -0.2787 0.6779 0.4386 0.1314 -0.3945 -0.4545 -0.1824 0.3596 0.695 0.5808 0.6858 0.9065 
                       
1.00    
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0011 0.0000 0.0647 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0402 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     




Pearson -0.0819 -0.1660 0.0356 -0.1595 0.9299 0.3329 0.0843 -0.1925 -0.2975 -0.1488 0.3125 0.9186 0.267 0.5648 0.7300 0.6950 
                       
1.00  
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.0990 0.0008 0.4743 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0894 0.0001 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   





Appendix C-2 - ANOVA 
 
 
Sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig. 
GDP per capita Between 109.667 3 36.556 0.39 0.758 
  Within 37107.086 399 93.000     
  Total 37216.753 402       
Non-agriculture GDP Between 0.513 3 0.171 5.71 0.001 
  Within 11.959 399 0.030     
  Total 12.473 402 
 
    
Non-oil GDP Between 0.030 3 0.010 0.83 0.477 
  Within 4.742 399 0.012     























revenue Between 60.745 3 20.248 11.14 0.000 
  Within 725.058 399 1.817     




































  Total 26928.861 402       
Net enrolment ratio - 
primary Between 407.249 3 135.750 2.53 0.057 
  Within 21409.855 399 53.659   
  Total 21817.105 402    
Net enrolment ratio - 
junior Between 
                           
3,368.720  3 
                    
1,122.907  10.83 0.000 
  Within 
                         






Sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig. 
  Total 
                         
44,755.508  402       
Net enrolment ratio - 
senior Between 
                                 
596.35  3 198.785 1.21 0.307 
  Within 
                           
65,668.82  399 164.584     
  Total 
                           
66,265.17  402       
Audit result Between 40.345 3 13.448 10.75 0.000 
  Within 499.020 399 1.251     
  Total 539.365 402 1.342     
Total local 
expenditure Between 51.018 3 17.006 13.1 0.000 
  Within 518.073 399 1.298     
  Total 569.091 402 1.416     
Social protection 
expenditure Between 0.010 3 0.003 16.12 0.000 
  Within 0.079 399 0.000     
  Total 0.088 402       
Economic 
expenditure Between 
                                 
41,014  3 
                          
13,671  14.92 0.000 
  Within 
                              
365,608  399 916.3     
  Total 
                              
406,623  402       
Education 
expenditure Between 
                                   
1.429  3 0.476 15.02 0.000 
  Within 
                                 
12.656  399 0.032     
  Total 
                                 
14.085  402       
Health expenditure Between 0.401 3 0.134 17.94 0.000 
  Within 2.970 399 0.007     






Sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig. 
Infrastructure 
expenditure Between 3.457 3 1.152 4.68 0.003 
  Within 98.345 399 0.246     





























































C1 Mean 7.766 0.655 0.979 158,583  1.042 16.220 29.589 89.336 63.603 49.063 2.933 0.968 0.011 24.504 0.234 0.088 0.215 
  N 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
  Std. dev. 11.285 0.181 0.099 76471.639 1.799 10.214 8.795 9.516 12.360 14.555 1.312 1.520 0.019 40.410 0.230 0.115 0.664 
C2 Mean 7.814 0.691 0.964 554,729  0.302 13.198 29.792 91.121 67.676 50.053 2.298 0.292 0.002 4.950 0.130 0.028 0.034 
  N 121 121 121 121  121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
  Std. dev. 7.548 0.164 0.131 193,815  0.152 5.864 7.439 2.807 6.939 10.652 0.809 0.149 0.002 3.286 0.077 0.017 0.023 
C3 Mean 6.407 0.723 0.964 1,296,703  0.207 13.975 29.910 91.599 71.811 47.621 2.244 0.201 0.001 3.032 0.104 0.020 0.020 
  N 45 45 45 45  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
  Std. dev. 4.722 0.146 0.102 263,274  0.084 5.333 7.164 2.205 5.066 7.913 0.704 0.082 0.001 1.649 0.050 0.009 0.012 
C4 Mean 9.213 0.819 0.996 2634552.643 0.129 9.896 27.475 92.096 70.040 43.819 2.571 0.125 0.001 2.210 0.058 0.013 0.011 
  N 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
  Std. dev. 7.599 0.166 0.009 722690.311 0.051 3.236 6.567 1.805 4.908 11.588 0.979 0.052 0.001 1.286 0.031 0.007 0.006 
National 
average Mean 7.80 0.72 0.98 1161141.97 0.42 13.32 29.19 91.04 68.28 47.64 2.51 0.40 0.00 8.67 0.13 0.04 0.07 
  N 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 





Appendix C-4 - Cluster membership 






Lanny Jaya, Kab. 1.300602 C1 Lagged 1 
Lembata, Kab. 1.325021 C1 Lagged 2 
Sumba Barat Daya, Kab. 1.40404 C1  3 
Tambrauw, Kab. 1.478386 C1 Lagged 4 
Seram Bagian Timur, Kab. 1.527466 C1 Lagged 5 
Manggarai Timur, Kab. 1.565708 C1 Lagged 6 
Yalimo, Kab. 1.59607 C1 Lagged 7 
Buru, Kab. 1.663017 C1 Lagged 8 
Sumba Tengah, Kab. 1.672788 C1  9 
Maluku Tengah, Kab. 1.81521 C2 Lagged 10 
Tolikara, Kab. 1.830784 C1 Lagged 11 
Manggarai Barat, Kab. 1.852633 C1 Lagged 12 
Deiyai, Kab. 2.054912 C1  13 
Bone Bolango, Kab. 2.072705 C1  14 
Manggarai, Kab. 2.07638 C1  15 
Sabu Raijua, Kab. 2.094119 C1  16 
Puncak, Kab. 2.110834 C1  17 
Puncak Jaya, Kab. 2.189311 C1 Lagged 18 
Timor Tengah Utara, Kab. 2.189476 C1 Border 19 
Kupang, Kab. 2.200094 C2 Border 20 
Timor Tengah Selatan, Kab. 2.228667 C2  21 
Alor, Kab. 2.338193 C1 Border, Lagged 22 
Kaur, Kab. 2.342222 C1 Lagged 23 
Halmahera Barat, Kab. 2.34293 C1 Lagged 24 
Nagekeo, Kab. 2.401509 C1  25 
Maluku Tenggara, Kab. 2.41958 C1  26 
Grobogan, Kab. 2.553632 C3  27 
                                                          










Maybrat, Kab. 2.556699 C1 Lagged 28 
Kepulauan Aru, Kab. 2.56365 C1 Border, Lagged 29 
Gorontalo, Kab. 2.574639 C2  30 
Wonosobo, Kab. 2.594686 C2  31 
Kepulauan Sula, Kab. 2.611363 C1 Lagged 32 
Tual, Kota 2.615568 C1  33 
Kebumen, Kab. 2.631027 C3  34 
Boalemo, Kab. 2.67389 C1 Lagged 35 
Blora, Kab. 2.682137 C2  36 
Tegal, Kab. 2.708926 C3  37 
Jeneponto, Kab. 2.761357 C2 Lagged 38 
Flores Timur, Kab. 2.765565 C1 Lagged 39 
Lombok Tengah, Kab. 2.777667 C2 Lagged 40 
Sumba Barat, Kab. 2.782278 C1  41 
Lombok Timur, Kab. 2.812626 C3 Lagged 42 
Maluku Tenggara Barat, Kab. 2.818448 C1 Lagged 43 
Maluku Barat Daya, Kab. 2.832395 C1 Border, Lagged 44 
Jayawijaya, Kab. 2.844536 C1 Lagged 45 
Pemalang, Kab. 2.854228 C3  46 
Pamekasan, Kab. 2.855179 C2  47 
Rote Ndao, Kab. 2.914474 C1 Border, Lagged 48 
Ngada, Kab. 2.926057 C1 Lagged 49 
Sikka, Kab. 2.942828 C1 Lagged 50 
Demak, Kab. 2.948808 C3  51 
Gowa, Kab. 3.000979 C2  52 
Buton, Kab. 3.016217 C1 Lagged 53 
Pacitan, Kab. 3.036326 C2  54 
Lombok Barat, Kab. 3.050369 C2 Lagged 55 










Purbalingga, Kab. 3.111435 C2  57 
Tidore Kepulauan, Kab. 3.117776 C1  58 
Banyumas, Kab. 3.133052 C3  59 
Dogiyai, Kab. 3.174531 C1 Lagged 60 
Tebo, Kab. 3.176631 C1  61 
Ende, Kab. 3.176714 C1 Lagged 62 
Bengkulu Utara, Kab. 3.225652 C1  63 
Asmat, Kab. 3.277108 C1 Lagged 64 
Nias Barat, Kab. 3.283663 C1 Lagged 65 
Simeulue, Kab. 3.292292 C1 Lagged 66 
Brebes, Kab. 3.309766 C3  67 
Bima, Kota 3.314517 C1 Lagged 68 
Wonogiri, Kab. 3.360589 C2  69 
Lombok Utara, Kab. 3.367528 C1 Lagged 70 
Toraja Utara, Kab. 3.38304 C1 Lagged 71 
Tasikmalaya, Kab. 3.386213 C3  72 
Ternate, Kota 3.390838 C1  73 
Padang Lawas, Kab. 3.421852 C1  74 
Banjarnegara, Kab. 3.454784 C2  75 
Sampang, Kab. 3.454821 C2  76 
Batang, Kab. 3.47554 C2  77 
Gorontalo, Kota 3.503243 C1  78 
Temanggung, Kab. 3.514682 C2  79 
Takalar, Kab. 3.568719 C1  80 
Magelang, Kab. 3.586238 C3  81 
Lebak, Kab. 3.587867 C3  82 
Way Kanan, Kab. 3.599469 C2 Lagged 83 
Padang Lawas Utara, Kab. 3.628975 C1  84 










Bima, Kab. 3.685878 C2  86 
Merangin, Kab. 3.710596 C2  87 
Lampung Barat, Kab. 3.711009 C2 Lagged 88 
Muaro Jambi, Kab. 3.742992 C2  89 
Mukomuko, Kab. 3.772693 C1 Lagged 90 
Sukabumi, Kab. 3.784153 C4  91 
Sragen, Kab. 3.784881 C2  92 
Depok, Kota 3.811194 C3  93 
Maros, Kab. 3.827527 C2  94 
Sekadau, Kab. 3.837571 C1 Lagged 95 
Tojo Una-Una, Kab. 3.841081 C1  96 
Mappi, Kab. 3.845024 C1 Lagged 97 
Pringsewu, Kab. 3.882244 C2  98 
Polewali Mandar, Kab. 3.894226 C2 Lagged 99 
Pandeglang, Kab. 3.907407 C3  100 
Cianjur, Kab 3.949795 C4  101 
Tapanuli Tengah, Kab. 3.971825 C2 Lagged 102 
Rembang, Kab. 3.986811 C2  103 
Konawe, Kab. 3.988337 C1 Lagged 104 
Pekalongan, Kab. 3.993899 C2  105 
Subulussalam, Kota 3.998553 C1  106 
Majalengka, Kab. 3.999372 C3  107 
Pati, Kab. 4.017903 C3  108 
Metro, Kota 4.03073 C1  109 
Ogan Komering Ulu Timur, Kab. 4.035964 C2  110 
Ngawi, Kab. 4.036437 C2  111 
Nias Utara, Kab. 4.056935 C1 Lagged 112 
Bengkulu Tengah, Kab. 4.094266 C1 Lagged 113 










Ponorogo, Kab. 4.117144 C2  115 
Cirebon, Kab. 4.144501 C4  116 
Enrekang, Kab. 4.167885 C1  117 
Pegunungan Bintang, Kab. 4.174738 C1 Border, Lagged 118 
Pakpak Bharat, Kab. 4.179583 C1 Lagged 119 
Bengkulu Selatan, Kab. 4.181542 C1  120 
Pohuwato, Kab. 4.203932 C1 Lagged 121 
Ogan Komering Ulu Selatan, Kab. 4.207772 C2 Lagged 122 
Majene, Kab. 4.269825 C1 Lagged 123 
Aceh Tenggara, Kab. 4.285862 C1  124 
Klaten, Kab. 4.339339 C3  125 
Hulu Sungai Utara, Kab. 4.343219 C1 Lagged 126 
Nias Selatan, Kab. 4.370003 C1 Lagged 127 
Pesawaran, Kab. 4.371511 C2 Lagged 128 
Bungo, Kab. 4.439854 C1  129 
Banjar, Kota 4.448299 C1  130 
Bondowoso, Kab. 4.495695 C2  131 
Dompu, Kab. 4.499383 C1 Lagged 132 
Empat Lawang, Kab. 4.516238 C1 Lagged 133 
Purworejo, Kab. 4.527928 C2  134 
Yapen Waropen, Kab. 4.529702 C1  135 
Bantul, Kab. 4.530075 C2  136 
Banggai Kepulauan, Kab. 4.542355 C1 Lagged 137 
Mamasa, Kab. 4.579434 C1 Lagged 138 
Kotamobagu, Kota 4.59469 C1  139 
Sumbawa, Kab. 4.640993 C2  140 
Bulukumba, Kab. 4.644511 C2  141 
Barru, Kab. 4.679872 C1  142 










Hulu Sungai Tengah, Kab. 4.699663 C1  144 
Bone, Kab. 4.707148 C2  145 
Kayong Utara, Kab. 4.713468 C1 Lagged 146 
Tulang Bawang Barat, Kab. 4.716767 C1  147 
Lampung Timur, Kab. 4.728644 C3  148 
Kulon Progo, Kab. 4.742111 C2  149 
Boyolali, Kab. 4.762646 C2  150 
Ogan Komering Ilir, Kab. 4.781086 C2 Lagged 151 
Garut, Kab. 4.792428 C4  152 
Trenggalek, Kab. 4.80919 C2  153 
Karang Asem, Kab. 4.828612 C2  154 
Aceh Singkil, Kab. 4.839029 C1 Lagged 155 
Banjar Baru, Kota 4.873741 C1  156 
Madiun, Kab. 4.905501 C2  157 
Sorong Selatan, Kab. 4.927184 C1 Lagged 158 
Sinjai, Kab. 4.972626 C1  159 
Bolaang Mongondow Selatan, Kab. 4.973426 C1  160 
Pidie Jaya, Kab. 4.988596 C1 Lagged 161 
Pagar Alam, Kota 5.02231 C1  162 
Padang Sidempuan, Kab. 5.054233 C1  163 
Gunung Kidul, Kab. 5.071934 C2  164 
Pesisir Selatan, Kab. 5.113134 C2 Lagged 165 
Ciamis, Kab. 5.124259 C3  166 
Kep. Siau Tagulandang Biaro, Kab. 5.195423 C1  167 
Bogor, Kota 5.202218 C3  168 
Aceh Tamiang, Kab. 5.21414 C1  169 
Buol, Kab. 5.219581 C1 Lagged 170 
Batanghari, Kab. 5.223294 C1  171 










Jember, Kab. 5.252609 C4  173 
Mandailing Natal, Kab. 5.252945 C2  174 
Subang, Kab. 5.257024 C3  175 
Sarolangun, Kab. 5.279105 C1  176 
Serang, Kab. 5.293343 C3  177 
Sumedang, Kab. 5.296082 C3  178 
Kepulauan Talaud, Kab.  5.307987 C1 Border, Lagged 179 
Hulu Sungai Selatan, Kab. 5.308449 C1  180 
Sumenep, Kab. 5.314711 C3  181 
Lebong, Kab. 5.358707 C1 Lagged 182 
Kediri, Kab. 5.360417 C3  183 
Luwu, Kab. 5.394657 C2  184 
Aceh Barat Daya, Kab. 5.3972 C1 Lagged 185 
Blitar, Kab. 5.407473 C3  186 
Belu, Kab. 5.499098 C1 Border, Lagged 187 
Nganjuk, Kab. 5.499202 C3  188 
Bandung Barat, Kab. 5.502835 C3  189 
Ambon, Kota 5.511434 C2  190 
Gayo Lues, Kab. 5.536984 C1 Lagged 191 
Salatiga, Kota 5.54295 C1  192 
Lampung Tengah, Kab. 5.543273 C3  193 
Tegal, Kota 5.553608 C1  194 
Jombang, Kab. 5.573094 C3  195 
Magetan, Kab. 5.575147 C2  196 
Bengkayang, Kab. 5.584813 C1 Border, Lagged 197 
Lamongan, Kab. 5.601771 C3  198 
Pasaman, Kab. 5.640808 C1  199 
Mataram, Kota 5.70226 C2  200 










Bolaang Mongondow Utara, Kab. 5.770748 C1  202 
Buleleng, Kab. 5.820653 C2  203 
Lubuk Linggau, Kota 5.82209 C1  204 
Tulang Bawang, Kab. 5.8773 C2  205 
Mamuju Utara, Kab. 5.916469 C1 Lagged 206 
Sleman, Kab. 6.006268 C3  207 
Tapanuli Utara, Kab. 6.020914 C1  208 
Lampung Utara, Kab. 6.039137 C2 Lagged 209 
Waropen, Kab. 6.065123 C1 Lagged 210 
Langsa, Kota 6.07249 C1  211 
Humbang Hasundutan, Kab. 6.106806 C1  212 
Tabanan, Kab. 6.162686 C2  213 
Sidenreng Rappang, Kab. 6.168525 C1  214 
Sambas, Kab. 6.173104 C2 Border, Lagged 215 
Kepulauan Sangihe, Kab. 6.177077 C1 Border, Lagged 216 
Dharmas Raya, Kab. 6.225659 C1 Lagged 217 
Sukoharjo, Kab. 6.243622 C2  218 
Kendal, Kab. 6.279108 C2  219 
Kepahiang, Kab. 6.280899 C1 Lagged 220 
Pare-Pare, Kota 6.284426 C1  221 
Tapin, Kab. 6.292467 C1  222 
Pasuruan, Kota 6.303088 C1  223 
Malang, Kab. 6.320454 C4  224 
Bener Meriah, Kab. 6.322814 C1 Lagged 225 
Tasikmalaya, Kota 6.370027 C2  226 
Bolaang Mongondow Timur, Kab. 6.433635 C1  227 
Pulang Pisau, Kab. 6.463986 C1  228 
Probolinggo, Kab. 6.473816 C3  229 










Aceh Selatan, Kab. 6.534276 C1 Lagged 231 
Palopo, Kota 6.557976 C1  232 
Donggala, Kab. 6.568675 C1 Lagged 233 
Banyuasin, Kab. 6.602175 C2 Lagged 234 
Lumajang, Kab. 6.679001 C3  235 
Tangerang, Kab. 6.679762 C4  236 
Sanggau, Kab. 6.687283 C2 Border, Lagged 237 
Bekasi, Kota 6.827782 C4  238 
Singkawang, Kota 6.846819 C1  239 
Kapuas, Kab. 6.852063 C2 Border, Lagged 240 
Banjar, Kab. 6.853555 C2  241 
Ketapang, Kab. 6.873516 C2 Lagged 242 
Sawahlunto Sijunjung, Kab. 6.87546 C1 Lagged 243 
Aceh Tengah, Kab. 6.912279 C1  244 
Mesuji, Kab. 6.934092 C1  245 
Jembrana, Kab. 6.948269 C1  246 
Bireuen, Kab. 6.955931 C2  247 
Bogor, Kab. 6.971402 C4  248 
Karanganyar, Kab. 6.984898 C2  249 
Barito Timur, Kab. 6.99269 C1  250 
Wajo, Kab. 7.005041 C2  251 
Manokwari, Kab. 7.034973 C1  252 
Bandung, Kab. 7.03557 C4  253 
Tapanuli Selatan, Kab. 7.041188 C1  254 
Nagan Raya, Kab. 7.050196 C1 Lagged 255 
Nabire, Kab. 7.051019 C1 Lagged 256 
Biak Numfor, Kab. 7.091299 C1 Lagged 257 
Banggai, Kab. 7.095216 C2 Lagged 258 










Agam, Kab. 7.117864 C2  260 
Buton Utara, Kab. 7.125585 C1 Lagged 261 
Kupang, Kota 7.132069 C2  262 
Simalungun, Kab. 7.133596 C2  263 
Minahasa, Kab. 7.144961 C1  264 
Bengkulu, Kota 7.147579 C2  265 
Kepulauan Mentawai, Kab. 7.166656 C1 Lagged 266 
Gunung Sitoli, Kota 7.186006 C1  267 
Musi Rawas, Kab. 7.218363 C2 Lagged 268 
Aceh Besar, Kab. 7.233663 C2 Lagged 269 
Gunung Mas, Kab. 7.243713 C1  270 
Bojonegoro, Kab. 7.287972 C3  271 
Kendari, Kota 7.29294 C1  272 
Palangkaraya, Kota 7.298075 C1  273 
Barito Kuala, Kab. 7.301169 C1 Lagged 274 
Teluk Wondama, Kab. 7.355003 C1 Lagged 275 
Seruyan, Kab. 7.364098 C1 Lagged 276 
Lingga, Kab. 7.365385 C1  277 
Aceh Barat, Kab. 7.423179 C1 Lagged 278 
Rejang Lebong, Kab. 7.451837 C1  279 
Konawe Utara, Kab. 7.468872 C1 Lagged 280 
Denpasar, Kota 7.518784 C2  281 
Banyuwangi, Kab. 7.522666 C3  282 
Tomohon, Kota 7.553554 C1  283 
Minahasa Utara, Kab. 7.557038 C1  284 
Gianyar, Kab. 7.574755 C2  285 
Mamberamo Raya, Kab. 7.580518 C1 Lagged 286 
Pinrang, Kab. 7.635627 C2  287 










Pasaman Barat, Kab. 7.676532 C2 Lagged 289 
Lahat, Kab. 7.700529 C2 Lagged 290 
Bandar Lampung, Kota 7.705054 C2  291 
Padang Pariaman, Kab. 7.712584 C2 Lagged 292 
Pekalongan, Kota 7.722211 C1  293 
Keerom, Kab. 7.77143 C1 Border, Lagged 294 
Langkat, Kab. 7.786403 C3  295 
Payakumbuh, Kota 7.797976 C1  296 
Aceh Utara, Kab. 7.818532 C2  297 
Blitar, Kota 7.874629 C1  298 
Dairi, Kab. 7.919196 C1  299 
Tanah Laut, Kab. 7.961212 C1  300 
Batu, Kota 8.025341 C1  301 
Klungkung, Kab. 8.040076 C1  302 
Tuban, Kab. 8.043629 C3  303 
Supiori, Kab. 8.055522 C1 Border, Lagged 304 
Serdang Bedagai, Kab. 8.056861 C2 Border 305 
Labuhan Batu, Kab. 8.08231 C2  306 
Tanah Datar, Kab. 8.11605 C2  307 
Mojokerto, Kab. 8.138322 C3  308 
Barito Selatan, Kab. 8.174205 C1  309 
Sabang, Kota 8.201443 C1 Border 310 
Banjarmasin, Kota 8.240935 C2  311 
Deli Serdang, Kab. 8.34099 C3  312 
Bangka Tengah, Kab. 8.347627 C1  313 
Tulungagung, Kab. 8.36793 C3  314 
Asahan, Kab. 8.374586 C2  315 
Sorong, Kota 8.427207 C1  316 










Tanjung Jabung Barat, Kab. 8.552092 C1  318 
Jayapura, Kab. 8.609454 C1  319 
Palu, Kota 8.768537 C2  320 
Purwakarta, Kab. 8.83392 C2  321 
Prabumulih, Kota 8.84861 C1  322 
Pangkajene Kepulauan, Kab. 8.866408 C1 Lagged 323 
Boven Digoel, Kab 8.997707 C1 Border, Lagged 324 
Kaimana, Kab. 9.071432 C1 Lagged 325 
Pematang Siantar, Kab. 9.082705 C1  326 
Katingan, Kab. 9.085898 C1  327 
Indramayu, Kab. 9.10371 C3  328 
Ogan Komering Ulu, Kab. 9.126551 C2  329 
Solok, Kota 9.182977 C1  330 
Barito Utara, Kab. 9.222017 C1  331 
Samosir, Kab. 9.283858 C1  332 
Tanjung Balai, Kota 9.287118 C1  333 
Padang Panjang, Kota 9.309741 C1  334 
Pariaman, Kota 9.509611 C1  335 
Sawahlunto, Kota 9.536242 C1  336 
Bukittinggi, Kota 9.598079 C1  337 
Lamandau, Kab. 9.603223 C1  338 
Probolinggo, Kota 9.790234 C1  339 
Magelang, Kota 9.823786 C1  340 
Morowali, Kab. 9.917691 C1 Lagged 341 
Tanah Karo, Kab. 9.959127 C2  342 
Bulungan, Kab. 9.982508 C1  343 
Labuhan Batu Utara, Kab. 9.995924 C2  344 
Murung Raya, Kab. 10.11113 C1  345 










Kolaka, Kab. 10.15074 C2  347 
Nunukan, Kab. 10.25077 C1 Border, Lagged 348 
Kubu Raya, Kab. 10.27573 C2  349 
Toba Samosir, Kab. 10.6015 C1  350 
Indragiri Hilir, Kab. 10.67938 C2  351 
Pelalawan, Kab. 10.68371 C2  352 
Surakarta, Kota 10.76198 C2  353 
Mojokerto, Kota 10.78425 C1  354 
Karawang, Kab. 11.06281 C4  355 
Kuantan Singingi, Kab. 11.33828 C1  356 
Raja Ampat, Kab. 11.65374 C1 Border, Lagged 357 
Tana Tidung, Kab. 12.05474 C1  358 
Indragiri Hulu, Kab. 12.1858 C2  359 
Muara Enim, Kab. 12.24136 C2  360 
Tanah Bumbu, Kab. 12.26622 C1  361 
Pontianak, Kota 12.35972 C2  362 
Tanjung Jabung Timur, Kab. 12.37128 C1  363 
Bitung, Kota 12.38418 C1  364 
Cimahi, Kota 12.39901 C2  365 
Madiun, Kota 13.17307 C1  366 
Sukamara, Kab. 13.53032 C1  367 
Kampar, Kab. 13.68099 C2  368 
Sidoarjo, Kab. 14.10105 C4  369 
Banda Aceh, Kota 14.12078 C1  370 
Tanjung Pinang, Kota 14.16432 C1  371 
Bandung, Kota 14.18738 C4  372 
Jayapura, Kota 14.25092 C1 Border 373 
Semarang, Kota 14.31286 C3  374 










Yogyakarta, Kota 14.81906 C2  376 
Cilacap, Kab. 14.92013 C3  377 
Padang, Kota 15.04421 C2  378 
Manado, Kota 15.06139 C2  379 
Kudus, Kab. 16.69131 C2  380 
Tangerang, Kota 16.92028 C3  381 
Samarinda, Kota 17.67291 C2  382 
Kota Baru, Kab. 17.67323 C1  383 
Malang, Kota 18.15163 C2  384 
Luwu Timur, Kab. 18.48443 C1  385 
Cirebon, Kota 18.77806 C1  386 
Batu Bara, Kab. 20.32887 C2  387 
Musi Banyuasin, Kab. 20.69342 C2  388 
Kutai Barat, Kab. 20.96399 C1 Border, Lagged 389 
Natuna, Kab. 21.34019 C1 Border, Lagged 390 
Lhokseumawe, Kota 22.98162 C1  391 
Pasir, Kab. 26.43452 C1  392 
Berau, Kab. 26.70798 C1  393 
Sorong, Kab. 27.01865 C1 Lagged 394 
Batam, Kota 30.11738 C3 Border 395 
Surabaya, Kota 33.87356 C4  396 
Sumbawa Barat, Kab. 34.07065 C1 Lagged 397 
Siak, Kab. 34.8168 C2  398 
Mimika, Kab. 44.22614 C1 Lagged 399 
Cilegon, Kota 47.4815 C2  400 
Bengkalis, Kab. 60.36169 C2 Border 401 
Kutai Timur, Kab. 70.23581 C1  402 
Bontang, Kota 141.7513 C1  403 
 
